The shift from a net emigration to a net immigration country is a challenging moment for any state as it poses  numerous challenges to the welfare system, labour market, and society as a whole. While Europe has for several decades been a major destination for people seeking a better life somewhere with higher wages and better welfare,^[1] European countries have varying experience with both migration and the management of it. Norway and Poland represent illustrative examples of these varied experiences. While Norway transitioned from being a net emigration to a net immigration country from the late 1960s onwards,^[2] a similar process was not ignited in Poland until recent years.^[3] Indeed, Polish citizens have constituted a large part of Europe’s labour migrant pool since Poland’s accession to the European Union in 2004: by 2011, up to 2.3 million Polish citizens had found work in Western Europe, with more than 140,000 of them employed in Norway.^[4] In contrast, only 100,000 foreigners relocated to Poland the same year, which is a notably low number considering its relatively large population of 38 million at the time.^[5] However, this trend is now changing rapidly: Poland received more labour migrants than any other OECD country in 2018 and 2019, with far fewer Poles also travelling abroad for work.^[6] Poland has received nearly 2 million Ukrainians since 2014, in addition to 20,000 Indians, 36,000 Nepalese, and 18,000 Bangladeshis over the past three years.^[7] As a result, nearly a half century later than Norway, Poland is now transitioning from a net emigration country to one with net immigration. At the same time, Poland is still the origin of many migrants and there are signs that it may also become a transit country for asylum seekers and labour migrants seeking to enter Germany. All the while, this transition is taking place in a very different context than in 1960s Norway. However, the EU’s eastern enlargement and the challenges it posed to the Norwegian welfare state and labour market can be compared to Poland’s own “eastern enlargement” towards labour migrants.

Norway and Poland: Transitioning from Net Emigration to Net Immigration Countries

Historically both the Polish and Norwegian nations experienced periods of intense emigration and immigration. In both cases, however, the transitions took place at different times and in very different political contexts. Norway went through the modern migration transition decades earlier than Poland where this process has only recently begun.

Between 1825 and 1945, nearly 850,000 Norwegians had emigrated to foreign countries, mainly involving labour migration to North America.^[8] After 1945, emigration drastically declined, and since the late 1960s, Norway has been a destination rather than a sending country.^[9] Initially, due to the common labour market that was established in the 1950s, most immigrants came from its Scandinavian neighbours.^[10] However, in 1956, the Norwegian government passed a law (Fremmedloven) that allowed foreign citizens to apply for a work permit after arrival in Norway, paving the way for a more liberal immigration regime.^[11] An increased number of non-Western labour migrants (mainly Moroccans, Yugoslavs, Pakistanis, and Turks) arrived in Norway until 1975.^[12] That year, Norway enacted its first legislation to formally restrict immigration, which made family reunification and right to protection the only two ways to legally enter the country.^[13] Although Norway at this time experienced economic growth and massive expansion of the welfare state, immigration brought about a number of social challenges: poor housing, harsh working conditions, and vulnerability to exploitation.^[14] The general ban on immigration was aimed at labour migrants from poor countries moving into low-skilled jobs, and was in line with actions taken by many other European governments at the time.^[15] 

The relatively strict post-1975 migration regime changed with the EU’s eastern enlargement in 2004, which led to a significant increase in labour migration from the new Member States.^[16] Until then, in line with existing laws and regulations, immigration was largely humanitarian and family-related.^[17] This changed significantly, and between 2004 and 2011, more than 140,000 Polish citizens had found work in Norway, mainly in construction, manufacturing, low-skilled services, and agriculture.^[18] The eastern enlargement resulted in the largest flow of migrants to Norway in history.^[19]

The history of Polish emigration goes back much further than Poland’s accession to the European Union. Poland experienced periods of intense emigration during the country’s period of partition between Austria, Prussia, and Russia in the 19th and 20th centuries, and under occupation during the Second World War. After the war, in the communist era, Poland was officially claimed as a homogeneous nation.^[20] The regime gained full control over people leaving and entering the country.^[21]

After the fall of communism, Poland began to change its status from a net emigration country to both an emigration and immigration one. However, together with Poland’s accession to the EU on 1 May 2004, the emigration of Poles took on a new dynamic as more than 5% of Poles left the country (moving mainly to the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland), most in search of jobs, higher salaries, and better social welfare. The post-accession period is characterised by the Europeanisation of migration law and practices. In 2007, Poland became a member of the Schengen Area, which meant the abolition of controls at internal borders of the zone and more responsibilities related to the protection of the EU’s external border (e.g., with Ukraine).

The recent chapter in Polish migration history is the rapid shift to a net immigration state. It has been possible “due to the specific confluence of ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors”—a very liberal system for the employment of foreigners in Poland geared to one geographical direction (the Eastern Partnership countries) and the situation in Ukraine after the outbreak of war and economic collapse in 2014-15.^[22] Since then, the number of applications regarding legalisation of stay in Poland has constantly grown.

Migration Situation: Statistics, Trends, and Policy

Norway’s well-functioning welfare system and high wages make it attractive for people seeking social mobility elsewhere.^[23] For obvious reasons, this is not limited to those coming to Norway for work. According to a quantitative study of why asylum seekers choose Norway as a destination, security (human rights, protection, fair asylum processes), future (access to labour market, education for children, welfare state), and reputation/image (Norway is a good country) are ranked among the top five.^[24]

Norway has high net migration levels relative to its population, with a total rate of 6% in the 2000s, which contributed to 60% of the country’s population growth.^[25] The number of first- and second-generation immigrants nearly tripled in the 16 years from 1995 to 2011, rising from 215,000 to 600,000. At the onset of 2020, nearly 15% of the Norwegian population was immigrants (790,500).^[26]

Although Norway is not an EU Member State, it coordinates many of its migration policies with the EU and is part of the common European labour market through the EEA agreement and the EFTA convention.^[27] Norwegian migration policy has also been largely influenced by its participation in the Schengen and Dublin agreements.^[28] Norway is therefore a unique case when it comes to balancing policies between national and supranational interests in the field of migration.^[29]

Following the EU refugee and migration management crisis, the trend of “re-nationalisation” of Norwegian migration policies^[30] was observed. While neighbouring Sweden welcomed more than 160,000 migrants after Chancellor Angela Merkel opened Germany’s borders in 2015, Norway only took in 30,000.^[31] Although migration is a sensitive and highly politicised issue, there is broad consensus among Norwegian political parties that Norway’s asylum and migration policy should be “strict, but fair”, as popularly stated. According to Statistics Norway, a growing portion of the population agrees with Norway’s current asylum and migration policy,^[32] while Norwegians are  “becoming increasingly more receptive toward having immigrants in close relationships and toward agreeing that most immigrants provide a positive contribution in the labour market and in the cultural life”.^[33]

Similarly, Poland is currently considered an attractive destination for labour workers. After accession to the EU, the country experienced unprecedented economic growth, during which time the country’s unemployment rate fell to a record low (from above 19% in 2004 to around 3% in 2020). Due to intra-EU labour mobility, Poland became the largest victim of “brain drain” in the EU (according to the European Committee of the Regions report, in 2017, 576,300 highly educated Poles lived in another EU country—the highest total among the EU Member States).^[34] The shortage of workers has become a problem for businesses operating in Poland. According to a Labour Market Barometer 2018 survey, more than 50% of Polish companies declared difficulties with finding employees.^[35] With current demographic trends—a rapid increase in the number of older adults and low fertility rates —it is certain that Poland will experience a further decline in the supply of labour in the future.

Facing the labour shortage, the Polish market has proved to be very open to a large influx of foreign workers. Currently, the country issues the most first-residence permits for third-country nationals in Europe (in 2018, 635,000 residence permits and long-stay visas). The most common is a temporary residence permit. Permit applicants are motivated mainly by planned employment, followed by family reunification and educational studies.  As of 1 January 2020, the largest national groups with valid residence permits in Poland were Ukrainians (218,000) and Belarusians (26,000).^[36]

Although Poland is the leading destination in the EU for those seeking to obtain a residence permit for employment-related reasons and is becoming a more popular destination for students, the refugee phenomenon pertains to the country to a much lesser extent than other EU members. Due to the limited access to employment during the asylum procedure, foreigners consider this form of legalisation of stay  as relatively less attractive than other forms (most of the immigrants to Poland prefer the simplified system of employer declarations, which promotes temporary employment among migrants from the east). As the statistics show, after a slight increase in 2013 and during the refugee crisis of 2015/16, the number of persons submitting applications for international protection in Poland stabilised at around 4,000. In 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of foreigners applying for international protection decreased to 2,800. In general, very few applicants successfully obtain refugee status (e.g., in 2020, only 400 applicants received it). The top five most represented countries of origin of foreigners applying for asylum in Poland are Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan.

Although the European refugee and migration management crisis of 2015 did not directly affect Poland, since then the government’s activity in the field of migration has proven to be a difficult balance between hard facts and anti-immigration rhetoric.^[37] The opposition to an open-door migration policy (expressed by disagreements over proposals for the Commission’s quota-based refugee relocation system), promoting border protection as a remedy for migration problems, and presenting “efforts to cope with the inflow of Ukrainians” as a contribution to the EU response to the migration crisis^[38] became symbols of Polish migration policy at the EU level. During the crisis, the government annulled the strategic document on migration from 2012,^[39] stating it was planning to replace it with a new one. Due to the unprecedented politicisation of this topic, however, doing so has turned out to be very difficult.^[40] Tensions have arisen between economy-related ministries, emphasising the needs of the labour market, and the ministry of interior, prioritising security issues. This dilemma is also expressed in public opinion on migration. On the one hand, Poles appreciate the positive impact of migrants on the labour market, but, on the other, they are afraid of accepting migrants from culturally distant regions.^[41] The refugee crisis of 2015 significantly influenced social attitudes in this regard: one report argues that, since 2015, “Poles have changed from being cautious supporters to decisive opponents of admitting refugees into the country”.^[42]

The Pitfalls of Immigration

Immigration brings about a number of practical challenges for the receiving state, the labour market, and the native population. Like Norway post-2004, Poland is experiencing its own “eastern-enlargement wave” of labour migrants, as well as migrants being used as geopolitical leverage in an international conflict. As a net immigration country, it will face numerous challenges. Some lessons may be learnt from Norway’s experience with the EU’s eastern enlargement and the subsequent tremendous influx of labour migrants.

An issue that is highly debated from time to time is whether immigration is bad for the welfare state. Some argue that there is a contradiction between inclusive welfare policies and comprehensive international migration.^[43] Rights are costly and immigration puts a strain on a welfare state based on the principle of “universalism”. Some experts foresaw a challenge created by this contradiction, stating that “when the welfare state is seen as something for ‘them’ paid by ‘us’, its days as a consensual solution to societal problems are numbered”.^[44] After 50 years of immigration in Norway, quite a few problems have still not been mitigated, such as the comparatively large gaps between labour force participation rates for immigrants compared to natives; immigrants often end up in the lower layers of the labour market with limited mobility; and a general sense among some portions of the population that integration has failed.^[45] The Norwegian labour market is characterised by high demand for skills and a compressed wage structure that makes low skilled labour comparatively expensive. A large pool of newcomers from countries in the global South with low skill levels have proven difficult to integrate in this labour market.^[46] These consequences are not unique to Norway and describe some of the challenges related to becoming a net immigration country, while there are clear differences between labour and humanitarian migrants. 

The labour migrants coming from EEA countries were supposed to be the “immigrants taking care of themselves”.^[47] In practice, the labour market became the central arena for the integration of the newcomers, as those coming from Eastern Europe usually found employment in Norway before arriving. However, not all EEA immigrants have been able to take care of themselves, which has presented the Norwegian state with practical challenges that are proving difficult to solve. EEA citizens have immediate access to substantial welfare rights, which raised concerns of so-called “welfare-tourism” in which immigrants stay in Norway to collect welfare benefits, but there has been little evidence of this.^[48] On the other hand, labour migrants are more exposed to work-related injuries, and thus, in the long term, disability benefits. Many have experienced several rounds of unemployment, which in the long run increase the risk of marginalisation in society. More widely felt in the whole of Norwegian society is the downward pressure on wages and social dumping caused by the labour migration from poorer countries increasing the flexibility and power of employers vis-à-vis employees.^[49] Norwegian labour market regulations based on broad tariff agreements negotiated through sectoral bargaining was not prepared for the wave of labour migrants, which triggered a forceful response with a renewed political battle on the principles of regulation in the Norwegian labour market.^[50] Particularly labour unions have been opposed to employers using staffing agencies that enable significantly lower wages, and this practice has created a divide between labour migrants and native workers.^[51]

There has been an increasing tendency of lasting settlement among labour migrants and their families.^[52] Although integrated into the economy, permanent settlement for labour migrants does not automatically lead to successful integration.^[53] For example, many do not learn Norwegian and speak little English because they work in language-segregated enclaves in the Norwegian labour market. This leads to marginalisation and increases socio-economic inequality.

The lack of an adequate response to the challenges related to migrants’ integration may lead to even bigger problems in Poland. Although Ukrainians (currently making up the largest group of immigrants in Poland) are culturally and linguistically close to Polish citizens, they do need integration assistance. A Rating Group survey showed that Ukrainian migrants living in Poland already complain about a sense of “secondary importance”, which manifests itself in the violation of their rights by employers, discrimination, and lack of access to public services.^[54] This problem may become even more common in the case of a further increase in migration to Poland of foreigners from culturally and linguistically distant countries (e.g., India, Nepal, Bangladesh).

As the competition for talent grows in Western countries, there is also the risk that Poland may become a transit country for labour migrants travelling from Eastern to Western Europe (e.g., to Germany).^[55] In Poland’s migration policy for 2021-2022, the government already identified the excessive concentration of foreigners in professions and industries that do not require high qualifications, and difficulties with keeping foreigners graduating from Polish universities in Poland, as well as attracting to Poland foreigners studying in fields relevant from the point of view of the state’s development policy.^[56]

There is also the rising risk of migrants being used as leverage in bilateral relations and a geopolitical power struggle. The threat of directing migration flows became a political tool during the migration management crisis of 2015. This weaponised use of migrants is also visible in the implementation of the EU’s migration deal with Turkey. In 2015, Norway was also put under migration pressure (though on a limited scale) by Russia. The country has become a point of entry for migrants (mainly Syrians) who obtain Russian visas and then fly to Moscow to start the journey by train to near the Norwegian border, finally crossing it by bicycle.^[57] In 2021, Poland was confronted with a migration crisis on its eastern border with Belarus. To divert attention from the internal situation, undermine Poland’s international position, and try to force the EU into negotiations on easing sanctions, Aleksander Lukashenka’s regime invited migrants, mainly from the Middle East, to enter Belarus, the forced them towards the border and territory of Poland, to enter the country and thus the EU irregularly.^[58]

Prospects for Norwegian-Polish Cooperation in the Field of Migration

The shift from a net emigration to a net immigration country is a challenging moment for any state and should be used as encouragement for the government to redesign its national migration policy. Norway started to create its immigration policy much earlier and under different circumstances than Poland. The Norwegian process was largely an ad hoc reaction to migration developments. Poland’s advantage is the possibility to use the experience of other countries such as Norway in designing its policy. In Poland’s case, the transformation is very rapid, so learning from the experience of other countries seems particularly important for shaping policy that would meet the new conditions and be acceptable for all stakeholders.

As European countries, both Norway and Poland have common challenges related to migration from the global South to Europe. Norway is not an EU member, which limits the two countries’ cooperation in shaping EU migration decisions, but with both a  part of the Schengen and EEA, they remains closely related on EU policy. In this context, cooperation between Poland and Norway in the implementation of migration priorities is not only possible, but even advisable.

One of the migration priorities defined on the EU level and supported by Poland and Norway is “addressing the root causes of migration”. After the 2015 crisis in Southern Europe, the emphasis was put on strengthening cooperation with African and Middle Eastern countries to prevent irregular migration from these regions and ensure the success of the return policy.^[59] Until recently, Poland focused its development activities mainly on the Eastern neighbourhood, while Norway is one of the world leaders in international development cooperation, conducting many projects in Africa and the Middle East. Therefore, Norway may be an invaluable source of knowledge and good practices for Poland.

As Schengen members, both countries are at risk of the new phenomenon of the increasing role of state actors in creating and facilitating irregular migration to test the efficiency of European border management and destabilise Europe. Exchanging experience of the pressure placed by Russia on the Norwegian migration policy system in 2015 and Norwegian responses to this challenge with the ongoing crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border may be useful not only to both countries but for all European frontline states. Conclusions from the lessons learnt should be considered in shaping EU migration policy to counteract this worrying phenomenon in the future. Initial observations from the different reactions to border crises by Norway in 2015-16 (which basically processed all asylum seekers according to humanitarian law) and Poland in 2021 (where we saw a more securitised response, including militarisation of the border) indicates that strong institutions and tested mechanisms of migration policy help states deal with refugee/migration pressure in a more humanitarian and organised manner.^[60]

Another field of potential cooperation is integration policy. According to the MIPEX 2019 survey, Poland’s integration policy is classified as “equality on paper”. Norway, on the other hand, has slipped somewhat on the ranking according to the survey, but still has a comprehensive approach to integration.^[61] It is ranked alongside Canada, Germany, and other Nordic countries in the category “labour market mobility”, described as offering effective support for many non-EU immigrants to progress into stable, quality employment. As labour migration is of special interest to Poland, the long Norwegian tradition of developing the integration of workers may be inspiring for the Polish government. Yet, the case of the labour migration of Ukrainians to Poland is vivid proof that facilitation of legal migration to the EU helps to avert more pressure in the form of irregular migration.^[62]

A prerequisite is to build national political consensus on migration, which, as the Norwegian example shows, makes the country’s policy more predictable and crisis-resistant. Avoiding internal political disputes on migration not only facilitates presenting the country’s position in the discussion on migration in the international arena but also enables it to clearly communicate the policy both to immigrants and its own citizens (easing the process of integration). Involving a wide range of experts and NGOs in the development of a new migration strategy could be a good beginning for limiting the excessive politicisation of the migration issue in Poland. However, of utmost importance to successful migration management is the state’s ability to handle the socioeconomic inequality easily produced by a large influx of migrants. 

The publication is prepared in the framework of initiative: Migration and Development: Sharing knowledge between Poland and Norway (MiDeShare). The Initiative is funded by Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway through the EEA Grants and Norway Grants.

Working together for a green, competitive and inclusive Europe.