

Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy

2008



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Contents

From the Editor	5
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I. THE BASIS OF POLISH FOREIGN POLICY

Government Information on Polish Foreign Policy in 2007

(presented at the session of the Sejm on 11 May 2007

by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland,

Anna Fotyga) 11

Polish Policy in the European Union (Leszek Jesień) 38

The Political and Military Aspects of Poland's Security Policy

(Marek Madej) 50

II. POLAND'S POLICY REGARDING SELECTED COUNTRIES AND REGIONS

Poland's Policy Regarding the United States (Beata Górka-Winter) 79

Poland's Policy Regarding Germany (Łukasz Adamski) 99

Poland's Policy Regarding France (Andrzej Szeptycki) 119

Poland's Policy Regarding Russia (Adam Eberhardt) 139

Poland's Policy in the Visegrad Group (Mateusz Gniazdowski) 162

Poland's Policy Regarding Lithuania (Halina Bukowiecka) 195

Poland's Policy Regarding Ukraine (Łukasz Adamski) 214

Poland's Policy Regarding Countries of the South Caucasus

and Central Asia (Ernest Wyciszkiewicz) 234

Poland's Policy Regarding the States of the Middle East

and North Africa (Jan Bury) 250

III. SELECTED PROBLEMS OF POLAND'S FOREIGN POLICY

Poland's Foreign Economic Relations (Artur Gradziuk) 271

Poland and the United Nations (Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala) 296

**IV. POLISH FOREIGN POLICY
DISCUSSION**

(Sławomir Dębski, Andrzej Olechowski, Adam Daniel Rotfeld,
Krzysztof Szczerski, Paweł Zalewski) 311

V. ANNEXES

Chronicle of Poland's International Relations in 2007
(Rafał Tarnogórski). 339

Management Staff of Polish Foreign Service
(Dorota Dołęgowska, Agnieszka Kondak) 361

From the Editor

Reflections on Polish foreign policy in 2007 are marked by the caesura of the parliamentary elections of 21 October. Until July 2007 Polish foreign policy was pursued by the coalition cabinet formed by Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) [Law and Justice], Samoobrona [Self-Defence] and Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR) [League of Polish Families], with Jarosław Kaczyński as the prime minister and Anna Fotyga as the minister of foreign affairs. The disintegration of this coalition on 9 July triggered a political process which resulted in earlier parliamentary elections. Between July and October a minority PiS government was in charge. In October PiS lost the parliamentary elections and the victorious Platforma Obywatelska (PO) [Civic Platform] set up a coalition with Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL) [Polish Peasant Party], forming a cabinet headed by Donald Tusk as the chairman of the Council of Ministers and Radosław Sikorski as foreign minister. The domestic political situation clearly exerted an impact on the shape of foreign policy. All the governments co-established by PiS deliberately curbed their foreign policy activity in order to leave room in this respect for President Lech Kaczyński.¹ Cooperation between the cabinets and the president could be exemplified by offering the president a leading role in negotiations on the fundamental treaty (the Polish “Sherpas” responsible for preparing the document included Marek Cichocki, the president’s special foreign policy adviser, and Ewa Ośniecka-Tamecka, secretary of state at the Office of the Committee for European Integration), as well as in developing relations with the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Ukraine and to some extent Germany.

The new political custom became a source of conflict between the president and the new government formed after the October elections, as could be seen in the president’s attempts to block the candidature of Radosław Sikorski for minister of foreign affairs. His efforts were unsuccessful, but this first serious political conflict between the main institutions of the state required under the Constitution to cooperate in foreign policy, i.e. the government, the minister for foreign affairs and the president, weakened the position of all the parties at the very beginning of the new political alignment and at the start of the new year.²

¹ See “Government Information on Polish Foreign Policy in 2007,” pp. 11–38.

² Let us note that under Article 146 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, foreign policy of the state is conducted by the Council of Ministers, which also “exercises general control in the field of relations with other states and international organisations.” The president of the Republic of Poland, according to Article 126 of the Constitution, is the supreme representative

The governments formed by PiS emphasised the need to alter the way foreign policy was pursued in order to—as Foreign Minister Anna Fotyga explained to the Sejm—“adjust Poland’s international activities to the changed situation,” improve its position in the European Union, ensure its security and enhance its prestige in the international environment. In her address Minister Fotyga reiterated Poland’s will to pursue “an active policy,” both as a member of the European Union and as a state defending common values and principles as well as national interests.³ At the verbal level, the goals thus defined could raise no objections, but the choice of measures and style in which these goals were pursued generated numerous controversies.

The conflict over the manner of pursuing Poland’s foreign policy dominated last year’s public debate on international relations. It was additionally fuelled by the election campaign, but also by the ongoing debate over the future of the European Union in connection with negotiations on the new fundamental treaty. The process of defining their approach to this debate and their negotiating position by Poland’s political groups as well as the course and outcome of the June European Council in Brussels naturally stimulated domestic political controversies, which coincided with the electoral campaign. Moreover, the negotiation process on the new fundamental treaty exerted an impact on most issues at the focus of attention of Poland’s foreign policy in 2007.

Notably, Poland participated in the process for the first time enjoying full rights. With regard to the new decision-taking system in the EU, the Polish authorities advocated a solution seen by observers as radical. The adopted manner of argumentation and rhetoric used to support the Polish position, as well as the tactics of talks in the final phase of the negotiations, can hardly be depicted as measures enhancing Poland’s international position and prestige on the international arena. On the contrary, the process of hammering out the Polish position on the fundamental treaty was regrettably non-transparent and incomprehensible even for experts with years of experience in Polish foreign policy, European affairs and EU institutional reforms. The Polish proposal was

of the Republic of Poland and cooperates with the prime minister and the appropriate minister in respect of foreign policy (Article 133). Notably, then, under the Constitution it is the president who is obliged to cooperate with the Council of Ministers and the minister competent for foreign affairs on foreign policy issues. A reverse interpretation of the provision is erroneous. Let us also add that according to Article 95 of the Constitution, “the Sejm shall exercise control over the activities of the Council of Ministers.”

³ At the beginning of her address the minister mentioned that the information also concerned the activities of the president.

based on the assumption that a member state's number of votes on the Council of the European Union would be calculated through the square root of the country's population. This method, originally designed to enhance the status of smaller states at the expense of larger ones, including Poland, failed to win sufficient support of the remaining EU members. Poland was left on its own with the proposal, while the backing of the Czech Republic and Lithuania, although important in the context of regional policy and the project's promotion in the European Union, turned out to be of little use. It is important to note, however, that it did help Poland at moments of the greatest tensions and pressures from the remaining EU states during the June European Council.

The proposal to introduce a square root-based system of weighing votes in the Council was the second—after the so-called Musketeers' Pact of 2006 [aimed at safeguarding the EU's energy security]—Polish mega-political initiative, i.e. a project involving a new political paradigm for the functioning of the community, proposed by Poland after its EU accession. And once again the Polish initiative was unsuccessful. Consequently, Poland's position in the European Union and beyond has been undermined for two main reasons. Firstly, the line of argumentation was often arrogant, antagonising rather than rallying supporters, and the presentation of arguments was far from professional. Secondly, a fiasco of any project undermines the international credibility of its author, indicating either that he is unable to persuade his partners to back him, which means that potentially he is not an attractive ally, or that he is unprofessional (it is customary not to propose projects doomed to failure).

The Polish position on the EU reform was often explained by the authorities by referring to fears of Germany's excessive growth into power, which could not but affect the level and intensity of relations with Poland's western neighbour, at the same time curbing significantly the country's ability to exert an impact on developments within the European Union and in a broader international environment. It is true that in the trade dispute with Russia over exports of Polish food products Poland succeeded in mobilising the European Union to manifest solidarity with its stand, but most likely at the expense of its own negotiation position on the institutional reform. A question arises whether or not this was deliberate, or perhaps such a course of events had simply not been envisaged in political calculations.

An "active" and tough foreign and European policy requires from a country with Poland's potential not only considerable prudence, but also an adequate style. Poland is in fact a large EU state, which means that it has vital interests in all community policies. Consequently, in European policy Polish interests are

much more difficult to reconcile with those of other EU members than is the case with smaller states, so Poland is likely to come into conflict more often than other Union members. And once in conflict, it is vital first of all to safeguard against ending up in a position defined as extreme, because the outcome of negotiations is usually achieved at the expense of the party that has either adopted an extreme position or has allowed others to push it into one.

The studies presented in this volume, studies whose authors—in the editors' intentions—were to focus on analyses of foreign policy *sensu stricto* rather than on discussing relations with individual partners, may constitute the first attempt at a cool assessment of the past year in foreign policy, an attempt intended as objective and free from the influence of the current political disputes. I do hope that—together with the included discussion on Poland's 2007 foreign policy—they will help indicate its real achievements and failures. Enjoy.

Sławomir Dębski

I.

The Basis of Polish Foreign Policy

Government Information on Polish Foreign Policy in 2007

(presented at the session of the Sejm on 11 May 2007

by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Anna Fotyga)

Mister President of the Glorious Republic!

Mister President of the Republic of Lithuania!

Mister Speaker!

Members of the House!

Excellencies!

Deputy Foreign Ministers!

It is a great honor for me that while delivering my address I can turn to two presidents, heads of friendly states that cooperate, are allies and strategic partners in all spheres. In the beginning of my address, first and foremost,

I wish to convey to your, Mister President, my heartiest wishes for the Lithuanian people. This is a great honor for me.

During my address I will again refer to the essence of cooperation between Poland and Lithuania, but I wanted to highlight this matter at the very beginning. It is personally very important and an honor to me that I am able to participate in shaping this partnership.

Today marks the beginning of the energy summit and I believe this is an excellent moment for the foreign minister to present a report on the goals and tasks of the government's foreign policy. In fact, this is foreign policy of Poland, because due to the profoundness of the tasks at hand, in line with the Polish Constitution, foreign policy is a realm of exceptionally active involvement by the president and the presidential administration, as well as the whole government of the Republic of Poland, the government of Premier Jarosław Kaczyński. Allow me, now, to move on to the text of my address.

Mister President of the Republic of Poland,

Mister President of the Republic of Lithuania,

Mister Speaker,

Members of the House,

I am honoured to present to the High Chamber a report on the foreign policy goals and directions of the government of Jarosław Kaczyński. The honour is the greater since it coincides with my first year in the post of foreign minister, while a few days ago we marked the third anniversary of our membership of the European Union. During that period we have introduced significant changes in the way we conduct foreign policy. They are designed to adapt our activity in the

sphere of foreign relations to the changing conditions, to strengthen the position of Poland within the European Union, to ensure its security and boost its international prestige.

The overriding goal of Polish foreign policy, today and over the next few years, until we attain that objective, is final affirmation of the security of Poland, including energy security, since it is a new component of the system of security.

Poland is a country firmly anchored in European and transatlantic structures. Drawing its strength from historic experience and the energy of its citizens, conscious of its European and global responsibility, modern-day Poland wants to be an active and responsible state on the international arena, dedicated not only to its own interests but also to fundamental values, particularly the idea of solidarity and respect for human dignity. While promoting these values, Polish diplomacy will firmly oppose any attempts to bypass Poland when decisions affecting our country are made, in line with the principle that nothing is decided about us, without us.

Thanks to our accession to the European Union we are part of a dynamic and powerful community. The Community exerts its influence on us, but we are co-shaping it at the same time, true to our values and political objectives. The position we are building in Europe has three dimensions: first—as an active member of the European Union, second—by developing bilateral relations with the respective states of the continent, and third—by participating in regional networks of cooperation.

In further in my address I will speak about the goals and plans that are connected with the tightening of cooperation in the framework of the Visegrad Group, as well as cooperation with the Baltic states, primarily Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Our cooperation with Estonia was confirmed by the recent initiatives of the president, the premier and the Polish foreign service I lead. We are doing this together with the Republic of Lithuania.

On Monday I will take part in a meeting of the EU's General Affairs and External Relations Council. Before that session, first we will be meeting with the foreign minister of the Republic of Lithuania to coordinate our positions, then with all the Baltic and Scandinavian states, and only after that with all the ministers of the European Union.

The balance sheet of our three-year membership of the European Union is unquestionably positive. Efficient and stable political institutions, dynamic economic growth and a prudent European policy all enhance Poland's authority and prestige. Thanks to our membership of the European Union we have gained

many new political and economic opportunities, which we are using to reduce the gap separating us from the most advanced countries of the world. The Polish economy has been developing at the fastest rate for almost a decade. Last year the economy grew by more than 6 per cent, Poland's international credibility increased, and we attracted a record 15 billion US dollars in foreign investments.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

This week, my colleagues from the government of Premier Jarosław Kaczyński were to present to the High Chamber the economic achievements of the government of Premier Jarosław Kaczyński. They constitute a great success of this government, the greatest. We are focused on utilizing the opportunity inherent in our European Union membership. Considering the present momentum and trends, it is extremely important to build a position of Poland in the European Union that corresponds to the trends and opportunities we have at present, a position, that—I am convinced—we will be able to attain in a few years' time. The economic growth taking place in Poland at present is something unique. Regardless of the status assured us under the Nice Treaty, and which we intend to affirm during the debate on the future of the European Union, we wouldn't want our present situation as one of the poorest countries in Europe to become preserved. For Poland has a great opportunity and we will certainly not remain the poorest country. We want to be and stay the sixth largest country of the European Union until we manage to realize our strategic goal, namely further enlargement of the European Union. Also, we want the position of Poland to correspond to that formal status. As yet, that is not the case. However, both the president and the whole government of the Republic, as well as the High Chamber, are working to attain this goal.

The European Union is today a chief platform for the fulfilment of our political and economic interests. We are actively involved in shaping the process of European integration. We are striving to consolidate the status of Poland as an important member state of the Union. We staunchly defend the common values and principles that guide the member states. We resolutely oppose attempts by third countries to differentiate among the member states of the Union. On this matter we stand in solidarity with our friends from the Baltic states.

Recognizing that treaty reforms are essential to ensure the European Union's cohesion and effectiveness, we firmly reject the theory that they have been necessitated by an alleged crisis of the Union composed of 27 members. On the contrary, the Union is operating well, the new states have given it additional

momentum, and treaty reforms should primarily give all the member countries a sense of equal participation in moulding its future.

Members of the House,

In March, the president took part in the European Union summit. The heads of states and governments were able to reach agreement and unanimity on what seems currently the most controversial issue in the European Union, because of substantial differences of interest between the respective countries. That demonstrates the Union's ability to take decisions.

A constitutional treaty, or, putting it differently, a basic treaty, is not essential for streamlining the decision-making process in the European Union. It is needed to put the legal system in order. Poland supports this. However, we do want the debate to be calm and prudent, without coercion, because we are talking about the most crucial elements. We are talking about the sovereignty of each member state of the European Union, so Poland, Poles, should be aware of this. Here, in this country, there should be no rush to a quick adoption of the treaty, because it is important that the treaty should be good.

Poland is pledging active participation in the works on the new treaty. Recognizing the need for compromise, we have agreed that the text of the constitutional treaty ratified by some of the member states should be the reference point for further debate. However, we feel that no issues should be excluded in advance from discussion at the planned intergovernmental conference. We are convinced that the treaty should invoke principles that are comprehensible to all the citizens of the Union and benefit them. For that reason, as regards the voting system, we postulate the introduction of the principle of equal influence of all citizens on Union decisions. After all, let us not forget that Poland's present status, elaborated in the binding Nice Treaty, was a crucial argument for Poles when they voted in the referendum for Poland's accession to the European Union and accepted the conditions of membership. It is a treaty that ensures a very good, prominent status for Poland. Yet even in the framework of that treaty I know how difficult it is to shape the position of Poland. We want the new voting system to take these elements into account. We are not only acting in the interest of Poland. Submitting our proposal of an alternative voting system, we are acting, first of all, in the interest of the entire Union, of medium and small states. After all, the point of democracy is that you should also take into consideration the voice of those who are small, poor and weak. Poland is doing this.

In the course of works on the treaty reform we will also call for a clear definition of the competencies of the Union and its member states, and for extension of the solidarity clause to energy issues. This dovetails with today's summit, since we want Poland's initiatives to be attuned to the future energy policy of the European Union. We are a good and loyal partner, an ally of the member states of the European Union. When we occasionally put forward postulates that may not always be understood in the beginning by our partners, we are acting in good will and, we believe, in the best interest of the entire European Union. We underline that the European Commission and its President should play a prominent role in the framework of the Community institutions.

Mister Speaker,
Members of the House,

In the course of discussions on the energy packet for Europe, which accompanied the process of adopting the negotiating mandate for the Union-Russia agreement, we noticed what an important role in Union institutions is played by the European Commission. It was the European Commission and its president, guided by the interests of the whole Union and all the citizens of the member states, who most strongly supported Poland and the other new states of the European Union in their strivings and aspirations. It is they who demonstrated the greatest understanding for our position.

I wish to convey warm thanks from this rostrum to President José Manuel Durão Barroso for his contribution and assistance in implementing postulates that were not, after all, only Polish. It is very important to me, personally, and to the whole Polish government that we can count on someone, who understands our position—I don't want to speak of interests here, though it is obvious that interests play a big role in energy issues—someone, who primarily understands our position and a certain assessment of the global situation presented by Poland.

We attach high significance to completing the Single Market and boosting its effectiveness, since it enhances the competitiveness of European economies. Poland will actively support the European Commission in its works on the revision of the internal market and elaboration of the priorities of its development. Within the next few months the European Commission will open the process of consultations on the shape of the future EU budget. In the course of that process we will be underlining the importance of the budget for levelling the development differences between the respective EU member states, which is a precondition for ensuring its political and economic cohesion.

Members of the House,

The government of Premier Jarosław Kaczyński, collaborating with our Union partners, the Republic of Lithuania foremost among them, seeks to level the development differences affecting the new states of the European Union. That process has been highlighted thanks, in part, to Polish actions, or perhaps primarily thanks to Polish actions, which found expression in the Berlin declaration. For we believe that the ongoing process is not a process of enlargement of Europe, but of integration of Europe, which simultaneously requires appropriate technical and infrastructural undertakings. We need suitable means to implement the postulates incorporated in the Berlin declaration, in other words to conclusively unite the western part of the European Union with the new, eastern part, which, after all, has always been European.

We also believe that premises exist for the Union to adopt a higher profile in global politics. The European Union must not remain a political and military midget when it is an economic giant, thanks to the combined might of all the member states of the European Union. Thus, the external relations of the European Union require close collaboration and tight coordination of the member states of the European Union. That is what we need the most. We need political will to become active and engaged externally. Next, there should be the will to commit appropriate funds for that purpose, since appropriate funds are still not being allocated to ensure the global role and function of the European Union. Only then should we move on to political integration, which will permit decision-making. That is the natural order of things.

We will take on particular responsibility in the EU in 2011, when we assume presidency of the EU Council. We are already launching preparations for that task this year. The government of Premier Jarosław Kaczyński and my ministry, or rather the two institutions subordinated to me—the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of the Committee for European Integration—are already working intensively. We have set about elaborating the priorities of the Polish presidency. Yesterday, during a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee, deputies expressed concern that I would not be addressing future tasks in my speech. Well, what I am talking about now is a task for the next few years. Its realization is already under way and over the coming months and years, up until 2011, we will be consistently implementing the actions that we are elaborating now.

Members of the House,

The history of the Republic has shown that it is possible to defend one's identity while being a multicultural community, open onto others. That is why we are not proponents of a closed Europe, a "fortress" Europe. On the contrary, we are in favour of a Union that is open to new members.

The government of Premier Jarosław Kaczyński backs the European aspirations of the states of the Western Balkans, Croatia foremost among them. During my visit to Croatia, I clearly reiterated the decision of the government of Premier Jarosław Kaczyński to back enlargement of the European Union without any reservations and preconditions, though we know that every country, every member state of the European Union must support, must adhere to the values common to the Union. However, we believe that states that were subjugated for so long, that were under the influence of communism, need a helping hand and a special, privileged relationship with the European Union. We are proponents of integration of the European Union, of further enlargement of the European Union, primarily through the accession of such countries as Ukraine and Moldova, of further expansion of the European Union eastwards.

Despite some tough discussions, also within the largest of the parties forming the present coalition, we support, for historical reasons, but chiefly due to geo-strategic considerations, the integration of Turkey with the European Union. During the last summit of the European Union, but also during previous ones, the president clearly stated that Poland supported enlargement. That may seem paradoxical, because we are the country, that—if interests were weighed on a scale—would stand to lose the most, because we could lose the funds that we are getting today. However, regardless of that, guided by the principle of solidarity that I mentioned earlier, Poland consistently, steadfastly supports in every conversation, every speech the further enlargement of the European Union through the accession of the whole Balkans, Ukraine, Turkey and other states.

During my visits to South Caucasus I signed memorandums with all three states of South Caucasus, memorandums in which the Republic of Poland pledged to support these countries, first of all Georgia and Azerbaijan, but also Armenia, in their European aspirations, if such will be the will of their societies. In the case of the Georgian society the commitment to integration is being clearly, openly and emphatically expressed—and the Union and NATO are duty-bound to listen. Poland supports such integration. During his visit to Ankara in January, President Lech Kaczyński expressed support for Turkish aspirations, coming out in favour of full European Union membership of Turkey.

We want to see greater engagement of the European Union in states of the South Caucasus, which should feel and appreciate our closeness and our interest. That is very important. These are countries and peoples, that, for historical reasons, are grappling with numerous problems, and on occasion get involved in mutual disputes. We would like to help them to settle these disputes. Moreover, for a number of years Poland has been engaged in the work of the OSCE Minsk Group. Poland supports the reconciliation of these states, attainment of peace and the European aspirations of the states of South Caucasus.

Poland is actively involved in shaping the eastern dimension of the European Union's external policy and the European Neighbourhood Policy. We advocate the Union's balanced engagement in the South and East. We are committed to the elaboration and implementation of a coherent policy towards Russia, the elaboration of a new agreement with Russia, in which Poland would also like to participate. We are currently in the midst of a process that, if the essential circumstances arise, can lead to the adoption of a negotiating mandate for the Union-Russia agreement. We believe that such circumstances should include, first of all, the willingness of our external partner to treat all the states of the European Union equally, both in the technical sense relating to the conduct of free trade, and with regard to political values, which should also be taken into consideration. Such European Union member states as Poland, Lithuania and Estonia can and should be partners of Russia that are equal to other states of the European Union. We are pleased to note the solidarity of other member states of the European Union with our postulates, and hope that the entire European Union becomes engaged in external actions only when suitable conditions for that are created. We are optimistic and expect that a joint, solidary stance of the European Union will persuade Russia, our important external partner, that it makes sense to talk seriously with the Union, that we are a serious partner and a strong union of sovereign states. The new agreement with Russia should be comprehensive, guaranteeing stable energy supplies, market transparency and respect for competition.

Members of the House,

Ensuring our state's security is of fundamental importance to us. Our country remains an active and solidary member of the North Atlantic Alliance. We steadfastly promote the view that the North Atlantic Alliance should remain an effective instrument of collective defence, while being fully capable of confronting new threats. We want continuation of the American engagement in Europe, as a guarantee of security and politico-military stability on the continent. We support the Alliance's "open doors" policy, development of NATO's pragmatic

cooperation with Russia and collaboration with partner states within the Partnership for Peace, the Euroatlantic Partnership Council, in the framework of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

Members of the House,

The postulate of elevating the level of dialogue between the EU and NATO is increasingly frequent within the Union. This is a very important matter, since we are dealing with two great powers. However, we should remember that European Union members also include states that are neutral, or simply have not decided to join NATO. Having attained the crucial objective of Poland's NATO membership which—as I am sure all of us here agree—has decisively enhanced Poland's security, we want Poland's voice in the North Atlantic Alliance to be a sovereign voice, and not a voice diluted by the alignment of forces or our position within the European Union. I wish to underline this very clearly.

Poland actively participates in stabilization and peace missions, that help eliminate—at an early stage—security threats on a global scale. We are involved in the Iraqi operation, commanding the Multinational Division Centre-South, and in the operations of the North Atlantic Alliance in Afghanistan. We are taking part in the UN operations in Lebanon and the Golan Heights. Poland's engagement in the Middle East has reduced the terrorist threat, at the same time enhancing our transatlantic relations.

We will commit ourselves to actions designed to extinguish, or at least reduce, tensions and conflicts occurring relatively close to our borders. I am referring to the situation in Kosovo, Transdniestria and South Caucasus. Poland is developing multilateral military cooperation, taking part in the establishment of a Battle Group with Germany, Slovakia, Lithuania and Latvia, and of the Weimar Battle Group with Germany and France. We are participating in European arms programmes in the framework of the European Defence Agency. Defence ministers of European Union states will be among those taking part in the forthcoming meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council on Monday. Their cooperation within the European Defence Agency will be one of the important points on the agenda. Thus, the Polish defence minister, as well as other ministers of the government of Premier Jarosław Kaczyński, participate—in cooperation with the foreign minister—in shaping Polish foreign policy.

We must stay aware of new threats, emerging far from our borders. WMD proliferation is among the most dangerous of them, so there is a growing need to tighten international cooperation to keep it in check. We are an active participant

in new initiatives—the Krakow Initiative and the Global Partnership against WMD proliferation. Next week, a joint seminar highlighting the significance of the Krakow Initiative will be held in Abu Dhabi, according to the initiative of Poland and in collaboration with the United Arab Emirates. Thus, the process is advancing. Poland is a crucial element of the fight against WMD proliferation. We are continuing this work, my ministry is continuing it.

As a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea we are involved in attempts to resolve the crisis situation on the Korean Peninsula brought on by the nuclear ambitions of the DPRK.

We support the efforts to settle the crisis connected with Iran's nuclear programme. In line with Polish foreign policy, our politicians, the president and the government of the Republic of Poland have expressed at many fora their concern over the developments in Iran. We support the relevant actions being taken by the European Union, mainly the Secretary General of the Council, but also the presidency and the European Commission acting on behalf of all the member states. We expect that the recent decision of the European Union to toughen sanctions against Iran will produce a desired effect. We hope that it will lead to an international solution with the use of peaceful methods, primarily a political dialogue.

Polish authorities attach great importance to the human dimension of security policy, to stimulation of democratic processes and values and to observance of human rights. In 2006 Poland started allocating considerable funds for humanitarian and development undertakings that serve peace and security not only in states to the south and east of our frontiers, but also in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan and African states.

Members of the House,

At the time when we were taking the decision to expand our participation in the peace mission in Lebanon, which in the framework of UNIFIL-2 has continued our engagement in Lebanon since 1992, I took part in a conference in Stockholm devoted to humanitarian and reconstruction aid for Lebanon, mainly assistance for the civilian population. Poland, despite its modest budgetary possibilities, and despite the very limited budget at the disposal of the foreign minister, committed itself to significant humanitarian and development aid for Lebanon. This policy will be maintained.

Similar development funds are backing our peace and stabilization presence in other parts of the world. We are allocating development aid and extending its scope in such countries as Iraq and, most of all, Afghanistan, using different

channels for its transfer. We believe this serves the stability of the countries where we are engaged and enhances the security of our military contingents. This policy will be continued.

On a regional level, our activity is focused on the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and its Office for Democratic and Institutions and Human Rights based in Warsaw. Poland supports ODIHR in its work, recognizing the role ODIHR plays in the democratization processes around the world. Poles have taken part in many election monitoring missions and we appreciate the importance of such undertakings. We want ODIHR to maintain its independent role and the present terms of reference. We are concerned that political factors could erode what has until now been the great value of ODIHR, namely its adherence to democratic values. Poland supports ODIHR.

Polish authorities attach great importance to the human dimension of the security policy, to support for democratic processes and values and the observance of human rights. I emphasize this once again.

Members of the House,

One of the greatest challenges facing Polish foreign policy is assurance of the country's energy security. We oppose all initiatives that threaten Poland's energy security. We are striving to diversify energy supplies and gain their stable and secure sources. For that reason we wish to collaborate with Norway, Denmark and Sweden in the construction of a gas pipeline, and to ensure secure supplies of liquefied gas for the maritime terminal planned at Świnoujście.

Honourable Members,

The energy summit begins today. One of the most important directions that Poland is trying to utilize in collaboration with our partners is the south-eastern direction of alternative energy supplies for Poland and all of Europe, since we believe that diversification of supplies is crucially important to the whole Europe, and it is here that we want to contribute to European policy.

Poland is a country in a peculiar situation. We largely depend on a single supplier in the case of both energy sources. We have already experienced a serious threat to supplies, our partners and neighbours having had similar experience. Retaining good, pragmatic and sensible relations with Russia, our partner, we would like to develop a more advantageous energy mix in Poland, with better utilization of other energy sources. This is a priority for the president, the government of the Republic of Poland and all the ministers. Referring to the counteracting of threats to our energy security, I must give due credit to the

Speaker, who, till recently, headed the government panel analyzing the situation connected with the construction of the northern pipeline.

For about a year now I have seen great progress, and not only in Poland, because we have been coordinating our actions very well. We all see the threat and are working vigorously. We also note a change of attitudes among our partners and are very hopeful that our postulates will be taken into consideration. With that in mind we will collaborate on the construction of a pipeline that will supply us from northern Europe. As you know, the government plenipotentiary, Minister Naimski is the person exceptionally involved in endeavours relating to energy security. This issue has become the flagship of Polish foreign policy. We consider this a crucial project, an area in which we have to be extremely active. I want to remind you that it was a Polish initiative that led to adding a paragraph on energy security to the declaration of the NATO summit in Riga late last year.

Cooperation with states of South Caucasus, including Azerbaijan, and countries of Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan, has a prominent place in our efforts to broaden the group of our energy suppliers. A senior representative of President Nazarbayev is taking part in the energy summit which begins in Krakow today. This is a very positive development. I am sure that this is a most welcome result of Polish diplomacy, especially of the work of Minister Paweł Kowal personally and his subordinated departments, but most of all of the president himself who from the beginning of his term has devoted utmost attention to energy security. I believe that this will be a significant theme of Polish foreign policy over the next few years.

Our activeness is reflected by the Krakow energy summit which begins in Krakow today, with the participation of Ukraine, Lithuania, Azerbaijan, Georgia and a representative of Kazakhstan. The political changes taking place in Turkmenistan, which have coincided with the opening of a Polish embassy in Ashkhabad, constitute a basis for intensifying cooperation with that country as well. I have presented the nomination, signed by the president, to the new ambassador to Ashkhabad and he is already in the region. We hope to tighten our relations with that country, too, which would allow us to seek energy supply diversification. Premier Jarosław Kaczyński has met with the Algerian minister of trade and industry. We believe that Poland's cooperation with Algeria has excellent prospects. We realize that the energy situation in that region is difficult, though we hope that Poland will also become an active player in areas that have been traditionally perceived as zones of influence of other states. A very competent ambassador, a woman, has been sent to Algiers; she knows our priorities in this area, so we expect very active cooperation.

I have recently made two important visits to the Middle East. One of them was to Sharm-el-Sheikh in Egypt where the discussion focused on the development programme for Iraq, an international compact for Iraq. The event also provided occasion for numerous bilateral talks, mainly devoted to energy security. I also took part in a meeting of the Joint Council devoted to cooperation between the European Union and Gulf states. That visit provided opportunity, first of all, for significant and extensive bilateral consultations, which I conducted in Saudi Arabia, and secondly, for talks with the foreign ministers of Kuwait, Qatar and Oman at the margins of the Gulf Cooperation Council—EU Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting.

I consider that direction of cooperation to be very important, also because of our energy security. I believe that in the nearest future we will be able to announce very positive news about cooperation with states in that region, including major visits in both directions. The premier will be visiting the region, and it may be an extended visit. There will be also visits to Warsaw, because Warsaw has become an important destination of visits by top-level international politicians. There have been many of them recently, when key decisions were being taken both by the European Union and NATO. Poland is a country they consult with, and Polish politicians are politicians they talk with. So, at this point, I wish to firmly refute the claims about our country's isolation.

Mister Speaker,
Members of the House,

Moving on to a review of our bilateral relations, I wish to start with our relations with the United States, a country that is the guarantor of global order. We will strive to maintain and intensify the Polish-American strategic dialogue. The government of Premier Jarosław Kaczyński has expressed interest in the proposal of the American administration to begin talks on the deployment of elements of the missile defence system in Poland. We are emphasizing—and this will be reiterated in the negotiations—the need for our American partners to take into consideration Poland's security concerns. In the note conveyed to the American government it was clearly stated that we want the installation at issue to enhance the security of Poland and the United States, as well as international security. This is exceptionally important to us and I am certain this will be the main topic of the talks which the president of the Republic of Poland will hold at Jurata with the President of the United States, George Bush.

We want to use our cooperation with the United States to bring about a significant increase in American investments which lead to the transfer of

cutting-edge technologies, and to invigorate bilateral trade. We are devoting much attention to the development of cooperation between our arms industries and are continuing implementation of the offset projects connected with the

F-16 contract. We wish to create better conditions for contacts between our societies, particularly the young generation. We are establishing a Polish-American parliamentary programme of youth exchanges, and this is an area of excellent cooperation, also with the High Chamber, the Chancellery of the Sejm.

A special place in Polish foreign policy is occupied by relations with our western neighbour, Germany—our main partner in the European Union and ally in the North Atlantic Alliance. We remember that Germany firmly supported our bid for membership in these institutions. I mean the European Union and NATO. Today, in the framework of the European Union, we should elaborate together a new, durable basis of our strategic relations. At the same time it has been admitted that certain issues are having negative impact on our relations. These are chiefly issues of a bilateral nature, invariably raised by Poland at all meetings and consultations at government level, by the president himself, and by members of parliament. We hope that Poland's voice will be heard, because consistency in raising bilateral problems, matters relating to history and the position of the Polish minority in Germany is extremely important, so we will remain consistent. We oppose the establishment of a Centre Against Expulsions in Berlin, since it would impede relations between the two states and nations. We feel that the Baltic pipeline project is ill-conceived. We will strive to ensure that Poles in Germany enjoy the same rights as the German minority in our country.

The government of Premier Jarosław Kaczyński wants a definite closing of the issues connected with World War II and its aftermath. But that requires appropriate conditions and dialogue, because many questions remain unresolved. We feel that the all property claims by German citizens against the Polish state have always been legally void under Polish and international law. We would like to be certain that they are equally groundless under German law. As we understand it, that is the legal position being adopted by the Federal Government. A joint declaration of the two governments on the matter, affirming the convergence of the legal positions of the two states, would additionally enhance the Poles' sense of security. It cannot be that, so many years after the war, a substantial part of Polish citizens feel uncertain in their homes and on their property.

We traditionally attach high importance to the development of relations with France. The Polish and French nations are culturally close and connected by tight historic links. We observe vigorous activity by French investors in Poland.

We want to maintain the intensive political dialogue at all levels and to establish close cooperation with the new president, Mr Nicolas Sarkozy. President Lech Kaczyński has already conveyed his congratulations. Polish diplomats have maintained contacts with circles close to President-Elect Nicolas Sarkozy. We expect similar political dialogue and all-round cooperation as was the case with the administration of President Jacques Chirac. We would welcome raising the level of that dialogue and its intensity.

We are developing cooperation with France and Germany in the framework of the Weimar Triangle. We feel that the potential of Weimar cooperation is not being fully utilized. It could be used to coordinate the positions of the three states concerning important Union decisions. We offer our partners new forms and vistas of cooperation: intensive dialog on the European Neighbourhood Policy and collaboration of the defence ministries in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy. Yesterday, I discussed such possibilities in the framework of the Weimar Triangle with the foreign minister of Georgia, who accompanied President Saakashvili. I am convinced that the European Neighbourhood Policy could be an excellent forum of Weimar triangle cooperation. We look forward to intensified dialogue in this subject.

Great Britain is among our closest European partners. We wish to take the fullest advantage of the stimulus which Polish-British relations received from last November's visit to London by President Lech Kaczyński, and Premier Tony Blair's visit to Warsaw in April. During the first quarter of the year I, too, paid a visit to London and held consultations on European topics with Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett. So, the dialogue is being continued and it is highly animated. We hope for a visit soon by an adviser to Premier Tony Blair and consultations, even before the European summit. We share with Great Britain a common vision of robust transatlantic relations and joint participation in the Iraq and Afghanistan missions. The presence of several hundred thousand Poles in Great Britain enhances the links between the societies of our countries.

A Polish Season in Great Britain, planned for 2009/2010, will provide a symbolic accent for our cooperation.

Italy remains our important West European partner. Further growth and diversification of trade is a priority and we are seeking access for Polish companies to that country's service market. The relations with the Holy See are an unchanging priority. During the past year there were several visits to the Holy See. President Lech Kaczyński took part in them. The prime minister paid a visit. I paid a working visit, as did my deputy, Minister Paweł Kowal. The

pilgrimage of Holy Father Benedict XVI was a great success. It was enthusiastically received by the Polish society and I believe we can move ahead, substantially building up our traditionally good relations with the Holy See. During the talks I noted the significance of the dialogue connected with issues of interest to the United Nations. On many matters here Poland and the Holy See have similar positions. We also reviewed issues of common concern connected with the future of Europe, including our positions on the constitutional treaty. I hope for continuation of that dialogue. I know that His Excellency Archbishop Mamberti has confirmed his visit to Poland and we look forward to its implementation. We share the conviction that the fundamental treaty of the European Union should invoke Christian values.

We are developing political relations as well as economic and investment cooperation with Spain. Intergovernmental Polish-Spanish consultations, that have become traditional by now, will be held shortly. During the meeting in Riyadh I arranged with Minister Moratinos his visit to Warsaw. So, political dialogue with Spain is intensive and will be continued.

The tightening of relations with Portugal will be stimulated by that country's presidency of the EU Council during the second half of the year. Even before the end of May we expect a visit by the foreign minister of Portugal. Several weeks ago Premier Jarosław Kaczyński discussed the priorities of the Portuguese presidency during a visit to Portugal. It was an exceptionally important visit and our partners share that assessment.

I wish to mention the Kingdom of the Netherlands—a major foreign investor in Poland—among our most important partners in Western Europe. The premier recently paid a visit to the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The talks focused on the future of the European Union and the constitutional treaty. Another round of the Utrecht Conference will also be held. I took part in the previous session, held in Holland. We will maintain this formula, which is very traditional and highlights the significance of our relations. The Utrecht conferences are traditionally chaired by the foreign ministers, so we are counting on the cooperation in this regard of the new foreign minister of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Our relations with Belgium combine cooperation on European issues with collaboration in the framework of the Polish-Walloon and Polish-Flemish inter-regional cooperation. We are interested in tightening cooperation between the Benelux states and the Visegrad Group. This has become a traditional formula of dialogue. We affirmed this position during the last visit to Warsaw by Premier Verhofstadt, at his meetings with the president and premier, in which I also took part.

We are working to maintain the excellent level of political and economic relations with Ireland, concentrating on the economic and social aspects of Ireland's opening of its labour market to Polish citizens. I wish to remind you here that the president recently paid a visit to Ireland. It offered an opportunity for a comprehensive review of political, economic and cultural relations between Poland and Ireland. One of my first visits as foreign minister was also to Ireland and it provided an occasion for substantial consultations. So, our political dialogue is vigorous and will be continued.

We hope that the upsurge of the Austrian economy will help liberalize that country's stand concerning access to its labour market of citizens from the new Union member states. Poland and Austria maintain traditionally good relations. We look forward to a visit by Minister Ursula Plassnik, now being arranged. The form of dialogue between Poland and Austria has been developed thanks in part to the skill of Austrian diplomacy and Austria's experience in exercising the presidency; we would welcome it if Austria shared that experience with us. We hope that the dialogue will be intensified.

We want to develop cooperation with the Swiss Confederation, appreciating the fact that the country has allocated substantial funds for the levelling of economic and social differences in the enlarged European Union. We recently hosted in Warsaw the president of the Swiss Confederation who simultaneously holds the post of foreign minister. The president made a substantial, personal contribution to the success of a referendum in Switzerland that endorsed the Swiss Financial Mechanism; it envisages substantial funds for the levelling of economic differences between Poland and the Swiss Confederation. We are glad that those talks marked a successful beginning to the utilization of the Mechanism funds.

Mister Speaker,
Members of the House,

Poland has not forgotten the historic ties and common interests that link us with our partners in the north and south, in bilateral and multilateral formats. Our economic and political cooperation with states in the regions of the Baltic Sea and the Danube is developing exceptionally vigorously. We attach great importance to the tightening of cooperation within the Visegrad Group, a forum of collaboration between four Central European neighbours. We are in favour of retaining the Group's integrity, while being open to proposals of cooperation with other states. The deepening of cooperation with the Czech Republic would be enhanced, among others, by our collaboration on the missile defence project.

Hungary and Slovakia remain Poland's important partners in European, Euroatlantic and regional policy. The political dialogue and visits in both directions are very intensive. We are active partners in relations with all the states of the Visegrad Group.

Today, Premier Jarosław Kaczyński is paying a visit to Slovakia. This visit also has certain symbolic significance that the foreign minister can mention in her address.

We place exceptional value on relations with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. We are cooperating with these states to bolster energy security and are moving ahead with a joint project for the development of the Ignalin nuclear power plant. We have strategic relations with Lithuania, which, among others, include the construction of a link between the power grids of the two countries and the involvement of Polish companies in the Mozeiki refinery.

The Baltic states are an important partner in shaping the eastern dimension of the European Union. We also wish to undertake joint transport infrastructure projects. In order to maintain the intensive cooperation that currently links Poland with the Baltic states, Lithuania foremost among them, we need an appropriate infrastructure, including a road network so that the two countries can stay effectively in touch, but even more importantly, to broaden the possibilities of cooperation between various social groups, because the political dialogue, the cooperation between politicians is already excellent. The president maintains ongoing, regular contacts with President Valdas Adamkus on all matters relating to foreign policy, also on matters concerning the internal situation in the two countries, upholding the possibility of cooperation towards third states. The dialogue of the premier with Premier Kirkilas, and my own relations with Minister Petras Vaitiekunas have similar significance.

I wish to disclose that it has become a certain custom, reflected in our schedules, that during all multilateral gatherings and before important meetings we hold quick consultations beforehand. That happens before every European Council, before every GAERC meeting, before or during every multilateral meeting, as happened in Riyadh. So these are intensive and important relations that help us build up ties between societies, businesses and between our countries.

We collaborate closely with Sweden, Denmark and Finland, among others, in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. We share a common concern for the Baltic Sea. We are seeking energy cooperation with Norway, which offers a chance to diversify energy supplies. We also cooperate with Baltic and Nordic states in the framework of the Council of the Baltic Sea States.

We hope for a further tightening of contacts between Poland and the Nordic Council. That opens new possibilities of cooperation and contacts.

The accession of Rumania and Bulgaria on 1 January 2007 to the European Union has opened new vistas of cooperation with those states, also within the Eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy. However, we hope that the integration of Rumania and Bulgaria will not divert the European Union's interest in the East solely in that direction, concentrating it on cooperation in the Black Sea area. We expect that the Eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy will, to an equal degree, embrace the relations with the societies of Belarus and such states as Ukraine and Moldova. We further hope that the European Neighbourhood Policy will provide equally significant commitment to and intensity of ties with South Caucasus.

Mister Speaker,
Members of the House,

I wish to devote more time at this point to the relations with our eastern neighbours, which are of exceptional importance to Poland. Let me underline the significance we attach to the development of good-neighbourly relations with Ukraine. The selection of Poland and Ukraine as the co-hosts of the European football championships in 2012 will enhance Polish-Ukrainian relations, opening up new prospects of cooperation and contacts. We also hope it will consolidate the European orientation of our neighbour. As a member of the European Union we are campaigning for the elaboration of a joint assistance package for that country. We back Kiyv's bid for the introduction by the Union of a liberalised visa regime for Ukrainian nationals.

Honourable Members,

Ukraine is a strategic partner of Poland. In our relations, the breakthrough attained in Pavlokoma thanks to the initiatives of the two presidents, is practically a miracle. We are a country that today maintains a very, very intensive dialogue with Ukraine at all levels. This is happening between the presidents of the two states—President Yushchenko is taking part in the Krakow energy dialogue today—and at government level. This permits us to have ongoing political influence. Premier Jarosław Kaczyński maintains regular contacts with Premier Yanukovich. We hope that the Polish-Ukrainian relations remain good, regardless of any political realignments. Poland is a great promoter of both the European and transatlantic aspirations of Ukraine. Naturally, in promoting these aspirations we will always be guided by the will of the Ukrainian people.

Relations with Russia remain in the centre of our attention. We want to strengthen the traditional historic and cultural ties between the two societies. At the same time, we are aware that Polish-Russian relations regrettably do not correspond to our aspirations and expectations. We also realize that their improvement, as Premier Jarosław Kaczyński put it in his address, requires patience and a long-term approach. They will not be ameliorated by extemporaneous, abrupt and hasty changes of decision. The historic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe took place relatively recently, and its genuine acceptance necessitates a genuine—and not merely apparent—change in the mentality of Russia's political elite. We want to advance bilateral economic cooperation with Russia. We encourage the collaboration of Polish self-government bodies with the authorities of Russian regions. We are continuing the dialogue on historical matters; the Group for Difficult Issues has been revived. However, we will resist unjustified attempts to discriminate against Poland, such as the ban on imports of Polish meat and plant products into Russia. We thank the German presidency and the European Commission for their solidarity and commitment to the lifting of the embargo. We hope that the Russian restrictions will soon be revoked.

Our relations with Belarus are largely determined by the momentum of events in that country. We are seeking greater commitment by the European Union to supporting the civil society and democratic forces in Belarus. The Polish government steadfastly demands respect for the rights of the Polish minority in that country. In our relations with Moldova we will consistently support that state's pro-European aspirations. We expect that Premier Jarosław Kaczyński will shortly pay a visit to Moldova. I have already conducted talks with the foreign minister and that dialogue will be certainly continued.

The states of South Caucasus play a growing role in our foreign relations. We support the process of systemic transformations in Georgia and that country's bid for NATO and European Union membership. The bilateral relations with that country are becoming one of the most important vectors of Polish foreign policy in the East. Azerbaijan is our partner in the region, also because of its energy reserves. We welcome the pro-European strivings of Armenia. We are concerned by the persistence of the so-called frozen conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union. These dormant tensions could be set off by an unfavourable course of events, or even a coincidence, exploding with redoubled force and threatening regional stability. Since 2006, we have augmented the relations with all these partners in the East with substantial development assistance, thus supporting political and economic transformations and integration with the West.

Honourable Members,

The process of globalization, as well as energy security considerations, have boosted the role of economic issues and defence of economic interests in diplomatic work. In 2007 we have granted priority importance to analysing the prospects for upgrading the competitiveness of the Polish economy, identifying the possibilities of trade and investment growth, ensuring energy security and developing scientific-technological cooperation. Economic diplomacy structures, set up within the MFA to defend the country's economic interests abroad, constitute a top priority for the foreign minister. The Polish Trade and Investment Agency is due to be launched this year; through a network of missions it will create a completely new quality as regards support for Polish companies. As a result of these structural changes, postulated since the early Nineties, diplomacy will have a stronger commitment to the promotion of our economy. Poland needs new investments and technologies, the export boom should be maintained, also with the backing of Polish diplomacy, which will be essential to win strategic investments for Polish companies abroad.

Development of economic cooperation has been granted priority in our relations with Asian countries, especially China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Indonesia. In the relations with these countries we have focused on the promotion of economic contacts, hoping to attract increased investments. In the relations with the People's Republic of China we are striving to reduce our trade deficit. We are also working to facilitate the access of Polish goods to Asian markets. We seek cooperation in the mining and power industries, as well as the food industry, tourism and the Polish educational offer. We are actively involved in multilateral contacts in the framework of the Asia and Europe Meetings (ASEM) and the dialogue between the European Union and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Early in his term, in September 2006, Premier Jarosław Kaczyński took part in the EU-ASEM summit, arranged during the Finnish presidency. Before the end of this month a ministerial Union-ASEM summit will be held in Hamburg and I will certainly take part. We are maintaining bilateral relations and the second half of 2007 is sure to bring numerous visits in both directions. A visit in May by the speaker of the Chinese parliament will definitely be an important event. In late May we expect a visit to Warsaw by the foreign minister of Japan. A few weeks ago we hosted President Musharraf in Warsaw. As I already mentioned during the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee, President Musharraf's visit outside the region is a very important political event; it is also important because of the security of our contingent in Afghanistan. I am convinced that the talks

President Lech Kaczyński had with President Musharraf will not only serve Polish policy, but will also enhance stabilization in the region.

Poland wants to uphold good relations with the well-established non-European democracies—Canada, Australia and New Zealand. During multilateral events we held meetings with senior Canadian government officials. The president met with the premier of Canada, I had talks in Warsaw with the Canadian foreign minister. I am certain that our partnership in many undertakings, our joint actions in the domain of development aid, also granted to third countries—and I wish to stress here the significance of undertakings addressed to such states as Ukraine, because we are jointly implementing development projects there—as well as our collaboration in such difficult missions as Afghanistan, will also benefit political dialogue between our countries.

Our relations with Israel have strategic significance. We maintain very intensive contacts with representatives of the Jewish diaspora organizations. At this point I wish to underline the importance of last year's visit to Israel by President Lech Kaczyński. That was the first visit to Israel by a foreign head of state since the conflict between Israel and Lebanon. Poland is a country that maintains good, strategic relations with Israel. We are also a good partner of the Arab countries and hope that this position will allow Poland to have a meaningful, positive influence on the peace process in the Middle East. In consequence of the president's visit, I recently paid an official several-day visit to Israel. It provided opportunity for consultations with all the leading politicians. I wish to note here that, in addition to bilateral relations, the Middle East peace process was among the most important topics discussed. Currently, we are finalizing arrangements for a Polish Season in Israel in 2008, which will testify to the common heritage of our nations and the present very good state of our cooperation. I wish to reiterate from this rostrum the great importance for me of having been able to take part in the Holocaust Memorial Day at Yad Vashem.

The value of Polish exports last year exceeded 342 billion PLN. That demonstrates our potential and constitutes a formidable basis for establishing closer contacts with countries in the most distant parts of the world. We are striving to regain Poland's traditional influence in the developing countries. Our main partners in Africa are Nigeria and the Republic of South Africa. That is why we have been alarmed by the recent events in Nigeria and want that country to become an area of political stability. We would like to see the threat of terrorism in that region kept in check. The situation in Nigeria was also a subject of my talks with such partners as the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia. Both the European Union and the states of the region, including Gulf states, are highly

concerned by the developments on the African continent. In other African states we are reinforcing democratization processes with the help of development projects.

In our relations with Latin America we will work to boost trade and maintain the high level of political dialogue. Relations with Mexico, Brazil and Argentina are among the priorities. We are attentively watching developments in Cuba.

Mister Speaker,
Members of the House,

Due to its historic experience, Poland attaches great significance to the idea of international solidarity. That idea is a priority, guiding our actions within the United Nations system. We favour UN reforms and improvement of the Organization's effectiveness in the spheres of development, humanitarian aid and environment protection. For many years we have been engaged in United Nations peace and stabilization missions. At the end of last year 811 Poles were taking part in the UN peace operations. We attach particular importance to the elaboration of the principles of a universal review of human rights. As one of the first member states of the Human Rights Council, we declared our readiness to submit to this procedure.

We are working to ensure that Poland's place in the structures of the United Nations system is commensurate with its role in the modern-day world. And so, we are upholding our bid for non-permanent membership of the UN Security Council during the 2010–2011 term, a seat in the UNESCO Executive Council for the years 2007–2011 and in the Economic and Social Council for the years 2008–2010. We have also committed ourselves to other initiatives designed to advance democracy. We are vying for the location in Warsaw of the secretariat of the Community of Democracies. I mentioned that during my address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York last year. Poland hosted the founding conference of the Community of Democracies initiative in 2000, and we want to continue Poland's role in that major initiative.

Poland is substantially committed to the programme of levelling development differences around the world. The Polish programme of foreign assistance is a new, dynamic instrument of Polish foreign policy. We believe that effective assistance to those in need and fulfilment of the Millennium development goals require support for democratization processes, an active civil society, free media and respect for human rights. These actions have to be carried out in a coordinated and combined way. The drafts of two important documents have been elaborated and submitted for consultations: these are the

Strategy of Foreign Aid for the years 2007–2015, codenamed “Solidarity: Development and Freedom,” and a law on foreign aid.

We direct assistance to many countries, building the image of Poland as a country that feels solidarity with those in need. In 2007, our assistance is addressed, first of all, to Ukraine, Belarus, Afghanistan, Moldova, Georgia, Iraq, the Palestinian Autonomy and states of sub-Saharan Africa. An important role in the implementation of the foreign aid programme, especially in African countries, is played by Polish missionaries, whose humanitarian work will continue to enjoy government support.

Members of the House,

For many reasons, very many of our compatriots have moved, or have been forced to move, abroad. The government of Premier Jarosław Kaczyński attaches great importance to cooperation with the Polish diaspora and Poles living abroad, to their maintaining close contacts with their home country, to their cultivation of Polish culture, language and customs. We grant support to Polish expatriate organizations, schools and parishes. We want to nurture their links with the Homeland, at the same time tapping their potential for the benefit of the country. It is an enormous, unused potential of very positive influence on countries where Polish expatriates live, influence which could serve both Poland and the countries of their residence.

We are particularly sensitive to the problems of persons who in recent years went abroad seeking work. Under the government programme “Closer to Work, Closer to Poland” we are extending assistance to migrant workers, monitoring their situation to make sure that their employee rights are respected in European Union states and trying to prevent discrimination against them. In this regard we collaborate both with trade union organizations that operate in Poland and with such institutions as the State Labour Inspection, because of its possibilities of international cooperation. We support local organizations that grant help to Polish citizens. We also cooperate with law-enforcement organs to protect Polish workers from criminal practices.

We are reinforcing the consular service in regions with the greatest concentration of Polish nationals. New consular offices are being established in Manchester, Reykjavik and in Catania, in southern Italy. We are gearing up for full application of European Union regulations, in view of Poland’s planned accession to the Schengen area.

We attach great importance to the protection of the rights of Polish national minorities. At present this is particularly urgent with regard to Poles living in

Belarus, where the authorities are not respecting international standards and bilateral agreements with Poland. Their legally elected representation, the Union of Poles in Belarus, is not recognized by the authorities. The problem of full respect for the rights of persons of Polish origin is also a subject of our talks with Germany and Lithuania. Work is in progress on draft laws concerning Polish citizenship, the determination of Polish origin and the Polish ID Card, and on amendments to the Sejm and Senate election law that will allow the Polish diaspora to have representatives in parliament.

Members of the House,

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs assigns great significance to the shaping of a positive image of our country as a democratic and stable state, and as an attractive cooperation partner. At the same time we emphatically oppose unfounded negative opinions, particularly those distorted by stereotypes and historic prejudice. It is important to promote information both about Poland's historic attainments in building the European civilization, and about modern-day Poland—a proponent of democratic changes and human rights, a country that is developing dynamically in every sphere. In recent years Polish authorities have focused on the promotion of Poland in European Union states. In the future we also intend to be active beyond Europe, especially in countries with considerable development potential, where cooperation has been limited.

We attach substantial weight to the improvement of Poland's image in Jewish communities, mindful of the need to promote around the world everything that has been done in Poland since 1989, and is being done, with regard to the Jewish heritage and culture.

The great civilizational leap forward that awaits Poland within the next few years should be coupled with an energetic promotion of knowledge about our country. We have to exploit the promotional opportunities inherent in our selection as co-hosts of EURO 2012 and to continue the diplomatic campaign to be granted organization of EXPO 2012 in Wrocław. All the structures of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are engaged in that campaign; it is being implemented in coordination with the government plenipotentiary and ministry of culture structures. The MFA is currently working on a Strategy of the Promotion of Poland till 2013; we are also backing reforms of the system of our country's promotion, including the establishment of the economic promotion agency and reform of the Adam Mickiewicz Institute.

We wish to deepen the knowledge of other societies and their opinion-makers about the historic specificity of Poland and other states in the region. For

it has been repeatedly demonstrated that the lack of such knowledge, or reliance on unfair stereotypes, breeds incomprehension for the contemporary challenges and needs of the nations in this part of the world. Poland, as a country that was extremely afflicted by the barbarity of World War II and exceptionally merited in the international struggle against fascism, will oppose all flagrant violations of elementary historic truth. We will not allow Nazi camps to be called “Polish concentration camps,” we will not allow Poland to be accused of collaboration with Hitler’s regime. We will respond to a lack of knowledge with patient explanations, and with resoluteness—to evident bad will. We are pleased that, as a result of numerous interventions by Polish diplomatic missions, often supported by Polish expatriate communities and foreign friends of Poland, the instances of such deceitful language have been increasingly shrinking.

Mister Speaker,

Members of the House,

In conclusion allow me to voice a few words *pro domo sua*. The Polish foreign service is changing. The personnel changes in the ministry that I lead and the entire diplomacy sphere are more than just a routine rotation of staff, they are designed to upgrade quality and introduce young blood. In line with the binding law, diplomatic and consular workers are submitting their lustration statements. Persons entangled in collaboration with the communist security apparatus are leaving the diplomatic service. The MFA is seeking to recruit high-class specialists in such areas as international law, economics, social sciences and international relations. And here I would like to underline the role of one of the branches of the ministry, led by my deputy, Minister Janusz Stańczyk. That branch is responsible for a key element of the state’s foreign policy—legal and treaty affairs. I wish to note that the efforts which the MFA has put recently—and is planning in the near future—into the ratification of agreements, are unprecedented. Now, from this rostrum, I want to thank my co-workers for their hard work.

We attach much importance to the training of diplomats and for this purpose we cooperate with the Polish Institute of International Affairs, the Diplomatic Academy and the National School of Civil Service.

The prospect of assumption by Poland of the EU presidency in 2011 is a profound challenge for the entire Polish administration. Many of the persons who will be assigned foreign postings in the near future will also represent the presidency. This obligates us to ensure their good preparation concerning Union matters.

The tasks of the foreign service have been extended. At the same time, budgetary constraints have prevented allocation of sufficient funds to satisfy urgent needs. The material status of Polish diplomats is still a problem. The salaries and benefits we offer to prospective diplomats are out of proportion to the requirements we place before them and are among the lowest in Europe, also among the new states of the European Union. In consequence, we observe a high rate of staff turnover, with many highly-skilled employees seeking other jobs. This is particularly acute among middle-level diplomats, whose career choices are often determined by attractive financial prospects. Moreover, there are unjustified differences in the remuneration of foreign service employees and professional soldiers posted to missions abroad.

Work is under way on amendments to the foreign service law, which will modify its organization, adapting it to the growing tasks. The proposed changes will make the foreign service more dynamic, enhance the role of the ambassador, regulate the authorization to issue essential executive acts, and specify a catalogue of rights protecting the interests of diplomats' family members.

Mister Speaker,
Members of the House,

The foreign policy programme of the government of Premier Jarosław Kaczyński that I have presented to you is designed to strengthen the position of our state in international relations, enhance its security and ensure the welfare of its citizens. We hope that our undertakings will get the backing of all the political forces in parliament. We recognize and do not question the right of the opposition to criticize the government's actions and to debate about them. We are also aware that on many issues there may be diverse views of Polish foreign policy. Still, may I be allowed to express the hope that foreign policy will be shielded from the ongoing political struggle. Our relations with foreign countries are too important to all of us to put them at risk because of political animosities and internal feuds. I wish to express the hope that we are united by a common goal: building of the position of Poland.

Mister Speaker,
Honourable Members,

Concluding my address I request that you accept the government's foreign policy report. Thank you.

Polish Policy in the European Union

The third year of Poland's membership in the European Union was dominated by work on the Reform Treaty, which was ultimately named the Treaty of Lisbon. It was also the first effective year of the New Financial Perspective for 2007–2013 and another year marked by high growth in trade between Poland and the other members of the European Union.

Background

The most important domestic factor influencing Polish policy both within the European Union and towards its individual member states was the change of government, from the coalition formed by Law and Justice, the League of Polish Families and Self-Defense, to the coalition established by the Civic Platform in coalition with the Polish People's Party following the parliamentary elections held in September 2007. Among other consequences, the coalition also changed the rhetoric in political relations with the European Union. Donald Tusk, the new prime minister, assumed the chairmanship of the Committee for European Integration and of the European Committee of the Council of Ministers, both previously chaired by Foreign Affairs Minister Anna Fotyga. This could entail the shift of responsibility for European coordination tasks from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Chancellery of the Prime Minister. Mikołaj Dowgielewicz was chosen to head the Office of the Committee for European Integration, an institution subordinated to the Prime Minister.¹

The second factor of influence was Russia's embargo on Polish meat imports, imposed already in October 2005 and followed by similar restrictions on vegetables. It became the subject of controversy and discussions within the European Union as a result of Poland's efforts to bring the matter into the

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¹ At the beginning of 2008, another change in the structures responsible for the coordination of Polish European policy was announced, namely the transfer of the OCEI along with its chief official to the MFA starting from 2009. If this announcement is carried through, European affairs will be the responsibility of the new Foreign Affairs Minister, Radosław Sikorski.

context of EU-Russia relations. In the absence of effective action in this respect on the part of a number of EU presidencies and of the European Commission, the Polish government blocked the EU's adoption of a mandate for negotiations about a new partnership and cooperation agreement with Russia. The year 2007 was also marked by the European Union's efforts, notably that of the German presidency, to break the Russian embargo. These efforts, however, did not prove fully effective.

Despite the embargo, which continued throughout the year, the deficit in trade with Russia, the traditional direction of expansion for Polish producers of foodstuffs (meat and vegetables), dropped by some €180 million (from €6 billion to €5.8 billion). This was due to a modest increase in imports (by approx. 8%), accompanied by a robust growth in exports (by 25%).²

The third influencing factor in relations between Poland and the EU in 2007 was the German presidency in the first half of the year. The main focus of the presidency was work on a declaration commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome and the preparations for the spring meeting of the European Council which had outlined long-term plans on energy: conservation, increased production of renewable energy, and preventing climate change. Following the adoption, without any serious controversy among the states, of the Berlin Declaration, the German presidency proceeded with the implementation of the third objective, namely the collection and assessment of the respective member states' positions on the Constitutional Treaty following the period of reflection that had been introduced due to difficulties with the treaty's ratification. The last two months of the German presidency brought surprisingly intense negotiations on the future of institutional reform, which led to the adoption by the European Council of a mandate for detailed negotiations for the Intergovernmental Conference. Already in July, the Conference started working on a new treaty based on the compromise reached within the framework of Constitutional Treaty.

A fourth important factor of influence was Poland's continuous and stable economic growth (GDP in 2007 was higher by 6.5% in real terms than in the previous year, and in 2006 it grew by 6.2% in comparison to 2005),³ and

² *Ocena handlu zagranicznego Polski w 2007 r. (provisional data)*, Warsaw: Ministry of Economy, April 2008, p. 31, www.mg.gov.pl/Analizy+i+prognozy/HANDEL+ZAGRANICZNY.

³ *Gross Domestic Product in 2007*, www.stat.gov.pl.

a systematic drop in the unemployment rate (11.4% in 2007, 14.8% in 2006).⁴ Although both economic indicators are the most important benchmarks for changes taking place in the economies surveyed for the purpose of the Lisbon Strategy, as updated in 2005 (Employment and Economic Growth), this did not significantly affect Poland's position in the rankings prepared to track such changes as part of the implementation of the Strategy. The London-based Centre for European Reform, researching the degree to which countries meet their obligations under the Strategy, placed Poland in the second-to-last position (26th) in the ranking.⁵ Poland came 27th (last) in the previous year's ranking.⁶ In turn, the European Commission, which analyzed the records of National Reform Programs (NPR) formulated by every member state under the Lisbon Strategy, noted that Poland's results were the poorest among all 27 EU members with respect to many indicators used to assess the degree of implementation of the Strategy: the lowest employment rate (54%), dropping professional activity rate (62.3%), highest poverty rate (25%) and lowest employment rate of the elderly (28.1%).⁷

Objectives

The objective of Polish policy toward the EU, as declared by minister Fotyga, was primarily to formulate a position on institutional reform, which was at a standstill following the negative results of the referenda held in France and the Netherlands in 2005. The entourage of the president was to play the leading role in this processes as was stated by the minister in the Sejm shortly before the assumption of the EU presidency by Germany, which was to lead the negotiations of this reform.⁸

A second objective was to enhance Poland's energy security which, beginning with Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz's proposition of

⁴ *Unemployment rate in 1990–2007*, www.stat.gov.pl/gus/45_677_PLK_HTML.htm.

⁵ K. Barysch, S. Tilford, P. Whyte, *The Lisbon Scorecard VIII: Is Europe Ready for an Economic Storm?*, London: Centre for European Reform, 2008.

⁶ K. Barysch, S. Tilford, P. Whyte, *The Lisbon Scorecard VIII: Will Globalisation Leave Europe Stranded?*, London: Centre for European Reform, 2007.

⁷ *Assessments of National Reform Programmes for Jobs and Growth: Poland*, European Commission, Brussels, December 2007, http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/european-dimension/200712-annual-progress-report/index_en.htm.

⁸ Parliament statement made by foreign affairs minister Anna Fotyga on 14 December 2006, shorthand report of the 30th session of the Sejm, [http://parl.sejm.gov.pl/StenoInter5.nsf/0/4C04F6EAF6CB3BABC12572450005EC97/\\$file/30_c_ksiazka.pdf](http://parl.sejm.gov.pl/StenoInter5.nsf/0/4C04F6EAF6CB3BABC12572450005EC97/$file/30_c_ksiazka.pdf).

a European Energy Security Treaty,⁹ became Poland's speciality in its relations with the European Union. This objective was pursued by the President, the Prime Minister and all senior ministers: Minister of Foreign Affairs Anna Fotyga, Minister of the Economy Piotr Woźniak, and Piotr Naimski, the government's plenipotentiary for the diversification of oil and gas supplies to Poland. When the coalition of the Civic Platform and Polish People's Party came to power, the competencies in this respect in 2007 were taken over by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Economy, Waldemar Pawlak.

A third objective was to work for a common EU position on the problem of the Russian embargo, which had been gradually expanded by the Russian authorities beginning in October 2005.

Polish Policy in the European Union

Political relations. On 1 January 2006, Romania and Bulgaria joined the European Union. As a result, the Polish government decided to open the domestic labor market for workers from those countries. In doing so, Poland found itself in a minority group, along with the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and two "old" EU members, Finland and Sweden. It was somewhat surprising that the United Kingdom kept limitations on access to its labor market since it had previously been the symbolic leader of efforts toward full free flow of workers within the EU.

Throughout 2007, public opinion closely followed changes taking place on the domestic labor market and new migration trends among Poles, who took advantage of the gradual opening up of successive EU countries. The first day of May marked the end of the first stage of the transition period (three years long) that member states could take advantage of with regard to workers of new member states. In 2007, all restrictions on access to their labor markets were lifted by the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Only Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France and Germany among the "old" EU members, and Malta from the "new ones" as well as Norway from the European Economic Area maintained certain limitations and did not allow for fully free movement of labor.¹⁰ Considering the positive experience of those states that opened up their labor markets fully, we

⁹ L. Jesień, "Poland's Proposal for the European Energy Security Treaty," in: L. Jesień (ed.), *The Future of European Energy Security*, Cracow: Tischner European University, 2006.

¹⁰ *Four years of Poland's membership in the EU. Analysis of the social and economic costs attributable to the accession to the European Union (1 May 2004 – 1 May 2008)*, Office of the Committee for European Integration, 2008, p. 38—www.ukie.gov.pl/raport2008.

can expect that following the lapse of the second stage of the transition period (two years), i.e. on 1 May 2009, only Austria and Germany will retain certain restrictions for the last three-year stage.

Poles sought work especially in the United Kingdom, although this trend slowed down in the second half of the year. In relation to the local population, however, Ireland accepted the greatest number of Poles (60,000 in 2007 and 90,000 in 2006). Germany traditionally remained an important destination, even though it opened its market for some professions only; here also the number of Polish job seekers decreased. Over 65,000 Poles lived in Spain in the second half of the year. Of the new member states, the Czech Republic was the destination of over 21,000 Poles. According to estimates by the Office of the Committee for European Integration, legal emigration from Poland in 2007 amounted to about one million persons. Although some studies came up with nearly two million, this figure was regarded as largely exaggerated.¹¹

The new phenomenon of Polish emigrants in the European Union, even though it is of an economic nature, should be viewed from a broader perspective. The ability to travel is of the greatest importance here, as this is a freedom that has a cultural, social, political, and also a European dimension for Poles. This is directly related to Poland's accession to the Schengen Agreement, allowing its members' citizens to cross internal borders without any border checks. In 2007, the governments of Poland and the remaining EU member states that were not yet included in the Schengen system collaborated with the European Commission and successive EU presidencies to accelerate work on their inclusion in the second-generation Schengen Information System (SIS II). The scheduled implementation of these tasks seemed under threat for a time. From this perspective, the Portuguese initiative (SISone4ALL) turned out to be very important, and enabled the integration of IT systems as planned.¹² These agreements took effect in December 2007 for land borders, subsequently covering air passenger traffic in March 2008. Thus, 2007 marked a successive stage (after 2004) of Poland's adoption of existing European solutions that its citizens could make use of in their daily lives.

The political actions of the Polish authorities included the maintenance of intense contacts, both bilateral and with the European Union as a whole. On

¹¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 39–40.

¹² *System informacyjny Schengen SISone4ALL w UE*, Warsaw: Ministry of Interior and Administration, 27 March 2007, www.mswia.gov.pl/portal/pl/256/4567/System_Informacyjny_Schengen_SISone4ALL_w UE.html.

28 February 2007, Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński met with ambassadors of the other EU member states. At the initial stage of the German presidency, when preparations for the spring economic summit of the European Council and negotiations on the declaration commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome were under way, the Prime Minister presented Poland's position on some fundamental issues. He stressed the need for a strong and transparent European Union and actions for energy security. He regarded Poland's initiatives as a contribution to common energy security.¹³ Of immeasurable importance were also the meetings of the President and Prime Minister with German Chancellor Angela Merkel and other important German representatives, especially on account of the German presidency. Moreover, numerous discussions were held, also over the phone, with the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, and other commission members.

In 2007, intense work was underway on institutional reforms, whose acceleration was proposed by Germany after the adoption of the Berlin Declaration. In the second half of the German presidency, a very precise mandate was negotiated for the Intergovernmental Conference, which began in July, during Portugal's presidency, to formally agree on amendments to the treaty.

At the beginning of the year, President Lech Kaczyński, who was politically responsible for the negotiations on the treaty at the European Council, revealed the details of the Polish position concerning the establishment of the Foreign Affairs Minister of the European Union, the method of weighing states for qualified majority voting in the Council of the European Union, the threshold of qualified majority, as well as the scope of applicability of majority voting. The President was also interested in the true relation between the weight of member states' and the influence those states have on decisions taken jointly in Brussels. The presentation of the formal Polish position was announced for March.¹⁴

Presidential and government representatives, the so-called "Sherpas," were appointed to conduct discussion with the European Union. They were Marek Cichocki, the President's adviser, and Ewa Ośniecka-Tamecka, head of the Office of the Committee for European Integration (OCEI).

¹³ *O silnej Europie z ambasadorami państw UE*, Warsaw: The Chancellery of the Prime Minister, 28 February 2007, www.kprm.gov.pl/archiwum/070228-3.htm.

¹⁴ L. Kaczyński, *Rozmowy przy kominku*, radio interview for PR I, 26 January 2007, www.prezydent.pl/x.node?id=7543028.

On 25 March 2007, the Berlin Declaration was adopted. It is a relatively smooth document that refers to the achievements of the integration process starting from the Treaties of Rome, and that assesses the state of integration and tries to define basic challenges. The importance of this declaration is primarily to be found in the political context of the day. A relatively easily reached agreement among heads of states and governments of 27 European Union Member States on the issue offered added momentum to the German presidency in its work to revive institutional reform. The declaration stipulates that these changes should be prepared and implemented before the new term of the European Parliament, for which the elections are to take place in June 2009.¹⁵

During the ceremonial event commemorating the anniversary of the Treaties of Rome, Chancellor Angela Merkel announced that at the end of the presidency, only a schedule of further work on institutional reform would be ready.¹⁶ However, not only was a general political agreement negotiated during the next two and a half months but, most importantly, so was a specific mandate for the Intergovernmental Conference. For the first time in the history of EU treaty changes, the mandate turned out to be detailed and specified the field of political compromise, and the Conference was given the task of negotiating the legal details of a new treaty. The Mandate was adopted by the European Council in Brussels in June 2007.¹⁷ The work of the Portuguese presidency and the Intergovernmental Conference were more focused on minor corrections and legal details that failed to stir any significant disputes between member states.

The new treaty was named the Treaty of Lisbon, after the location of its ceremonial signature on 13 December 2007. The substance of the treaty was based on the agreement reached for the Constitutional Treaty of 2004, although, as specified in the Intergovernmental Conference mandate, it doesn't contain stipulations about traits suggesting statehood.¹⁸ This was the consequence of very strong opposition from many member states, including Poland. The formula of a single treaty replacing the existing three treaties was abandoned, as

¹⁵ *Declaration on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of Rome*, Berlin, 25 March 2007, http://europa.eu/50/docs/berlin_declaration_en.pdf.

¹⁶ Speech by Angela Merkel, www.eu2007.de/de/News/download_docs/Maerz/0324-RAA/PolishBK.pdf.

¹⁷ *European Council in Brussels, 21–22 June 2007. Presidency Conclusions*, <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=DOC/07/2&format=HTML&aged=1&language=PL&guiLanguage=en>.

¹⁸ Annex I, Draft Mandate for the Intergovernmental Conference, *ibidem*.

was the definition of European Union symbols, such as the flag, anthem, or currency. It was also decided that decisions would be taken to make the Charter of Fundamental Rights a legally binding document. This decision led to the subsequent negotiations with the United Kingdom and Poland on the partial suspension of the Charter's force in relation to these two countries. These negotiations were concluded with the signature of the UK-Poland protocol and the issuing by Poland of two declarations annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon (No. 61 and 62 in the consolidated version). The protocol refers to the scope of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and the manner of interpreting the Charter by the national judiciary, while the declarations refer to, among other things, legislating on matters of public morality, family law, Poland's full respect of labor rights.

The political compromise in June also concerned the method of weighing the member states' votes during majority voting in the Council of the European Union, and its mechanism. It was decided that the new system, the so-called double majority, provided for in the Constitutional Treaty, which was opposed primarily by Poland, would take effect only in 2014. It was further agreed that a mechanism, modeled on the Ioannina compromise, would allow a group of states that do not have the ability to block a decision taken by qualified majority but is nevertheless strong and numerous enough to persuade the Council to continue searching for compromise solutions. The mechanism is to operate until 2017 in a stronger version initially and a weaker version later on. The essence of the Polish position was to weaken the ability of states with a significantly larger number of votes than the others to outvote their opponents. However, the question remains, also in Poland, to what extent the mechanism negotiated in 2007 truly meets this goal.¹⁹ The mechanism is rather complicated and, therefore, its comprehensive assessment will only be possible in the future.

An important element of the Polish negotiating strategy on the majority voting method in the Council of the European Union was the proposal to abandon weighted votes, adopted by the Treaty of Rome, and the double majority (population and states) provided for in the Constitutional Treaty, in favor of the square root of the population. The proposal had two variants. The first one provided that states' voting power would be equal to the square root of their number of inhabitants, and decisions would be taken by a majority of at least 61.6%. The second version stipulated that at such a coalition should represent at

¹⁹ J. Kranz, *Tło prawne dyskusji nad reformą ustrojową Unii Europejskiej*, Cracow–Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Towarzystwa Naukowego "Societas Vistulana," 2007, p. 123.

least 50% of all countries. Therefore, in its second variant, the Polish proposal was in principle close to the concept of double majority (population and states), although the weight of the population would be reduced by the result of the square root.²⁰ Ultimately, this principle was not adopted and its potential effectiveness was subject to controversies in Poland as well.²¹

In the area of energy security, Poland established cooperation with Lithuania, and both countries agreed on the so-called energy bridge and held negotiations on the construction of a new nuclear power plant in Ignalin. These undertakings are supported by the European Union as they favor the developing its internal energy market. In addition, Poland took action for a greater diversification of energy supplies, something that would not only enhance Poland's energy security, but also that of the entire region and the European Union. In this context, the cooperation with Norway on future natural gas supplies was also important. In March 2007, the company PGNiG SA acquired gas deposits in that country.

In the European Union, 2007 was a breakthrough year also because the European Council adopted a package of energy and climate obligations in the spring, the so-called 3x20. The EU undertook to implement, by 2020, measures generating savings of 20% (in comparison to 1990) in overall energy consumption, to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases, especially CO₂, by 20%, and to ultimately reach a 20% share of renewable energy in the overall energy balance.²²

Initially, the Polish government attempted to resolve the issue of the Russian embargo on Polish food products through bilateral contacts. Its failure in this respect (e.g. unclear reasons for the Russian position following Poland's clarifications concerning the functioning of its veterinary and phytosanitary supervisory systems and export certificates for companies) forced Poland to bring the matter to the European Union level. The legal basis for this step was the European Community's exclusive competence in matters of trade policy with regard to third countries. The absence of a European Union position that was

²⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 124–127. See also: J. Barcz, P. Świeboda, *Opinia w sprawie formuły podejmowania decyzji w Radzie UE większością kwalifikowaną*, Warsaw: Niezależny Instytut Prawa Międzynarodowego i Europejskiego, 15 June 2007, www.nipmie.pl/pliki/opinia.pdf.

²¹ L. Jesień, "Relatywna siła głosu w Radzie Unii Europejskiej. Polityczny punkt widzenia," *Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny*, 2007, no. 3, pp. 103–124.

²² *Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Brussels, 8–9 March 2007*, www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/PL/ec/93142.pdf.

seen as adequate by the Polish government led Warsaw to block, in the autumn of 2006, the negotiations between the European Union and Russia on a new partnership and cooperation agreement.

In this context, the EU-Russia summit, held in Samara on 18 May 2007, was an important event, during which representatives of the European Union, A. Merkel and J. M. Barroso, presented Polish arguments and position firmly during their meeting with President Vladimir Putin. J. M. Barroso stated: “We had an occasion to say to our Russian partners that a difficulty for a Member-State is a difficulty for all of us at the European Union. We are a Union based on principles of solidarity. We now have 27 Member-States. So, a Polish problem is a European problem. A Lithuanian, an Estonian problem is a European problem as well.”²³ Nevertheless, the positions of the respective parties on the embargo remained unchanged until the end of J. Kaczyński government’s term. Only when power was assumed by the new coalition, in the autumn of 2007, did signs emerge that Russia seemed interested in defusing the dispute with Poland.

Economic relations. An important factor that determined the economic relations of Poland in the European Union was the strengthening of the Polish currency (złoty). The value of the Polish currency in relation to the euro grew by nearly 3% (the złoty’s appreciation in relation to the American dollar was much more—almost 11%).²⁴ Another significant factor was a certain slowdown of economic growth both worldwide (from 5% in 2006 to 4.9%), and in the European Union (from 3% to 2.9%, of which in Germany, Poland’s key economic partner, from 2.9% in 2006 to 2.5% in 2007). A third factor was a significant increase in net transfers from the EU budget to Poland, including funds for agriculture and from structural funds. In 2007, the positive balance of transfers was two times higher than in the previous year, and amounted to €5.2 billion.²⁵

Since 2004, Poland has recorded an increase in foreign direct investments. As estimated by the Ministry of the Economy, this was partially due to the domestic economic upswing and Poland’s membership in the European Union.²⁶ In this respect, 2007 was only slightly worse than the record-breaking 2006.

²³ Press conference following the EU–Russia meeting, Samara, 18 May 2007, www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/images/pText_pict/559/Transcript.doc.

²⁴ *Ocena handlu...*, p. 4.

²⁵ *4 years of membership...*, pp. 28–29.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 11.

During those two years, €12.8 billion and €15 billion, respectively, were invested in Poland. Over 85% of these funds came from European Union countries, primarily France, Germany, Austria, Italy and Sweden. It appears that investors are satisfied with doing business in Poland, as is reflected by the 41.5% share of reinvested funds in the total amount of foreign direct investments.²⁷

In 2007, the value of Polish exports exceeded €100 billion for the first time, although it should be stressed that it was the second consecutive year in which imports grew faster than exports, following many years during which the trade deficit was decreasing. As a result, the trade deficit grew to €17.6 billion. Particularly disadvantageous are the trade deficits with China—€7.8 billion, as well as with Russia—€5.8 billion, with the gap in trade with China increasing, while the one with Russia it is slowly being bridged. Against this background, the surplus in trade with competitive European Union markets, conducted in conditions of a single market with a fully free movement of goods and services, stands out. In 2007, this surplus amounted to €3.8 billion and was smaller than in the previous year by about €0.5 billion. This was the first such decrease in several years. Poland's largest trade surplus is in its trade with the United Kingdom (€2.3 billion), while its largest deficit is in its trade with Germany (also €2.3 billion).²⁸

Given that Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007, trade with these countries was counted as part of internal community trade. As a result, the share of Poland's trade within the EU as part of its entire foreign trade increased slightly, to 78.7% for exports and 63.8% for imports. The value of goods exported by Poland to EU markets amounted to over €80 billion. The largest annual growths were recorded for exports to Germany, Italy, the UK, Spain and the Czech Republic. The fastest-growing exports were those of food and agricultural products, chemicals, metallurgical products, electrical machinery and ceramic products. According to the Ministry of the Economy, Poland's satisfactory foreign trade results stem from, for example, the favorable economic situation in the European Union, although in the case of trade with Germany it led to a larger deficit. The volume of trade with Germany and its significance for Poland can be more clearly seen when one realizes that even the improved balance of trade with 15 European Union countries could not compensate for the

²⁷ *Napływ bezpośrednich inwestycji zagranicznych do Polski w 2007 roku*, Warsaw: National Bank of Poland, 2008.

²⁸ *Ocena handlu...*, p. 29.

deteriorating trade results with Germany, as a result of which the Polish surplus in trade with the European Union as a whole decreased slightly.²⁹

Evaluation

Poland's relations with the remaining European Union members in 2007 were influenced, among other factors, by the change of the ruling coalition in Warsaw. The government of Donald Tusk introduced new rhetoric to European cooperation, primarily stressing Poland's desire to co-operate and its readiness to compromise. However, as a result of mutual criticism of the main political forces in the country (Law and Justice and the Civic Platform), also concerning international and community relations, Poland's foreign policy became, for the first time in many years, the subject of sharp disputes. This will not serve to increase the effectiveness of the actions taken by the Polish administration and Poland's diplomats in the European Union.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 30–31.

The Political and Military Aspects of Poland's Security Policy

Background

At the end of 2006, Poland's geo-strategic situation was relatively good, at least in the political and military dimension. The risk of an armed conflict in Europe, or of manifestation of a non-traditional threat such as terrorism, was in fact negligible. Poland's relations with its neighbors were good, and with most of them friendly. Only in relations with Russia and Belarus were there significant problems, but mainly in non-military spheres. A slight risk of regional destabilization existed in connection with still unresolved conflicts or disputes in the Euro-Atlantic area (in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Transdniestria, and the Caucasus). The most important factor in Poland's immediate vicinity that unfavorably affected its perception of state security, thus influencing policy in this sphere, was Russia's confrontational attitude toward its neighbors. This attitude was most acutely felt in the spheres of energy (crises related to natural gas deliveries to Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia, in 2006) and trade (including the embargo on certain imports from Poland, Georgia, or Moldova), and led to growing concerns about Poland's security, particularly in context of energy.

Polish security policy was also affected by the global security situation in 2006, which deteriorated due especially to the growing destabilization of the Middle East and Central Asia despite international efforts (mostly undertaken by the United States or on its initiative). Important in this context were also the crises connected with the nuclear programs of Iran and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. As a result, the credibility of the United States, which has borne the largest responsibility for global security and which is, at the same time, one of Poland's most important partners in the security sphere, had been reduced and its international position weakened.

Another important factor affecting Polish security policy was the situation within NATO and the European Union, which are the most important instruments of that policy. In late 2006, NATO had still not overcome the crisis

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that had existed within the alliance since 2003. Assuming responsibility for the security of all of Afghanistan by the ISAF force in October 2006 reinforced the conviction within NATO about the priority of the difficult Afghan mission. This led not only to an increase of the human and material costs of the Alliance's activities but also to its concentration on day-to-day operations. The November NATO summit in Riga, which was dominated by disputes over the mission in Afghanistan, produced some modest results, and perhaps some dubious ones, as, for instance, the somewhat prematurely-announced full combat readiness of the NATO Response Force (NRF). The summit's failure to address numerous long-term issues (for example, new strategic concept and enlargement) was indicative of serious differences of opinion about the future role of the Alliance.¹

In 2006, the development of the European Union's European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was overshadowed by discussions on the comprehensive reform of EU institutions. Progress was nevertheless made on the most important components of the ESDP—the creation of battlegroups and cooperation within the context of the European Defense Agency. The EU mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in December 2006 ended with success. Poland contributed significantly to some EU achievements. Despite Poland's efforts, however, no agreement was reached on energy security.

In addition to early parliamentary elections, domestic factors of importance for Poland's security policy in 2007 seem to include the importance attached to this policy by both government and the president, as well as by the public opinion and the opposition. The parties in power until the 21 October elections, particularly the senior coalition partner Law and Justice (PiS), stressed the importance of issues of national security and the necessity to make ongoing effort to strengthen it.² Law and Justice often invoked patriotic values, national pride, and national interest, as well as Poland's right to pursue a foreign policy that is autonomous and independent (of the influence of its closest partners and allies, such as the EU countries, as well). President Lech Kaczyński's position was an identical one. Significantly, the government's view of the importance of

¹ More in *Rocznik Strategiczny 2006/07*, pp. 136–137.

² The foreign policy positions of the government and of PiS can be considered identical, as the influence of the coalition parties (League of Polish Families and Self-Defence) on foreign policy was negligible and their views on certain issues were more distant from the government's positions than were those of the opposition parties (for instance, on the mission in Iraq and Afghanistan). See P.M. Kaczyński *Polska polityka zagraniczna w latach 2005–2007: co po konsensie?*, Warsaw, 2008, pp. 19–21.

security issues was shared by the public at large and by all the opposition parties, including the largest, Civic Platform (PO).³

Discrepancies between the government (*de facto* PiS) and the opposition, and public opinion to an even greater extent, had more to do with the preferred methods and instruments of Poland's security policy and with steps taken in this sphere. The government advocated an active policy, entailing a significant military component and closer ties with the United States. A manifestation of this position was the extension of the Polish armed forces' mission to Iraq, the decision to increase the number of troops in Afghanistan and the increasingly intense (though informal until May 2007) discussions about the deployment in Poland of elements of the American anti-missile defense system. Public opinion was critical of the country's military involvement abroad,⁴ however, and its support for the deployment of the anti-missile shield in Poland and for NATO as the primary multilateral instrument of Poland's security policy was also on the wane.⁵ Even though the opposition parties, including PO, supported an active security policy, they viewed with skepticism the majority of the steps taken by Jarosław Kaczyński's government, such as its decision to build closer ties with the United States above all by expanding cooperation on missile defense and through Poland's military presence in Iraq (only the Polish People's Party—PSL—was against the idea of basing Poland's security on relations with the United States).⁶ The opposition, however, viewed the present and future role of

³ According to a survey by Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, conducted between 1 and 4 December 2006, ensuring security for Poland in the present international situation was considered important or very important by 94% of respondents. *Najważniejsze cele działań państwa—postulaty i oceny. Komunikat z badań*, January 2007, no. BS/4/2007, p. 2.

⁴ In October 2006, Poland's involvement in UN missions was supported by 25% of Polish citizens (57% were in favor of selective involvement); involvement in NATO missions by 21% (52%), involvement in EU missions by 20% (51%), and in *ad hoc* coalitions by 5% (21%). At the same time, 39% of respondents were against participation in UN missions, 43% against Poland's participation in NATO and EU missions, and 71% opposed participation in "coalitions of the willing." *Opinia publiczna o udziale polskich żołnierzy w misjach poza granicami kraju. Komunikat z badań*, Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, October 2006, no. BS/161/2006, p. 2.

⁵ According to the "Transatlantic Trends" report of 2006, 48% of Polish citizens considered NATO to be the primary instrument of Poland's security policy (64% in 2002). In June 2006, 35% supported the deployment in Poland of American missile defense (54% were against it), in December 2005, 50% were in favor and 32% against, and in February 2007, 28% were in favor and 55% against. *Polacy o tarczy antyrakietowej. Komunikat z badań*, Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, February 2007, no. BS/28/2007, p. 2.

⁶ P.M. Kaczyński, *op.cit.*, pp. 47–53.

the European Union in Poland's security policy more optimistically than did the government.

Premises and Objectives

It is not possible to point to a single government document which comprehensively presented the premises and objectives of Polish security policy and which remained current throughout 2007. Their most detailed presentation is contained in the document entitled Government Information on Polish Foreign Policy, presented on 11 May at the Sejm by the PiS foreign affairs minister, Anna Fotyga, and in Prime Minister Donald Tusk's opening address on 23 November 2007 as head of the PO-PSL government following the 21 October elections.⁷

To a great extent, minister Fotyga made reference to the most important premises Poland's security policy in previous years. She did however, make some changes of emphasis, and alter the relative importance of particular issues, thus changing the shape of the policy itself. She emphasized the top-priority weight of security issues more strongly than her predecessors had, and saw "the ultimate confirmation of Poland's security and sovereignty" as a fundamental goal of the government in the years to come. She viewed NATO, still considered the primary instrument of Polish security policy, not only as "an effective instrument for collective defense" and for combating new threats, but also as a means to maintain the United States' involvement in Europe as a "power guaranteeing security and stabilizing political and military relations on the continent." She reiterated Poland's support for the alliance's "open door" policy, and for the development of cooperation with partner states, underscoring the need to adopt a pragmatic approach in relations with Russia. She also pointed to the importance of reinforcing ties between NATO and the European Union, while stressing that Poland's voice must be sovereign, rather than "diluted by the forces at play and our position in the European Union."

⁷ The new "National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland" was adopted in the same month (see www.bbn.gov.pl/dokumenty/SBN_RP.pdf) and should represent the basic document for Polish policy in this respect. However, the document's actual importance for the policy pursued in 2007 is limited both by the time of its adoption and by the related circumstances (President Kaczyński signed it on 13 November 2007, three days before appointing PO's leader, Donald Tusk, as prime minister, and ten days before the parliamentary vote of confidence test for the PO-PSL coalition government, whose representatives did not participate in work on the Strategy).

Minister Fotyga emphasized Poland's involvement in the effort in the stabilization of the global order though its involvement in non-proliferation efforts and in peacekeeping and stabilization operations carried out either by the "coalition of the willing" (in Iraq) or by universal organizations such as the UN, as well as the importance of the "human dimension of security policy," including the promotion of democratic values and combining traditional policies in this respect with the provision of development aid by Poland. The Polish foreign minister devoted very little attention to the European Union, mentioning only the continuation of work on the establishment of battle groups and cooperation as part of the European Defense Agency.

Two things stand out in minister Fotyga's statement: Firstly, she repeated emphasis on the fundamental importance of energy security issues, including the diversification of supplies and, secondly, the clear indication of the top priority given to relations with the United States as "guarantor of the global order."⁸ The most important manifestation of this cooperation was to be the deployment in Poland of elements of the American anti-missile defense system. Poland's foreign minister expressed the hope that these installations would not only serve to strengthen the security of the United States and Poland, but also that of the international community.⁹

Prime Minister Tusk devoted a relatively large amount of attention to security policy in his *exposé*. He named NATO as its main pillar, but also referred to membership in the European Union as an "obvious guarantee" of Poland's security. Declaring Poland's intent to remain a "strong link" in the Alliance, he announced that efforts would be made for a fairer distribution of costs incurred in connection with participation in the organization's activities and of the resulting benefits. The prime minister presented expeditionary activity, including the mission in Afghanistan, as a form of investment in solidarity of allies. Such investment was made in the hope that it would lead to the organization's greater involvement in issues of regions closer to Poland. He pointed to the European Union as the main platform for building energy security for Poland and of Europe as a whole, and emphasized the need to work on EU-wide solidarity in this area. In addition, he announced Poland's contribution to the development of European military capabilities as a factor for promoting the European Union's global role.

⁸ A similar position was adopted in the National Security Strategy of November 2007, p. 6.

⁹ "Government Information on Polish Foreign Policy in 2007," see above p. 23.

The section of his *exposé* devoted to relations with the United States also related to security. While emphasizing the community of shared values between Poland and the United States, and the need to assure a strong position for Poland in the European Union, Prime Minister Tusk declared himself in favor of closer cooperation between the EU as a whole and the United States in the sphere of security. At the same time, he declared that efforts would be made to increase American presence in Poland and to strengthen Polish defense capabilities thanks to its cooperation with the United States, indicating, however, that further negotiations on anti-missile defense would be preceded by consultations with Poland's NATO partners and with certain neighbors (i.e. Russia).¹⁰

On the basis of the above mentioned documents and political practice, the three most important characteristics of Polish security policy for 2007 were:

1. Giving security matters a level of priority requiring an active role and a greater involvement in international actions, including expeditionary military missions. However, the improvement of Poland's energy security, an essentially non-military objective, was treated as an issue of fundamental significance.

2. NATO and the European Union remained the primary instruments of Poland's security policy. Nevertheless, before the PO-PSL coalition came to power, the overriding importance of the Alliance had been underscored in the political and military dimension. The European Union, on the other hand, was considered to be the primary platform for action for the improvement of Poland's energy security. The primary objective was the increase in effectiveness of both organizations and the strengthening of Poland's position within them as a member state.

3. In fact, however, the most important role in Poland's security policy was played by the US and by efforts to develop cooperation with the United States in order to achieve the status of a close and, to some degree, privileged partner. The anti-missile shield became the *de facto* principal issue of the Polish security policy in 2007, while Poland's activities in a multilateral context (NATO, the EU and other international cooperation institutions) were to a considerable extent viewed by the Polish authorities, especially before the October elections, in terms of their impact on relations with the United States.

¹⁰ Full text of the opening address at www.kprm.gov.pl/s.php?id=1389&path=10325.

The “Strategic Partnership” with the United States

As already mentioned, the Polish government regarded the development of Polish-American relations in the area of security as a high-priority issue. This followed, on the one hand, from the conviction that Poland’s sovereignty and security are at risk owing to the country’s dependence on Russian energy resources and, on the other hand, from the conclusion that the United States is the only partner able to offer Poland real military assistance and support in resolving its security problems.¹¹ The plan to locate in Poland an interceptor missile base being an element of the European component of the American anti-missile defense system provided an opportunity for closer ties with the United States. It was assumed that the deployment of these installations in Poland would increase America’s interest in Poland’s security and indirectly reinforce it.

On 20 January 2007, the United States officially turned to Poland (and to the Czech Republic, where the radar making up the second element of the shield’s European component was to be located) with a proposal to begin negotiations. Poland stated its willingness to begin talks, announcing that it would agree to the building of the base only if it will help to improve Polish and international security. The United States assured that the European component of the system is to be a defense against a possible Iranian ballistic attack on the eastern coast of the United States, against American troops in Europe, or against the territories of the majority of NATO countries (for technical reasons, the system would not protect Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey). At the beginning of March, the Polish government gave signals that, in exchange for its consent to the building of the base in Poland, it would expect to conclude a political agreement that would “bring relations with the US to a higher level.”¹² This was universally interpreted (as suggested by the authorities, including the head Polish negotiator,

¹¹ A popular idea within PiS, and one shared by Prime Minister J. Kaczyński and President L. Kaczyński (not formally a party member), was that obligations under the Alliance currently do not represent a credible guarantee of Poland’s security. This resulted from the difficulties of the NATO operation in Afghanistan, and the general evolution of NATO and its undertakings after Kosovo War in 1999. Additionally, lack of confidence in the European Union in this respect resulted from an overall skepticism about the EU, including convictions about its limited military resources and the overly favorable attitude to Russia of some of its members. P.M. Kaczyński, *op. cit.*, pp. 43–45.

¹² *Rzeczpospolita* of 8 March 2007. This expectation could testify to divergent Polish and American threat assessment missile defense were supposed to counter, as well as growing Polish government’s conviction that deployment of the American missile defenses alone might not be sufficient to ensure security for the country.

Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Witold Waszczykowski) as expectation for the United States to provide additional guarantees (distinct from its obligations under NATO) to help Poland in case of threat and to base Polish-American relations on a model of bilateral alliance.¹³ In reaction to the position expressed by the opposition, which wanted to consult NATO countries and the European Union on the missile defenses, and to Russia's mounting criticism of the American plans, the government underscored the bilateral nature of the talks. The government declared its intention—which was never actually realized—of cooperating closely with the Czech Republic throughout the negotiations, concluding that the task of overcoming Russian resistance to the missile defenses in Europe, and in Poland in particular, was a task for American diplomacy. The government position met with criticism from the opposition and from some experts on security, nor was it accepted by citizens.¹⁴

Official negotiations began in May. Progress was slow, however, and a number of contentious issues emerged, such as those concerning financing for the construction and operation of the base. Despite this, President Lech Kaczyński, during his visit to Washington D.C. on 17 July and following talks with President George W. Bush, unexpectedly stated that Poland would consent to the construction of the shield—which is “good for Poland” “in itself,” irrespective of other possible additional agreements, although many details remained to be agreed upon.¹⁵ There was an attempt to accelerate the talks in September, owing to the approaching parliamentary elections, with a focus on the part of the

¹³ Cf. Minister W. Waszczykowski's interview for TOK FM radio, 6 June 2007, <http://serwisy.gazeta.pl/tokfm/1,75295,4206440.html>. At the same time, contrary to the expectations of part of the opposition (including Civic Platform), the government avoided submitting specific demands concerning military assistance from the United States (for instance, the provision to Poland of PAC-3 missile systems). It was argued that such demands would make agreement on the missile defense and general agreement on political and military cooperation harder to reach.

¹⁴ The criticisms concerned both the justification for building the shield (doubts were produced by the technical reliability of the system, accuracy of threat assessment, and its potential influence on the international order as a measure increasing the strategic advantage of the US over the rest of the world) as well as the government's negotiation posture. In context of the latter critics question assumption that there is a direct link between the establishment of the base in Poland and US interest in the security of our country; the need to refrain from making specific demands in terms of military cooperation; and the purpose of maintaining the bilateral nature of the talks. Cf. “Po co nam tarcza? Debata Gazety,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 3–4 March 2007; O. Osica, “Tarcza nie zapewni nam przyjaźni Amerykanów,” *Rzeczpospolita* of 1 February 2007. According to a survey by Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej, the proportion of the population opposed to the base in Poland was from 55% to 60% and the percent of supporters from 24% to 27% for the period from February to November 2007, www.cbos.pl.

¹⁵ *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 17 and 18 July 2007.

agreement concerning the base for interceptor missiles. The government continued to declare its intent to enter into an additional agreement with the United States, but more in reference to strictly military cooperation than security guarantees.¹⁶ The negotiations were not finished before the elections on 21 October.

The new government had a substantially different view of the talks. It announced that the resumption of negotiations would be preceded by consultations with NATO countries and neighbors (i.e., Russia). Moreover, acting on the premise that building the system did not, in itself, directly enhance Polish security, the government intended to present, more forcefully than its predecessor had, Poland's expectations concerning appropriate compensation for its consent to the deployment of the shield on Polish territory. Primarily form of this compensation should be increased American military assistance and support in the modernization of the Polish armed forces (although demands for special security guarantees were not abandoned). However, the main points of the new Polish position were not formally presented to the United States before the end of 2007 (they were only submitted in mid-January 2008, during a visit in Washington D.C. by Defense Minister Bogdan Klich). The new position was criticized by the Presidential Chancellery and by the Law and Justice party (in opposition since the October 2005) as being "inflexible and confrontational" and as asking for conditions impossible for the US authorities to meet. Modification of the Polish government's position on the missile defenses did not alleviate society's critical attitude toward the negotiations or the project itself.¹⁷

The second main subject concerning relations with the United States in the security realm was the participation of Polish armed forces in the stabilization mission to Iraq.¹⁸ The deteriorating situation in Iraq in 2006 led to discussions in

¹⁶ Agreements on military cooperation between Turkey and Italy and the United States were referred to as model solutions for the negotiated agreement, although neither provided any alliance-related obligations or security guarantees beyond the Treaty of Washington.

¹⁷ 57% of the population were against location of the base in Poland, while 24% were in favor. *O terminie wycofania żołnierzy polskich z Iraku, stosunku do ulokowania w Polsce elementów tarczy antyrakietowej i obawach przed terroryzmem. Komunikat z badań*, Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej, November 2007, no. BS/176/2007, pp. 2–3.

¹⁸ Poland's presence among the coalition forces was also an expression of Polish involvement in combating terrorism; however, from the very beginning, but particularly in 2007, the mission was perceived as a way to establish closer relations with the United States, while stabilizing the Middle East was of secondary importance from the Polish perspective. Such perceptions of Poland's military involvement were confirmed by Prime Minister Tusk in his opening address, when he referred only to the performance of obligations toward the American ally, not to the government of Iraq.

the United States on future strategy and the nature of the military involvement there. It was ultimately decided to strengthen the military contingent stationed there (the so-called surge) and to keep it in Iraq until the situation stabilized and the Iraqi government acquired the means to ensure internal security. Under such circumstances, the Polish government, despite the negative attitude of public opinion, decided to extend the presence of the Polish contingent in Iraq by another year, until 31 December 2007 (the appropriate decision was issued by President L. Kaczyński on 22 December 2006).¹⁹ The number of troops was maintained (900 soldiers deployed on the ground, and 300 as reserves in Poland). The deployment of Polish force within the coalition did not change either: the Polish contingent in Iraq remained the core component of the Multinational Division Central-South, led by a Polish commander, responsible for training the Iraqi army and ensuring security in the provinces of Qadisiyah and Wasit (responsibility for the latter was handed to the Multinational Division Center in June 2007). The 8th rotation of Polish forces, on duty in Iraq in the first half of the year, was primarily carrying out training and advisory tasks, as well as those related to civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). In response to an increased number of attacks on the division's troops during this period, the rapid reaction component of the 9th rotation, which had been serving in Iraq since July 2007, was reinforced, and its operational strategy was changed to a more offensive one than that of previous rotations.²⁰

In the autumn, with the expiry of the Polish troops' mandate in Iraq approaching and with the electoral campaign under way, the debate about ending the Polish involvement in the Iraqi mission resurfaced. The government and the president firmly declared themselves in favor of Poland's continued presence in Iraq, emphasizing the importance of cooperation in Iraq for closer ties with the United States, the continued instability of the situation there, as well as the mounting threat from Iran. The opposition, on the other hand, strongly supported by public opinion, resolutely—to a greater (Self-Defense, League of Polish

¹⁹ In January 2007, 77% of Poles were against the involvement of Polish troops in Iraqi mission, while 20% were in favor. *Opinia publiczna o udziale polskich żołnierzy w misjach poza granicami kraju oraz o ostatnich wydarzeniach w Iraku. Komunikat z dwusetnego badania aktualnych problemów kraju*, Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, February 2007, no. BS/19/2007, pp. 1–2.

²⁰ The possibility of changing the nature of the mission from training and mentoring to stabilizing was already indicated in April, and the Polish armed forces' chief of operations, General Henryk Tacik, even suggested, for the first time, a possible increase in the number of Polish troops in Iraq. Cf. *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 6 April 2007.

Families) or lesser degree (Civic Platform, the Left and Democrats)—demanded an end to the mission, arguing that obligations toward the United States had been more than fulfilled, the mission's objectives had been met, that resources were needed for other Polish military operations (such as in Afghanistan), the premises behind the attack on Iraq in 2003 had been false, and there were no economic benefits from the Iraq operation. For all these reasons, the decision to withdraw Polish troops from Iraq by October 2008 was one of the first taken by Prime Minister Tusk after forming his government. It was criticized by President Kaczyński, who signed the relevant act only on 21 December 2007.²¹ The allies, including the United States, accepted the decision with calm and understanding (Radosław Sikorski, foreign affairs minister since November, emphasized on numerous occasions the decision had been consulted with Poland's partners in the international coalition and the Iraqi authorities).

In keeping with the motion submitted to the president, the 10th Polish armed forces rotation (900 soldiers), of a advisory and training character, was sent to Iraq. Its deployment ended in January 2008. The main objective of the 10th rotation was the efficient termination of the Polish mission, including the completion of training courses for Iraqi forces and of development programs within the CIMIC framework. In the opinion of the present Polish government, the five-year military involvement in Iraq was a success, even if it did not lead to the initially expected economic benefits. In this view, as a manifestation of solidarity between Poland and the United States, it had contributed to closer military cooperation between the two countries as well as to the improvement of Poland's image in the Middle East and an improved level of training of the Polish armed forces.²²

The North Atlantic Alliance

Despite the above-mentioned concerns of some politicians about NATO's credibility, in 2007 the alliance continued to be the basic multilateral instrument

²¹ "Postanowienie prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej o przedłużeniu okresu użycia Polskiego Kontyngentu Wojskowego w składzie Międzynarodowych Sił Stabilizacyjnych w Iraku," *Monitor Polski*, 2007, no. 100, item 1088.

²² This position of the government was presented on 9 January 2008 to the Sejm Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committees by Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski and Minister of National Defense Bogdan Klich. They admitted, however, that many issues in Polish-Iraqi relations remained open (including the matter of Iraq's debts). *Biuletyn z posiedzenia Komisji Obrony Narodowej (nr 4) i Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych (nr 7)*, no. 130/VI kad., 9 January 2008, pp. 5–8, www.sejm.gov.pl.

of Poland's security policy.²³ For the alliance as a whole and for Poland, the priority was, like in previous years, the ISAF operation in Afghanistan where the situation was still unstable, and where the fighting against the insurgents opposing the Kabul government and the presence of international forces continued, particularly in the South and East part of the country.²⁴ Poland's decision in September 2006 to reinforce its contingent with over 1,000 additional soldiers, without operational restrictions (caveats) was very well received by NATO allies. In keeping with the decision taken by the president on 22 November 2006, the Polish forces in Afghanistan were to be deployed by April of the following year, and to take on patrol and combat operations in May. However, problems with equipping the force, and the logistical complexity of the deployment operation, on account of the lack of appropriate Polish transportation capabilities and dependence in this respect on the United States, led to a delay in the deployment of the contingent.²⁵ The causes mentioned as reasons for this delay included the poor intelligence preparation for the mission (a consequence, to some degree, of the dissolution of the Military Intelligence Services, and the reorganization of military intelligence and counter-intelligence). The situation was further complicated by the resignation, in February 2007, of defense minister Sikorski, some of the reasons for which had to do with differences concerning the Afghan mission.

²³ Probably the most often quoted statement of a government representative on the then authorities' "limited confidence" in NATO was a fragment of a speech by Deputy Ministry of Foreign Affairs Witold Waszczykowski at a Business Centre Club conference on 1 March 2007, devoted to the plans to deploy elements of the American missile defense in Poland. During the conference Deputy Minister reportedly said that "NATO now is not the alliance we were dreaming of and does not meet our expectations." Even though the minister argued that he had been misunderstood and imprecisely quoted by the journalists reporting on the conference (e.g., from *Rzeczpospolita*), the statement itself, taken as a peculiar "motion of no confidence" for NATO, also explained the attempts to enter into separate alliance agreements with the US. Cf. *Rzeczpospolita* of 8 March 2008.

²⁴ The mission to Afghanistan, with PLN 461 million budgeted for it by the Ministry of National Defence, was the most expensive operation for Polish troops in 2007; www.isaf.wp.mil.pl/kontyngent.html.

²⁵ Disputes focused particularly on the decision to equip Polish forces in Afghanistan with Rosomak transporters, which some experts considered were too poorly armored. Quite astonishingly the lack of Polish helicopters in Afghanistan was much less debated (the necessary purchases were made after the decision to increase the contingent, thus to the end of 2007 helicopters of Polish Army were not deployed to Afghanistan), although this made the Polish units totally dependent on the allies (above all, on the United States) as far as in-theater air-lift capability is concerned. See *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 12 December 2006 and 22 May 2007.

Poland neither organize its own Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan nor deploy its forces as one concentrated operational unit. As a result, components of the Polish contingent found themselves in the areas of responsibility of four ISAF regional commands out of five. In addition, the core of the Polish force, namely the three companies making up the Polish Combat Group, which had been deployed to the provinces of Ghazni and Paktika in eastern Afghanistan with the task to secure the Kabul-Kandahar highway, were integrated with the structure of the American forces, which had arrived in the area earlier and were simultaneously involved in the anti-terrorist “Enduring Freedom” operation, which was separate from that conducted by ISAF.²⁶ The Polish force was thereby subordinated to the command of the American-led East command.²⁷ This concept of Poland’s involvement was criticized by some experts, who pointed out that it led to the Polish contingent’s excessive dependence on the American forces, and that the contingent’s dispersion would not enable it to influence the course of the ISAF operation in proportion to its size. The government emphasized the lack of alternatives to this solution, owing to limited logistical and funding capabilities, and the advantages to be derived from the Polish forces’ close cooperation with the United States army (modern equipment, level of training).²⁸

The deployment of the Polish contingent, commanded by General Marek Tomaszewski (at the same time Deputy Commander of the ISAF force in the East Region), began in March and was completed in June, when Polish troops started to conduct patrolling and stabilization operations in the provinces of Ghazni and Paktika. In August, the first Polish soldier (the only one in 2007) died in Afghanistan.

²⁶ See *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 22 May 2007.

²⁷ The first rotation of PMC Afghanistan was deployed in the following areas: Regional Command North (RC(N))—some 80 soldiers responsible for protection of the staff of PRT led by Swedish and serving in the regional HQ in Mazar-e-Sharif; Regional Command South—a special forces unit (some 100 soldiers) in the province of Kandahar; Regional Command Capital (RC(C)—Kabul)—officers in the ISAF HQ (a so-called composite command—7 positions) and the regional HQ, Regional Command East (RC(E))—some 900 soldiers of the Polish Combat Group, the National Support Element and the Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT), as well as personnel of command of Polish contingent in Baghram. However, the separation of the Polish contingent also resulted from the fact that the units serving in the RC(N), RC(C)—Kabul (except ISAF HQ personnel) and RC(S) area of responsibility had already participated in the NATO operation or “Enduring Freedom” operation (special forces in Kandahar) prior to the decision about expanding a mission in September 2006. See www.isaf.wp.mil.pl/kontyngent.html.

²⁸ *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 22 May 2007.

From September to October, the 2nd rotation of the Polish contingent, also composed of 1,200 soldiers, was deployed in Afghanistan, under the command of General Jerzy Biziewski. Despite calls made to NATO member states by the alliance's secretary general and some allies (the Netherlands, Canada, the US) for greater involvement in ISAF operations due to intense fighting in the South and East of Afghanistan, Poland did not provide more soldiers for the mission.²⁹ In November, the military prosecutor's office arrested seven soldiers participating in the Afghan operations on charges of having breached the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of 1959 during the shelling of the village of Nangar-Khel (16 August), leading to the death of six civilians.³⁰ This led to a discussion on the desirability and the effectiveness of the way in which the Polish contingent in Afghanistan was organized, and particularly its close operational links with American forces. The new government, formed after the October elections, gave high-priority to the ISAF mission among Poland's foreign expeditions, and announced in December 2007 that the contingent in Afghanistan would be reorganized and consolidated, with a view to assuming responsibility for security in the provinces of Paktika or Ghazni.³¹ It was argued that this would not only increase the effectiveness of Poland's involvement in Afghanistan, but would also make it more noticeable to NATO allies and thus strengthen Poland's position in the alliance. On 28 December 2007, Defense Minister Bogdan Klich announced the government's decision to reinforce the contingent by sending an additional 400 soldiers and 8 helicopters.

The modifications brought to Poland's strategy in Afghanistan did not alter the Polish public opinion's low level of support for Poland's participation in the ISAF.³²

²⁹ Only some minor modifications of structure of the contingent were made, such that there were no more Polish forces in the North (RC(N)), and the Polish units in Kabul (except the officers from the ISAF HQ) came under the command of the Regional Command East. See www.isaf.wp.mil.pl/kontyngent.html.

³⁰ *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 15 November 2007. In August, the Ministry of National Defense only released short information on the issue, in which it stated that the village had been shelled in reaction to the rebels' attack on a Polish patrol, and the civilian casualties had resulted from a tragic coincidence. See *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 24 August 2008.

³¹ In March 2008, it was announced that control would be taken of Ghazni. See *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 22–24 March 2008.

³² In January 2007, 75% of citizens were against the involvement of Polish troops in Afghanistan, while 20% were in favor; in December the respective figures were 83% and 14%. *Opinia publiczna...*, February 2007, no. BS/19/2007, p. 2; *Stosunek do obecności polskich żołnierzy w Afganistanie oraz do ostatnich wydarzeń związanych z tą operacją. Komunikat z badań*, Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej, December 2007, no. BS/188/2007, p. 1.

Poland's activeness in the alliance's missions was not limited to the Afghan operation. Poland maintained its involvement in KFOR in Kosovo, where 300 Polish soldiers from the Polish-Ukrainian battalion POLUKRBAT serve in the American-led Multi-National Task Force East (MNTF-E). As in previous years, a Polish navy vessel was involved in the operation "Active Endeavour" in the Mediterranean Sea (the submarine *Bielik*, until April 2007). In addition, Polish military instructors were participating in the NATO training mission (NTM-I) in Iraq.

Besides operational activities, a very important aspect of NATO work, from Poland's viewpoint, was the issue of the alliance's formulation of a common position on the missile defense system that the United States was working on with selected NATO members (Poland and the Czech Republic), and on the relation of this project to NATO programs of a similar nature.³³ However, it was mainly the United States that wanted the alliance to define its position on the issue, as it was eager to reconcile the differences of opinion among the allies about this project, and particularly about building part of the system in Europe.³⁴ At meetings in Brussels and Oslo on 20 and 27 April, the ministers of defense of the member states gave their support to the implementation of the American program in its proposed form, with the reservation, however, that the security of all NATO countries must remain indivisible. They also acknowledged the complementary nature of the program in relation to the projects worked on by the alliance, although they did not make a definite decision on the program's future nature and status (i.e. whether the system could become a common NATO asset and, if so, to what extent and on what terms). In June, they found that the feasibility study for NATO's long-range anti-missile defense system, presented in May 2007, may in the future form the basis for integrating NATO and US projects.³⁵

³³ Since 2004, work has been underway at NATO to develop the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) to integrate the allies' partially existing and functioning missile defense systems. Also, a feasibility study was conducted (May 2006) for the Alliance's long-range missile defense system. More in B. Górka-Winter, "Techniczne oblicza tarczy," *Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny*, 2007, no. 3.

³⁴ Suggestions to give the system the status of a NATO project appeared most frequently in Germany. Cf. Ł. Adamski, "Niemiecka debata o systemie obrony przeciwrakietowej," *Biuletyn PISM*, 2007, no. 17.

³⁵ More on the arrangements during subsequent NATO meetings in www.nato.int/issues/missile_defence/index.html.

Poland's position on this issue was deliberately ambiguous. On the one hand, the Polish government expected that the system in its present form would be endorsed by all the states of the Alliance while, at the same time, supporting the development of NATO missile defense programs and pointing to the possibility of using the American project in future NATO-wide solutions.³⁶ On the other hand, it stressed the bilateral nature of Polish-American talks and, in contrast to Czech negotiators, did not go out of its way to seek a clear declaration of the intent about turning the system into a common NATO asset in the future in the agreement being prepared with the United States. The opposition (especially Civic Platform) did call on the government to take a clearer stand in favor of this option.³⁷ However, even after the change of government, Poland's position on the potential "NATO-isation" of the American anti-missile shield did not become any more legible, something that could, at least partially, be explained by a desire to retain as much room to maneuver in bilateral talks with the Americans as possible.

In 2007, Poland also took other action aimed at transforming the alliance's military capabilities. Along with the other 16 members of the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) program, Poland decided on 20 June to establish a special agency, NAMO (NATO Airlift Management Organization) to support the program. Polish land forces (some 220 soldiers) and navy units took part in the NATO Response Force (NRF) exercises, and in May exercises for the Navy component of this force (Noble Mariner) took place in Gdynia. However, the growing operational involvement of Polish armed forces limited their possibilities for transformation. For this reason, at a meeting of NATO defense ministers in Noordwijk (24–25 October), National Defense Minister Aleksander Szczygło supported modifying the organizational model of the NATO Reaction Force and (indicating, however, that the change would be temporary).³⁸

As Poland saw this as an occasion to strengthen its position within NATO, it continued to express its intention to host the alliance's military installations,

³⁶ Minister W. Waszczykowski's statement at the Sejm on 11 May 2007, <http://ks.sejm.gov.pl:8009/kad5/041/50414077.htm>.

³⁷ See *Biuletyn z posiedzenia Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych*, no. 2225/V kad., 5 July 2007.

³⁸ The so-called "graduated approach" or modular concept of the force was agreed on at the meeting, providing for a lower level of readiness of some units delegated to the NATO Reaction Force, while keeping the overall size of the force (25,000 soldiers) and its range of activities unchanged. The decision was primarily a consequence of the withdrawal by some states of certain units submitted for the subsequent rotations, which was justified by the growing demands of the mission in Afghanistan. Cf. www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL25654988.

including the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) base, on its territory. With Minister Sikorski's departure from government, however, the government's interest in the subject diminished somewhat. Poland made efforts to secure the nomination of General Franciszek Gągor, Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, to the post of chairman of the NATO Military Committee. Ultimately, however, despite support for this candidacy by some members, including the United States, he lost to the Italian admiral Giampaolo di Paola.³⁹

Poland showed little activeness in the increasingly lively debates within NATO on the organization's tasks in the area of energy and ICT security. Following the electronic attacks on Estonia's ICT infrastructure at the turn of April to May (the Alliance not only granted, with the agreement of all its members, diplomatic support to Estonia but also technical and expert assistance), NATO initiated work on the formulation of ICT strategy. Poland did not get especially involved in these efforts, however. Similarly, Poland did not present, in 2007, any propositions concerning the role of the Alliance in ensuring the energy security of its members, although this was a subject discussed by President Kaczyński and Prime Minister Tusk with NATO representatives in Brussels.⁴⁰

Relatively little attention was paid by NATO to the subject of its enlargement and to cooperation with third countries. Poland firmly supported maintaining NATO's "open door" policy and supported the aspirations of Croatia, Albania, and Macedonia to the membership of the organization, providing that all these countries meet the membership criteria. Nevertheless, Poland's priority was still to bring Ukraine and Georgia closer to the alliance, and to maintain NATO's openness to their potential accession in the future. However, owing to the internal situation in those countries, and the attitudes of some allies, the adoption of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for those countries by the

³⁹ *Rzeczpospolita* of 15 November 2007. The attempts to appoint Brigadier General Andrzej Falkowski as head of Logistics and International Resources of the NATO International Military Staff were successful, www.brukselanato.polemb.net/?document=15.

⁴⁰ The lack of significant initiatives from Poland regarding energy security is surprising, considering that Poland tried very hard in 2006 to make it an item on the NATO agenda, treating a rather general and vague remark on the subject in the Riga Summit declaration as an important success of its delegation. Moreover, the debate itself, focusing in 2007 on the role of NATO regarding the protection of sea routes for energy transport, was evolving in a rather unfavorable direction for Poland. Cf. *Rocznik Strategiczny*..., p. 137.

alliance was not, despite Poland's efforts, the subject of serious discussion in NATO in 2007.⁴¹

The European Union and Other International Cooperation Structures

In 2007, cooperation within the European Union focused on institutional reform, and discussions primarily concerned the mandate for the Intergovernmental Conference and the substance of the Reform Treaty. The European Security and Defense Policy did not give rise to any significant contentions. As a result, neither the mandate of the Conference nor the final form of the Treaty sections on the ESDP differ significantly from the proposals of the Constitutional Treaty, something to which Poland did not object.⁴²

Poland's principal area of activity in the European Union in the security realm, one that favored the expansion of the EU's military capabilities and its potential for international influence, was participation in its foreign military missions. In the first half of the year the most important of these, both for the EU and for Poland, was operation "Althea" in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Due to the relatively stable situation in that country and the need to reinforce the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, the EU Council for General Affairs and External Relations decided to reduce, by the end of the year, the size of the force participating in this operation from 6,000 to 2,500 soldiers (without significantly reducing their tasks). The reduction, completed in November, also affected the Polish contingent (reduced from 230 to 170 soldiers) which is a part of the maneuvering battalion stationed in Sarajevo.⁴³

At the turn of July to August, on the initiative of France and in cooperation with the UN, talks began in the EU on deploying a military mission to Chad and

⁴¹ During his visit to Georgia on 17–18 April 2007, President Kaczyński had already assured President Mikheil Saakashvili that the decision about granting Membership Action Plan to Georgia would be taken during the following NATO summit (April 2008); however, representatives of the Polish government were more cautious on the subject in subsequent months. See www.nato.int/docu/update/2007/12-december/e1204a.html. The issue of MAP was not so openly referred to in talks between Polish and Ukrainian leaders, mainly due to the undecided position of the Ukrainian authorities on the issue, and the Ukrainian public attitude toward getting closer to NATO. Cf. *Rzeczpospolita* of 16 April 2007.

⁴² More in K. Miszczak, "Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa," *Sprawy Międzynarodowe*, 2007, no. 4.

⁴³ *EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation EUFOR—Althea)*, EU Council Secretariat, Factsheet, ATH/08 (update 8), 28 February 2007, www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/070228AltheaUpdate8a.pdf.

the Republic of Central Africa (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA), in order to provide humanitarian aid to refugees (some 240,000 persons) who had fled to those countries from Darfur. Upon France's request for support, Poland declared in early August that it would send to Chad 150 military police officers (gendarmerie) from the units that had participated in the EUFOR mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2006. On 25 September 2007, the Council of the European Union decided to set-up the mission with about 4,000 soldiers, and gave it a year long mandate, starting on the date of operational readiness, planned for November.⁴⁴ However, the deadline was not met due to difficulties with assembling the required number of troops and the necessary equipment. In mid-October, the French minister of foreign affairs Bernard Kouchner announced that Poland had agreed to increase its contingent to 350 soldiers.⁴⁵ The then Polish authorities did not confirm the fact in unequivocal terms, but Defense Minister Bogdan Klich confirmed the figure in November.⁴⁶ However, owing to persistent organizational problems (which continued to the end of 2007), the mission was not begun before 2008. In response, and in order to manifest its intent to develop the European Security and Defense Policy, as well as to make a friendly gesture toward France, Poland decided to reinforce its contingent with 100 additional soldiers and two transport helicopters.

Poland was also involved, although to a smaller extent, in other European Union missions, including the assistance and monitoring EUBAM mission to the border between Ukraine and Moldova (EUBAM), and advisory mission on justice, internal affairs and the judiciary within the framework of EUJUST LEX

⁴⁴ *EU Military Operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic (EUFOR CHAD/RCA)*, EU Council Secretariat, Background, January 2008, www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/misc/98416.pdf.

⁴⁵ *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 16 October 2007.

⁴⁶ The decision made the Polish component the second-largest in the operation (beside Ireland); only France sent more soldiers (some 50% of the overall number of troops). The position of deputy Operation Commander (EU Operation Commander—supreme commander of the EUFOR CHAD/RCA mission being the Irish general Patrick Nash) and five high-rank posts for Polish officers in the field command of the mission (which was led by a French general Jean-Philippe Ganasia as EU Force Commander in area of deployment) were thus granted to Poles. Poland also made the reservation that its forces would operate in Chad only, and be concentrated in one base. *Udział Polskiego Kontyngentu Wojskowego w operacji Unii Europejskiej w Czadzie*, Press release (as at 30.01.08), Polish Armed Forces General Staff, www.sgwp.wp.mil.pl/plik/File/misja_PKW_Czad_30styczen08.doc.

in Iraq.⁴⁷ Poland also supported plans to establish an advisory mission to Kosovo composed of about 1,800 police officers and civilian experts.⁴⁸

An important element of Poland's involvement in the European Security and Defense Policy in 2007 was its participation in the creation of battlegroups, whose formation had been decided in 2006. At the turn of 2009 to 2010, the battlegroup formed along with Germany, Slovakia, Lithuania, and Latvia (with Poland as the lead nation) is scheduled to achieve operational readiness, followed in 2011 by the Weimar group, co-organized with France and Germany. In addition, during a meeting on 27 January 2007 in Sliac, Slovakia, the chiefs of general staffs from Visegrad Group countries announced the formation of a common battlegroup to which Ukraine was also to be invited.⁴⁹ The Polish authorities did not, however, return to the subject of the European Army in 2007, despite the proposals in this respect made the previous year by Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński, and appeals made by German Chancellor Angela Merkel in March 2007 for the European Union to take the necessary steps in this direction.⁵⁰

In contrast, Poland was strongly engaged in cooperation within the framework of the European Defense Agency. A reflection of this involvement came in May in Brussels, when defense minister A. Szczygło (and his counterparts from 19 EU states) signed an agreement on the Agency's first common research program—a three-year project valued at €55 million for protection against mines and weapons of mass destruction and detection of contaminants.⁵¹ Poland also joined the program, initiated during the same period, for the development of the defense technological base in Europe and took part in formulating the strategy of research into defense technology. Poland's strong participation in the work of the Agency most probably contributed to the nomination of General Adam Sowa as its Deputy Chief Executive for Operations, beginning in 2008.

In 2007, the importance of the **United Nations** in Poland's security policy continued to diminish, at least in the political and military sphere. Poland's

⁴⁷ K. Miszczak, "Polska a rozwój Europejskiej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony," *Sprawy Międzynarodowe*, 2007, no. 1, p. 54.

⁴⁸ *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 15–16 December 2007.

⁴⁹ Work on the Visegrad battlegroup progressed very slowly in 2007, probably because of the remote date for its operational readiness (2015).

⁵⁰ *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 24 March 2007.

⁵¹ By earmarking €10 million for the project, Poland became one of its key participants, next to Germany and France, which provided €12 million each. K. Miszczak, *op. cit.*, pp. 58–59.

participation within the UN context was limited to routine activities, the primary manifestation of which was its participation in peacekeeping operations. By April 2007, pursuant to decisions taken in 2006, Poland had completed the deployment of about 300 additional soldiers as part of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), increasing the Polish contingent there to 514 soldiers. Poland also maintained a unit of 350 soldiers in the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights. In addition, 125 Polish policemen served in the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and Polish military and police observers were delegated to participate in several other operations (in Congo, Western Sahara, Georgia, Liberia, Sudan, Ivory Coast, and on the Ethiopia-Eritrea border).⁵²

The activities of the **Organization for Security and Development in Europe** in the sphere of security were dominated by the problem of maintaining the regime based on the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. Toward the end of May, Russia threatened to suspend its compliance of this treaty in response to the ongoing negotiations on the anti-missile defense system. Russia justified the move by citing NATO's refusal to ratify the 1999 revision of the treaty, even though Russia had carried out—in its view—its obligations under the revised Treaty (Russia ratified it). Poland consistently supported the NATO common position in this respect. When President Putin signed a decree to suspend Russian compliance with the treaty obligations on 14 July (one month after the inconclusive end of an extraordinary conference of the parties to the agreement, convened at the request of Russia in Vienna), Poland and NATO reacted by stating that they would continue to perform their obligations under the treaty. This failed to prevent Russia's decision to suspend its participation in the CFE regime (12 December 2007), despite talks at the NATO-Russia Council. In response, the alliance maintained its position.⁵³

Poland's involvement in 2007 in arms control and disarmament activities deserve some attention. Like in previous years, Poland placed much importance on cooperation within the framework of the Cracow Initiative (Proliferation Security Initiative—PSI), by continuing its efforts on behalf of the broadest possible international support for this undertaking. On 29–31 October, Poland, jointly with Ukraine, organized air, sea, and land exercises in interception and

⁵² See www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors.

⁵³ M. Madej, "Traktat o siłach konwencjonalnych w Europie—geneza, istota, perspektywy," *Biuletyn PISM*, 2007, no. 25. See also *Alliance's Statement on the Russian Federation's 'Suspension' of its CFE Obligations*, www.nato.int/docu/pr/2007/p07-139e.html.

control of materials for the production of weapons of mass destruction (Eastern Shield 07) and participated, along with Estonia, in an air force exercise of a similar nature (Smart Raven), held on 26 and 27 April in Lithuania.⁵⁴

Poland also undertook numerous initiatives in connection with the 10th anniversary of the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Poland independently submitted a draft UN General Assembly resolution of the implementation of the convention and, along with Holland, organized a meeting devoted to the assessment of the convention's functioning and of its future, held on 27 September in New York.⁵⁵ In addition, from the very beginning, i.e., from the inauguration conference (22–23 February), Poland participated in the so-called Oslo process, destined to lead, in 2008, to the signing of a legally binding agreement on the prohibition of cluster bombs. However, during work on the document, Poland adopted a rather conservative stance and, like Japan and Romania, did not sign the final declaration. Moreover, during subsequent conferences (23–25 May in Lima and 5–7 December in Vienna), it called for the adoption of the narrowest definition of this type of bombs, and for the right to use them if they are equipped with a self-destructing mechanism.⁵⁶

In January 2007, Poland somewhat softened its stance on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Mine Ban Treaty) and declared that it would begin the ratification procedure as soon as its armed forces obtain substitutes for this weapon (not before 2014).⁵⁷ Moreover, the ratification procedure was initiated for the 5th Protocol to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons concerning unexploded and other lethal weapons (the so-called “explosive remnants of war”) remaining in areas of conflict.

Conclusions

In 2007, Poland pursued a very active security policy, at least in the political and military dimension, a fact that corresponds to the high-priority status

⁵⁴ See www.state.gov/t/isn/c12684.htm.

⁵⁵ In addition, a workshop on implementation of the Convention on chemical weapons at the national level was organized in April in Krynica, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. More at www.opcw.org.

⁵⁶ More on the topic at www.clusterprocess.org.

⁵⁷ See www.icbl.org/lm/2007/poland.org. Poland and the Marshall Islands are the only signatories to the Convention (156 parties at present) that have failed to ratify it.

accorded to this sphere. Nevertheless, this activeness was not matched by a similar level of effectiveness, if measured by the degree to which the country's objectives were attained. The actual progress made in relation to objective defined in 2007 as the most important, i.e., establishing closer bilateral relations with the United States was rather slight. The results of Poland's attempts to accomplish other important goals of its security policy—that is, strengthening Poland's position within NATO and the EU, enhancing the internal cohesion and solidarity within those organizations, and the expansion of their general operational abilities—were also moderate.

The failure of Poland's efforts to establish closer relations with the United States in the area of security most probably and in large measure resulted from the unrealistic nature of the objective, and from an excessively optimistic view of Poland's ability to achieve it. Poland desired a qualitative change in relations with the US, and to make those relations strategic for both parties, not only for Poland. These close relations were to embrace the security policy in general, rather than only its strictly military aspect (that is, cooperation between the armed forces and ministries of defense). Poland's goal—at least as stated by its leaders—was to establish an alliance with the United States that would go beyond the standard links among NATO members and translate into some additional security guarantees (not fully specified as to their form and scope) for Poland. This strategy was followed during negotiations on deploying the American anti-missile shield elements in Poland on the assumption—not fully justified, as shown by the progress of discussions on the subject in the United States and during the negotiations themselves—that the system is of primary importance for American security. In reality, the asymmetry in the potential of the two countries, Poland's location in a region that has in recent years been losing the United State's attention owing to expanding American involvement in the Middle East and Asia, the United States' increased room for maneuver in its relations with European states due to the improvement in American-German and American-French relations, and Russia's hostility to the Polish-American rapprochement, have all meant that Poland was not for the US a partner of strategic significance. These factors substantially reduced the chances for a bilateral agreement that would provide Poland with US support beyond its obligations under NATO. Moreover, Poland's abandonment, on account of its desire for such an agreement, of attempts to obtain more modest commitments (such as increased military assistance, including US participation in the modernization of Polish air defenses) gave its efforts to produce a rapprochement with the United States the character of a zero-sum game, in keeping with which

only the full realization of all Poland's postulates could be deemed a success.⁵⁸ Furthermore, the discussions on the anti-missile shield provided a convenient pretext for Russia to escalate tensions in relations with Poland. Although the majority of the Russian moves (its withdrawal from the CFE Treaty and a similar threat concerning the Treaty on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces—INF, announcements about the redeployment of some Russian units) were solely, or chiefly, of a propaganda nature, and did not adversely affect Poland's security (at least in the political and military sphere), and most Russian steps were taken primarily for internal purposes, or as part of political maneuvers aimed at countries other than Poland (the United States, countries of Western Europe), they nevertheless limited the already slight possibilities for dialogue between Poland and Russia on bilateral relations (for instance, on energy).⁵⁹

Poland's attempts to strengthen its position in the organizations that are most important for Poland's security, i.e., NATO and the EU, and its efforts to increase the solidarity and effectiveness of both institutions, cannot be judged unequivocally either. On the one hand, Poland's involvement in expeditionary missions, by now almost customary and one of the main instruments for increasing its prestige internationally, is a positive development. In particular, the statements made in 2006 about a substantial increase, without caveats, in the number of troops deployed to Afghanistan were followed by action to that effect, and the deployment of troops in the unstable Eastern provinces was undoubtedly noticed and appreciated in NATO (especially as Poland's previous contribution to this operation had been rather modest in comparison to that of most other allies). Poland's decision to join the mission in Chad as one of its

⁵⁸ It must be admitted, however, that relations with the United States and attempts to strengthen the ties between the two states had gained a priority well before PiS's term in office, in 2003 at the latest. Under the rule of PiS (in coalition and independently) the tendency was only strengthened, but to such a point that it had a clear impact on other objectives of Poland's security policy, including in NATO and the European Union, which were perceived to a considerable degree through the prism of their usefulness for the striving for closer relations with the United States.

⁵⁹ In this context, Poland's refraining (at least before the elections) from dialogue with Russia on the missile defenses, either bilaterally, or through participation in Russian-American negotiations, was surprising, as was its passive stance in the NATO-Russian forum. Since Russia's opposition to the missile defenses was justly perceived in Poland as failing to reflect the missile defenses' genuine impact on Russian security, the negotiations to overcome Russia's objections should, by their nature, also have touched upon other issues than the disputed project only, and not have taken the form of technical negotiations between Russia and the US, the main developer of the missile defenses. Poland's participation in such talks would appear to be advisable, as Poland was directly interested in their progress and outcome.

most actively involved participants should have a similar effect as regards the European Union.

On the other hand, certain factors reduced the successes achieved on the NATO and EU forum. The concentration on relations with the United States, and the course of the anti-missile shield negotiations themselves lent credence to beliefs that Poland is a decidedly “transatlantic” (i.e., pro-American) country, and this somewhat limited Poland’s options in both organizations. In NATO, this could be seen not only in discussions on missile defense (a project supported by the allies with “varying degrees of enthusiasm”),⁶⁰ during which Poland’s position was in fact identical with that of the U.S., but also in the alliance’s foreign missions (it was not a coincidence that Polish troops in Afghanistan and Kosovo cooperated most closely with the American forces and were subordinated to commands led by Americans). Irrespective of the objective reasons for this situation (limited military capabilities and resources), it could be argued that by setting limits to the Polish force’s operational independence and preferences in choosing partners to work with, Poland reduced the effectiveness of its involvement in expeditionary missions as a means for strengthening its position in the alliance and consolidating its unity. The failure of Poland’s attempts to obtain the post of the Military Committee chairman for the Polish representative, as well as the lack (until the end of 2007) of a more detailed discussion within NATO on the Membership Action Plan for Ukraine and Georgia, which is considered a priority matter by Poland (in both cases, Polish efforts failed despite the support or similarity of views of the United States) also pointed to Poland’s limited influence in the alliance. Oddly enough, considering the *de facto* secondary role of Poland’s security policy at the EU forum, it is precisely there that Poland managed to achieve quite a lot. Polish involvement in Chad, its activeness in the European Defense Agency, and its efforts in work on establishing battlegroups all made Poland stand out among participants of the European Security and Defense Policy. However, the value of these accomplishments in strengthening Poland’s position in the European Union was reduced by actions in other areas of EU cooperation, especially by Poland’s stance on the Reform Treaty and its overt suspicion of European integration as such.⁶¹

⁶⁰ Statement by W. Waszczykowski at the Sejm...

⁶¹ The Polish government treated involvement in the ESDP as a means to manifest pro-European direction of its policy and to compensate for the losses—primarily in terms of image—resulting from adopting certain positions on other areas of EU cooperation. Moreover, in some cases it was also perceived even as a way to improve bilateral relations with major EU partners, s as it was with the decision on participation the mission to Chad, as part of bilateral relations with

An evaluation of Polish security policy in 2007 would be incomplete without mentioning the way in which it was prepared and conducted. It was oftentimes marked by inconsistency, as evidenced by the lack of Polish initiatives on NATO's role as a guarantor of energy security for its members (despite the declared importance of the issue), and contradictory positions presented to the United States during the negotiations on the anti-missile shield (far-reaching demands were combined with surprisingly enthusiastic statements from the authorities about the benefits offered by the system). Perhaps of even greater importance was the policy's lack of clarity for domestic public opinion. The authorities were unable, or unwilling, to present clearly either the motives for their decisions, or national interests or benefits justifying them. This led to Polish public opinion's growing dislike for Poland's most important activities in the security sphere (foreign military missions and negotiations on the anti-missile shield). It should be admitted, however, that with the passage of time Polish security policy has gradually undergone some changes that positively affected its form and, presumably, also its effectiveness. These were not solely related to the change in government, since some (such as with regard to the talks with the US) had appeared before the October elections. Those positive developments include the gradually more realistic position on the anti-missile shield and on expectations about the scope of cooperation with the United States; the decision to reorganize and enforce Polish forces in Afghanistan; the increase of the European Union's rank in Poland's security policy; and the growing awareness of the need to improve the government's information policy and to pay more attention to public opinion. Given all of the above, a final evaluation of Poland's security policy in 2007 will have to await its results in 2008 and subsequent years.

major EU members. There are similarities between the mechanism behind the latter decision and the objectives it was to serve (irrespective of its positive impact on the development of the ESDP) and Poland's declaration in favor of the attack on Iraq in 2003. Here also, the choice was made according to the principle of 'give now and discuss the price later, relying on the partner's gratitude and sense of decency' and it is difficult to consider the model as being particularly effective, given the Iraq experience.

II.

Poland's Policy Regarding Selected Countries and Regions

Poland's Policy Regarding the United States

Background

For many years, one of the most important influencing factors for Polish-American relations has been cooperation on security and the strategic partnership proclaimed by both countries. Since 2001, Poland has been providing continued political support to the United States in its war on terror and has participated in the key—from the American viewpoint—military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. The cooperation is greatly facilitated by the fact that both countries, despite an extremely different geopolitical position, different potentials, and often different short term interests, hold similar views on threats to international security, among which they see terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and regional conflicts. They also share values such as an attachment to a democratic order, the protection of human rights, the ideals of liberty and justice, and common historical experiences.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, regardless of the political orientation of those in power, the United States remained the most important political partner for Poland which sees it (owing to the United States' greatest power projection capability among NATO members) as a *de facto* guarantor of its security. Poland is thus interested in the closest possible cooperation with the United States, primarily in the political and security spheres. Although the United States is one of the largest investors in Poland, economic affairs have thus far been of secondary importance in the two countries' mutual relations. During the period when the Law and Justice government was in office (2005–2007), the conviction about the United States' fundamental role in ensuring Poland's security were even strengthened, undoubtedly thanks to the mounting problems of the North Atlantic Alliance in Afghanistan, the lack of decisive NATO steps—in the Polish government's view—to maintain the ability to protect the territories of new members states (contingency planning for conventional military threats, the lack of NATO infrastructure in new member states), as well as mistrust of the European Union. In 2007, three major events provided the context for Polish-American

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relations. The first of these was the offer to participate in the American anti-missile defense program (Ballistic Missile Defense—BMD), made to the Polish authorities by the George W. Bush administration. In spite of significant differences in their positions on the American proposal, both the government of Jarosław Kaczyński and Donald Tusk's government formed after the October elections—despite significantly differing views on the American proposal—gave Poland's decision to participate in the program the character of a strategic choice (comparable, in the view of some politicians and experts, to gaining NATO membership) to determine the context of Polish-American relations for decades.

The second significant factor (one which will, no doubt, increasingly affect bilateral relations), is the Polish public's growing criticism of the nature of Polish-American relations thus far. This criticism is reflected in the public debate and in the results of opinion polls, which reveal signs of disenchantment with American policy, both in its global context and with regard to Poland. According to a survey conducted by CBOS on January 2007, more people still consider the United States' role in the world to be positive than negative (38% and 24% respectively) but, at the same time, the share of positive responses dropped by 24% in comparison to 2006.¹ In a ranking of nations that Poles feel most friendly towards, Americans came only in twelfth place (in 1993–2003, they came first and liking for Americans was each declared by over 50% of respondents; in 2005 and 2006 Americans were the fifth most-liked nation).² This decrease is most probably the result of the growing sense that the American administration's declarations about a strategic partnership with Poland are rather of a courteous nature and that they are not backed up by any real support for Polish interests (problems with admission to the Visa Waiver Program and with carrying out offset obligations).³ However, until the October elections, the influence of public opinion on the state of bilateral relations was rather limited and did not, in principle, affect political decisions. Only after the formation of Donald Tusk's government (or even as early as the election campaign) did such

¹ See *Rola Stanów Zjednoczonych w świecie w ocenach mieszkańców 25 krajów. Komunikat z badań*, Warsaw: Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, January 2007, no. BS/10/2007.

² Cf. *Komunikaty z badań Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej*: January 2003, no. BS/1/2003; January 2005, no. BS/1/2005; October 2006, no. BS/148/2006; September 2007, no. BS/144/2007.

³ The general decrease in positive feelings about the United States is also considerably affected by the excellent effects of Poland's integration in the European Union, notably the freedom to take up employment and study in many member states, which is in increasingly acute contrast with the Americans' unwillingness to admit Poland to the Visa Waiver Programme.

views stimulate a debate on possible modifications to Poland's policy towards the United States.

Thirdly, Poland's position as one of the United States' most important allies in Europe in the so-called war on terror has clearly deteriorated. The conflict between the Bush administration and some NATO countries that started in 2003 with the invasion of Iraq, has recently been alleviated, due mainly to France's change of position after Nicolas Sarkozy's election to the presidency and his decision to seek a rapprochement with the Alliance and to adopt a tougher course with regard to Iran. Against this background, Polish support for American policies has become relatively less important.

Polish Foreign Policy Objectives Regarding the United States

An analysis of the most important documents defining the principles of Polish foreign policy in recent years indicates that Poland's policy regarding the United States is consistently guided by three main objectives.

Firstly, Poland's security interests, and its inability to pursue them single-handedly, require that Poland strive for, and maintain, the position of the United States' strategic partner in Central and Eastern Europe.⁴ The most desirable expression of this partnership for Poland is close cooperation between those two countries in the political and military sphere. Although the United States has been reducing the size some of its bases in Europe, its material and institutional presence in this region is still viewed in Poland as one the primary guarantees of European security. The maintenance of close relations with Americans is seen by Poland as a way to enhance its defense capabilities,⁵ mainly by purchasing advanced armaments to upgrade the Polish armed forces (with yearly financial and in-kind contributions provided by the United States through Foreign Military Financing—the FMF mechanism), as well as close cooperation of both countries' armed forces in military operations. Furthermore, the prevailing view among the Polish political elites is that Poland's high ranking on the list of America's closest allies will increase Poland's prestige on the international stage and, especially, strengthen its position within NATO. It is primarily on the latter forum that Poland would wish to see America as a broker for its interests, one that would, for example, support an "open door" policy toward the East, the

⁴ See "Government Information on Polish Foreign Policy in 2006," *Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy 2007*.

⁵ See Donald Tusk's opening address, www.kprm.gov.pl/s.php?id=1389&path=10325.

deployment in Poland of certain components of NATO infrastructure (e.g., the Allied Ground Surveillance base), and Polish candidates for top positions in NATO structures. The political and financial support of the American ally is additionally supposed to further Polish interests both in its immediate neighborhood (the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, and supporting the pro-European and pro-Atlantic aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia), and in regions where Poland has failed to play a serious political role thus far, but where it would like to increase its presence (e.g., in the Middle East).

The second important objective is to attract American investments.⁶ Although since Poland's accession to the European Union, Polish economic interests have been mainly pursued mainly through relations with European states, there is no doubt that the economic standing of the United States (irrespective of the falling value of the dollar and symptoms of an approaching recession) still makes the prospect of closer cooperation in this area (increased trade, attracting modern technology) extremely attractive.

Thirdly, although the project is rather ill-defined for the time being and serious complications can be expected during its implementation, Poland also counts on the United States' participation in ensuring Poland's energy security, mainly through American political support for the Polish government's efforts to develop new routes for oil and gas supplies from the Caspian Sea region and by the United States' transfer of nuclear energy technology (in exchange for Poland's agreement to participate in the missile defense program, for example).⁷

Political Relations

Negotiations about the anti-missile shield. In 2007, relations with the United States were marked by negotiations about Polish participation in the American Ballistic Missile Defense program. Formally, the offer on the issue was submitted to the Polish government in January. The proposal is to build a base on Polish territory, with ten missiles to intercept long-range ballistic missiles in the middle phase of their flight (Ground Based Interceptor, GBI).⁸ In

⁶ See "Government Information on Polish Foreign Policy in 2007," see above, p. 23.

⁷ See statement of Paweł Poncyliusz, Deputy Minister of the Economy in "J. Kaczyński's government for Rynki24 portal," in: G. Stańczak, *Za garść "franklinów,"* www.rynkizagraniczne.pl/?pid=news&docid=5179.

⁸ The issue was presented to the Sejm by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs W. Waszczykowski, see stenographic record of the Sejm session, 5th term, 41st session, Day 4 (11 May 2007), item 39 on the agenda: Minister of Foreign Affairs' statement on foreign policy in 2007.

response, in February, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed Poland's readiness to begin negotiations. At the same time, the ministry also emphasized that the objective of the Polish authorities would be to "reinforce the security of our country, of the United States, and international security."⁹ It was also stated that the potential agreement would be subject to ratification.¹⁰

Four rounds of negotiations were held by the end of the year. In the first, conducted on 23 and 24 May in Warsaw, both parties presented their positions. The American delegation was headed by John Rood, assistant secretary of state for arms control and international security, and the Polish by Witold Waszczykowski, undersecretary of state at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the course of the negotiations, the Americans presented two draft versions of the agreement. The first concerned the status of the forces to be deployed at the base in Poland (Status of Forces Agreement, SOFA).¹¹ Standard agreements of this type contain regulations on the deployment of foreign armed forces on the territory of the host country, such as their civil and criminal liability, compensation for any damage, tax and customs questions, and provisions related to uniforms and the use of arms. The second draft agreement concerned the construction and operation of the base. It addressed the issue of sharing the costs of deploying and maintaining the installations—estimated at some \$30 million annually (this issue especially gave rise to some controversy)—and the principles for notifying the Polish authorities of the launch of the missiles and liability for any possible consequences. According to the information provided by the head of the Polish negotiating team, the Americans suggested the possibility of concluding an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation with Poland.¹²

Although the detailed negotiating instructions remained undisclosed, the general outline of Poland's concept for talks with the Americans could be inferred from comments made by individuals directly or indirectly involved in them. Most of all, it was claimed that the most desirable outcome would be to conclude with the United States a political and military agreement that would raise the status of relations between the two countries (for example, thanks to

⁹ See www.msz.gov.pl/files/docs/PBdoc/MD.pdf.

¹⁰ It was finally decided that the agreement would be ratified by the president as approved by the Sejm.

¹¹ According to the information revealed by the MFA, there would be approx. 200–300 military and civilian personnel and their families.

¹² See statement of W. Waszczykowski at the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Sejm of Poland on 5 July 2007, Bulletin no. 2225/V.

a bilateral alliance operating alongside NATO structures) and define a broader context for Polish-American relations in the area of security.

Formal negotiations were accompanied by an unusually intense information and lobbying campaign launched by representatives of the American administration at different levels (for various reasons, the United States wanted to finalize the talks by autumn).¹³ Before the negotiations had started, around the turn of March to April, Poland was successively visited by Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried, Director of the Missile Defense Agency General Henry A. Obering III and his deputy General Patrick O'Reilly,¹⁴ and Defense Secretary Robert Gates himself. The main goal of the meetings with representatives of the government (including opposition politicians), experts, and the media was to clarify the reasons behind the United States' intent to build the BMD system, the technical details of the project, and to dispel doubts of a political nature, especially the reservations raised by the Russian Federation and some European NATO members (notably Germany). During the talks, Americans offered assurances that the planned installations would also protect (with certain exceptions) the territories of the United States' allies in Europe, including Poland.¹⁵

The negotiations were not completed by the end of 2007. Following relatively intense negotiations in autumn, they were ultimately suspended owing to anticipated parliamentary elections in Poland and to the formation of a new government. The leaders of the Civic Platform party, which won the elections, had already announced during the electoral campaign that they would be reviewing certain aspects of Poland's negotiation stance. It was emphasized that Poland should expect increased assistance from the United States to modernize its armed forces, among other areas (currently, Poland receives some \$30 million annually from the FMF), which would directly contribute to increasing the security of the country. In his November opening address, Prime Minister Tusk noted that further negotiations would resume only after consultations with NATO allies and some of Poland's neighbors.

High-level visits. Negotiations on the missile defense system had an undeniable impact on the frequency of bilateral political contacts, including those at the

¹³ See letter by Victor Ashe, US Ambassador to Poland, <http://poland.usembassy.gov/news/missile-defense-ii/ambassadors-introduction2.html>.

¹⁴ See Bulletin of the 77th session of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee of 18 April 2007, no. 1853/V.

¹⁵ It should, however, be noted that in General Obering's previous statements, protecting the allies' territories by the BMD was only mentioned in third place.

highest level. On 8 June 2007, President Bush visited Poland for several hours and met with President Lech Kaczyński at the presidential retreat on the Hel Peninsula. The main items on the agenda were the anti-missile shield, Polish-Russian relations (particularly in the context of Russian reservations about Poland's participation in the BMD), problems related to the determination of Kosovo's final status, and the cooperation of both countries in Afghanistan. On 16–18 July, President Kaczyński paid a working visit to the United States. The agenda of his trip included meeting with President Bush in Washington DC, and also a visit to Vandenberg Air Force Base in Santa Monica, California, where elements of the missile defenses that could potentially be used in Poland had already been deployed.¹⁶ Discussions included energy security, the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan (Bush underscored Poland's special contribution to both operations and the "strong and unique" partnership that links both countries), as well as plans to deploy elements of the American BMD system in Poland. The issue of Poland's inclusion in the Visa Waiver Program was also discussed.

Contacts between the defense ministers of both countries were also intense. On 24 April, Minister Aleksander Szczygło met with American Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, who was on a visit Poland. Their discussions included the anti-missile shield as well as cooperation in Iraq and Afghanistan. The two ministers had another opportunity to exchange views in July, when Minister Szczygło accompanied President Kaczyński to the US. They discussed the current European security situation in the context of the progress in bilateral negotiations on the deployment of BMD elements in Poland and of Russia's decision in June to suspend its participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).

In 2007, the Strategic Dialogue with the United States was continued. Subsequent rounds of talks were held in February and revolved around energy security, the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the political situation of Poland's neighbors to the east.

Military Cooperation

Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. One of the most important manifestations of the close military cooperation between Poland and the United States has been Poland's participation in the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

¹⁶ B. Górka-Winter, "Techniczne oblicza tarczy," *Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny*, 2007, no. 2, pp. 50–57.

In 2007, Poland was still conducting operations in Iraq in its area of responsibility (Al Diwanayah province and, until July, also Wasit). These were tasks of a mainly training and advisory nature, although, owing to the worsening security situation in that country, a decision was taken to reinforce the rapid reaction force.¹⁷ The Multinational Centre-South Division was also involved in civilian-military cooperation (CIMIC). Over four years, some 3,000 assistance projects have been carried out, for a total of approximately \$144 million (rebuilding of basic infrastructure—power plants, drinkable water intakes, medical facilities, schools, etc.). Donald Tusk's government has decided to withdraw the Polish contingent in the autumn of 2008. There were several reasons for this decision, such as the declared achievement of the mission's objectives, political calculations (Poland's involvement in Iraq was primarily used as a tool to establish stronger ties with the United States, the importance of which had clearly been diminishing),¹⁸ uncertainty about the possibility of maintaining the training nature of the mission in the face of a deteriorating security situation and the resulting loss of life, as well as a significant drop in public support for the operation.

In addition, the maintenance of such a strong presence in Iraq would hinder the realization of the costly Afghan mission. In 2007, the tasks of the Polish Military Contingent (some 1,200 military and civilian personnel) in the NATO operation in Afghanistan (ISAF) expanded significantly. Cooperation with American forces has been particularly close in the eastern part of the country, where part of the Polish combat force is operating beside the elite 82nd Airborne Division (Americans provide the means of transportation for Polish soldiers). In order to attain the required degree of interoperability, the troops of both countries held many joint exercises (such as the Immediate Response 07 exercise at the Wędrzyn Training Range in Poland). At the specific request of the United States and of the NATO secretary general, National Defense Minister Bogdan Klich announced the decision to reinforce the Polish Military Contingent in Afghanistan with about 400 additional soldiers. He also expressed Poland's readiness to provide eight helicopters for the operation.¹⁹

¹⁷ See, for example, P. Bernabiuk, "Przełom," *Polska Zbrojna*, 2008, no. 13, pp. 19–20.

¹⁸ Ł. Kulesa, M. Madej, P. Sasnal, M. Terlikowski, and A. Zdrada, "Konsekwencje wycofania Polskiego Kontyngentu Wojskowego z Iraku dla polskiej polityki zagranicznej," *Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny*, 2008, no. 1, pp. 33–53.

¹⁹ See www.wp.mil.pl/pl/artykul/3969.

Purchase of equipment. American defense companies are one of the primary sources of modern military equipment for the Polish armed forces. On 3–6 September 2007, the United States was the honorary guest of the 15th International Defense Industry Fair. Over thirty American companies exhibited their products there (the event included a presentation of UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, manufactured by the Sikorsky company).

In 2007, more of the F-16s purchased by Poland were delivered. As in previous years, the delivery process was not without its complications, which were extensively commented on in the press. Moreover, flying the jets revealed numerous, albeit minor, flaws in the fighters' avionics, engines, and outfitting, among others.²⁰ In addition, the pilot training system proved to be ineffective and extremely expensive, a factor that may hamper the full utilization of the F-16s.

Poland would also like to join, as co-manufacturer, the development project for the new generation F-35 JSF Lockheed Martin fighter, the successor to the F-16. American responses to official queries on this issue indicate that Poland could participate in the project from 2015 on.²¹ However, the high cost of participation (\$125–175 million for level 3 partners) for relatively modest benefits may prove to be an obstacle.²²

In autumn 2008, C-130E Hercules transport aircraft, purchased with FMF funds for an estimated \$80 million, are scheduled to arrive in Poland (the aircraft are currently being upgraded and furnished with additional equipment in the USA). A meeting on the issue, attended by envoys of the American Air Force and by the command of the 3rd Air Transport Brigade and 14th Air Transport Squadron (14 elt.), was held on 4 October 2007. Details of the transaction such as the training of pilots, the supply of spare parts, and logistical support were discussed. Polish representatives also attended the world conference of C-130 users and the conference on preliminary arrangements for the C-130 for Poland Program (on 22–26 October in Florida and Texas). The C-130E Hercules aircraft, to serve in the 14th Squadron, will significantly improve Poland's ability to organize the independent transportation of soldiers to missions abroad.

²⁰ Details on the issue on www.mon.gov.pl/pl/strona/222.

²¹ MOD statement on the plan of deliveries for weaponry and military equipment for the Armed Forces of Poland in 2007, presented at the session of the National Defence Committee of the Polish Sejm on 15 March 2007. Bulletin no. 1741/V.

²² More in J. Dołęga, "Spory o transfer technologii wojskowej w ramach programu JSF. Wnioski dla Polski," *Biuletyn PISM*, 2006, no. 35.

Economic Relations

American investments in Poland. In 2007, the US was one of the most important investors in Poland. The Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency (PAIiZ) estimates that American cumulated investments amounted to a total \$15–16 billion, while in 2007 alone, American companies provided the majority of the capital for investment projects carried out by the Agency (€387 million).²³

According to preliminary data of the National Bank of Poland, the United States was second only to the European Union (which is the origin of 85.3% of all investments) in terms of investments in Poland in 2007.²⁴ One of the most important transactions was the agreement concluded in December 2006, and finalized in March 2007, between the Industrial Development Agency (ARP) and Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, one of the world's leading helicopter manufacturers,²⁵ concerning the latter's acquisition of a majority stake in Polskie Zakłady Lotnicze Mielec, Poland's largest manufacturer of aviation equipment. The contract is valued at about 250 million PLN, and this amount covers the total value of shares (approximately 210 million PLN), and investment projects planned for over five years.²⁶ In addition, the contract provides for the repayment of PZL Mielec's debt of about 130 million PLN to ARP, the previous owner of the company, the comprehensive upgrade of the machine stock and production lines, the creation of about 1,000 new jobs (currently, the company employs about 1,500 persons) and an attractive social package for employees (pay raises, a six-year guarantee of employment, reimbursement of education costs, etc.).

The production of fuselages and other components for Black Hawk helicopters is to begin in Mielec in 2008 followed, within three years, by the full assembly of this machine in its International version. According to the announcement of the Sikorsky management, the facility in Mielec is to become its main European base in the future (with a marketing centre and servicing for

²³ From www.eksportuj.pl/artykul/pokaz/id/1869/13-mld-euro-inwestycji-w-polsce.

²⁴ See www.nbp.pl/publikacje/zib/zib2007p.pdf.

²⁵ The company is owned by an American defense concern, United Technologies Corporation (UTC).

²⁶ Following accusations of the incorrect estimation of the contract value, levied by the National Aviation Council and the National Security Bureau, the transaction was audited by the Supreme Chamber of Control. The investigation found no irregularities, as confirmed by the SCC report of January 2008.

helicopters) and an important element in the global supply network. The modernization of the facility is progressing well, and it is estimated that 30% of the work connected with the integration of PZL Mielec with Sikorsky Aircraft and the preparations for the production of the Black Hawk has already been completed.

Other significant investment projects launched or continued in 2007 include the construction of a production facility of articles for infant hygiene (Procter & Gamble), the beginning of the production of Chevrolets (General Motors), and the start-up of the European Cleaner Coal Centre (General Electric).²⁷

Trade. Although trade in 2007 grew by over 30% in comparison to the previous year, a sizeable negative balance of some \$1.2 billion was noted, which represents an increase of nearly 50% compared to 2006. In all, from January to November 2007, the volume of trade came to slightly over \$5 billion. Polish exports amounted to some \$1.9 billion and imports to \$3.1 billion (an increase of 1% and 22.8% respectively, in comparison to 2006).²⁸ According to experts, factors that adversely affected the trade balance between Poland and the US were unfamiliarity with the American market and of its operating principles (such as consumer protection and sanitary regulations), Polish entrepreneurs' lack of flexibility (and often dependability), their insufficient knowledge of business language, poor promotion efforts, the failure to turn to companies specializing in the launch of new products on the American market, and the lack of well-established Polish investments in the United States.²⁹

The largest Polish exporters include such companies as WSK PZL Rzeszów, Swedwood Poland Sp. z o.o. (furniture for Ikea), Tele-Fonika Kable SA, Polmos Żyrardów Sp. z o.o., Animex Sp. z o.o., Cargill (Polska) Sp. z o.o., Fabryka Kotłów Rafako SA, and Hutmen SA. Of Polish exports to the United States, the largest share is held by electrical and mechanical engineering products (turbojet and turboprop engines), food and agricultural products, furniture and chemicals, as well as metal products. From the United States, Poland mainly imports vehicles, pharmaceuticals, and medical equipment.³⁰

²⁷ *Współpraca gospodarcza Polski ze Stanami Zjednoczonymi*, www.wehusa.gov.pl/content/view/131/197/lang.pl.

²⁸ *Struktura polskiego eksportu na rynek amerykański w 2007 roku*, www.wehusa.gov.pl/content/view/124/211/lang.pl. The falling exchange rate of the dollar, the United States' fulfillment of the contract for the supply of F-16s and symptoms of recession on the American market.

²⁹ *Ibidem*.

³⁰ *Współpraca gospodarcza Polski...*

Despite numerous promotional campaigns,³¹ Poland is still a marginal trade partner for the United States (49th in exports and 64th in imports). However, the structure of Polish exports is changing for the better—most of all, products of the electrical and mechanical engineering industries make up an increasing share of the whole, a development that is also related to American investments in Poland based on offset contracts. Undoubtedly, the US Department of Agriculture's decision, in November 2007, to open the American market to frozen and chilled pork from Poland stimulated Polish exports to the United States (until then, only processed meat had been exported to the United States, a value of some \$40 million annually).

Carrying out the offset agreement. In recent years, the manner and pace in which the provisions of the offset agreement concluded on 18 April 2003 in connection with the purchase of F-16 fighters have been carried out have been the object of many reservations concerning. It was claimed that the Americans have not been meeting their obligations, especially in terms of the so-called direct offset (investments in the Polish defense industry) and the transfer of modern technologies. The offset agreement calls for the United States to invest a little over \$6 billion by 2013. In 2003–2006 period (the first for accounting purposes), the Ministry of the Economy approved American investments in Poland for a total amount of \$3.9 billion, of which about \$1.1 billion was the value of direct offset and the remaining \$2.8 billion was indirect (in other sectors of the economy). Currently 19 projects out of 44 planned are underway.³²

Among the most recent offset investments is a transaction valued at \$470 million, concluded with Zakłady Metalowe Dezamet SA, which will receive modern technology for the production of ammunition for automatic grenade launchers from a Norwegian group, Nammo,³³ and a proposal made to PZL Hydral SA of Wrocław to provide services for United Technologies Corporation (\$30 million). Negotiations are far advanced on locating a servicing and, potentially, a modernization facility for F-16 fighters at the Military Aviation

³¹ For example on 9 February, Ambassadors Janusz Reiter and Victor Ashe attended a meeting with American entrepreneurs in Atlanta, for the purpose of encouraging American companies to invest in Poland. The delegation with Ambassador Ashe also featured the President of the American Chamber of Commerce in Poland and the President of the Polish Information and Foreign Investments Agency. In September, Poland was visited by experts from the Defense Acquisition University to familiarize Polish entrepreneurs with the complicated procedures for bidding on American government contracts.

³² See www.wehusa.gov.pl/content/view/131/197/lang,pl (status as of January 2007).

³³ Z. Lentowicz, "Dezamet ładuje granatniki," *Rzeczpospolita* of 1 February 2008.

Works No. 2 in Bydgoszcz (it remains to be seen whether this would be only for machines used by Poland), and also on the production of radio and other telecommunications equipment at Radmor SA. In contrast, the program of assistance to sell aircraft produced in Mielec to South America ended unsuccessfully. The project to promote Polish exports in the United States also failed to be launched. It was to be implemented jointly with the Polish Chamber of Commerce and PHZ Bartimpex SA in cooperation with Lockheed Martin Corporation.

The Americans' performance of their obligations under the offset agreement in its part related to science and technology, for which the Polish partner is the University of Łódź, has also been severely criticized. The obligations include the promotion of Polish science in the United States, the establishment of the so-called Seed Capital Fund to provide funding to small companies in the high-tech sector, the transfer of American know-how, and the provision of a license for a program of studies in the area of technology commercialization. Together, these initiatives were valued at \$250 million. The Seed Capital Fund has not been implemented yet, and, although the studies and business incubators did arise, the contribution of the American partners to those projects was insignificant.³⁴

Many reservations have also emerged over the method in which the offset is being settled. According to some experts, the amount approved by the Ministry of the Economy was too high, because all American investments were counted as indirect offset, procedures were simplified, and the costs of expert advice from the United States were overstated, etc.³⁵ In addition, contractual penalties for failure to abide by contract stipulations were set too low (3%–4% of the value of the contract). Without doubt, a great number of imprecise formulations in the contracts are due not only to a lack of good will on the offset providers' part, but also to Poland's limited experience in entering into this type of contract. Many important provisions were formulated in too enigmatic a language to ensure their proper performance.

Attempts to Include Poland in the Visa Waiver Program

Despite the intense efforts of Polish diplomats (and a hired lobbying company, Dutko Worldwide), Poland's inclusion in the Visa Waiver Program

³⁴ See J. Blewaska, "Gdzie się rozeszły dolary z offsetu," *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 31 January 2008.

³⁵ The doubts are to be investigated by the Supreme Chamber of Control.

was not attained. In July 2007, the United States Congress adopted the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, which amended the Visa Waiver Program. The recommendations lift (although not automatically) the visa requirement for citizens of states that cooperate closely with the United States on the war on terrorism, on the condition that the rate of rejections for non-immigration visa applications submitted by citizens of those countries does not exceed 10% (previously 3%).³⁶ It is the task of secretaries of state and homeland to set the admissible limit of individuals remaining in the United States illegally after the expiry of non-immigration visas for citizens of countries, including Poland, which are still applying for inclusion in the Visa Waiver Program. This, however, requires the establishment of a system to monitor persons who are leaving the United States.

Polish efforts in this area have found numerous supporters in the United States, for instance from a non-partisan group of congresspersons (27 people in all, including Senators Barbara Mikulski and Richard Lugar). On 19 July, this group issued a letter to the Congressional Conference Committee, which was to prepare appropriate legislation on the basis of bills from the Senate and House of Representatives, with a proposal to amend the visa law so that the only criterion for inclusion in the program would not be the percentage of visa denials, but other factors determining the so-called emigration risk of a given country. According to the congresspersons, this change in approach would strengthen relations with important American allies, enhance their security, and also bring economic benefits. Poland also received political support from other EU members on the visa issue, for example, during the EU-US summit of April 2007.

The fact that Poland would not be included to the Visa Waiver Program met with a firm response from the then Polish ambassador to the United States, Janusz Reiter. In the *Washington Post*, he stated that American regulations were anachronistic and humiliating for Polish citizens, and he saw the linking of these regulations with US security as a clear misunderstanding.³⁷ A special statement was also issued by the ambassadors of the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. In it, they stated that the changes in the regulations made by the June legislation are a step in the right direction, albeit insufficient.

³⁶ The rejection rate for Poland is 25%.

³⁷ J. Reiter, "The Visa Barrier," *The Washington Post* of 29 August 2007, p. 17.

Cultural and Educational Relations

The year 2007 saw closer cooperation between Poland and the United States in the sphere of education. Primarily, better conditions for youth and student exchanges were established. One of the most important events was the renegotiation of the intergovernmental agreement laying down the framework for the Polish-American Fulbright Commission. The signing of this agreement on 10 March 2008 significantly broadened the grant program.³⁸ For example, the number of persons receiving grants is to increase in the future as much as three-fold.³⁹ In addition, Poland's financial contribution to the undertaking has been increased (in the past, Poland paid only about 10% of the annual total of close to \$1.5 million). On 20 September, President Bush signed the United States-Poland Parliamentary Youth Exchange Program Act of 2007. This was the initiative of Senator Richard Lugar, to make high school youth exchange between the US and Poland possible. About \$500,000 is initially earmarked for the program.

In 2007, many initiatives of a symbolic nature, emphasizing the bonds between both countries, were undertaken. The US Embassy founded three new awards: the Jan Nowak-Jeziorański award for significant contribution to the strengthening of the civil service (Władysław Bartoszewski received this award in March 2007), the Jan Karski Freedom Award (in January, the first was given to Lech Wałęsa), and the Czesław Miłosz Award for actions to establish closer ties between Poland and the United States (the first winner was Andrzej Wajda). During his visit to the United States in July 2007, President Kaczyński honored Ronald Reagan posthumously with the Order of the White Eagle. High decorations, namely Commander's Crosses with the star of the Order of Merit of the Republic of Poland were also awarded to other persons, including senators Carl Levin and Richard Lugar.

There were also many interesting cultural events. The most important was the series of events promoting Polish culture in Sarasota, Florida, entitled "Sarasota Goes Polish," organized by the Polish Embassy and by local, public and private cultural centers. From 2 February to 10 March, over a dozen concerts, shows, exhibitions, film screenings and lectures were held: for example, "Chopin Goes Jazz," Stanisław Moniuszko's opera *Halka* (played in Polish), a Chopin recital,

³⁸ See interview with Andrzej Dakowski, Director of the Polish-American Fulbright Commission, www.study-abroad.pl/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=55&Itemid=38.

³⁹ Thus far, the academic exchange program has included only 35 Polish and 25 American grant receivers.

and presentations of collections of Polish literature and music. Poland was in turn visited by the American pianist John Robilette. His concert on 20 April in Warsaw's Łazienki Park was part of the program to commemorate Ignacy Jan Paderewski.

Many cultural events in 2007 were devoted to the promotion of jazz. On 10 January, at the invitation of the Polish Embassy and the Polish Cultural Institute in Washington, DC, a Polish jazz singer, Aga Zaryan, gave concerts in this city. In April, Karrin Allyson, an American jazz singer, visited Poland for a short tour, and the Jan Ptaszyn Wróblewski quartet played in the US capital. Between 16 and 18 November, Poznań hosted (for the second time) the jazz festival "Made in Chicago," organized by Estrada Poznańska and the Jazz Institute of Chicago.

In addition, efforts continue for the restitution of works of art. In December, talks were finalized at the embassy in Washington, DC, concerning the donation to the National Museum in Poland of Aleksander Mroczkowski's painting "W żniwa," which was lost during the Second World War and has been in a private collection until now (before the war it was in the collection of the Fine Arts Society in Warsaw).

Conclusion

For years, the main objective—both real and declared—of Polish foreign policy regarding the United States has undoubtedly been to establish a lasting alliance between the two countries and to ensure Poland's position as the United States' strategic partner in Central and Eastern Europe. Problems with evaluating whether the objective so formulated has actually been attained result from the fact that, essentially, no Polish foreign policy documents define the term "strategic partnership" in relation to the United States. Based on practice, however, it would appear that Poland's priority is to establish close relations in the political and security spheres, as was clearly observable during negotiations on the deployment of the American ballistic missile defenses on Polish territory. The key Polish proposal centered on an agreement that would give Polish-American interactions the status of special relations and on a peculiar "informal Polish-American alliance"⁴⁰ that would entail the United States' obligation (in addition to that arising from art. 5 of the Washington Treaty) to come to Poland's assistance in the event its security was threatened. This could be particularly

⁴⁰ See Minister W. Waszczykowski's statement during the debate "Missile defenses and Polish national interest" organized by the Batory Foundation on 7 August 2006, www.batory.org.pl/doc/tarcza-antyrakietowa.pdf.

important if Poland were to accept the American offer concerning the BMD, which would obviously be met with hostility on the part of the Russian Federation (at the negotiation stage, Russia had already announced that it would direct its missiles at targets in Poland), and could lead to an increased risk of a terrorist attack in Poland, however minimal.

An analysis of the state of relations between Poland and the US in 2007 shows that many goals, notably in the political and military dimension, were not attained. Although negotiations on the deployment in Poland of elements of the anti-missile shield are not over, they have nevertheless revealed substantial differences of views between the parties, primarily about the threats that may arise as a result of the deployment and also on the measures necessary to counter them. The United States, in line with its principle of not entering into separate arrangements (with the exception of the Washington Treaty) with its NATO allies, argues that the guarantees existing as a result of the two countries' membership in NATO are sufficient.⁴¹ It should not be expected, therefore, that any political and military agreement will contain any additional obligations of the United States towards Poland.

The long list of issues that were not satisfactorily resolved includes the relatively poor interest of the present US administration in promoting NATO membership prospects for Ukraine and Georgia⁴² and the absence of the expected strengthening of Poland's position in the Middle East, in both the political or economic spheres (although the invitation to Minister Radosław Sikorski to attend the November conference in Annapolis should definitely be treated as a gesture of recognition for Poland's involvement in the region). Poland had also counted on stronger American support for General Franciszek Gągor's candidacy for the position of head of the Military Committee (although it cannot be assumed with any certainty that such support would have worked to the benefit of the Polish candidate, who was ultimately not chosen), as well as on a positive decision regarding the location on Polish territory of the NATO Allied Ground Surveillance system. Preliminary signals coming from NATO do not inspire much hope that this is going to be the chosen location.

Polish diplomatic efforts to have Poland admitted to the Visa Waiver Program also fell through. Although the issue is of secondary importance from

⁴¹ See statement by Condoleezza Rice following the meeting with Radosław Sikorski on 1 February 2008, www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/02/99964.htm.

⁴² Neither country was subjected to the Membership Action Plan at the session of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest in April 2008.

the perspective of the Polish national interest, it is still regarded as a failure in terms of prestige, particularly since other countries of the region (Estonia and the Czech Republic) were finally admitted to the program. The visa problem, a topic that stirs public emotions, contributed to the drop in Poles' liking for the United States, as the dominant view is that Poland, being such an important ally of the United States in its war on terror, should not be among the states whose citizens face difficulties in entering American territory.

Difficulties with achieving the aims of Poland's policy regarding the United States are due to both objective factors (the problems with which the United States is struggling in the Greater Middle East, the perception of Central and Eastern Europe as one of the most stable regions in the world and the resultant decrease of American interest in it), as well as the fact that Polish instruments used to shape mutual relations are very one-sided, a fact that has severely compromised their effectiveness recently. For many years, the support (both political and in kind) that Poland provided to American military operations was seen in Poland as one of the most effective methods of building close relations with the United States. Of particular importance in this context was the participation of the Polish Military Contingent in the Iraqi mission. Polish involvement in the operation was undoubtedly noticed and appreciated (Bush emphasized the importance of Poland's participation on many occasions, and when Poland's ambassador to Iraq, Edward Pietrzyk, was injured in an attack in October, Bush contacted him by telephone), but the possibilities of using for political advantage the fact that Poland was one of the few countries to support the United States so unequivocally in its campaign against Saddam Hussein in 2003 have been exhausted. It is also dubious whether the decision to reinforce the Polish contingent in Afghanistan (also taken more to earn the favorable attitude of the Americans rather than NATO) has contributed, beyond closer military cooperation, to the achievement of Poland's political objectives. Poland's input to ISAF will probably be interpreted by the Americans as the performance of a clear obligation by an ally, even if the Polish government's decision to allow Polish units to participate in combat operations contrasts positively with the unwillingness of other NATO countries to increase their commitment. Poland's attractiveness as a political ally will also decline as a result of last year's rapprochement between the US and France, something which will doubtless lead to a greater involvement of French armed forces in the Alliance's operations.

In this context it seems rather difficult to decide whether the Polish government's agreement to the deployment of American missile defenses in Poland would actually contribute to strengthening mutual relations and to the

realization of Polish interests, such as those related to upgrading the armed forces. Proponents of Poland's participation in the project (including Jarosław Kaczyński's government) emphasized that the deployment of a system that is crucial for American security will make it possible to "anchor" the United States in Europe and will somehow automatically increase Poland's security. The opposition (especially Civic Platform) was rather of the opinion that the American offer for Poland could be attractive on the condition that the United States, while pursuing its interests, would also consider Polish proposals.

The debate on the conduct of negotiations with the Americans reflects a broader problem. Although no significant political milieus in Poland would question the United States' role in ensuring security for Poland, in 2007, during the course of the discussion about Poland's participation in the BMD program, for the first time two concepts for conducting policy with regard to the US emerged. One concept holds that the establishment of close relations with the United States (primarily in the political and military spheres, as a sort of insurance policy for Poland in case its security worsened substantially), modeled on those enjoyed by the UK or Israel, is of crucial importance. This is accompanied by the conviction that to bring those relations to such a high level entails certain political costs (for example accepting, or at least not questioning, American choices in important international policy questions, often without consideration for the cost of such support), and contributions in kind, (chiefly military contributions to US-led operations). This concept takes it as self-evident that the interests of Poland and the United States are largely convergent.

The second concept, even if it does not question the importance of the Polish-American partnership, and does not propose to cool relations, nevertheless puts in doubt the ways in which this partnership has functioned thus far. In this concept, particular attention is drawn to the absence, or limited extent, of any tangible benefits compensating the costs incurred, including the adverse effects of ignoring the broader context of Polish foreign policy. At the same time, this approach stresses that upon making any important decision in its relations with the United States, Poland should consider the ramifications of such decisions for its own security (in keeping with the principle that not all actions that enhance the American security automatically enhance that of Poland) and for relations with other allies from NATO or the EU.⁴³

⁴³ See, for example, statements by B. Komorowski and R. Kuźniar during the debate "What do we need missile defences for?," *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 3 March 2007, <http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,3959278.html>.

The present state of Polish-American relations clearly indicates that both the objectives of Polish foreign policy regarding the United States and the measures used to attain them should be modified. The former must be formulated with more realism, considering the countries' differing potentials and their often divergent interests. In the case where Poland's interests are not convergent with those of the United States, it would be worthwhile to communicate our reservations. It has happened more than once that support for a given aspect of United States policy has led to situations where Poland has had to incur the political costs, and the American lack of awareness of such costs meant that the United States was not inclined to compensate Poland for its potential losses.

It also appears necessary to ensure a greater diversity in the instruments that Poland uses to build its relations with the United States. In addition to seeking support at the top political level, the pursuit of specific interests in that country requires intense lobbying (and thus, increased spending for this purpose), sending of clear messages to those institutions, research centers, and opinion-forming media (where Poland's presence is slight) which exert influence on the present administration and congress, and reaching the administration and congress directly. It would be worthwhile to create a program, (similar to the American International Visitor Leadership Program, under which 5,000 persons are invited to the United States by the State Department every year), to promote the guiding principles of Polish foreign policy among experts from leading think-tanks and journalists. Thus far, Poland has been primarily trying to ensure that as many Polish students, researchers, etc. as possible are allowed to conduct research in the United States. We should also look at possibilities for mobilizing the Polish-American community, primarily the young and the educated elites that reside in the United States.

In formulating our foreign policy with regard to the United States in the future, we should be aware that a power such as the United States still remains, measures the "usefulness" of its alliances by how convenient they are in the pursuit of the power's own policy objectives. Regardless of whether the next administration will be formed by Republicans or Democrats, American foreign policy will still be dominated by problems in the Greater Middle East. In this context, chances for a strategic partnership between Poland and the United States in the global dimension are slim, and would require an outlays that the Polish public feels increasingly reluctant to make, as the prevalent view is that Poland no longer faces such serious challenges as, for example, accession to NATO, and that the support of the United States is not of key importance for the pursuit of a foreign policy suited to a country of Poland's potential.

Poland's Policy Regarding Germany

Among the most important elements of Poland's foreign policy are its relations with the Federal Republic of Germany. The subject is both delicate and complicated, and Polish political parties have failed to achieve a consensus on it, as was clearly visible in 2007.

Jarosław Kaczyński's government, dominated by the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party, failed to secure a strong political situation. Even if from the beginning of its tenure (July 2006) the party could count on President Lech Kaczyński, the prime minister's brother, it was in turn dependent on the support of its coalition partners: right-wing Euro-sceptics from the League of Polish Families (LPR) and left-wing populists from Self-Defence (Samoobrona). The coalition lacked cohesion politically and, in addition, was fraught with personal conflicts. More importantly, however, Prime Minister Kaczyński's policies, which advocated the need for a comprehensive overhaul of the state and negating the achievements of the governments in the 1989–2005 period, came in for unusually sharp criticism from the opposition as well as from a sizeable portion of the influential elites and the media. The dispute between the defenders of the 3rd Republic and those who desired to build a 4th Republic led to a considerable polarization of Polish society.

Foreign policy was not free of political infighting either. Prime Minister Kaczyński considered that the manner in which it had been conducted by previous governments was unsatisfactory, "suppliant-expiatory and immensely timid" in character,¹ and failed to protect Polish interests to a sufficient degree. He also criticized Western European politicians' attitude towards Poland. "The most obvious defense of Polish interests is treated as an expression of resentment rather than concern for what every state should care for. We are mainly urged to forget about the past, with which our partners are only vaguely familiar, and to simply accept proposals today from older and stronger

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¹ Interview with Jarosław Kaczyński in *Rzeczpospolita* of 16 December 2006.

[countries]. It could be said that we are to adopt the attitude of a minor. Just such an approach was adopted by many of our predecessors.”²

This diagnosis had a specific impact on relations with Germany, Poland's most important trade partner. In the 1990s, Germany had also been a close ally of Poland, whose efforts to join NATO and the EU it had intensively supported. Later, however, increasingly frequent disputes broke out between the two countries. One of the most serious was the dispute that arose over plans to build a centre in Berlin commemorating the forced resettlement of Germans from East-Central Europe. This undertaking, pressed on by Erika Steinbach, who is chairwoman of the German Expellees' Association and who is hostile to Poland, was endorsed in 2005 by Angela Merkel's government and met with serious opposition in Poland. It was feared that the presentation of the history of forced resettlements, called expulsions by the Germans, out of historical context—which included the atrocities the Germans perpetrated during the Second World War—would substantially distort the truth about the history of the 20th century. Such fears were only confirmed by evidence of the great ignorance of Germans, especially the younger generation, about Polish history.³

Even greater concern was aroused by the German government's political support for the plan to build a gas pipeline from Russia to Germany at the bottom of the Baltic Sea. This plan was personally advocated by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, and Angela Merkel's government continued to support the project. In Poland it was feared that the pipeline would expose the country to the risk of Russian “energy blackmail,” as Russia could use the pipeline to deliver gas to Western Europe while by-passing Poland. Furthermore, the construction of the pipeline at the bottom of the sea entails threats to the environment and, in practice, makes immaterial the plans to extend the Yamal pipeline (through Belarus and Poland) or to build a new, “Amber” gas pipeline (through Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland). Either of these projects would be considerably cheaper than laying a pipeline at the bottom of the Baltic.

² *Ibidem.*

³ For example, according to a 2005 survey, half of young Germans (and one-third of the total population) do not know what country Germany assaulted in 1939, thus starting the Second World War. In fairness, let us mention that as many as 55% young Germans (and 29% of the total population) do not know who started the Reformation in their country. See *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 26 April 2005, and “Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V. Deutsche Geschichte: Ergebnisse einer repräsentativen Bevölkerungsumfrage,” *Studie 1512*, Mennheim, 2005, as discussed in *Die Welt* of 23 April 2005.

Finally, emotions in Poland were also stirred by the activities of the Prussian Trust, an organization representing former German residents—or their legal successors—of areas that have been part of Poland since 1945, who are currently raising property claims against Poland. Even though, in 2004, Chancellor Schröder declared that Germany did not support such claims and, in the view of most specialists of international law, including the authors of the special expert opinion in the matter commissioned by Poland and Germany,⁴ such claims have no basis in law, the Trust nevertheless began to file claims against the Polish state at the European Court of Human Rights.

All these contentious issues ensued from the actions of the authorities of the FRG or German organizations, and for this reason, PiS politicians and the commentators supporting them argued that the tension between the two countries was due to Germany's patronizing attitude towards the interests of its eastern neighbor, and to a rising current of "historical revisionism," depicting the unique nature of Nazi historical crimes in relative terms. For this reason, the previous Polish policy was to be replaced by a peculiar strategy of political realism, consisting in the non-avoidance of confrontation and disputes, insofar as this would accelerate the resolution of problems that had existed for several years.

As early as 2006, the pursuit of this policy, and especially the rhetoric of Jarosław Kaczyński, who often referred to Germany's Nazi past, earned the Polish prime minister, and the president to some degree, considerable hostility from a large portion of the German mass media. The accusations of nationalism, intolerance, and of misunderstanding the "spirit of Europe"⁵ leveled by the German media against the Kaczyński brothers, and sometimes against the entire country, were often repeated by the press of other European countries. This did not help the Polish government to find allies among other EU countries at times of important international negotiations. In 2007, however, Polish-German relations were not determined by bilateral affairs, but rather by the subject of the EU's institutional future. Germany, presiding over the EU in the first half of 2007, had been in the past an important proponent of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, which was rejected in 2005 by the French and Dutch

⁴ J. Barcz, J. Frowein, "Expert Report on Claims from Germany against Poland in Connection with World War II," *Polish Quarterly of International Affairs* 14, no. 1 (2005), pp. 109–137.

⁵ See the report of the Foundation for Polish-German Reconciliation authored by a researcher from Poland—Magdalena Latkowska, and from Germany—Julia Walter, in M. Muszyński, P. Sypniewski, and K. Rak (eds.), *Niemcy o Polsce i Polakach, Polska w mediach niemieckich w latach 2006–2007*, Warsaw, 2007.

in referenda. When, during the German presidency, the debate began over the shape of another treaty, Germany wished it to resemble the Constitutional Treaty as much as possible. Poland, in turn, was one of the chief opponents of this approach, and therefore the German presidency and Polish-German relations were largely dominated by disputes over the shape of the future treaty, and particularly over the method of counting votes at the EU Council, and by the press debates they generated.

Poland's electoral campaign also affected relations between Poland and Germany. In July 2007, the government coalition fell apart and early elections to the Sejm and Senate were called for 21 October. In the run-up to the elections, the state's activeness in foreign affairs, including in its relations with Germany, diminished. At the same time, the disputes over foreign policy grew sharper between the opposition Civic Platform (PO) and Left and Democrats (LiD) on the one hand, and PiS on the other. The elections were won by the centre-right PO, which formed a government, headed by Donald Tusk, with the Polish People's Party (PLS). The government, sworn into office on 16 November, decided to warm Poland's relations with Germany. A symbol of the new approach was, for example, the appointment of Władysław Bartoszewski, a former prisoner of the Nazi camp in Auschwitz, twice minister for foreign affairs under the 3rd Republic and an avid proponent of Polish-German reconciliation, to the post of Secretary of State at the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, responsible for relations with Germany.

The arrival in power of PO and PSL was welcomed by German politicians and the German media. During that period, Germany's relations with France, traditionally its most important partner, deteriorated as the latter under its new president, Nicolas Sarkozy, treated Germany on several occasions not as an ally but rather as a competitor for informal leadership in the EU. PO politicians regarded the improvement of the political climate between Poland and Germany as valuable in itself, and were not inclined to adopt a principled stance on historical issues in the manner of PiS. However, political pressure from PiS and the need to work with President Kaczyński have not allowed PO to shape its German policy freely. It is telling that PO leader Donald Tusk disappointed Chancellor Merkel by turning down her invitation to visit Berlin before the Polish parliamentary elections, no doubt fearing that such a visit would fuel PiS's accusations of being "pro-German."⁶

⁶ *Rzeczpospolita* of 6 December 2007.

Poland's accession to the Schengen zone on 21 December 2007 was an event that crowned many years of Polish-German cooperation in internal affairs and substantially facilitated travel and trade between the two countries. It was, however, accompanied by the anxiety expressed by German public opinion, notably in the eastern Lands, of rising crime, an influx of illegal immigrants, and competition from the new EU member states, where, owing to cheaper production costs, many German enterprises relocate. Another source of concern was a possible rise in unemployment following the unrestricted opening of the German labor market to workers from Central and Eastern Europe, scheduled to happen after the end of the transition periods, but no later than in 2011.

Premises

The premises of Polish policy with regard to Germany in 2007 were presented by Foreign Affairs Minister Anna Fotyga in two important addresses to the Sejm. On 25 January 2007, she presented a government communication on the implementation of the Polish-German Good Neighborhood and Friendly Cooperation Treaty of 1991. In her detailed account of the history of relations between the two countries following 1991 and their present state, she formulated a number of declarations and proposals with regard to Germany. "The government considers it necessary to reshape present relations to a considerable extent, to break with the overly passive approach [that has been] present for many years in favor of cooperation in partnership. This will take place through a number of bilateral initiatives proposed by Poland in areas subject to the Treaty [...] and in forums for European cooperation." The government "intends to participate in a sensible manner in the establishment of the European 'Memory and Solidarity' Network" and hopes that "the Centre against Expulsions in the form proposed by radical milieus concentrated around the Expellees' Association will not be established."⁷ Minister Fotyga welcomed the evolution of Germany's view of Russia in a direction that she judged "increasingly realistic and taking the opinions of EU partners into account." She announced a further intensification of cooperation with Germany on European and transatlantic policy, and on stimulating dialogue within the Weimar Triangle, as well as the activities of the Polish-German Youth Exchange and of the Foundation for Polish-German Cooperation. Minister Fotyga expected from Germany

⁷ *Informacja rządu nt. realizacji Traktatu między Rzeczpospolitą Polską a Republiką Federalną Niemiec o dobrym sąsiedztwie i przyjaznej współpracy*, Sejm publication no. 1328 of 2007, [http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki5ka.nsf/wgdruku/1328/\\$file/1328.pdf](http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki5ka.nsf/wgdruku/1328/$file/1328.pdf) (20.03.2008). Subsequent quotes come from the same source.

a significant increase in its support for the Polish community in Germany—to a level commensurate with that accorded by Poland to its German minority.

In a broader context, the objectives of Poland's policy regarding Germany were presented by Minister Fotyga in the Government Address on the main points of Polish foreign policy delivered at the Sejm on 11 May 2007. The document refers to Germany as an "important partner" in the EU. The minister noted, however, that as Poland is presently a member of the EU and NATO, a new framework for bilateral relations should be worked out. She also mentioned outstanding problems in relations between the two countries: the Centre against Expulsions, the Nord Stream gas pipeline project, and the situation of the Polish minority in Germany. She also stated that Poland was concerned about property claims made by German citizens and that a joint declaration by both governments, affirming the lack of legal basis for such claims "would additionally contribute to cementing Poles' sense of security." Finally, the minister reiterated that the potential for cooperation within the Weimar Triangle was not being fully utilized. She proposed expanding, within the framework of the Triangle, the dialogue on the European Neighbourhood Policy and on the cooperation of defense ministries as part of the European Security and Defense Policy.⁸

Comparing this address with the addresses of the two preceding ministers—Stefan Meller, who stated in 2006 that Poland was a friend of Germany,⁹ and Adam Daniel Rotfeld who, a year earlier, had referred to Germany as Poland's "strategic partner," one of three major ones in the EU (in addition to France and Great Britain)—it is evident that Minister Fotyga, rather than focusing on opportunities for cooperation between the two countries, whether in the bilateral, regional, or EU dimension, concentrated instead on existing problems.

In his exposé on 23 November 2007, Prime Minister Tusk announced intensified cooperation with Germany, referring to it as "strategic," but he also declared that "difficult issues will not be avoided." "We all know in Poland that Polish-German relations are of key importance for the good standing of both countries in the European Union but that they also require special solicitude, a complex-free attitude, a clear—determined when necessary—and friendly presentation of mutual problems and expectations."¹⁰

⁸ "Government information on Polish foreign policy in 2007," see above, p. 25.

⁹ "Government information on Polish foreign policy in 2006," *Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy 2007*, p. 9.

¹⁰ Opening address by Prime Minister Donald Tusk (27 February 2008), www.kprm.gov.pl/s.php?id=1389&path=10325.

Anna Fotyga's addresses and Donald Tusk's exposé did not differ much but, as it turned out, the conduct of Poland's policy with regard to its western neighbor was quite different.

Bilateral Relations

Political relations. Contacts between the governments of Poland and Germany in 2007 were very lively, a fact that testifies to the importance attached by both countries to mutual relations and, also, to the number of issues to be addressed. On 1 February 2007, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Germany's foreign minister, visited Poland, followed shortly by Norbert Lambert, president of the Bundestag (17 February and 1 May). A meeting between the delegates of the Sejm, headed by Speaker Marek Jurek, with the presidium of the Bundestag was also organized. It was the first-ever meeting between parliamentarians of both countries. The subsequent speaker of the Sejm, Ludwik Dorn, also visited the German capital (12 September), followed by Speaker of the Senate Bogdan Borusewicz (29 and 30 November).

The most important event in the relations between the two countries was, however, the visit to Poland, on 16 and 17 March, of Chancellor Angela Merkel, who held talks with Polish politicians and gave a lecture at Warsaw University, where she underscored the importance of the Solidarity movement for the political transformations of Central and Eastern Europe and for German reunification. She and her husband were also guests of Lech and Maria Kaczyński at the presidential holiday resort on the Hel Peninsula.

President Lech Kaczyński visited Germany on three occasions: on 4 February he met with President Horst Köhler at the final game of the handball world championships played between Poland and Germany, with Chancellor Merkel at Meseberg Castle in Brandenburg on 16 June, a few days before the opening of the European Council summit in Brussels, and on 12 October in Berlin.

On 6 December 2007, Radosław Sikorski, the new Polish foreign minister, visited Berlin, followed by Prime Minister Tusk on 11 December. The heads of the Polish and German governments met again on 21 December during a ceremony at the Porajów-Zittau border crossing on the occasion of Poland's accession to the Schengen area.

The most important aspect of the discussions was the EU's institutional future. Germany, which was holding the EU presidency, was also the leader of a large, informal group of the Constitutional Treaty's supporters. Poland, in turn,

along with the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic, demanded that many provisions of the treaty be revised. In March, however, following Chancellor Merkel's visit, Poland agreed to the proposal that the text of the Treaty should form the basis for talks on a new treaty.¹¹

Poland was especially opposed to the so-called "double majority" system. In comparison with the Nice Treaty in force at present, it strengthened Germany's position while reducing the weight of Polish votes in decisions taken by a qualified majority. Initially, President Lech Kaczyński and Jarosław Kaczyński's government attempted to retain the Nice system. When it turned out that no state, except the Czech Republic, supported this proposal, Polish diplomacy started to promote the Equal Influence System, also known as the square root system (in it, every country would have a number of votes proportional to the square root of its population).

Germany opposed this proposal also, and many well-known politicians, especially Bundestag and European Parliament deputies without a government function, e.g., President of the European Parliament Hans Georg Pöttering (CDU), Martin Schulz (SPD), or Ruprecht Polenz (CDU), publicly accused the Polish authorities of being "anti-European."¹² Their statements were widely quoted by the German media, which also added many of their own commentaries, in which reasonable criticism appeared side by side with a patronizing attitude with regard to Polish interests, with stereotypes, misinformation, or primitive satire, as well as with stock accusations of nationalism, misunderstanding the "spirit of Europe" and suggestions that Poland simply didn't fit in the EU.¹³ Such attacks grew in intensity shortly before the session of the European Council in Brussels (21–22 June 2007), during which a decision was made about the new treaty. Commentators who defended the Polish viewpoint were few. An article by Alan Posener, head of the editorials section at *Die Welt*, attracted the most attention in Poland, as he wrote that "it is Poles who are saving Europe," and that press attacks on Kaczyński's government were inspired by the authorities in Berlin, who were using the "biased, anti-Polish views of German public opinion" to exert pressure on Poland.¹⁴

¹¹ Interview with President Lech Kaczyński for TVP 1, 17 March 2007, www.prezydent.pl/x.node?id=8543123 (25.03.2008).

¹² M. Muszyński et al. (eds.), *Niemcy o Polsce i Polakach...*, p. 40.

¹³ *Ibidem*, pp. 37–47.

¹⁴ A. Posener, "Es sind die Polen, die Europa retten," *Die Welt* of 21 June 2007, <http://debatte.welt.de/kommentare/25275/es+sind+die+polen+die+europa+retten> (21.03.2008).

The unfavorable climate in Polish-German relations reached its apogee after the Brussels summit, when Germany tried to push through the adoption of the mandate without Poland's consent, a move opposed by Lithuania and the Czech Republic. The Polish position was criticized by the media and by numerous politicians, including Minister Steinmeier. The flames were further fanned by Prime Minister Kaczyński's statement that "something bad is happening in Germany" and by the context in which this was said, which suggested to some in the German media that he had compared Germany's present situation to that of the 1930s.¹⁵ Minister Steinmeier retorted that the Polish prime minister's diagnosis was "unjustified" and "historically false."¹⁶ Angela Merkel, in turn, attempted to alleviate the situation,¹⁷ although it was precisely at this time that the Polish weekly *Wprost* published a distasteful photomontage showing the chancellor bare-chested and, in the same edition, an article by Mariusz Muszyński, the Foreign Minister's representative for Polish-German relations, suggesting that Germany owed its prosperity to the ruthless exploitation of countries which had been subdued by the Third Reich and which had subsequently not been sufficiently compensated.¹⁸ Later, German public opinion was also shocked by allegations, made by a Polish MEP, Maciej Giertych, that Chancellor Merkel was more cunning than Hitler.¹⁹ Irrespective of it all, and as the treaty had finally been agreed on, emotions began to cool even if they could still be felt during that autumn's Sejm electoral campaign. Former Foreign Affairs Minister Władysław Bartoszewski, a PO supporter who had been engaged in Polish-German dialogue for many years, referred to PiS politicians as frustrated individuals and "diplo-morons."²⁰

During the German presidency of the EU, Berlin was busy resolving the constitutional crisis of the EU and, against Polish expectations, did not manage to substantially intensify the eastern dimension of the European Neighborhood Policy. However, it increased EU interest in Central Asian countries, a development that was beneficial for Poland. More importantly, Germany, holding the EU presidency, intensively engaged Russia on the subject of lifting

¹⁵ PAP dispatch of 27 June 2007.

¹⁶ *Rzeczpospolita* of 28 June 2007.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

¹⁸ *Wprost*, no. 26 of 2007.

¹⁹ PAP dispatch of 18 July 2007.

²⁰ "Bartoszewski: Nie wierzcie frustratom i dewiantom!," news from gazeta.pl portal, 29 September 2007, <http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/Wiadomosci/1,80708,4532533.html> (19.03.2008).

the embargo on Polish foodstuffs (meat and, partially, produce). It was precisely on account of meat or, more precisely, Russian trade sanctions against Poland, that the Kaczyński government vetoed the opening of negotiations between the EU and Russia about a new accord to replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1998. During the May EU-Russia summit in Samara, Chancellor Merkel strongly accentuated the need to protect human rights in Russia and stood up for Poland's interests in the food trade dispute.²¹

Relations between Poland and Germany in 2007 were still weighed down by unresolved problems, such as the above-mentioned German plans to commemorate the expulsion of Germans, the construction of the gas pipeline from Russia to Germany, the property claims of the Prussian Trust, the situation of the Polish community in Germany, and the issue of the return of cultural artefacts.

The question that drew the most attention had to do with the dispute over cultural artefacts of German origin that had become Polish property with the extension of Polish sovereignty over the former eastern territories of the Third Reich. The conflict had smoldered over many years and was rekindled in the summer of 2007 following a statement by Tony Eitel, a diplomat who was appointed by the German foreign affairs ministry's to negotiate with Poland on the issue. Eitel accused Poland of refusing, in breach of international law, to return "looted" cultural artefacts.²² The matter concerns primarily manuscripts that had been written by famous Germans and had been found in 1945 in Lower Silesia. They had previously been owned by the Prussian State Library in Berlin and are now kept at the Jagiellonian Library in Cracow. Eitel's charges led to a stormy reaction from Polish public opinion, as a result of which numerous articles containing harsh statements on the topic were published in the Polish and German press. Minister Fotyga also spoke critically of Germany's actions.²³

The entire dispute had a negative impact on the German negotiating position. Under pressure from public opinion, the Polish authorities toughened their stance. Undoubtedly, broad media coverage of the dispute in the German media worked to Poland's benefit as it allowed Polish arguments to be voiced to

²¹ PAP dispatch of 19 May 2007 and *Rzeczpospolita* of 19 May 2007.

²² *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* of 26 July 2007.

²³ Interview with Minister Fotyga on *Sygnaly Dnia* radio programme, 9 August 2007, www.polskieradio.pl/jedynka/sygnalydnia/artykul10550.html (21.03.2008).

German public opinion. The German authorities thus began to distance themselves from Eitel's statement.

Little changed in the status of the Polish community in Germany, estimated at approximately one million persons.²⁴ In an interview with the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Minister Fotyga stated that in no other EU country did the Polish community experience such difficult living conditions as in Germany and accused Germany of assimilating Poles and of non-observance of its obligations regarding support for the Polish language.²⁵ The topic was later discussed in meetings, but no visible effects were achieved.

Matters unfolded differently in the case of the centre to commemorate the forced resettlement of Germans from Central and Eastern Europe. In 2005, an idea strongly favored by the chairwoman of the Expellees' Association and CDU activist, Erika Steinbach (who, as a Bundestag deputy, presides over the work group on human rights of the CDU/CSU caucus), was incorporated in the coalition agreement between CDU/CSU and SPD. Both parties agreed to the establishment in Berlin of a centre, tentatively called the "Visible Sign," to document those events. Poland was opposed to the idea from the outset. In 2007, when work on the Visible Sign intensified, Merkel's government was particularly anxious to convince the Polish government to accept the idea, or at least to withdraw its objections.

This became possible after the elections in Poland. Discussions on the Visible Sign took place during Prime Minister Tusk's visit to Berlin on 11 December 2007. The Germans were interested in having official representatives of Poland in the council of experts of the future institution. On 6 February 2008, the federal government's representative for culture and the media, Minister Bernd Neumann, visited Poland to hold consultations on the Visible Sign. After this meeting, Polish authorities withdrew their objections against the project, reserving the right to exercise critical monitoring of the institution's operations. "We are taking the Visible Sign item off the governmental plane. This does not mean, however, that we are depriving ourselves of the right to assess it in the

²⁴ *Rzeczpospolita* of 3 February 2008. It should, however, be noted that official German statistics give the total of 384,000 Poles, see Interior Ministry Statistics, www.bmi.bund.de/cln_012/nn_165228/Internet/Content/Themen/Auslaender_Fluechtlinge_Asyl_Zuwanderung/Daten_undFakten/Deutsche_Auslaender_mit_Migrationshintergrund.html (27.03.2008). It appears that a sizeable portion of the Polish citizens also have German citizenship.

²⁵ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* of 2 February 2007.

future,” said Bartoszewski after the negotiations.²⁶ It was also decided that Poland would not delegate any official representatives to the center’s council.²⁷ The placing of a statue or a plaque in Berlin, near the Reichstag, commemorating the role of the Solidarity trade union in the overthrow of communism and the construction in Gdańsk of a Second World War museum, where the resettlements would be shown in their historical context were also discussed. The concept was announced by Prime Minister Tusk just before his visit to Berlin.²⁸

The climate of good mutual relations was disturbed, not for the first time, by the activities of the Prussian Trust. In 2007, the organization broadened its scope of activities to include cultural artefacts; in October, it demanded the return of a dozen or so paintings previously belonging to the Silesian von Inhenheim family, including the famous “Virgin and Child, St. John and Angels,” currently at the National Museum in Warsaw. During his visit to Poland on 1 February 2007, Minister Steinmeier confirmed that Germany did not endorse any claims raised by the Trust, but added that he would not agree to actions intended, amongst other things, to appease Polish public opinion, as proposed by the Kaczyński government. These were to include, for example, an obligation for Germany to pay compensation in the case—a purely theoretical one—any are awarded by the Court in Strasbourg. The Berlin government explained its refusal by arguing that to do so would be an admission of the justified nature of the claims themselves.

The issue of the construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline also failed to be resolved. Jarosław Kaczyński’s government strongly opposed the project and attempted to persuade other countries to block this undertaking, which was politically supported by the German government and developed primarily by German companies, such as E.ON-Ruhrgas and BASF. Instead, he proposed the construction of a much cheaper gas pipeline across the Baltic States and Poland. Germany, in turn, offered a short pipeline to Poland, to link the Polish transmission network with the German one. They repeated the proposal after the elections, hoping for a positive response from Poland. It didn’t come. “Poland’s

²⁶ Interview with Władysław Bartoszewski in *Rzeczpospolita* of 9 February 2008.

²⁷ *Rzeczpospolita* of 6 February 2008.

²⁸ Interview with Prime Minister Tusk for *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* of 10 December 2008, www.faz.net/s/RubDDBDABB9457A437BAA85A49C26FB23A0/Doc~EBED0CCA095EF4EF080B4E4479D3A0117~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html?rss_aktuell (17.03.2008).

position on the pipeline has not changed, but we want to discuss these issues” said Foreign Affairs Minister Radosław Sikorski in Berlin.²⁹

In March 2007, an animated debate began in Germany about the plans to deploy elements of the American missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. SPD chairman Kurt Beck, supported by many other Social-Democratic, Green and FDP politicians, argued that the deployment could lead to an arms race in Europe, that it would damage relations between the EU and Russia and strengthen anti-Western trends in that country,³⁰ or even that it represented an element of an American anti-Russian strategy aimed at “encircling Russia” (Gerhard Schröder).³¹ Government officials and Christian-Democratic politicians and some politicians of other parties did not object to the deployment of the defense shield and tried not to criticize Poland overtly, but called for a dialogue and for a NATO-based solution. The great majority of public opinion (70%) considered that it was the shield’s critics, including Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, who were right.³²

Economic relations. Political disputes between Poland and Germany did not affect their economic relations, which are very good. Germany remained Poland’s most important economic partner. In 2007, Poland’s exports to Germany amounted to €26.1 billion,³³ and its imports from Germany to €28.4 billion, which accounted respectively for 25.8% of Poland’s total exports and 23.9% of its imports.³⁴ Germany’s share in Polish foreign trade dropped slightly in comparison with 2006 (at the time 27.2% exports and 24% imports) fell for Germany, although the volume of trade itself grew. In comparison with 2006, exports to Germany grew by 6.3% (in PLN) and 9.4% (in EUR). Imports grew

²⁹ *Rzeczpospolita* of 7 December 2007.

³⁰ Ł. Adamski, “Niemiecka debata o systemie obrony przeciwrakietowej,” *Biuletyn PISM*, 2007, no. 17.

³¹ “Schröder geißelt Bushs Raketenabwehr,” *Der Spiegel*, Internet edition of 11 March 2007, www.spiegel.de/politik/debatte/0,1518,471062,00.html (21.03.2008).

³² *Rzeczpospolita* of 19 February 2007.

³³ These and the following statistics from the Central Statistical Office—*Foreign trade turnover, in total and by countries, 1–12 2007, preliminary results*, www.stat.gov.pl/gus/45_970_PLK_HTML.htm (26.03.2008).

³⁴ CSO statistics from *Foreign trade turnover in total and by countries, 1–12 2007, preliminary results*, www.stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/PUBL_obroty_handlu_zagr_01-12_2007.pdf (26.03.2008) and *Foreign trade January–December 2006*, Warsaw, 2007, pp. 92–93, www.stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/PUBL_handel_zagr_01-12_2006.pdf (26.03.2008).

by 13.8% (in PLN) and 17.3% (in EUR).³⁵ It is worth noting that Poland's trade with other important partners in the EU grew even more during the same period (by 10% with Italy, by 21% with France, and by 23% with the UK for exports, calculated in EUR. The respective figures for imports are 18%, 10%, and 28%).

Poland is also an important trade partner for Germany. It comes 12th in the ranking of importers and is the 10th largest exporter,³⁶ while the combined volume of trade between the two countries is equal to that between Germany and Russia and falls only 28% short of Germany's trade with China.³⁷ If we consider German exports alone, Poland is more important to the German economy than either China or Russia.³⁸ Poland's primary exports to Germany are machines, vehicles, household appliances, food, and furniture. Germany's main exports to Poland include machines and equipment, vehicles, chemicals and synthetic products.

In 2007, Polish investments in Germany grew substantially and amounted to €650 million (500 million in 2006). The principal investor in terms of single project value was PKN Orlen (150 million PLN), which owns 552 fuel stations in Germany. Further down the list were such companies as: Ciech SA (€75 million), Asseco (€37.7 million), Kopex (€27 million), Sanplast S.A. (€20 million), Unimil (€17 million), ComArch S.A. (€9.5 million), and Smyk (€1 million).³⁹

An important issue in the economic relations between the two countries is Polish citizens' access to the German labor market. Germany continues to keep it closed for workers from the new EU member states. Formally, countries of the "old" EU will be required to open up their labor markets only in 2011, but many have already decided not to make use of transition periods. While it is true that the German business lobby is calling for the lifting of barriers to the employment of citizens of the new EU member states, politicians are more influenced by

³⁵ The author's own calculations, based on: *Foreign trade turnover...; Foreign trade January–December 2006...* Owing to the appreciation of the PLN against the EUR in 2007, it is best to give the figures in both currencies.

³⁶ See information on the portal destatis.de (Federal Statistical Office), *Aussenhandel, Rangfolge der Handelspartner im Aussenhandel der Bundesrepublik Deutschlands 2007*, Wiesbaden, 2008, www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Content/Statistiken/Aussenhandel/Handelspartner/Tabellen/Content100/RangfolgeHandelspartner.property=file.pdf (26.03.2008).

³⁷ The author's own calculations, based on data from the Federal Statistical Office, *ibidem*.

³⁸ *Ibidem*.

³⁹ PAP dispatch of 23 April 2008.

public opinion, which fears a rise in unemployment. In a survey from March 2007, such anxiety was voiced by 41% of Germans.⁴⁰

On 1 November 2007, Germany opened its labor market solely to electrical and machine engineers, auto technicians, and to Poles who had graduated from German learning institutions.

Social and cultural relations. Cultural collaboration between Poland and Germany is based on the agreement of 14 July 1997,⁴¹ and the youth exchange program, which is very important for both countries, is based on the agreement of 17 June 1991.⁴² Both countries are connected by numerous ties, and cross-border, inter-governmental, cultural, and social cooperation is very intense.

An important element of the relations between Poles and Germans is the historical reconciliation process. This entails measures to increase historical awareness about the neighboring country. On 8 May 2007, on the anniversary of the end of the Second World War, an exhibition was opened on the site of the former forced labor camp "Berlin-Schöneweide," depicting the fate of Polish victims of forced and slave labor in the Third Reich. The exhibition was prepared by the Foundation for Polish-German Reconciliation, in cooperation with a German foundation, Topography of Terror. The ceremony was attended by Paweł Kowal, Polish deputy minister of foreign affairs.

In turn, work began in Berlin's city centre on a Topography of Terror project calling for the construction, on the grounds of the former Gestapo and SS headquarters, of a documentation centre dedicated to the crimes and victims of the Third Reich. The future museum is to inform visitors about Nazi crimes in Poland. The first exhibition is scheduled for September 2009, on the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of the Second World War, and will present Germany's onslaught on Poland.

Young Germans' awareness of Poland was furthered by a conference in Warsaw about the Warsaw Uprising, entitled "Memory, Truth, and Responsibility," co-organized by the Chancellery of the President of Poland. The conference was

⁴⁰ In a survey conducted by Forschungsgruppe Wahlen of Mannheim, an equal percentage of Germans claimed, however, that the opening of the labour market to, for example, Poles would not translate into rising unemployment, while 13% were of the opinion that unemployment would drop. See "Politbarometer Extra. Deutsche sehen Europäische Union ambivalent. Drei Viertel empfinden Stolz, Europäer zu sein," www.forschungsgruppe.de/Studien/Studien-Archiv/PB_Extra_Europa/ (2.04.2008).

⁴¹ *Dziennik Ustaw*—Dz. U. (Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland) 1999, no. 39, item 379.

⁴² Dz. U. 1994, no. 3, item 12.

held between 30 March and 1 April 2007 and was attended, besides intellectuals from both countries, by many German students.

On 6 December, foreign ministers Steinmeier and Sikorski extended their patronage to the reconstruction of the Gothic parish church in Gubin that had been destroyed during the war. Both politicians also announced that work would begin on drafting, following French-German experience, a joint Polish-German history textbook.

At the turn of 2007, a work by German historian Tobias Weger and Polish researchers Małgorzata and Krzysztof Ruchniewicz and Kazimierz Wóycicki, entitled *Zrozumieć historię—kształtować przyszłość* [Understanding History, Shaping the Future] was published in both languages. This work, published by the Saxon Education Agency, is to be used as supplementary material for schools, and contains a parallel treatment of the history of Poland and Germany in the years 1933–1945, including numerous source materials. Critics in Poland, however, stated that it too often adopted a German point of view and contained factual errors.⁴³

Historical topics were also reflected in the arts. On 19 February 2007, an official preview of Volker Schlöndorff's film *Strike*, devoted to Anna Walentynowicz, took place. Soon thereafter, the film was shown in Polish and German cinemas. An even more important event was the preview of the film *Katyn*, directed by Andrzej Wajda. The film, devoted to the story of the murder of Polish officers by the USSR and the subsequent lies of communist propaganda on this subject met with a positive reception from critics. The official presentation of the film on 16 February 2008, during the festival Berlinale, was also attended by Chancellor Merkel, who later met with the director.⁴⁴

Disputes over the institutional future of the EU and commentaries in the German media were not conducive to the improvement of Poland's negative image in Germany. In September 2007, a survey commissioned by a reputable journal, *Internationale Politik*, on Poland's membership in the EU was published. It showed that German public opinion is divided: 47% of respondents stated that Poland was something positive in the EU, while 45% were of the opposite opinion. The largest proportion of those with negative views on Poland

⁴³ *Rzeczpospolita* of 20 February 2007 and review by Marek Rzeszutarski in *Zeszyty Niemcoznawcze PISM*, 2008, no. 1.

⁴⁴ See *Rzeczpospolita* of 16 February 2008.

were older people and Christian-Democratic voters.⁴⁵ In addition, according to a survey conducted by TV Channel ZDF on March 2007, Germans dislike Poland more than any other EU state (23%), followed by Romania (11%) and the UK (8%).⁴⁶ According to another survey, 65% of Germans believe Poles are likeable, while 20% hold the opposite view,⁴⁷ which may suggest that anti-Polish prejudice is strong mainly among those Germans who harbor xenophobic views about the rest of the world in general. The results were undeniably affected by the fact that Poland is Germany's immediate neighbor, and the fact that the border on the Oder and Neisse rivers continues to be one of the most pronounced in the EU as it divides countries of different levels of economic development.

Another survey, commissioned by the weekly *Der Spiegel*, also aroused some interest in Poland. It showed that 24% of Germans still consider Silesia and East Prussia to be German, and therefore the German relinquishment of any claims for those regions (something that has already taken place in 1970) would be inappropriate.⁴⁸ Commenting on the survey's findings, former Polish foreign affairs minister Adam Daniel Rotfeld said that "Germans failed to do their elementary homework," and that one "can't pursue a head-in-the-sand policy" in relations with that country.⁴⁹

Poland's accession to the Schengen area was unusually important for the interaction between Poles and Germans, particularly those from the border areas. This was accompanied by serious anxiety in Germany, triggered primarily by fear of rising crime.⁵⁰ The majority of residents in the eastern lands opposed the enlargement of the Schengen area,⁵¹ and they were supported in this by the police trade unions.⁵² Shortly after the opening of the borders, complaints began to appear about increased and often spiteful and repressive checks by the

⁴⁵ See PAP dispatch of 28 September 2007, quoted in http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/kat,1356,statp,cG93aWF6YW5l,wid,9247838,wiadomosc.html?ticaid=15e47&_ticiresn=3 (2.04.2008).

⁴⁶ *Politbarometer ZDF. Deutsche sehen Europäische Union ambivalent*, <http://politbarometer.zdf.de/ZDFde/inhalt/6/0,1872,5253638,00.html?dr=1> (2.4.2008). See also *Rzeczpospolita* of 20 March 2007.

⁴⁷ See PAP dispatch of 27 June 2007.

⁴⁸ *Der Spiegel*, Internet edition of 20 February 2007, <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,467433,00.html> (2.4.2008), and *Rzeczpospolita* of 21 February 2007.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁰ *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 23 November 2007.

⁵¹ *Rzeczpospolita* of 22 December 2007.

⁵² *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 20 November 2007.

German police of cars with Polish number plates,⁵³ in response to which the Polish police began to treat Germans in similar fashion. Konrad Szymański, a MEP from PiS submitted several motions at the European Parliament about the behavior of the German police.

Media reports related to Poland's accession to the Schengen area accentuated the fact that many Poles are settling on the German side of the border, in the vicinity of Szczecin.⁵⁴ The phenomenon, positive in itself, is accompanied by unpleasant incidents, however, such as the destruction of Poles' property, most likely by supporters of the neo-Nazi party, NPD.

Finally it is worth noting that, on 1 February 2007, a parliamentary traineeship at the Sejm for young German scholarship winners was initiated under the International Program of Parliamentary Traineeships. Thus, Poland started to offer Germans what young Poles have long been able to do during their traineeship programs at the Bundestag.

Conclusions

Even though economic relations between Poland and Germany have been developing positively for a long time now, including in 2007; even though the number of ties between the two countries is growing; and even though Poland has joined the EU, of which Germany is also a member, political relations between the two countries last year were not the best. Poland and Germany held opposite positions on the vote counting method in the EU and were each other's main opponents in the dispute over the shape of the Reform Treaty. This led to a worsening of their mutual relations, which was also due to the rhetoric used by politicians on both sides, who were not sparing in their use of dismissive words, spiteful comments and insinuations about revisionism, nationalism, or great power tactics.

Jarosław Kaczyński's government also failed to resolve other contentious issues in relations between the two countries, such as the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline, the claims of the Prussian Trust, the unsatisfactory state of Polish language instruction and the protection of the Polish community in Germany, or Germany's demands for the return of certain cultural artefacts of German origin. Agreement failed to be reached also on the issue of vital interest

⁵³ For example, *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 8 February 2007, www.gazetawyborcza.pl/1,76842,4909261.html (2.04. 2008), *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 25 February 2007.

⁵⁴ See *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 12 December 2007.

to Polish public opinion, namely, the plans for the establishment in Germany of an institution to commemorate the fate of Germans, who, after 1944, fled or were displaced from territories currently part of Poland. Since the activities of the Weimar Triangle were not intensified, Poland and Germany did not cooperate more effectively on the EU forum, and it could be said that the objectives set out by Minister Fotyga in her addresses to the Sejm in January and May 2007 were not attained.

This does not mean, however, that they were achievable in a single year, particularly as the dispute over the institutional future of the EU, followed by the electoral campaign in Poland, meant that there was simply too little time to undertake diplomatic initiatives to improve mutual relations. In any case, the resolution of these disputes, except the one over the Nord Stream pipeline, depends to a greater extent on Germany than on Poland. The majority of the problems originate in the actions of the German authorities or organizations and Polish objections were merely a reaction to them. Awareness of this fact is lacking in Germany, as is understanding for the Poles' specific, historically-determined sensitivities. There was also insufficient awareness west of the Oder river of the fact that Germany—a country over twice as populous and considerably more powerful economically than Poland and, in addition, a country responsible for the atrocities and material losses sustained by Poland during the Second World War and, indirectly, for Poland's 40-year period of communism—should shoulder a greater responsibility for the state of mutual relations.

Naturally, the Polish side also made many mistakes. The majority of Polish politicians depicted Germany in an excessively one-sided manner and with a pronounced tendency to generalize. This was a manifestation of Polish over-sensitivity, especially in historical matters. Partially, this also ensued from the behavior of the Polish media, notably the more popular press, which focused too much attention on historical affairs and on the activities of Erika Steinbach and the expellees, creating an undeniably false impression that the views voiced by these circles were commonly held in Germany.

On the west side of the Oder, substantial ignorance of Polish issues could be observed, along with often thinly-veiled convictions about the Germans' cultural superiority and greater political maturity, or a patronizing treatment of their neighbor's interests—under the guise of European political correctness at that. The media storm that broke out prior to the summit in Brussels bears out the accuracy of this diagnosis.

Undoubtedly, the language used by Poles to describe Polish-German relations and German positions on key international problems was inappropriate. The adoption of a strategy summarised by the expression “we tell you straight what we think of you,” whether the opinions aired in this fashion were justified or not, led to great hostility from some German politicians and the media, making the resolution of existing problems more difficult and harming Poland’s image on the international stage. Moreover, key German politicians, such as the chancellor or the foreign affairs minister, spoke in terms of dialogue and understanding, while Polish politicians, especially Jarosław Kaczyński and Mariusz Muszyński, resorted to language that was hardly diplomatic.

The strategy of PiS politicians did bring one benefit, however. The use of “straight talk” in discussing existing problems in mutual relations, Poland’s steadfast objection to the Nord Stream project and the Centre against Expulsions, and the confrontational rhetoric, definitely contributed to making Germans aware of the brittle nature of political relations with their eastern neighbor and of the great sensitivity needed to nurture them. In this manner, the tactics of the Kaczyński government, which led to a sharpening of Polish-German disputes from an earlier period, facilitated the resumption of good relations under Donald Tusk’s government. Tusk won over the Germans at the outset by the mere fact that he was not from PiS. In addition, the shift in rhetoric, the declared interest in dialogue, and tolerance for the institution called the Visible Sign contributed to improving those relations.

It could be argued that the concentration on contentious issues by Jarosław Kaczyński’s government, and by commentators supporting it, made German society more aware of these issues, and particularly of the highly significant changes in the historical memory of Germans and the way in which the past is presented in that country.

Polish-German relations in 2007 and the “realistic” strategy with regard to Germany adopted by the PiS government will certainly be subject to dispute for many years, as will the Tusk government’s tolerance for the Visible Sign. A proper and dependable evaluation of these relations will be possible only after some time has passed. At present, it would seem that Jarosław Kaczyński’s strategy with regard to Germany has done more harm than good. His strategy essentially failed to resolve any of the outstanding issues in Polish-German relations and caused great damage to the credibility of the Polish authorities and to Poland’s image abroad.

Poland's Policy Regarding France

Background

Poland has traditionally perceived France as one of its most important partners in Western Europe. This is the result of historical ties between both countries, the presence of the Polish émigré community in France, Poles' interest in French culture, and the importance of French investments in Poland. At the level of inter-state relations, what counts above all is that France is a leading member of the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance, and that it makes up, with Poland and Germany, the Weimar Triangle. Despite these factors, in the early years of the current decade, Poland had a critical view of its relations with France, due primarily to divergent views on the Iraq crisis and during negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty (2003–2004), as well as to French society's reluctant attitude toward EU enlargement, due mainly to fears of an influx of cheap labor from new EU member states (the so-called Polish plumber case). President Jacques Chirac's statement on February 2003 to the effect that EU candidate countries, in their support of the United States on Iraq, had "missed [...] a good opportunity to be silent"¹ significantly contributed to the deterioration of France's image among Poland's political elites and ordinary citizens alike.

Relations with Poland are not of primary importance for France, given the disproportionate potential of the two countries, the different geopolitical objectives of their foreign policies, France's conviction that Central and Eastern European countries give priority to their relations with the United States and Germany, and fears related to EU enlargement. At the same time, it can't ignore the fact that Poland is the largest country in the region and, since 2004, one of the six largest EU member states, a major ready market for French companies, and an important destination for French investors. France, like Poland, took a negative view of the evolution of bilateral relations in the first half of the

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¹ *Conseil européen extraordinaire. Conférence de presse du Président de la République, M. Jacques Chirac, Bruxelles, 17 February 2003, www.doc.diplomatie.fr (01.04.2007).*

present decade. The results of the parliamentary and presidential elections in Poland in 2005 and the formation of the Law and Justice-led government, which was later joined by Self-Defence and the League of Polish Families, gave rise to some concern in France. The French media spoke critically of the new Polish government's nationalism and excessive conservatism (e.g. discrimination against sexual minorities).² It should, however, be noted that charges of this nature were not formulated by French state officials, at least not in their official statements.

The most important factor affecting Polish-French relations is both countries' membership in the European Union. Poland's accession to the EU significantly contributed to changing the nature of bilateral relations, bringing both countries closer together, and increasing the importance of Poland in France's policies. The cooperation between the two countries within the European Union can not be assessed unequivocally. Poland and France differ significantly in their views of European integration, yet they have common interests in some areas and manage to work together pragmatically.

Since 2003, Poland has been skeptical about the proposal to deepen European integration, especially the suggested resignation from the Nice voting system, seen as beneficial for Poland, in favor of the so-called double majority system introduced by the Constitutional Treaty. Poland also demanded that Europe's Christian roots and respect for Christian values be recognized in the treaty (this second aim appeared more difficult to meet, and therefore was less prominent). Poland also declared itself in favor of further EU enlargement, especially in the case of Ukraine.

France considered institutional reform to be necessary to render the European Union more effective (for this reason, among others, it supported the voting system introduced by the Constitutional Treaty). In addition, it defended the EU's secularity and viewed the proposed enlargement of the EU beyond the Western Balkans with skepticism. The Constitutional Treaty's rejection in referenda in France and the Netherlands (May–June 2005) suited Poland, as this made it possible to retain the provisions Nice Treaty. France, in turn, demanded the adoption of a new treaty that would include the institutional solutions contained in the Constitutional Treaty.

² See, for example, C. Châtelot, "Homophobie et radio antisémite et xénophobe: le côté obscur des conservateurs du PIS," *Le Monde* of 9 October 2005; *idem*, "Une idéologie défendant l'Etat, la morale et la famille," *Le Monde* of 25 October 2005.

Issues that brought Poland and France closer together include their shared desire to preserve the Common Agricultural Policy in its present shape, and their common objections to the excessive liberalization of certain sectors of the economy, particularly that of public services. In 2005, Poland and France cooperated with Germany during the last stage of the negotiations for the European Union's budget perspective for 2007–2013.³ Their steps led to the modification of the initial proposals of the British presidency and led to tangible financial benefits for Poland.

Another factor affecting Polish-French relations is the nature of both countries' security policies and a vision of the post-Cold War international order related to it. Poland places primary importance on close cooperation with the United States which, along with membership in NATO, represents the foundation of its security policy. France, in turn, views American hegemony unfavorably and, for this reason, takes a skeptical view of NATO which it considers too subordinated to the American superpower and favors the strengthening the European Security and Defense Policy.

Against the background of political relations, economic cooperation between Poland and France represents an optimistic contrast. Growth in trade has been growing uninterrupted for years, and Poland's trade deficit with France is decreasing. Poland has long been an attractive destination for French investments. At the beginning of the 21st century, France was one of Poland's largest foreign investors. In 2006, the volume of French investment outlays in Poland placed in third position, after the Netherlands and Germany.⁴ From Poland's perspective, the most important problem in economic relations with France was the lack of free access to the French labor market for Polish workers. In the pre-accession negotiations with Poland, France secured a long, five-year transition period in this sphere and did not want to give it up before 2009. This was primarily related to fears of the "Polish plumber."

To sum up, it should be stated that Polish-French relations in the initial years of the 21st century were not the best but, starting from 2004, there began to be signs that the two countries wished to tighten them. In February 2005, the first Polish-French summit, held in Arras, was attended by the presidents and several

³ See P. Douste-Blazy, S. Meller, "Budget Impasse: EU Needs to Move on and the World Will Not Wait," *Financial Times* of 15 December 2005.

⁴ *Zagraniczne inwestycje bezpośrednie w Polsce. Tablice statystyczne (2006) (Aneks statystyczny. 2006 rok)*, www.nbp.pl.

ministers of both countries.⁵ In 2006, President Kaczyński visited France, followed by Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz. The visits did not, however, result in reciprocal calls from France's highest officials. In the same year, Nicolas Sarkozy, the leader of the centre-right Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) in power in France and one of the potential candidates for the French presidency, declared himself in favor of strengthening Poland's position in the European Union, proposing that the six largest EU states (Germany, France, the UK, Italy, Spain, and Poland) set the pace for its activities, as used to be the case with the French-German tandem.⁶ In the event, it is with great interest that Poland observed the preparations for the French presidential elections, which were scheduled for May 2007 and expected to end the Chirac era—a difficult period in Polish-French relations—and, perhaps, give the presidency to Nicolas Sarkozy.

Premises

The premises of Poland's policy regarding France in 2007 were officially formulated in the address by foreign affairs minister Anna Fotyga at the Sejm (May 2007) and, in somewhat broader terms, in the opening addresses of Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński (July 2006) and his successor, Donald Tusk (November 2007).

Minister Fotyga recalled the cultural and historical ties between Poland and France and their economic, investment, and technological cooperation, especially the activeness of French investors in Poland. She expressed the hope that cooperation and political dialogue with France under its new president, Nicolas Sarkozy, would continue to grow. She further stated that the potential of the Weimar Triangle had not been fully utilized, as the forum could also serve to work out positions among the three states on issues of importance for the EU, such as the European Neighborhood Policy or the European Security and Defense Policy.⁷

In his opening address, Prime Minister Kaczyński referred to France only once, namely, when he stated that Poland should perhaps learn from the French experience in the area of nuclear energy, but he spoke of his government's

⁵ See *Deklaracja z Arras przyjęta podczas szczytu polsko-francuskiego 28 lutego 2005 r.*, www.ambafrance-pl.org.

⁶ See N. Sarkozy, *Témoignage*, Paris, 2006, pp. 70–74.

⁷ "Government Information on Polish Foreign Policy in 2007," see above, p. 25.

European policy program in detail. He emphasized that Poland wishes to participate in real decision-making mechanisms in the EU. In order to achieve this objective, he said, Poland would use its own position, but also refer to the Weimar Triangle and the Visegrad Group.⁸

Prime Minister Donald Tusk, in turn, stated that his government wishes to work with all EU member states and is a “guarantor of good collaboration with key partners within the European Union,” i.e., primarily with Germany and France. He declared himself in favor of improving relations with both countries (the remark primarily concerned Germany, in fact) and intensifying bi- and trilateral cooperation, on the premise that “when relations between Warsaw, Berlin and Paris are good, Poland’s interests in the European Union will do well.” The new prime minister also pointed to France as an example Poland could follow in the context of its population growth policy, which should be implemented in Poland as well.⁹

In practice, the premises of Polish policy with regard to France in 2007 could be summarized as follows:

1. France is one of Poland’s most important partners in the international stage, although it plays a less prominent role, from the Polish perspective, than our largest neighbors (Germany, Russia) and the United States.¹⁰

2. The resumption of political dialogue with France in 2004–2007, a new foreign policy under President Sarkozy, difficulties in relations with Germany, and disappointment in the cooperation with the United States (the prolonged presence in Iraq, the unresolved visa issue) have made Poland view its relations with France as a promising and increasingly significant element of Poland’s foreign policy.

3. The main subject of the political dialogue with France should be European (EU) affairs, in particular, Poland’s achievement of advantageous solutions in such matter as institutional reform, relations with EU neighbors and other third countries, the EU budget, the future of the Common Agricultural Policy, the European Security and Defense policy, and Poland’s position in the European Union.

⁸ *Exposé premiera Jarosława Kaczyńskiego*, 19 July 2006, www.kprm.gov.pl.

⁹ *Exposé premiera Donalda Tuska*, 23 November 2007, www.kprm.gov.pl.

¹⁰ In its election program, Civic Platform states that it would attach the same importance to relations with France as to relations with Poland’s neighbors. See *Program PO “Polska zasługuje na cud gospodarczy,”* Warsaw, 2007, p. 78, www.platforma.org.

4. Poland wishes to continue its economic cooperation with France, although this issue played a smaller role in Poland's foreign policy in 2007 than in previous years; of primary importance are French investment activity and the full opening of the French labor market for Polish citizens.

5. Poland intends to work with France more closely in such areas as culture, education, science and technology, and social policy, although there are certain differences of views between the two countries on the latter issue. It is considered that French solutions in its energy, demographic, and cultural policies are worth emulating,¹¹ and that cooperation in the spheres of culture and education enhances, as always, the promotion of Poland in France.

It is worth adding that Poland did not formulate very many proposals referring specifically to Polish-French cooperation. The majority of the above premises could be applied to Poland's relations with other large European countries. There were no basic disputes between Poland and France in the bilateral sphere, which was France's asset as compared to Germany, although areas in which privileged cooperation could be initiated were lacking.

Political Relations

Political relations between Poland and France intensified in 2007. Two visits at the level of heads of state took place, including the first visit of a French president to Poland since 1996.¹² The recovery of Polish-French relations was due to two factors: a new French president (since May) and, to a lesser extent, the change of government in Poland (in November), as well as the successful completion of negotiations on the Lisbon Treaty.

Bilateral relations. The first months of 2007 were dominated by France's presidential electoral campaign which led to the limitation of that country's activeness on the internationally stage. The main candidates paid little attention to Poland and referred to it in the European context only. The candidate of the Socialist Party, Ségolène Royal, in speaking of Poland, sharply criticized social dumping and business relocation. The candidate of the centrist Union for French Democracy (UDF), François Bayrou limited himself, in answering Polish journalists'

¹¹ Another method of non-budget funding considered is the introduction of the principle "one per cent to culture." The solution, implemented in France, both stimulates the art market and contributes to the growth of public collections. See *ibid.*, p. 73.

¹² Jacques Chirac visited Poland on two more occasions: to attend the Weimar Triangle summit in Poznań (1998) and on the 60th anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz concentration camp.

questions, to vague statements on the importance of bilateral cooperation and the opening of the labor market.¹³ Only Sarkozy, as we have seen above, called for the strengthening of Poland's position in the European Union, counting it among the EU's largest countries.

Poland followed the French electoral campaign with interest, both out of conviction that the end of the Chirac era could contribute to unblock the process of institutional reform in the EU, and due to the large media presence of the two major candidates, Sarkozy and Royal. The majority of the Polish political class and media responded positively to Sarkozy's candidacy. Factors that worked in his favor included his Central European (Hungarian) roots,¹⁴ although the significance of this factor was overestimated, his modernization project for France, his desire to establish closer relations with the United States and NATO, some of his critical comments about Russia and, of course, his proposals to strengthen Poland's position in the European Union.

Politicians from Law and Justice especially were counting for closer relations between Poland and France in the case of Sarkozy's victory. In March, Ludwik Dorn, deputy prime minister and minister of internal affairs and administration, traveled to France and invited Sarkozy to visit Poland. In his letter of congratulations to Sarkozy following his victory in the second round of elections (6 May), President Kaczyński expressed the conviction that "further rapprochement between our nations and comprehensive cooperation are a significant precondition for the building of a common Europe" and repeated the invitation to visit Poland.¹⁵ After the assumption of office by the new French president, in the summer of 2007, *Wprost* and *Rzeczpospolita*, publications which were seen as close to the then Polish government, published extensive articles on the importance of Polish-French relations. The authors referred to the historical and cultural ties between the countries, shared interests in Europe (the Common Agricultural Policy, the European security policy, and energy cooperation) and the need to oppose the growing influence of Germany.¹⁶ At the same time, in their

¹³ Evening news, TVP 1, 21 March and 20 April 2007, www.itvp.pl.

¹⁴ Nicolas Sarkozy was born in France and has always lived there. His mother is of Greek Jewish descent, while his father, who left the family when the future president was four, came from Hungary. Sarkozy never maintained close relations with his father, nor did he ever feel any special bonds with Hungary, chiefly underscoring his attachment to France. Many Polish commentators tended to ignore these facts, focusing instead on his Hungarian descent.

¹⁵ *Gratulacje prezydenta RP dla Nicolasa Sarkozy'ego*, 7 May 2007, www.prezydent.pl.

¹⁶ M. Muszyński, K. Rak, "Gambit Sarkozy'ego," *Rzeczpospolita* of 17 July 2007; M. Fita-Czuchowska, P. Białobok, "Unia polsko-francuska," *Wprost* of 5 August 2007.

unofficial pronouncements, Poland's most important state officials gave expression to concerns that Sarkozy's victory, and the probable improvement in Franco-American relations, could lead to the reduction of Poland's importance in US policy. Some Polish commentators also warned that Sarkozy would not become one of the most important partners for the Polish authorities, primarily because of differences between the two countries in the sphere of European policy (treaty reform, EU enlargement, etc.).¹⁷ In general, however, his election to the French presidency was seen as beneficial for Poland.¹⁸

On 14 June, one month after the beginning of his term, the new French president visited Poland. This was his fifth official visit abroad. Responding to the Polish authorities' invitation, he wanted to underscore the importance of bilateral relations and rebuild France's influence in Central Europe, which was weakened during Chirac's term. His most important objective was, however, to overcome differences concerning the new European treaty. During his visit, the French president met with President Lech Kaczyński and Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński. The subjects discussed were primarily European affairs, Polish-French economic cooperation, and enhanced cooperation on internal affairs and justice. Sarkozy noted that Poland and France "have always been together," he emphasized Poland's achievements in the fight against communism and Poland's importance in the EU. In addition, wishing to distance himself from the policy of his predecessor, he unequivocally rejected the notion of Central Europe's allegedly too close relations with the United States. He also proposed that a "strategic partnership between Poland and France at the heart of the European Union" based on common energy interests, agricultural policy, European solidarity, and the vision of a strong Europe in the international stage, be established so that both countries could be driving forces in the EU, and could meet the expectations of its citizens and new challenges in the area of the natural environment, energy, and the fight against terrorism. Despite these declarations, the French president didn't support Polish proposals about changing the voting system in the EU Council.¹⁹

¹⁷ J. Pawlicki, "Gdzie Sarkozy, gdzie Kaczyński," *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 8 May 2007.

¹⁸ See A. Szeptycki, "Konsekwencje wyborów prezydenckich we Francji dla Polski," *Biuletyn PISM*, 2007, no. 21.

¹⁹ *Conférence de presse conjointe de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, et de M. Lech Kaczyński, Président de la République de Pologne—propos de M. Sarkozy, Varsovie, 14 juin 2007*, www.diplomatie.gouv.fr; "Polska jest za wielka na pierwszy rzut oka," interview with N. Sarkozy, *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 14 June 2007.

Presidents Kaczyński and Sarkozy subsequently met at the European Council summit in Brussels (21–22 June), and during the Polish president's visit to France following a Polish coach accident near Grenoble (22 July). Another meeting between the two leaders was planned for autumn, at the residence of the Polish president in Jurata, but the visit did not take place. On 7 and 8 October, Kaczyński visited France once again, to hold talks with President Sarkozy and Prime Minister François Fillon. Their main subject of discussion was the new European treaty, the consequences of Poland's accession to the Schengen area, and energy security. Sarkozy also proposed signing a bilateral framework agreement on closer political, economic and military cooperation, which was not finalized in 2007, however. In addition, the Polish president met with representatives of the Polish community in France and delivered a lecture at the European-American Press Club.

The French elections were followed with great interest in Poland and, similarly, the evolution of the political situation in Poland gave rise to curiosity and a degree of anxiety in the French political elites and media. The policies of Lech and Jarosław Kaczyńskis were viewed negatively in France, especially their ties with Radio Maryja (an ultra-Catholic radio station), their coalition with Self-Defense and the League of Polish Families, their hostility towards Germany, their peculiar vision of European integration, their inability to achieve compromise, their pro-American foreign policy, and their homophobia.²⁰ The most intense criticism was aroused in connection with attempts to deprive Bronisław Geremek—a person highly esteemed in France as a scholar and a politician, and also as a friend of France—of his seat in the European parliament (April 2007).²¹ The French minister for European affairs Catherine Colonna assured the professor of her solidarity, and saw the Polish vetting act as inconsistent with European standards of democracy.²² French foreign affairs minister Philippe Douste-Blazy demanded that EU institutions take appropriate

²⁰ See e.g. "La Pologne en arrière," *Le Monde* of 5 April 2007.

²¹ The Polish authorities claimed that Geremek should lose his European Parliament mandate because he had failed to submit on time a statement that he did not cooperate with the communist secret services, as required by the new vetting law. Geremek justified his position by his negative opinion of the new law and the fact that he had already submitted similar statements in the past. In May 2007, the Constitutional Court found the majority of the provisions of the vetting act to be inconsistent with the Constitution and thus, in practical terms, ended the dispute and its potential ramifications.

²² *Communiqué de Mme Catherine Colonna à propos de M. Geremek*, 26 avril 2007, www.diplomatie.gouv.fr.

steps. Sarkozy, still a candidate for the presidency, considered the developments in Poland worrying.²³ The Polish anticipated parliamentary elections on 21 October, and the victory of Civic Platform, were greeted in France with satisfaction. The French foreign affairs ministry stated that “the elections, and particularly the rise of the voter turnout and the intensity of public debate, are indicative of the liveliness of democracy in Poland and of Poles’ commitment to the building of Europe.” The MFA also stated that France intended to continue its strategic partnership with Poland.²⁴ The right-wing *Le Figaro* emphasized the ineffectiveness of Law and Justice’s campaign slogans about fighting corruption.²⁵ *Le Monde* openly expressed joy at the change of government in Poland.²⁶

Almost one month after assuming office, the new prime minister visited France, where he met with the president and the prime minister. The most important subject of discussions was European affairs—the Lisbon Treaty, the EU mission to Chad, and energy cooperation. Following the meeting with Sarkozy, Tusk stated that he heard from his French interlocutor that the talk of “strategic partnership [between Poland and France] was not empty words or mere rhetoric, but a proposal for unusually close cooperation between two great European partners.”²⁷

European policy. In 2007, the European Union was the most important subject in the political dialogue between Poland and France. EU affairs dominated the agenda of meetings between representatives of both countries and the dynamic of EU institutional reform shaped the schedule of their meetings.

The most significant issue was a new treaty to replace the Constitutional Treaty. Poland wanted to see provisions in the treaty that would protect its interests and consolidate its position in the EU. These demands could stall negotiations on the new treaty, however. Such a scenario was inconsistent with the interests of France which, after the presidential elections, took action to have the new treaty adopted as quickly as possible in order to wash off its

²³ “M. Sarkozy juge ‘préoccupant ce qui se passe en Pologne’,” *Le Monde* of 28 April 2007.

²⁴ *Point de presse du 22 octobre 2007*, www.diplomatie.gouv.fr.

²⁵ A. Thedrel, “Cuisante défaite pour les frères Kaczynski,” *Le Figaro* of 22 October 2007.

²⁶ “Alternance en Pologne,” *Le Monde* of 23 October 2007.

²⁷ *Tusk: Strategiczne partnerstwo Polska–Francja nie jest pustym słowem*, PAP dispatch of 12 December 2007 r., www.euro.pap.pl.

responsibility for having rejected the Constitutional Treaty in the 2005 referendum and to strengthen its position within the EU.

Nicolas Sarkozy was among the initiators of the “mini-treaty,” which would retain only the most important provisions of the Constitutional Treaty. Poland welcomed the solution. It also supported the efforts to strengthen the European Union’s position in the international arena, but rejected the voting system for the Council, provided for in the Constitutional Treaty.²⁸ From the very beginning, France refused to support the alternative voting regime for the Council submitted by Poland, the so-called square-root system, emphasizing that double majority was democratic, and that it would also be risky to start negotiations anew on such a vexed issue. At the same time, France declared that it understands the Polish position, and stated there are no reasons for Poland should be concerned about marginalization in the European Union.

In an interview with *Gazeta Wyborcza* in the first half of June, the French president again warned Poland against blocking the negotiations and expressed his ‘warm feelings’ about the square-root system, adding that he did not fully agree with it. In his opinion, Poland, being a large country, had no reason to fear losing its identity in the EU, and should rather cooperate with other states.²⁹ In response to the French arguments, Prime Minister Kaczyński said in an interview for *Le Monde* that Poland was ready for compromise, since the square-root system was essentially a compromise in relation to the Nice system. He also argued that when France was against a given solution, the solution was rejected by the EU, and requested that the same standard should apply to other states (implicitly Poland).³⁰

The voting system in the Council was the main topic of discussions during Sarkozy’s visit to Poland on 14 June, on the eve of the European Council summit that was to work out the negotiation mandate for the Intergovernmental Conference. The talks did not lead any of the parties to alter their position significantly, albeit they expressed hope for a compromise. Poland remained optimistic as, based on fragmented and largely unofficial information, Sarkozy was to present a proposal providing for Poland’s position in the EU to be

²⁸ “La Pologne pose ses conditions à l’Europe,” an interview with L. Kaczyński, *Le Monde* of 10 May 2007.

²⁹ “Polska jest za wielką na pierwiastek...”

³⁰ “Sur l’Europe, ‘la Pologne est prête au compromis’,” an interview with L. Kaczyński, *Le Monde* of 13 June 2007.

strengthened without changing the voting system in the Council. In the French camp, it was said that Sarkozy had managed to lessen the intransigence of the Polish authorities and their concerns about Poland's position in the EU, thanks, among other things, to his declarations on the strategic Polish-French partnership.

At the European Council summit, Poland did not back away from its demand to change the voting system in the Council. France sought to find a solution that would satisfy Poland and was ready to accept certain concessions, but did a fundamental change in the entire system, as its principal aim was to reach a compromise quickly. France proposed, for example, a solution that would weaken Germany's position under the double majority system by adopting the theoretical assumption (for the purpose of calculation) that Germany had only 75 million residents, which would address Polish concerns and at the same time reduce Germany's advantage over France. The proposal was rejected, however. France also declared itself in favor of granting a specified group of countries that do not have a blocking minority the right to delay the decision taking process at the Council for a "reasonable period of time" (the so-called Ioannina mechanism). Poland initially replied that this was insufficient because, first, a mechanism of this type already existed and, second, it did not allow states to block Council decisions entirely. Poland suggested that the double majority system should apply only from 2020, with the Nice system in place until then. France was willing to agree for such a solution to be in force only until 2014. Ultimately, a compromise was reached, partially as a result of a telephone conversation between President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Tony Blair on the one hand and Prime Minister Kaczyński (absent in Brussels) on the other. They agreed that the Nice System would apply until 2014, but until 2017 any country could request that a decision to be taken according to the Nice system.³¹

Following the end of the summit in Brussels, Polish representatives stated that they had received a verbal promise for the introduction of the so-called "reinforced" Ioannina mechanism into the new EU institutional system.³² This was denied by the new French minister for European affairs, Jean-Pierre Jouyet, who stated that all arrangements were included in the mandate of the Intergovernmental Conference and opposed any attempts to challenge those

³¹ *Mandat konferencji międzypaństwowej—2007, Bruksela, 26 czerwca 2007 r.* (26.06) (OR. en), 11218/07, POLGEN 74, www.consilium.europa.eu.

³² *Premier: Na szczycie UE Polska odniosła sukces i została wzmocniona*, 23 June 2007, www.gazeta.pl.

provisions.³³ France became worried that the Polish authorities might hamper the speedy finalization of the conference and the signature of the new treaty, especially considering the unstable political situation in Poland. The treaty was the main topic of the bilateral talks during Lech Kaczyński's visit to France in October. Poland concentrated on incorporating the so-called reinforced Ioannina mechanism into the new treaty and obtaining the post of Advocate General at the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for a Polish candidate. As regards the first issue, Lech Kaczyński expressed the conviction that Poland could count on France's acquiescence. The French president did not, however, make any unequivocal declarations in this matter. Referring to the second proposal, he suggested that the Polish authorities should turn to the Portuguese presidency on this issue.³⁴ Poland was ultimately granted the post of ECJ Advocate General. The Ioannina mechanism was not included in the treaty itself, but in a declaration to it; in a separate protocol it was stated that the formula of the mechanism can only be changed by unanimous consent.³⁵

On the eve of his first visit to France, Donald Tusk wanted to dispel any possible doubts related to Poland's European policy. In an interview for *Le Monde* he stated that Poland was not *l'enfant terrible* of the European Union and wanted to confirm this by being the first member state to ratify the treaty. He also emphasized that he placed great hope in President Sarkozy's role in Europe and agreed with him that Europe should be strong, although the European security system should be based on the Euro-Atlantic framework.³⁶ He also declared himself in favor of the French concept of appointing a group of wise men to debate the future of the EU.³⁷ Based on unofficial information, support for this project was dependent on the inclusion of a representative from Poland in that group.³⁸

³³ *Francuski minister przeczy słowom polskiego premiera o dodatkowej obietnicy*, 17 July 2007, www.rzeczpospolita.pl (12.12.2007).

³⁴ *Suma—Francja—wizyta polskiego prezydenta*, press release by IAR Newswire of 8 October 2007, www.securities.com.

³⁵ More on this subject in A. Kreczmańska, "Przebieg Konferencji Międzyrządowej 2007 oraz szczyt w Lizbonie," *Biuletyn PISM*, 2007, no. 46.

³⁶ "La Pologne n'est pas l'enfant terrible de l'UE," an interview with D. Tusk, *Le Monde* of 8 December 2007.

³⁷ *Tusk: Strategiczne partnerstwo...*

³⁸ M. Marczak, *Waleśa wśród mędrców Europy?*, 15 December 2007, www.newsweek.pl.

Although the issue of the new European treaty dominated Polish-French cooperation in 2007, both countries were also taking action on other issues. The most important of these was cooperation within the European Security and Defense Policy. Poland decided to take part in the mission to Chad and the Republic of Central Africa (Eurofor Tchad/RCA). France is supposed to play the leading role in this mission. At first, 150 Polish soldiers were to be deployed to the area. In mid-October, following a meeting of EU ministers of foreign affairs, the French minister Bernard Kouchner announced that Poland had decided to increase its contingent to 350 soldiers. Initially, Poland's position was ambiguous,³⁹ and it was only the new defense minister, Bogdan Klich confirmed that Poland did plan to send this many soldiers to Chad, but under certain conditions.⁴⁰ Presumably, by making the decision public, even though it most probably had been the subject of informal Polish-French consultations, Kouchner wanted to force Poland to increase its contingent for Chad. Poland, in turn, did not want the issue to lead to a dispute with France. In addition, in the view of the Polish opposition, increased involvement in Africa could have been an attempt to secure France's support for the Ioannina mechanism during the Intergovernmental Conference that ended in October.⁴¹ In December, after the formation of Donald Tusk's government, reports emerged that Poland, at the request of France, would send 450 soldiers to Chad.⁴²

It is also worthwhile to note that President L. Kaczyński and Prime Minister J. Kaczyński both declared themselves in favor of a European army, without the reservation, as in the previous year, that it should be subordinated to NATO. Such an evolution of their views was probably welcomed by France.⁴³ On 14 July, the Guard of Honor of the Polish Armed Forces, along with armed forces units from the remaining 25 EU members, marched in the Bastille Day parade on the Champs Élysées. The parade, organized in this manner for the first time, was to be a symbol of the new French president's commitment to European cooperation in the area of defense. There presumably were three reasons behind Polish support for the development of the European Security and Defense Policy and for French initiatives in the sphere. These were the desire to establish closer

³⁹ 350 polskich żołnierzy na misję w Czadzie. *Spodziewano się stu*, 15 October 2007, www.rp.pl.

⁴⁰ *Polska wyśle do Czadu 350 żołnierzy, ale stawia warunki*, 19 November 2007, www.gazeta.pl.

⁴¹ *Komorowski: ilu żołnierzy do Czadu?*, 18 October 2007, www.euro.pap.pl.

⁴² M. Górka, "Więcej Polaków na misji w Czadzie," *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 14 December 2007.

⁴³ "La Pologne pose ses conditions...;" "Sur l'Europe..."

relations with France, to strengthen Poland's position in the European Union, and Poland's traditional involvement in international peacekeeping operations. The Polish stance could also have been affected by Nicolas Sarkozy's declared intention to improve French-US relations and signals about France's possible return to NATO's military structures, all of which seemed to indicate that cooperation with France under the European Security and Defense Policy would not adversely affect Poland's position in NATO and its relations with the United States.

France occasionally criticized plans to build the American anti-missile shield on Polish territory. It would seem that France did not want to obstruct the US in the implementation of these plans—perhaps counting on certain technological gains in exchange for its support—but at the same time it was concerned that realization of the project in its current form could hamper cooperation of European states on security and defense. France's ambassador to Poland, Pierre Ménat, declared in January that the deployment of shield components in Poland was a matter between two countries: the United States and Poland. However, he called for discussions on the topic in a broader forum, so as not to produce new divisions in Europe.⁴⁴ While still a candidate for the presidency, Nicolas Sarkozy had stated that the implementation of this project could lead to a rift between Europe countries and threaten the European Security and Defense Policy,⁴⁵ but after his victory in the elections, he didn't spoke of the project anymore, at least not in the context of relations with Poland. Foreign affairs minister Kouchner, who is known for his fairly radical statements, criticized the missile defense project, arguing that the American plans were directed against Russia.⁴⁶ However, in practical terms, the missile defense project has not been a point of contention between Poland and France, although the latter probably welcomed the fact that Prime Minister Tusk treated the project less enthusiastically than his predecessor had.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ "France not against U.S. Missile Shield in Poland, but Emphasizes Need for Broad Talks," *Interfax—Poland Business Weekly* of 31 March 2007, www.securities.com.

⁴⁵ See Sarkozy's statement for *Le Monde*, "Dix enjeux de politique étrangère," *Le Monde* of 16 April 2007.

⁴⁶ *Déplacement en Russie. Entretien du Ministre des affaires étrangères et européennes*, M. Bernard Kouchner, interview with the radio "Echos de Moscou," Moscow, 18 September 2007, www.diplomatie.gouv.fr.

⁴⁷ "La Pologne n'est pas l'enfant terrible de l'UE..."

France expressed understanding for Poland's proposals to cooperate more closely in energy matters and for solidarity between EU member countries in connection with the Russian embargo on meat imports from Poland. However, in practice it never wanted to adopt too hard a stance towards Russia, not wanting to harm its relations with that country, and being also convinced that Poland's blocking of negotiations on the new EU-Russia treaty was "counterproductive," as it hampered the implementation of new principles of cooperation with Russia in the sphere of energy. In his opening address to the Sejm in July 2007, Prime Minister Kaczyński stated that Poland should perhaps make use of French experience in the area of nuclear energy. This gesture towards France probably met with a positive response. At the beginning of 2007, French representatives offered assistance to Poland in developing a civilian nuclear energy industry.⁴⁸ The proposal is part of a broader plan to promote nuclear energy in the European Union, as this source of energy is considered environmentally "clean" by the French authorities (leaving aside the issue of nuclear waste and the risk of contamination in case of an accident at the plant). Plans for bilateral cooperation on nuclear energy were not made more specific in 2007. It is nevertheless worthwhile to note that President Kaczyński stated in an interview for *Le Monde* that the fight against global warming was one of the EU's most important objectives,⁴⁹ which is in line with French policy.

Both countries continued to differ on EU taxation policy. France is calling for the harmonization of taxes to counteract social dumping, while Poland, for different reasons, opposed the concept. The issue did not, however, give rise to serious controversy between the two countries. At the same time, Poland and France shared views on another issue: they both opposed the speedy liberalization of the postal services market. Free market competition on deliveries of mail up to 50g was delayed for two years, partially on account of France's and Poland's opposition.

Economic Relations

Irrespective of problems in the political sphere in previous years, economic cooperation continued to be an important and positive aspect of mutual relations. The volume of bilateral trade is growing systematically. In 2007, exports to

⁴⁸ "France Can Help Poland Develop Civilian Nuclear Power—French Foreign Minister," *Interfax* —*Poland Business Weekly* of 2 February 2007, www.securities.com.

⁴⁹ "La Pologne pose ses conditions..."

France amounted to €6.11 billion (11.4% more than in 2006), while imports from France came to €6.06 billion (an increase of 9.5%). France is the third largest importer of Polish goods and the fifth largest exporter to Poland,⁵⁰ while Poland ranks tenth on the list of importers of French goods, and fifteenth in the ranking of top exporters to France.⁵¹ It is worthwhile to note that the value of Polish exports to France, for the first time in many years, was higher than the value of French imports to Poland. The structure of trade is evolving as well. Polish exports are dominated by highly processed goods from the electrical machinery, metal processing, chemical, and the wood and paper industries. The most important imports are from the electrical machinery, chemical, metal processing, textile, and food and agricultural industries.

Since the 1990s, France has been one of the largest investors in Poland. At present, however, French companies rarely embark on new investment projects in Poland. The total value of French investments in Poland amounted to €10.82 billion toward the end of 2006. France was the third largest foreign investor in Poland, after the Netherlands and Germany, while, in 2006, the value of new French direct foreign investments amounted to only €757.1 million, which put France in seventh position among the top investors in Poland.⁵² That year, investments were planned or extended by the Carrefour Group, which took over the Hypernova and Albert supermarket chains from the Danish Ahold (the overall value of planned investments amounts to about €1 billion); the Casino Guichard Perrachon Group which, having divested itself in 2006 of some of its assets in Poland, decided to become involved in building a chain of shopping centers in the region, along with the American foundation Whitehall (the group will contribute land and projects already launched to the common undertaking); the Accor hotel chain, which increased its share in the Orbis company by 4.9% (to 45.48%), for €42 million; Michelin, which has decided to build a new production line in Olsztyn; and Lafarge Cement (part of the Lafarge Group), which intends to invest some €80 million in Polish cement factories.

⁵⁰ *Obroty handlu zagranicznego ogółem i według krajów (I–XII 2007 r.) (dane wstępne)*, www.stat.gov.pl.

⁵¹ *Les 20 premiers clients de la France*, May 2007, www.insee.fr; *Les 20 premiers fournisseurs de la France*, May 2007, *ibidem*.

⁵² *Zagraniczne Inwestycje Bezpośrednie w Polsce—Tablice statystyczne (2006) (Aneks statystyczny. 2006 rok)*, www.nbp.pl. The French Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Poland present different statistics, according to which the aggregate value of French investment in Poland by the end of 2006 was €16–17 billion (See *Francuskie inwestycje w Polsce*, www.paiz.gov.pl).

After Poland's accession to the European Union, France introduced a transition period for Polish workers to protect its labor market for a planned period of 2 to 5 years. Some restrictions on 62 occupations that were underrepresented in the labor market in France were lifted on 1 May 2006. No significant modifications were made in this respect in 2007. Although the French authorities encourage Poles to seek employment in their country and promise to lift the restrictions currently in effect, in practice they seem to use every opportunity to make such employment difficult. There have even been cases of deportation of Poles who worked in France in violation of the labor regulations. It should also be noted that France's liberalization of access to its labor market in 2007 was not discussed at the highest level between Poland and France. This was probably the result of the bilateral talks having been dominated by European affairs, as well as of an unwillingness to touch upon potentially controversial topics. Poland opened its labor market for citizens of France and ten other EU and EFTA countries in January 2007.⁵³

Social and Cultural Relations

Polish-French relations in 2007 did not see any events of similar magnitude to the Polish Season in France ("Nova Polska") in 2004. However, a few events of a slightly lower profile deserve mentioning here. In May the Jan Nowak-Jeziorański award was presented to Cardinal Jean-Marie Lustiger, born in Poland, who supported Polish society and the Solidarity movement in communist times. In June, on the 200th anniversary of the establishment of the Great-Duchy of Warsaw, the exhibition "Poles and the Légion d'honneur" was organized at the Paris Hôtel des Invalides. After the French, Poles are the largest national group to have received this highest French state award; half of the four thousand Poles who have received the Légion d'Honneur obtained it during the period of the Great-Duchy of Warsaw. In October, the 2nd Polish-French Audiovisual Meetings took place in Warsaw (the first event took place in 2005). Their main objective was to counteract the drop in the number of films produced through Polish-French cooperation. In November, the Evens Foundation organized a conference entitled "A Vision of Europe in the Future" in Paris. The conference's honorary guest was the wife of Poland's president, Maria Kaczyńska, who presented awards for the best educational projects in the competition "Education in Diversity 2007."

⁵³ *Rozporządzenie Ministra Pracy i Polityki Społecznej z dnia 10 stycznia 2007 r. uchylające rozporządzenie w sprawie zakresu ograniczeń w sferze wykonywania pracy przez cudzoziemców na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, www.mpips.gov.pl.

It was also in November that the film *Trójka do wzięcia* (Three for the Taking) took the Grand Prix at the 22nd European Short Film Festival in Brest.

On 22 July, on a mountain road in the vicinity of the town of Vizelle, south of Grenoble, an accident occurred involving a coach carrying Polish pilgrims. The coach was not authorized to travel on this dangerous road and twenty-six people perished. Accompanied by President Sarkozy, President Kaczyński arrived the same day to Grenoble, where the injured had been taken. Prime Minister François Fillon had been to the scene of the accident earlier. Both the French authorities and the French public expressed their solidarity with the Poles, attempting to offer help to the victims and their families who came to the site of the accident. President Kaczyński referred to this fact several times, thanking the French president and cabinet members, the residents of Vizelle, the medical staff and all persons involved in the rescue operation.⁵⁴ During his visit to France in October, President Kaczyński decorated French citizens particularly involved in bringing help to the Polish pilgrims.

Conclusions

In keeping with the premises presented by foreign affairs minister Anna Fotyga, the Polish-French political dialogue, initiated in 2004–2006, was further intensified. This is borne out by the increased frequency of high-level meetings, the first visit of a French president to Poland since 1996, and by French declarations about a strategic partnership between the two countries in the European Union. The enlivening of relations with France was facilitated by four factors. Firstly, 2007 marked the end of the term of President Jacques Chirac, who did not attach much importance to Polish-French relations. His successor, Nicolas Sarkozy, is more popular in Poland and has a better understanding of the significance of relations with Central Europe for France's position in the EU than did his predecessor. Secondly, as a result of deteriorating Polish-German relations, still troubled relations with Russia, and a certain disappointment with Polish-US cooperation, France started to be perceived by Polish policymakers as an attractive partner. Closer cooperation with France was especially important for Polish politicians during the Law and Justice government, as that party was often criticized for its ineffectiveness in foreign policy, and cooperation between Poland and France contradicted such accusations. Law and Justice's actions brought tangible results: Polish-French relations were not subject to criticism

⁵⁴ *Piękny objaw solidarności*, 26 July 2007, www.prezydent.pl.

during the electoral campaign in Poland in 2007, and the policy of the new government towards France is, or will be, largely a continuation of its predecessor's actions. Thirdly, the Lisbon Treaty was negotiated and signed in the previous year. Poland and France maintained close relations during the negotiation phase and presented the adoption of the treaty as a success, although, in practice, it failed to include some proposals that were important for Poland. Fourthly, the spontaneous assistance offered by the French authorities and public to the victims of the coach accident near Grenoble contributed to the improvement in relations, particularly in the public dimension. Presumably, France's attitude was used by the Polish authorities as a case for improving bilateral relations.

Poland failed to achieve all its goals as regards its policy towards France, despite the intensification of relations between the two countries. This is particularly true of cooperation in the European Union. France did not back Poland's proposal for the square-root-based voting system for the Council—although it did strive for a compromise that would satisfy Poland—neither did it support Poland's effort to incorporate the provision on the Ioannina mechanism into the Lisbon Treaty. No progress was made as regards lifting restrictions to the French labor market for Polish citizens. This partially resulted from the fact that Poland barely touched upon the issue, being unwilling to bring up topics that could hamper the improvement of Polish-French relations and France's support for Polish proposals in the EU. On similar grounds, Poland did not criticize Sarkozy's plan—rather dubious from the perspective of Polish interests—to establish the Mediterranean Union.

In 2007, France declared itself, on several occasions, to be in favor of a "strategic partnership" with Poland. However, the partnership existed at the declarative level rather than in reality. Neither France nor Poland initiated any privileged cooperation on any EU policy, or in areas of interests to both countries. The main subject of bilateral consultations in 2007 was EU treaty reform. Under the circumstances, what will be the nature of the "strategic partnership" between Poland and France after the Lisbon Treaty comes into effect remains to be seen.

Poland's Policy Regarding Russia

Background

An evaluation of Polish-Russian relations in 2007, and of the effectiveness of Poland's policy toward Russia, has taken into consideration of pre-existing conditions, as these relations are unusually encumbered with lasting conflicts of interest, irrespective of the political situation. No assessment of the criticisms frequently leveled at Polish diplomacy, or any realistic formulation of expectations, can overlook the serious differences in how the two societies and political elites in both countries perceive the importance of Polish-Russian relations.

As far as conflicts of interest are concerned, they concern first of all the future of the common neighborhood. In Moscow, Poland's support for Ukraine's rapprochement with Western structures and its striving to overcome the autocratic regime in Belarus is treated as a threat to vital Russian interests in the region. The two countries also disagree on energy issues; the Polish authorities find it difficult to accept Russia's attempts to decrease its dependence on the transit of energy resources through Central European countries, as well as Russia's determined attempts to take advantage of contrary interests among individual European Union members. The most important manifestation of this Russian policy are the privileged relations, not limited to the sphere of energy, that exist between Russia and the largest EU states: Germany, France, and Italy. Historical issues, mainly related to different appraisals of the period of Soviet domination over Poland, have remained an important component of Polish-Russian disputes.

The aforementioned controversies might be described as structural in nature. There are no reasons to assume that we might expect their resolution or even a lasting rapprochement of viewpoints, even in the long-term perspective. The priorities of Polish foreign policy will still include attempts to improve energy security and the desire to include Poland's eastern neighbors in the integration structures of which it is a participant. In Russia, on the other hand, we should

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expect the continuation of Vladimir Putin's policy to see the states in Russia's immediate neighborhood in light of a geopolitical rivalry with the West; to use energy issues as the principal instrument of foreign policy; and to refer to the Soviet period as an important component of Russia's identity as a great power.

The conditioning factors of Polish-Russian relations are perceived differently in both countries, mostly because of the disproportion between their potentials. Relations with Russia constitute a very important element of the political discourse in Poland. Although a very critical view of Russian foreign policy is undeniably dominant in society and among the political elites, a need for normalization of relations with Moscow is very present. Such a desire for a breakthrough in mutual relations is shared neither by Russian society nor by its decision-makers. This claim is clearly illustrated by the number of visits paid to Russia in recent years by representatives of the Polish authorities (President Aleksander Kwaśniewski excelled in this), without reciprocity on the Russian side.

Russia's answer to emerging conflicts of interest is rather to work for Poland's marginalization than for an understanding. An analysis of mutual relations in recent years indicates that the Russian authorities even resort to creating and escalating conflicts, whose aim is to reduce Poland's credibility among its EU and NATO partners by portraying it as an organically anti-Russian country motivated primarily by historical phobias.¹

This is how the situation in relations between the states at the threshold of 2007 could be interpreted. The major issue on which the attention of Polish public opinion was then focused was the Russian embargo on Polish food products, introduced by Russia in October 2005. Poland pointed to the clearly unsubstantial but political motivations lying behind the Russian sanctions, seeing them as hostile and intended to exert pressure on Warsaw. Although the impact of the Russian embargo on the Polish economy was slight, in November 2006, Poland decided to respond in an unprecedented way: it vetoed negotiations on a new partnership and cooperation agreement (PCA) between the EU and Russia. Each month of the dispute saw a further escalation, which—considering the growing significance of the prestige factor—decreased the chances for a compromise solution. Thus, in early 2007, Polish-Russian relations reached a stalemate.

¹ See A. Eberhardt, "Poland's Relations with Russia," *Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy* 2006; *idem*, "Relations between Poland and Russia," *Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy* 2007.

Goals and Concepts

In the eyes of the general public, the lifting of the Russian embargo was viewed as the most obvious goal of Poland's policy regarding Russia in 2007, and even as one of the largest challenges standing before the Polish diplomatic service. The major Polish political parties nevertheless agreed that the issue of Polish exporters' access to the Russian market could not be seen as a goal in itself, as one to be attained irrespective of the shape of bilateral relations as a whole. They believed that the way in which the "meat war" was resolved would influence the future of Polish-Russian relations and that it might affect the coherence of the European Union's policy toward Russia and the role Poland would play in shaping it.

This similarity of views on the nature of the dispute with Russia and basic agreement as to the necessity for a resolute defense of Polish interests did not mean there was no divergence over the desirable extent of the dialogue with Russia and the readiness to compromise. These controversies coincided with the division of the political stage into two dominant parties: Law and Justice (PiS) and Civic Platform (PO). For most of 2007, foreign policy had been conducted by the former (the government of Jarosław Kaczyński) with the benevolent support of President Lech Kaczyński. After the October parliamentary elections, which were won by PO, Donald Tusk formed a new government, which introduced changes to the policy toward Russia during its first few weeks in office.

The Law and Justice government primarily aim was to take advantage of the trade dispute to reveal the true intentions of Russian diplomacy and, as a result, to win support on the EU forum for Poland's policy toward Russia. Jarosław Kaczyński emphasized that the problem was not about the Russian embargo, but primarily about "something incomparably more important: whether Poland, in the Russian viewpoint, was to be treated as a full-fledged member of the EU." He also added that "the game is being played for unusually high stakes" and if, in the name of ostensible successes, Poland agreed to a compromise, if "we agree to be treated as a non-EU state, if the EU agrees to that, it will remain so for ever."² This stance was shared by President Lech Kaczyński, who warned the government against hasty concessions in the embargo issue, which—in his opinion—would mean accepting the status "of a second class European Union member."³

² *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 17 May 2007.

³ PAP dispatch of 23 April 2007.

In the annual government address on foreign policy objectives, Foreign Minister Anna Fotyga indicated that improvement in Polish-Russian relations and reaching a level consistent with “our ambitions and expectations” required “patience and a long-term outlook.” She linked this improvement with the issue of the de-mineralization of Russian policy: “The historical transformation of Central and Eastern Europe took place relatively recently, and its acceptance—real acceptance, not a outward one—requires a change in the consciousness of Russia’s political elites.” Minister Fotyga also stressed that the formulation and implementation of a cohesive EU policy towards Russia would be the best way to counteract unjustified attempts to discriminate against Poland.⁴

Civic Platform politicians admitted that the Law and Justice government’s veto, blocking negotiation of a new partnership and cooperation agreement between the EU and Russia, had played a major role in defending Polish interests; they supported the broadest possible use of EU instruments in Poland’s policy towards Russia. At the same time, they expressed their dissatisfaction with the limited use of classic negotiating techniques and called for the formulation a more nuanced approach. “We expect the president and the prime minister to pursue Polish interests effectively, not merely to make demonstrations of Polish pride,” said Donald Tusk, leader of PO, in April.⁵ This stance was confirmed immediately after PO’s victory in the parliamentary elections. The goals set by Tusk in his policy toward Russia were motivated to a larger extent than in the case of his predecessors by the need for a quick success in foreign policy, and the resolution of the two-year trade dispute fitted perfectly here. It would also seem that the new government attached greater importance to how Poland was perceived by its EU partners. Overcoming Poland’s image as an anti-Russian country could also serve to increase Warsaw’s ability to shape EU policy not only toward the Russian Federation, but also toward all of Eastern Europe.

In his post-election statements for the Russian press, Donald Tusk indicated that improvement of mutual relations constituted “one of the most important Polish foreign policy task,” with the reservation that “this requires the will of both parties.”⁶ He also considered that what was needed in Polish-Russian relations was not a breakthrough, but more trust and openness, which he would try to achieve. On the other hand, in his policy address, the new prime minister

⁴ “Government Information about Polish Foreign Policy in 2007,” see above, p. 18.

⁵ PAP dispatch of 4 April 2007.

⁶ “Signal dla sosedey,” *Rossiyskaya gazeta* of 22 October 2007.

said: "Although we have our own views on the situation in Russia, we want dialogue with Russia such as it is. Lack of dialogue is beneficial neither for Poland, nor for Russia. It harms the interests and reputations of both countries on the international stage. Thus I am convinced that the time of change for the better in this respect has just arrived."⁷

Bilateral Relations

Political relations. In the last months of 2006, given the unlikelihood that the **Russian trade embargo**, introduced a year earlier, would be lifted, the Polish authorities strove with increasing determination to resolve the dispute through the EU. One mode of exerting pressure on Moscow, and also on EU partners, was the aforementioned November decision to block talks on the new EU-Russian partnership and cooperation agreement; the result was that Polish-Russian political dialogue was virtually frozen in 2007. Dialogue was replaced by Polish and Russian unilateral statements formulated to influence other countries and to blame one another for the escalation of the trade dispute, and, consequently, for the deep crisis in mutual relations.

The Russian authorities, in attempting to influence the views of European states, claimed that Poland was abusing its EU membership for its own particular goals, and giving in to Poland would adversely affect the interests of the entire Community. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov assured everyone that Russia would not accept "blackmail and a policy of talking to it from a position of force,"⁸ he also warned the Union against making relations with Russia a hostage "to its internal problems."⁹ An influential Russian presidential advisor for EU relations, Sergei Yastrzhembsky, also emphasized that "for the first time, Russia has come against blackmail from an EU member state."¹⁰

Meanwhile, EU states and institutions were increasingly supporting Poland's position. The High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, declared that "issues of veterinary and phytosanitary controls are

⁷ *Przedstawienie przez prezesa Rady Ministrów programu działania Rady Ministrów z wnioskiem o udzielenie jej wotum zaufania, 23 listopada 2007 r.*, <http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata6.nsf/main/45FF588C#213>.

⁸ PAP dispatch of 7 March 2007.

⁹ PAP dispatch of 7 February 2007.

¹⁰ PAP dispatch of 19 February 2007.

being handled at the European level,” which makes the controversy “a European problem, and not a bilateral one between Poland and Russia.”¹¹

As a result, sustaining the dispute concerning the access of Polish products to the Russian market began to harm Russia’s own interests. Not only was work brought to a halt on the EU-Russian agreement, but also Russia’s image began to deteriorate in its relations with EU partners. A hasty lifting of sanctions was not in the interest of the Russian authorities either, however, as that might be understood as a sign of weakness and might encourage other states to take advantage of the EU as a means for exerting pressure on Russia.

It is assuredly for this reason that subsequent technical discussions between Russian, Polish, and European Commission experts failed, as did the mission conducted in February in Poland by Russian veterinary inspectors and phytosanitary experts. The Russian experts concluded that Poland had still not worked out an effective monitoring system to prevent the import into Russia through Polish territory of contaminated goods originating in third countries. In reality, the Russian inspections were genuine in appearance only and were meant to lend credibility to the Russian thesis about justified substantial grounds for the sanctions. The EU did not share Russia’s position, however.

At the same time, the Russian media carried information about plans to introduce, within three months, drastic limitations whose purpose would be to reduce the value of Polish exports to Russia by half.¹² These threats, empty as it turned out, were no doubt intended as a means to exert pressure. They not only failed to achieve this goal, but they also revealed the political intentions behind the Russian trade sanctions.

The biggest hopes for breaking out of this stalemate and reaching a compromise were connected with the EU-Russian summit, announced for May near Samara, where the two parties were to return to the issue of beginning negotiations on a base agreement. It was the Germans, holding presidency in the EU, who particularly desired to put an end the Polish-Russian dispute.

Some of the actions and pronouncements of the parties to the conflict indicated that a compromise was feasible. In the first days of April, the Federal Service of Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision expressed the desire to conduct a repeat inspection in meat-processing facilities in Poland, in order to

¹¹ PAP dispatch of 4 February 2007.

¹² “Yevrosoyuzu s Rossiey meshaet Polsha,” *Kommersant* of 6 February 2007.

dispel doubts that had not been clarified in February. The representatives of *Rossielnadzor* suggested that the case of the embargo might be closed before the Russian-EU summit.¹³

Readiness to compromise was also declared by the Polish government, which agreed to the adoption by the EU states' ambassadors of a draft mandate to negotiate talks on an new agreement with Russia. Poland (and Lithuania) only expressed "reservations" (and not a veto, as was expected), thanks to which the issue of the mandate could be addressed at the foreign ministers' meeting and this, in turn, cleared the path to negotiations with Russia in Samara.

In the end agreement was not reached, mainly, it would seem, because of a premature disclosure of the upcoming compromise. Information about the lifting of the veto against talks with Russia, planned in the course of the month, was leaked to the Polish press from the Polish representation at the EU,¹⁴ upon which President Kaczyński made it clear that Poland would accept the mandate for EU-Russian talks only after having obtained guarantees that the Russian embargo would be lifted. Although Russia had, in the first instance, declared that it was pleased with Poland's willingness to lift its veto, it afterwards refused to accept a tie between this matter and the issue of lifting the embargo. In the end, it interpreted the signals from Poland as being contradictory and counterproductive.¹⁵

As a result, the dispute remained unresolved. In the week preceding the summit, Poland maintained its veto against the adoption of the mandate for talks on the EU-Russian agreement, demanding additionally the EU's adoption of a political declaration in which the EU would bind itself to guarantee the energy security of Poland and the other new member states and to solidarity with them. This demand was met with reserve by Poland's EU partners, which indicated that the safety of deliveries could not be achieved through political declarations.

In the face of a loss of any chances for a compromise in Samara shortly before the summit, the Russians took steps to discredit the Polish position. Sergei Yastrzhembsky accused the Polish elites of being "infected with the virus of Russophobia" and of "trying to bring their complexes into the relations

¹³ PAP dispatch of 2 April 2007.

¹⁴ J. Pawlicki, K. Niklewicz, "Rząd zrezygnuje z unijnego weta, gest wobec Rosji," *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 4 April 2007.

¹⁵ PAP dispatch of 5 April 2007.

between Russia and the entire Union.”¹⁶ Yastrzhembsky’s accusations were accompanied by a leak to the press from the Russian ministry of foreign affairs, stating that, since March, Moscow had not received a reply to the invitation sent to the Polish minister of foreign affairs to visit Russia.¹⁷ This was supposed to show a lack of goodwill on Poland’s side and its reluctance to engage in dialogue. In response, Anna Fotyga stated that “an embargo in trade relations is a kind of declaration of war,” and thus the state of Polish-Russian affairs could not “be summed up though a visit by the foreign minister.”¹⁸ It should be noted that although the war analogy was criticized by the opposition (Civic Platform—PO) as being unnecessarily confrontational in nature, the refusal to visit Moscow itself met with its approval. One of the PO leaders, Bronisław Komorowski, pointed out the necessity of being consistent and expressed the opinion that “at this time, it is logical to limit the number of any symbolic or courtesy visits.”¹⁹

In spite of the fact that no agreement on trade limits was reached during the Russian-EU summit, the talks in Samara can be seen as a great strategic success for Poland and a propaganda failure for Russia. Russian attempts to undermine EU unity and discredit Poland’s goodwill proved unsuccessful, in spite of the biting remarks of President Putin, who publicly complained that Poland had been refusing to talk for a year, and that any progress was possible only due to the support of the German chancellor. Both Angela Merkel, the chancellor of Germany, holding the EU presidency, and the president of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, declared once again that this Polish problem was a European problem, and that the EU saw no grounds for the Russian trade restrictions.

A few days after the summit had ended, President Putin instructed the Russian minister of agriculture, Alexei Gordeyev, to intensify talks with the European Commission on the principles governing the deliveries of agricultural products to Russia and spoke in favor of de-politicizing the dispute and resolving it at the technical level. This statement indicated that Russia was interested in effacing the unfavorable impression left by the summit in Samara. In the face of the EU’s consolidation around Polish demands, it was in Russia’s

¹⁶ PAP dispatch of 16 May 2007.

¹⁷ Interfax dispatch of 17 May 2007.

¹⁸ PAP dispatch of 17 May 2007.

¹⁹ PAP dispatch 17 May 2007.

interest to present the most constructive stance possible. In weeks and months that followed, Putin's words were not followed by any actions, however.

The first direct talk in months between Anna Fotyga and Sergei Lavrov, which took place in June on the occasion of a ministerial summit of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, also failed to produce any agreement. The Polish government ruled out the possibility of any detailed bilateral talks, pointing to EU competencies as regards trade matters, and also turned down Russian demands for repeated sanitary inspections, referring to the earlier EU position, which questioned the grounds for them. "Russia should, first of all, lift its embargo, and then there are appropriate international instruments which would allow Russia to conduct inspections. Placing an embargo and using inspections as a form of blackmail is a violation of these instruments," Fotyga argued.²⁰

Moreover, President Kaczyński and representatives of the Polish government began to wonder if, given Russia's drastic violation of the rules of trade cooperation, the European Union should not block Russia's accession to the WTO.²¹ Although the Polish threats were perfectly understandable given Russia's maintenance of an unjustified embargo, and while they naturally produced dissatisfaction in Moscow, they primarily served to prolong the stalemate, which was defused only by the October parliamentary elections in Poland.

Even though Polish-Russian political relations in 2007 were dominated by the embargo issue, other matters of dispute also arose. One was the controversy surrounding the plans to deploy the **American anti-missile shield** on Polish territory.

While Russia admitted that it had no right of veto in this respect, with every passing month of Polish-American negotiations, it expressed with growing resolve its discontent with the project, which it described as hostile and provocative act. It claimed that the purpose of the anti-missile shield was not to protect the West against a nuclear attack from Iran, but an attempt to weaken Russia's position, and that its deployment would undermine the delicate strategic balance in Europe. Interestingly, the edge of Russian criticism was directed not at the United States, which had initiated the project, but primarily at Poland (and at the Czech Republic, which was considering hosting an American radar). Representatives of the Russian armed forces and state authorities, including

²⁰ PAP dispatch of 9 October 2007.

²¹ "Unser wichtigster Angelpunkt ist und bleibt die EU," *Neue Zuercher Zeitung am Sonntag* of 27 May 2008.

President Putin, gave warning that if the plans were implemented, Moscow would once again aim its missiles at European targets, especially at elements of the shield deployed in Central Europe. They also threatened to increase the missile arsenal in the Kaliningrad District.

Poland, on the other hand, pointed to its right to enter into bilateral agreements with the United States, as do other EU or NATO states. "Russia placed no veto when an anti-missile shield was to be deployed in Denmark or the United Kingdom. Why are there attempts to raise this question in the case of locations in Poland and the Czech Republic? Do we constitute a territory of a different category, still under Russia's influence? It is not the case," argued Minister Fotyga.²² She also opposed requests to alleviate the dispute by allowing for a permanent presence of Russian inspectors at the American base. Addressing Russian fears, the Polish government emphasized that the possible deployment of ten intercepting missiles, which are defensive by nature, in no way undermined Russia's deterrent potential.

Representatives of the Polish government also kept repeating that not only was the project not aimed against Russia, but that it had no relation to Polish-Russian relations and resulted from Poland's desire to improve its relations with the United States. The sincerity of these assurances was questioned by Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński. In an interview, he said that the deployment of elements of the shield would counter Russia's ambitions to expand its sphere of influence over Poland for decades.²³ This statement was broadly publicized in the Russian media as an indirect confirmation of the fact that deployment of elements of the US anti-missile shield is aimed against Russia.²⁴

The greatest tension between the authorities of the two states was reached in June when Russia proposed to the United States that it desist from deploying elements of the anti-missile system in Poland and that it use instead a radio location station in Qabala in Azerbaijan. The Polish defense minister, Aleksander Szczygło, criticised the initiative, whose acceptance would have meant that "no decision concerning this part of Europe can be made without at

²² PAP dispatch of 27 September 2007.

²³ Conversation on the *Sygnaly dnia* radio programme, Program I PR, 20 February 2007, hereafter cites as: www.kprm.gov.pl/s.php?id=706.

²⁴ J. Pietrowska, "Kachynski pereputal Rossiyu s izgoyami," *Nezavisimaya gazeta* of 21 February 2007; "Polskiy premer schitaet chto razmeshchenie PRO presechet popytki Rossii viernut' Polshu w sferu svoego vliyaniya," www.newsru.com/world/20feb2007/netvlijanijumoskvy.html.

least the silent consent of Russia.”²⁵ The head of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Sejm, Paweł Zalewski, concluded from Russia's proposal to use the radar station in Azerbaijan that “Russia does not fear the shield; it just does not want it to be deployed in Central and Eastern Europe.” This argument was turned around by the head of the Russian general staff, General Yuri Baluevsky, who interpreted Polish skepticism towards the proposal of another location for parts of the American anti-missile system as proof of the fact that Poland was in reality concerned with a threat from Russia, not Iran.²⁶ It would seem that both interpretations were at least partially true.

It should also be noted that the above mentioned remarks, frequently very severe in tone, of Polish and Russian politicians were not an element of Polish-Russian dialogue, but were publicized in the form of unilateral declarations. The poor condition of mutual relations, due mostly to the issue of the embargo on Polish meat, resulted in the blockage of Polish-Russian communication channels, which, in turn, had a negative impact on chances to improve relations. A one-off meeting between the head of the National Security Office, Władysław Stasiak, and his Russian counterpart, Igor Ivanov, to clarify controversies around the anti-missile shield, did not fill the gap in any way, due to the secondary influence of the two institutions on how foreign policy is shaped and conducted.

Polish-Russian political relations in 2007 were weighed down not only with the embargo and anti-missile shield issues, but also with **disputes over the interpretation of history**. The most publicized of these concerned the plan for a Russian national exhibition in the Auschwitz-Birkenau museum; the dispute concerned the state affiliation of persons who, following the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, in 1939–1941 fell under the control of the Soviet Union. Russia claimed the victims of the Nazi German camp from Vilnius, Lviv or Białystok as Soviet citizens. This was also the case for the inhabitants of pre-war Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Eastern Romania, all of which had been annexed by the USSR as well. The directors of the Museum, with the unanimous support of the International Auschwitz Council, were opposed to such an interpretation, indicating that the proposed exhibition appeared to sanction the Nazi-Soviet pact and to ignore the fact that Soviet citizenship was forced upon the population of the annexed lands. As a result, the exhibition was not opened to visitors.

²⁵ PAP dispatch of 7 June 2007.

²⁶ PAP dispatch of 21 June 2007.

The dispute broke out into the open in early April after a Russian newspaper published accusations that Poland was making political use of the victims of the Nazi camp.²⁷ Subsequently, the Russian ministry of foreign affairs called the Polish standpoint absurd and demanded that the Russian national exhibition be opened to visitors.²⁸ In commenting on the issue, Russian politicians, among whom were the heads of the foreign affairs commissions of both houses of parliament, Konstantin Kosachev and Mikhail Marghelov, described the Polish actions as an unacceptable provocation.

Interestingly enough, the above mentioned differences had been in existence for over two years, and in 2007 no new elements emerged which could justify their escalation or politicization. Furthermore, the party to the dispute on the Polish side was the museum management not the Polish government. This was initially acknowledged by the Russian embassy in Warsaw when its spokesman explained that the exhibition had been closed temporarily and that there could be no talk of a scandal in Russian-Polish relations for this reason.²⁹ It is worthwhile to note that the Russian publication and the subsequent comments by politicians appeared exactly during the days when the two parties were involved in delicate discussions, unsuccessful as it turned out, concerning the resolution of the trade dispute prior to the EU-Russian summit in Samara.

These facts seem to point to a deliberate attempt to make use of the difference of opinions concerning the Auschwitz exhibition to escalate Polish-Russian tensions. Although we cannot with full certainty identify who initiated the escalation on the Russian side or what this person's aims were, MP Paweł Zalewski's hypothesis that the Polish side was consistently provoked in order to obtain arguments "which are later processed in the West into a thesis on Polish Russophobia" seems highly probable.³⁰

As regards the dispute over the commemoration of the Auschwitz-Birkenau victims, in the following months talks were held, which—according to the director of the museum, Piotr Cywiński—were conducted in a good atmosphere

²⁷ "Polyaki osvobodili Osventsim... ot sovetской ekspozitsii," *Kommersant* of 3 April 2007.

²⁸ "Kommentariy DIP Rossii v svyazi s voprosami CMI otnositelno rossiyskoy ekspozitsii v muzeye Osventsima," 3 April 2007, www.mid.ru/Brp_4.nsf/arh/D2135C2272EECAC9C32572B2004D13BE?OpenDocument.

²⁹ "Rossiyskiy MID osudil 'spekulyatsii' vokrug Osventsima," 3 April 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/russia/newsid_6521000/6521571.stm.

³⁰ PAP dispatch of 4 April 2007.

and were entirely different in tone from the remarks made by politicians and the media. In September, there was news of a possible compromise to be worked out among Polish and Russian museologists, to open a new Russian exhibition commemorating the victims of the Nazi concentration camp in a way that would not give rise to controversy.

The outbreak of a second dispute in Polish-Russian political relations in 2007, caused by different perceptions of history, was set off by the Polish Ministry of Culture's work on a bill regarding national remembrance sites. The draft contained, among matters, a simplification of the procedures needed to remove monuments commemorating the two largest totalitarian regimes of the 20th century: the Nazi and Communist regimes. Work on the draft coincided with the crisis in Russian-Estonian diplomatic relations in early May, caused by the relocation of a monument to Soviet soldiers from downtown Tallinn to a military cemetery. The coincidence, which was absolutely unintended according to the Polish authorities, was perceived in Moscow as a provocation. This is most probably why the matter was taken up personally by the Russian minister of foreign affairs, who expressed his indignation at the plans to dismantle monuments to Soviet soldiers in Poland, a move he described as "an attempt to rewrite history." A separate statement was issued by the Russian ministry of foreign affairs.³¹

Representatives of the Polish government argued that the question of symbols of Soviet domination in Poland should not constitute an issue of Polish-Russian relations and indicated that the bill did not allow for the removing mausoleums or cemeteries containing the remains of soldiers who fell on Polish territory during the Second World War.

The change of government in Poland following the October parliamentary elections created an opportunity to break out of the impasse in Polish-Russian relations. Civic Platform's more conciliatory vision of relations with Russia was greeted in Moscow with cautious optimism. Russian politicians and political commentators saw a chance for a gradual normalization of bilateral relations, and thus of Russian-EU relations as well. President Putin's spokesman expressed hope that the change of government "will bring about an end to Russophobia and the policy of demonizing Russia."³²

³¹ PAP dispatch of 7 May 2007.

³² PAP dispatch of 22 October 2007.

The new Polish government's efforts to alleviate disputes and resolve at least some of the controversies in bilateral relations were also in line with Russia's interests. It served to improve Russia's image in the European Union, which would be advantageous given Russia's simultaneous heated disputes with other European countries, such as the United Kingdom, Lithuania, or Estonia. Moreover, and maybe above all, improvement of relations with Poland could serve to justify the thesis that it was Warsaw that had hitherto been the source of conflict.

The first gesture of goodwill by the new Polish government toward Russia was the declaration that it would cease to block Russia's negotiations regarding its accession to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). It must be noted that although the Polish government had indeed taken advantage of the rights it was entitled to at the OECD to oppose Russian aspirations, this only had insignificant impact on bilateral political relations, mostly because of the illusory nature of the Polish veto—Russian accession to the OECD must be preceded, in any case, by its accession to the World Trade Organization, which remains a rather distant goal. The Polish government's gesture thus constituted a feigned concession, intended to induce a favorable response from Russia.

Another concession, which reflected a withdrawal from the principled stance of Jarosław Kaczyński's government, was consent for the Russians to conduct inspections in Polish meat-processing facilities. These inspections took place in mid-November. Owing to this, in December, during the visit of Poland's minister of agriculture, Marek Sawicki, to Moscow, the parties announced the lifting of the embargo on Polish meat that had been in place for over two years. Russia made the reopening of the trade in meat conditional on the signing of a memorandum after a meeting of veterinary experts, which took place in December.³³

It must be added, however, that some restrictions concerning vegetable products and certain meat products remained in place. Doubts have also emerged about the effect of the restrictions' lifting, considering that additional veterinary inspections were required. The head of the Law and Justice party, former prime minister Jarosław Kaczyński, described the agreement as a Pyrrhic victory,

³³ *Memorandum między polską Inspekcją Weterynaryjną a Federalną Służbą ds. Nadzoru Weterynaryjnego i Fitosanitarne Federacji Rosyjskiej o warunkach dostaw produkcji zwierzęcej z Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej do Federacji Rosyjskiej, 20 grudnia 2007 r., www.msz.gov.pl.*

pointing to the fact that Poland gave up on having the conflict resolved through Russian-EU negotiations, thus giving in to Russia's efforts to bilateralise trade disputes.

The biggest change in Polish-Russian political relations to occur in the last two months of 2007 was the opening of communication channels, which had been unused for several months, at the governmental, inter-ministerial and technical levels. Even if such channels were insufficient to resolve all problems, they might serve to alleviate controversies between the two parties.

Such a goal was clearly adopted by the new Polish government regarding the issue of the anti-missile shield. In December, Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, announced that bilateral consultations would be held in Warsaw with the participation of the Russian deputy minister of foreign affairs, with the reservation, however, that the final decision would be made by Poland alone. Prime Minister Tusk spoke on the subject in a similarly firm manner. Although he emphasized that he cared a great deal about improving relations with Russia, at the same time he stated that the decision concerning the possible deployment of the US anti-missile shield in Poland "would not be the effect of negotiations with third-party states."³⁴

Besides undertaking preparations for consultations about the shield for the year's end, two high-ranking visits to Moscow were announced—by the Polish minister of foreign affairs, and then by the prime minister. The two visits took place in January and February 2008. As part of the attempt to resume bilateral dialogue, a joint decision was made to set-up a Polish-Russian Group for Difficult Issues. In late 2007, Professor Adam Daniel Rotfeld, former minister of foreign affairs, was appointed the Polish co-chairman of the Group. On the Russian part, the Group was to be headed by Professor Anatoly Torkunov, chancellor of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). Composed of experts, the group is supposed to work for the rapprochement of standpoints on political issues that give rise to controversy, mostly concerning various painful aspects of 20th century Polish-Russian history.

Economic relations. The Russian embargo on imports of Polish meat and vegetable products had a much smaller impact on mutual economic relations, and an even smaller one on Poland's overall foreign trade balance, than might have been assumed on the basis of the dynamics of the political dispute. The sanctions, which had been in place since late 2005, affected as little as 8% of

³⁴ PAP dispatch of 15 December 2007.

Polish exports to Russia, the equivalent of \$300 million. In the next two years of sanctions, the increase in exports of Polish meat and meat products to other foreign markets (mostly within the EU) was five times as high as the losses caused by the closing of the Russian markets. Even exporters of vegetable products found new buyers, and even partially managed to stay on the Russian market owing to the issuing of phytosanitary certificates by the relevant institutions of other states (for example, there was a significant increase in exports of Polish fruit and vegetables to Lithuania and Ukraine).³⁵

Polish-Russian trade in 2007 reached a record value of €15.2 billion (\$20.7 billion), thus it increased by 12.7% in relation to the previous year (the increase in USD amounted to 23.5%, on account of the steady depreciation of the US currency). It was the fourth consecutive year of a dynamic increase in trade—as recently as 2003 trade between the two states was three times smaller. Russia strengthened its position as the sixth largest destination for Polish exports and the second (after Germany) supplier of imported goods. Poland was Russia's ninth trade partner in exports, and twelfth partner in imports.³⁶

What was important for Poland in 2007, was not only to halt the growth but also to diminish Poland's already huge trade deficit with Russia. Owing to rapid economic growth in Poland, and growing demand on the Russian market, the value of Polish exports grew by 25.2% (in Euro prices). Imports from Russia grew only by 7.8% compared to the previous year, as a result of the maintenance of relatively stable, though high, prices for energy. As a result, in 2007 the negative trade balance with Russia, though reaching the not trifling amount of €5.8 billion, decreased from 47.8% to 32.8% of Poland's entire foreign trade deficit.

Positive changes also took place in the breakdown of Polish goods exported to the Russian market. 2007 saw an increase in the share of relatively highly processed electrical machinery, to 35.8% from 31.3% in the previous year. Other important groups of goods in Polish exports to Russia were: chemical industry products, 20.7% (a 1.5% drop), metallurgy, 10.8% (a 0.5% increase), wood and paper industry products, 10.3% (a 1.4% drop) and food and agricultural products, 9.7% (a 1.9% drop). The structure of imports from Russia remained

³⁵ *Zmiany w eksporcie z Polski produktów rolno-spożywczych w kontekście ograniczeń importu z Polski do Rosji*, Departament Analiz i Prognoz, Ministerstwo Gospodarki, January 2008, www.mg.gov.pl/NR/rdonlyres/BE7F17AE-EE68-4306-9B26-B948DFE300A4/42730/embargo.pdf.

³⁶ *Ekspert i import Rosji w 2007 g.*, www.rusimpex.ru/index1.htm?varurl=Content/Economics/index.htm.

unusually one-dimensional—mineral resources represented as much as 87.5% of the whole.³⁷

Table

Polish trade with Russia in 2007

Item	2007						2006	2007
	PLN billion	USD billion	EUR billion	2006 = 100			structure in %	
				PLN	USD	EUR		
Exports to Russia	17.849	6.432	4.707	121,3	136,5	125,2	4,3	4,6
Imports from Russia	39.786	14.364	10.501	104,4	118,3	107,8	9,7	8,8

Source: *Obroty handlu zagranicznego ogółem i według krajów styczeń–grudzień 2007 r. (wyniki wstępne)*, Central Statistical Office, www.stat.gov.pl/gus/45_970_PLK_HTML.htm.

Good cooperation between Polish and Russian enterprises marred by the lack of progress on matters that required inter-governmental or inter-ministerial agreements. In 2007, no meeting was held of the inter-governmental commission for economic cooperation, established a year earlier; only meetings of industry working groups were held. The parties did not manage to achieve larger progress either on the agreement on the support and mutual protection of investments or on an agreement on the principles of navigation on the Vistula Lagoon.

Poland did not manage to encourage the Russians to make use of the transshipment terminal in Sławkowo in Silesia which, due to an already existing wide-gauge rail connection, could be used to process containers transported by rail from Asia to Europe. This issue was raised, among other times, during the June meetings of the Polish minister of the economy, Piotr Woźniak, with the Russian minister of transport, Igor Levitin. The Russians declared their readiness to consider the offer on the condition of the capital involvement of their companies in the railway infrastructure in Sławkowo.³⁸ In fact, interest on the Russian side was negligible; at the same time, talks were being finalized

³⁷ *Ocena handlu zagranicznego Polski w 2007 r. (na podstawie danych wstępnych)*, Analyses and Forecasting Department, Ministry of Economy, April 2008, www.mg.gov.pl/NR/rdonlyres/BE7F17AE-EE68-4306-9B26-B948DFE300A4/44269/Ocenahandluzagranicznegow2007r.pdf.

³⁸ PAP dispatch of 10 June 2007.

on a competing project that bypasses Poland, the extension of a wide-gauge rail line from Košice in Slovakia to Vienna.

The Polish government's request in 2007, that fees charged for transporting goods over Russian railroads be harmonized, did not serve to convince the Russians to make use of the Sławkowo terminal. According to Poland, the fees charged by the Federal Tariff Service favor railroad transport from Russian ports, creating "artificial transport corridors."

Polish-Russian energy cooperation invariably remained a difficult topic during talks. In January, Russia questioned the tariff levels for the transport of natural gas via Poland to Western Europe and demanded an increase of its rights in EuRoPolGaz, which is the operator of the Polish section of the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline. The dispute between the Polish and Russian shareholders of EuRoPolGaz (Gazprom and PGNiG) on the subject of the transit fees had not only a financial, but also a propaganda dimension. It helped Russia to prop up the thesis holding that Poland is a troublesome partner in gas transport, and was supposed to justify the construction of the costly Nord Stream gas pipeline.³⁹

Controversial energy issues included the matter of resuming deliveries of crude oil via the Druzhba pipeline to the Lithuanian Mažeikiai refinery, controlled by PKN Orlen, as well as Polish initiatives in favor of expanding infrastructure that would allow imports of oil and gas from the Caspian region, bypassing Russia. When Poland organized an energy summit of the states of Central and Eastern Europe and of the Southern Caucasus in Krakow in May, President Putin made simultaneous attempts to undermine those initiatives, as being against Russian interests, through talks with the leaders of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, states which are major exporters of energy resources from the Caspian region.

The declaration made to the Russian press by the new deputy prime minister and minister of the economy, Waldemar Pawlak, helped to defuse the confrontational tone that had dominated energy relations between both countries. Among other matters, he assured the Russians that Russian companies would be allowed to purchase companies in the Polish energy sector on the same principles as other investors.⁴⁰ This announcement, though formally only a confirmation of the norms in force in Poland, in the context of the recent

³⁹ A. Łakoma, "Rosjanie powinni płacić Polsce więcej," *Rzeczpospolita* of 12 June 2007.

⁴⁰ "Upushchennoe vremya trudno naverstat' i dla Polshy i dla Rossii," *Kommersant* of 30 November 2007.

events could be received as a signal of the new government's greater openness to mutually beneficial Polish-Russian initiatives in the area of energy.

Cultural relations. Deep political controversies have had only an insignificant impact in recent years on the dynamics of Polish-Russian cultural relations. There were objective factors helping to maintain the high intensity of these relations: the traditionally large interest in Russian culture among Poles and the still large interest of the Russian intelligentsia in Poland's cultural offerings (although this has clearly decreased in the last two decades). There were thus many varied initiatives ensuing from the good cooperation between the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage and its Russian counterpart, the Federal Agency of Culture and Cinematography. The most important of these initiatives are the "cultural seasons," which began in 2004: series of a few dozen events presenting the cultural achievements of the neighboring state and organized alternately in the two countries.

Year 2007 saw the organization of the Season of Russian Culture in Poland. It was initiated with a solemn gala at the Grand Theatre-National Opera, with the participation of soloists from the Bolshoi Theatre, the Moscow National Philharmonic, and the Polish Radio Orchestra. In the following weeks and months, the "Jazz Travel" project, consisting of mutual jazz concerts by bands from the two countries, was performed. A lot of events involved classical music, such as the performances in Polish cities given by Vladimir Kontarev's Russian Chamber Choir. A joint youth orchestra, composed of students from the Warsaw Academy of Music and young musicians from Russia, has also been established. The Season also involved cinema screenings (including a Russian Week in Warsaw, a review of the most recent Russian films). Many photographic exhibitions were also opened. One presented Russian and Polish UNESCO World Heritage monuments. Many initiatives were aimed at helping to introduce Russian theatre to a Polish audience. The Small Drama Theatre-The Theatre of Europe managed by Lev Dodin participated in the Shakespeare Festival with a presentation of *King Lear*. There were also guest performances in Warsaw of the Alexandr Theatre from St Petersburg. The International "Theatrical Confrontations" Festival in Lublin was devoted to Russian theatre. On the other hand, a ballet gala in the Grand Theatre and National Opera in Warsaw involved soloists of the Bolshoi Theatre ballet, of the Mariinsky Theatre ballet from St Petersburg and of the Warsaw National Opera ballet. The Polish audience had an opportunity to be introduced to the work of the top Russian songwriters at performances by the Pesni Nashego Veka band, and by Lube, one of the most popular Russian rock bands, with its first concert in Poland.

Russian culture was presented in 2007 in Poland not only as part of the "Russian Season," but also during local events. The inhabitants of Wielkopolska, for whom an Autumn of Russian Culture 2007 series was organized in Poznań, could hear a dozen concerts and see many theatre performances, exhibitions, and the most recent achievements of Russian cinematography. In addition, St Petersburg Days were announced in Krakow, during which, besides concerts and exhibitions, meetings were held for persons of the business milieu. On the other hand, the Silesian voivodeship organized a Polish-Russia Tourism Forum, inviting 70 representatives of Russian travel agencies to Katowice.

Great success was enjoyed by the grassroots Russian Film Festival "Sputnik over Warsaw," which showed 60 films, including both the most recent productions of Russian cinema and the most interesting Soviet films. The screenings were attended by a total of 15,000 persons, and the organizers, the "Wspieram" Foundation and Warsaw Kinoteka cinema, announced that the event will be repeated regularly.

Many events promoting Russian culture in Poland in 2007 were not accompanied by analogous events to present Poland's cultural offerings to Russians. However, this was due to the agenda: the Polish Culture Season in Moscow was planned for 2008. The events held in Russia in 2007 were mostly carried out as Polish initiatives. The most important was the opening of the Polish House, financed by the Polish Senate, in St Petersburg. The ceremony was attended by the wives of the presidents of Poland and Russia, Maria Kaczyńska and Ludmila Putin. The Polish House is the first venue of its kind in Russia; it will have a library and will become the seat of St Petersburg's Polish community organizations. Classes for children, cultural events, and scientific seminars will be held there. In addition, thanks to the aid of the Polish Institute, a small Polish Club was established in the Russian capital with the aim of expanding contacts between the two nations in the area of education and culture. The initiators of the club, who are affiliated with the Moscow Academy of Economy and Law, one of the oldest non-state run universities in Russia, intend to organize a dozen or so events a year, including exhibitions, concerts and seminars dedicated to various aspects of Polish-Russian relations.

Among cultural of events of note, we might point to Polish Culture Days in Irkutsk. The event involved film screenings, concerts, and exhibitions dedicated mostly to the fate of the Siberian exiles. It was organized in September by the local Polish community organization, Ogniwo, with the support of the local Consulate General of the Republic of Poland. Moreover, Polish cultural offerings

were attractively presented, among other places, at the Moscow International Film Festival and International Non-Fiction Book Fair.

In 2007, the intricate mutual interaction of culture and politics in Polish-Russian relations was clearly visible. This was due to two film premieres, which not only gained understandable publicity among their home audience, but also received attention from the neighbor. The films were Andrzej Wajda's *Katyn*, devoted to the murder of the Polish officer corps by the Soviet authorities in 1940 and the effects of this tragedy on Polish society in subsequent years, and *1612*, directed by Vladimir Khotinenko, referring to the history of an uprising against the Polish garrison stationed in the Kremlin. This event from 400 years ago, which is for the most part quite unknown in Poland or is treated as an insignificant episode, is perceived in Russia as being historically significant (a *levée en masse* against the Poles brought an end to the Time of Troubles).

Considering the deep crisis in Polish-Russian political relations, the production of these two films could have given the impression of a hidden motive: the use of culture for political purposes, i.e., the film made by the Poles, with an allegedly anti-Russian message, was met with an immediate response in the form of a supposedly anti-Polish production. Fortunately, these fears proved to be entirely unjustified. Both directors emphasized that "the memory of someone cannot be a memory against someone." Andrzej Wajda pointed out that his film "has nothing in it that could be perceived as an attack against Russia,"⁴¹ and Vladimir Khotinenko, for his part, emphasized that he would be unable to make an anti-Polish movie, as he grew up on Polish cinema and was friends with many Polish producers. The words of the two directors were confirmed by the content of the two pictures, which indicates that in Polish-Russian relations it is possible to leave current political tensions outside the sphere of culture. It would be an even greater success for the mutual understanding of Poles and Russians if there were an opportunity to show the films in the other country to a larger viewing public. This did not happen in 2007, however.

Conclusion

One thing has typified Polish-Russian relations for a few years now: deep controversies in political issues accompanied by an impressive increase in trade and relatively intense relations in the area of culture. This was also the case in 2007. For most of the year, political dialogue was frozen, limiting relations in

⁴¹ W. Ramm, "Pravda pana Vaydy," *Izwiestija* of 17 September 2007.

this area to mutual accusations of hostility and ill will. The agenda of political relations corresponded to a catalogue of controversial issues, primarily the trade embargo imposed by Russia, but also Polish plans to participate in the American anti-missile defense system, and, less importantly, artificially-politicized problems relating to various perceptions of history. The Polish authorities' strategy to internationalize the dispute meant that the crisis in Polish-Russian relations had a significant impact on the relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation.

Relying on EU institutions and calling upon the solidarity of community members were unusually important experiences for Polish foreign policy in 2007. The course of the EU-Russian summit in Samara confirmed that, given Poland's limited possibilities of direct influence, EU membership is becoming one of Poland's most vital instruments in its policy towards Russia. In this domain, there has been full unanimity among the major political parties.

Nevertheless, Poland's policy towards Russia did become the object of political controversies. These did not arise from any dramatic differences of program, but were primarily a reflection of the broader dispute concerning the way Polish foreign policy was being conducted—a dispute which was additionally sharpened during the parliamentary election campaign. Contrary to the impression that might have emerged in 2007, the differences between the two dominant parties as regards relations with Russia are relatively minor. In principle, they mostly concern the degree of determination to engage in dialogue with Russia, and not the scope of the concessions required.

The dispute which took place at the end of the year concerning the limits of compromise with Russia was basically for show. The Tusk government accused its predecessors of intransigent rhetoric, but did not offer any real concessions to Russia. The agreement to allow veterinary inspections and the change of position concerning Russia's future membership in the OECD were gestures that allowed the Russian authorities to come out of the protracted conflict without losing face, but did not change the perception of the conflict as such. Although a compromise had been achieved, the European Union's awareness of the unsubstantial context for the Russian sanctions did not disappear. This awareness, it should be added, was largely due to the resolute policy conducted during the two previous years by the governments of Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz and Jarośław Kaczyński. It would seem that prolonging the stalemate in Polish-Russian relations over the following months would not have brought any further positive results. Russia would not accept any solution that would involve its full capitulation, and the impatience of Poland's EU partners with a prolonged

dispute could have had a negative impact on both parties unable to reach a compromise. In this sense, the actions undertaken by the governments of first Jarosław Kaczyński, and later of Donald Tusk, were not contradictory to each other, but rather complementary.

The partial lifting of the embargo imposed by Russia two years previously, and the announcement that it would be lifted in full, allowed Polish-Russian dialogue to resume. Although dialogue is a necessary pre-condition for a lasting improvement in political relations, it is by no means a sufficient condition. It should be remembered that no other controversial issue affecting mutual relations has been resolved thus far, nor has the susceptibility of these relations to new conflicts decreased. We should expect that sooner rather than later disputes will reoccur as a result of objective conflicts of interest: their subject might be Poland's agreement to the construction of the anti-missile shield or its engagement in favor of the European or Atlantic ambitions of Eastern European states. Incidents in 2007, such as the dispute over the Auschwitz exhibition or the controversy over the work on legislation regarding national remembrance sites, indicate that there is no lack of potential areas of conflict.

In 2007, in the political field, Polish-Russian relations had achieved such an unnaturally bad state that some toning down of the controversies had to take place—and this in fact occurred near the year's end. There is no basis, however, to associate this normalization with the long-awaited breakthrough in Polish-Russian relations. Limited expectations not only favor lesser disappointment in the future, but also allow a more realistic approach to shaping Poland's policy toward this important—if difficult—neighbor.

Poland's Policy in the Visegrad Group

Introduction

Poland's policy in the Visegrad Group (V4) as well as its policies towards the member states of the V4—the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary—is an important element of the regional dimension of its foreign relations. Since the accession of Poland and the other states to the European Union, the significance of EU-related considerations in shaping this policy has increased. The political cooperation between the V4 member states is an instrument as well as—in a sense—a manifestation of their European policies. In Poland's policy towards the individual states of the Group, EU issues are also becoming an increasingly significant reference point. Within the Group its member states also pursue strictly regional goals, resulting from the neighbourly nature of their mutual relations. In this dimension as well, Visegrad cooperation supplements and—to a degree—also replaces traditional bilateral relations within the region. Bilateral contacts increasingly often serve to address matters of a multilateral nature. Thus, the EU, Visegrad, and bilateral planes of political relations in Central Europe are interdependent, a fact which calls for comprehensive approach to Poland's policy in this sphere. The vision of cooperation in the region taking place at “different speeds,” one dependant on bilateral relations and the convergence of standpoints at the EU level, has already led certain political commentators to claim that Central European cooperation takes place not so much within the Visegrad Group as within the Visegrad space. Developments in 2007 have only confirmed this tendency.

Background

On the eve of 2007, the sense of continued cooperation within the V4 was not questioned in any of the Visegrad Group countries. During the previous years the conviction emerged that severing the ties which had been established during the intense pre-accession contacts would constitute a backward step, if

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only in terms of information flow. Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary thus stated their intention to use the Group for consultations and decision making in the sphere of their common EU interests.¹ After EU accession the number of meetings between politicians and other officials increased, as did co-operation between individual ministries. The closer ties were motivated by the significantly higher economic growth of all countries in the region (with the exception of Hungary) than in the old EU countries, and the high cooperation potential which this entailed. Another aspect favouring cooperation was the Group's positive image, which enhanced the "soft power" of V4 members in the EU and in external contacts, and which contributed to the formation of elements determining the region's particular identity. In 2006, however, the role of these factors decreased, as the image of the region worsened. In 2006, Western European media carried many pronouncements on the populism, nationalism and political instability of Central Europe. The emergence of this image was helped by the fact that Poland and the Czech Republic voiced slogans of a steadfast defence of their national interests on the EU forum, thanks to which the two states were perceived as the "braking" elements in the European integration process. In 2006, political cooperation among the states of the V4 became less intensive and more complicated on account of tensions in Slovak-Hungarian relations, electoral campaigns, and the formation of governments. Some politicians used the prestige of the V4 forum to make their positions more credible in the eyes of their electorates and ostentatiously distanced themselves from their neighbours.² In spite of this, in all V4 states the political elites declared their intention to increase regional cooperation and their public opinion had a favourable attitude towards this idea.

Given the importance of increased cooperation in Central Europe in programme documents and statements of Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość—PiS) politicians, it could be expected that this aim would be reflected in the foreign policy pursued by the government formed by this political party. The call to activate Poland's policy in the Visegrad Group was supported by the other coalition members—the League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin—LPR) and the Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland (Samoobrona RP). On the Right voices were calling for Poland to "represent the views of Central Europe"

¹ *Guidelines on the Future Areas of Visegrad Co-operation*, www.visegradgroup.eu.

² For example during the summit of the Visegrad Group in October 2006 the Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány ostentatiously refused to meet with the Slovak Prime Minister Róbert Fico.

and to “mobilize” the states of the region. Some politicians and commentators went even further and advocated the establishing, under the Polish leadership, of a regional alliance which was to strengthen the region’s position in its relations with Germany. Even though critics of the government claimed that this was an unrealistic and “esoteric” geo-political idea, the goal of increasing Visegrad cooperation was not questioned. Neither Poland’s policy within the V4 or its relations with other members of the Group gave cause for any disputes on the Polish political stage. This resulted, among other reasons, from the increasingly positive image of the Czechs, Slovaks and Hungarians in Poland, and from the desire of two thirds of Poles to have permanent allies within the European Union with which to cooperate on a continual basis.³

Supporting the states of Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine, in the process of their rapprochement to the structures of the Western world by, among other means, promoting the “open nature” of the EU and NATO and reinforcing the eastern dimension of the EU policy is a traditional priority of Polish foreign policy. The V4 states generally share this purpose, and Slovakia and the Czech Republic have manifested an ever increasing interest in Ukraine. These two countries had earlier been involved in helping to shape a civil society in Belarus. For the Czechs, interest in Belarus is dictated by the great importance which is attached to human rights in the world in its foreign policy. Hungary, on the other hand, did not participate in the Polish-Slovak-Czech initiatives supporting EU measures directed against the Lukashenka regime.⁴ The Western Balkans have traditionally been of great importance for Poland’s V4 partners, and in 2007 the centre of attention of the entire EU was focused on the region on account of Kosovo, a fact which also had implications for Poland’s policy within the Visegrad Group.

The political situation in the **Czech Republic** was favourable from the Polish viewpoint. In June 2006, the centre-right Civic Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická strana, ODS), won the parliamentary elections, a fact that meant a turnaround in Czech policy, from affirmation of the existing trends of European integration to more critical positions, which manifested themselves,

³ In a poll on July 2007, less than one fifth of respondents believed that the Polish policy with the Community should be based on ad-hoc, short-term arrangements with other states aimed at pursuing concrete goals. *Sprzymierzeńcy Polski w Unii Europejskiej. Komunikat z badań*, Warsaw, July 2007, www.cbos.pl; *Sympatia i niechęć do innych narodów. Komunikat z badań*, Warsaw, September 2007, www.cbos.pl.

⁴ J. Hamberger, “The Future of the Visegrad Cooperation from the Hungarian Perspective,” *International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs*, 2006, no. 3–4, p. 94.

for example, in opposition to the Constitutional Treaty. There was also a shift from the position of an equal distance “between Washington and Brussels” to a position of strengthening Atlantic ties and the alliance with the USA. An expression of this shift was the progress in talks with the Americans regarding the location of parts of the anti-missile shield on Czech territory. Local attitudes towards this project, however, brought to light growing differences of opinion on Czech foreign and security policy, also within the governing coalition.

Poland's relations with **Slovakia** were marked by the ideological and biographical differences between the elites in power. The parliamentary elections of June 2006 brought victory to the alliance of the Smer—Social Democracy (*Smer—sociálna demokracia*) party and political forces which had been in power until 1998 and impeded Slovakia's integration with the Euro-Atlantic structures. The two states had different approaches to Atlantic relations and European integration. Prime Minister Róbert Fico in his criticism of the plans to locate anti-missile systems in Poland and the Czech Republic shared Russia's viewpoint, and the maintenance of close relations with that country was viewed by the governing elites and a part of society as a manifestation of an independent policy and the pursuit Slovakia's own interests. Slovakia, which plays an important role in the transit of energy resources to the EU, tried to maximise its profits from its cooperation with Russia and did not support Poland in its policy of applying the conditionality principle in the Russia-EU relations. The weakening of Slovakia's Atlantic orientation was accompanied by a more favourable attitude towards deeper integration within the EU. Slovakia declared full support for the Constitutional Treaty and for the actions of the German presidency aimed at including as many provisions of that document as possible in a new treaty.

In **Hungary**, the ideological makeup of the government and its attitude towards international problems differed markedly from Poland's preferences.⁵ The Hungarian Left, in power since 2002, has traditionally been more sceptical about increasing contacts with Poland and developing cooperation within the V4.⁶ The internal crisis favoured the “economization” of foreign policy and its reflection of demands of the domestic political struggle. Under the rule of the Centre-Left, Hungary shifted towards “soft Atlantism” and distanced itself from American policy. In European relations, it showed a pro-integration attitude (and criticized the Poland's restrained stance), and presented its struggle with the

⁵ The elections of 2006 brought victory to the Hungarian Socialist Party, which again formed a coalition with the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats.

⁶ J. Hamberger, *op.cit.*, pp. 101–102.

right-wing opposition as a struggle against “radical nationalism” which impeded the necessary reforms “from Poland to the Balkans.”⁷ On the subject of energy security, of high priority issue for Poland, Hungary advocated the development of a common EU energy policy, but it saw increased security primarily in terms of the diversification of shipment routes rather than sources. Hungary’s goal was to maximize profits from its strategic position on energy resources shipment routes from Russia. The good relations between the Hungarian opposition with PiS, as well as with Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform), which formed the new coalition government in November with the Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe—PSL), were also significant for Polish-Hungarian relations.

The Goals of Polish Policy within the Visegrad Group

Poland stated on many occasions that the Visegrad states should seek a common denominator on issues which they view as important, and act jointly in the EU forum.⁸ Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński in his policy statement, delivered on 19 July 2006, also declared the desire to expand cooperation within the Visegrad Group, which was treated as an important component of the broader coalitions in the EU in which Poland participated (e.g. that of the New Financial Perspective or the EU position on Belarus). The programme of the coalition government formed by PiS, Samoobrona RP and LPR emphasised that “Our role in the political organisations of the West depends in large measure on coordinated action with neighbouring states, and on activeness of regional cooperation organisations: the Council of the Baltic Sea States and the Visegrad Group.”⁹ During a meeting of the Group’s prime ministers in Visegrád in October 2006, Jarosław Kaczyński stated that “cooperation within this quadrangle gives us strength. Thanks to this cooperation certain issues can be dealt with more effectively and easily than if we acted alone.”¹⁰ Close cooperation with the

⁷ Statement made by Prime Minister Gyurcsány for *The Times* of 2 March 2007.

⁸ See, for example, K. Marcinkiewicz, “The Visegrad Declaration 15 Years Later,” *The Visegrad Group. A Central European Constellation. Publication on the Occasion of the 15th Anniversary of the Visegrad Group*, Bratislava, 2006, pp. 18–19.

⁹ The coalition programme declaration “Solidarne państwo” (27 April 2006), Appendix no. 1: “Cele i zadania rządu koalicyjnego w latach 2006–2009,” www.kprm.gov.pl.

¹⁰ *15 lat współpracy wyszehradzkiej*, www.kprm.gov.pl.

Czech Republic was also supposed to be a factor preserving the stability of the Group.¹¹

The Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anna Fotyga, in the Government's Information Paper on foreign policy priorities mentioned the importance of ties with "partners from the north and south," in which the government attached great importance to activeness and "increased cooperation within the Visegrad Group." Poland and the Czech Republic were to be brought closer together through their "collaboration on the missile defense project" whereas Hungary and Slovakia were to remain "remain Poland's important partners in European, Euroatlantic and regional policy."¹²

In spite of the optimistic tone of these statements and a certain degree of diplomatic courtesy, the programme documents did not indicate that reviving Central European cooperation was a top priority. The awareness that the cooperation within the V4 would not provide Poland with a strong enough voice to influence processes within the EU and would not replace the establishing of *ad-hoc* coalitions with large EU states within broader coalitions influenced the conceptualisation of policy within the V4. Poland thus placed great emphasis on developing a flexible "V4+" formula, allowing for the widening of cooperation so as to include other partners on specific issues and for broader regional cooperation. Poland, as a neighbour and an important partner of Lithuania and an active participant in the cooperation between Baltic Sea states, declared its will to take steps favouring the synergy of initiatives focused primarily on the eastern neighbours of the EU.

Cooperation with the V4 states is also connected with pursuing the goal of consolidation of the full-rights membership of Poland in the EU. Cooperation on the earliest possible accession to the Schengen area was of particular importance for Poland in 2007. During the Visegrad summit of October 2006 Poland mobilised its Group partners to exert joint pressure to ensure that the planned date for the area's enlargement in 2007 is kept. Poland also strove to eliminate all the restrictions to Poles' access to the common market and to provide its citizens with the same rights as those enjoyed by citizens of the "old" EU states. In these efforts, Poland saw the V4 states as allies, as they faced similar obstacles. On the other hand, Poland showed a reserved attitude to closer cooperation on

¹¹ J. Kaczyński, M. Topolánek, "Polak, Czech—dwa bratanki," *Rzeczpospolita* of 19 February 2007; J. Kaczyński, M. Topolánek, "Češi a Poláci, partneři v Evropě," *Mladá fronta Dnes* of 19 February 2007.

¹² "Government Information on Polish Foreign Policy in 2007," see above, pp. 27–28.

joining the euro zone. Prime Minister Kaczyński reserved the right for Poland to make take the relevant decision on its own.¹³

On the other hand, the Polish government harboured no illusions regarding the possibilities of political cooperation within the Group on the issue of energy security. In the opinion of Minister Fotyga, “despite the declared interest of other Visegrad capitals in embarking on talks about the diversification of energy sources and the expansion of the system of gas pipeline connections on the North-South axis, Bratislava, Prague and Budapest have differing views on Polish position on this issue.” The Czech Republic manifested the greatest understanding for the Polish position on the gas deliveries, whereas Hungary was “determined to pursue more intense cooperation with Gazprom” and Slovakia, “given the benefits ensuing from the transit of the Russian energy resources, did not intend to change either the producer or the supply structure.”¹⁴

The pessimistic view of the possibility to increase co-ordinated action on this important issue did not lead to the abandonment of cooperation or to its depreciation in public. Polish politicians resisted the temptation to show the “if it’s not ideal, it’s disastrous” attitude, which they had usually adopted after setbacks on the Visegrad forum. The energy issue became a permanent topic raised by Poland. Among other things, attempts were made to see if there was a possibility to work out a joint position on the recurring disruptions oil and gas deliveries from Russia.¹⁵ These efforts to gain the support of the Group’s members were the result, among other things, of the desire to present the Polish position as reflecting the standpoint of Central Europe as a whole on the EU forum. For example, the Polish ambassador to European Union, explaining Poland’s opposition to the Baltic pipeline, emphasised that Poland wanted diversified supplies for the whole region, as “Central Europe still cannot overcome the energy infrastructure inherited from the Warsaw Pact. We have no access to the Western infrastructure, which should be expanded from the west to the east and from the north to the south.”¹⁶

¹³ *Informácia o priebehu a výsledkoch oficiálnej návštevy predsedu vlády Slovenskej republiky Roberta Fica v Poľskej republike dňa 5. októbra 2006*, www.rokowania.sk.

¹⁴ Responses of Minister Fotyga to the questions not answered during the consideration of current information on the 30th session of the Sejm on 14 December 2006 and 24 January 2007, pp. 31–32, www.sejm.gov.pl.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶ *Polish Ambassador on EU Treaty, Energy and Russia*, an interview with Jan Tombiński, 4 April 2007, www.euractiv.com.

The government clearly stressed the importance of extending the transport infrastructure along the neglected north-south axis for the economic ties between Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. On 26 October 2006, the Lithuanian-Polish-Slovak-Hungarian declaration on the construction of an expressway from Lithuania, along Poland's eastern border, to Slovakia and Hungary, to ultimately to link the Baltic Sea region with the Balkans and Turkey, was signed in Łańcut in the presence of President Lech Kaczyński.¹⁷ The emergence of a similar expressway in western Poland would involve cooperation on the construction of the Central European Transport Corridor (CETC), which would run through all the V4 states.

After the PO-PSL coalition came to power in November 2007, the Tusk government declared its will to continue cooperation in Central Europe.¹⁸ During the meeting of V4 prime ministers in Ostrava, he emphasised that Visegrad cooperation was a permanent component of Polish foreign policy, regardless of political changes.

Multilateral Cooperation

European integration issues played an increasingly important role within the Visegrad Group. The symbolic expression of this fact was adopting the custom of inviting the prime minister of the state which was going to hold the EU presidency during the next 6-month period to the summit of the V4 states. The Portuguese Prime Minister José Socrates participated in the meeting of the V4 heads of governments on 18 June in Bratislava, and the Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Janša was the guest of the V4 states in Rožnov near Radhošť and in Ostrava on 9–10 December.

Until June 2007, the annual presidency in the Visegrad Group was held by Slovakia, and this function was taken over the following year by the Czech Republic. The issue of joining the **Schengen Area** represented an important challenge from the beginning of the year. The V4 states jointly tried to overcome the difficulties resulting, in large measure, from the negligence of the European Commission in the implementation of the SIS II system, which could have led to

¹⁷ For more information see A. Jarominiak, "Historyczne intencje: Deklaracja Łańcucka," *Magazyn Autostrady*, 2007, no. 1–2, pp. 46–49.

¹⁸ Prime Minister Tusk stated in his policy statement that "the states of the Visegrad Group and states of the Baltic Sea area obviously are and will be important political and economic partners." *Przedstawienie przez prezesa Rady Ministrów programu działania Rady Ministrów z wnioskiem o udzielenie jej wotum zaufania*, 23 listopada 2007 r., www.sejm.gov.pl.

delays in the enlargement of the area. Coordinated action in this sphere contributed to the implementation of the transition SISone4ALL system (the relevant declaration was signed in Lisbon on 27 March 2007), overcoming the resistance of Austria, which proposed that border controls be maintained also after 1 January 2008, and dispelling the doubts of other states, particularly Germany. It is worthwhile to note that the V4 countries' state of readiness to join the Schengen Area varied. The European Commission especially pointed to Slovakia's delays in getting its border with Ukraine ready. The Czech Republic, which did not have the problems associated with an external EU border (with the exception of airports), declared as early as in December 2006 that if Slovakia were not ready, it was prepared to introduce the Schengen border regime on its eastern border. During the annual summit of the V4 states which took place in September in the Hungarian city of Keszthély the presidents, in reaction to signals from Austria, expressed their objection to the prospect of extending police controls on the border after joining the Schengen Area. At high-level meetings a joint standpoint was presented throughout 2007 on the issue of the date for the extension of the Schengen Area to all states of the V4 Group in 2007.

The period of the Slovak presidency in the Group was marked by discord on the subject of **EU institutional reform**. Although Polish politicians presented their efforts as attempts to reach a compromise which would "allow Poland and Central European states, medium and small, feel as co-hosts in the European Union,"¹⁹ the issue divided the V4 states. Poland and the Czech Republic, which had similar views on the institutional shape of the EU, cooperated closely and showed an unfavourable attitude towards the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, which was rejected in the referenda in France and the Netherlands. Slovakia and Hungary, in support of the German, which held the EU presidency, showed a community of interests, despite the strong tensions in their mutual relations. In keeping with the expectations of analysts,²⁰ Slovakia and Hungary used the Visegrad forum to express a standpoint different from that of Poland prior to the session of the European Council. Poland, on the other hand, seemed hopeful to gain the support of all of the V4 states for its proposals while, at the same time, threatening on the V4 forum to block the EU

¹⁹ Speech by Paweł Zalewski at the session of the Sejm (5th term, 43rd session, 4th day 15 June 2007), www.sejm.gov.pl.

²⁰ See L. Jesień (ed.), "Current Status of Debate in European States on the Constitutional Treaty," *PISM Research Papers*, April 2007, no. 5, p. 76.

understanding. As a result, a needless and spectacular political clash followed. During the meeting in Bratislava on 28 June, the Prime Ministers of Hungary and Slovakia, Ferenc Gyurcsány and Róbert Fico, objected to the Polish proposal of the square root-based vote counting system, which they publicly trivialized. Their rhetoric was sharply criticized by the Polish Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński as “unnecessary” and “exacerbating the situation.” In contrast, the Polish project of compromise was supported by the Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek who, however, made it clear that he didn’t have a mandate from the governing coalition “to die for the Polish proposal.”

The rift in views on institutional matters did not entail a breakdown of cooperation in the pursuit of specific common interests on the EU forum. One of these was ensuring the best possible conditions for the reinforcement of the eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the promotion of the open character of the EU, as well as the general support for the formulation of a common EU energy policy.²¹

The will to deepen the Visegrad cooperation, develop and consolidate its mechanisms, particularly on the EU forum, was also characteristic of the efforts of the Czechs while they held the presidency of the Group.²² The nature of work within the Group in that period was clearly influenced by the preparations to the **Czech presidency in the EU Council** in the first half of 2009. Prime Minister Topolánek declared as early as March that the Czech Republic wished to define its priorities jointly with its partners from the V4. Poland and other V4 states showed a positive attitude with regard to the main premise of the Czech EU presidency: “Europe without barriers,” and especially with regard to the postulate of ensuring the free movement of persons, goods and services and maintaining the open character of the European Union.²³

Cooperation among the permanent representative offices of the V4 states at the European Union in Brussels also grew. Discussions were planned on all major European policy issues. Representatives of the European Commission participated in some of the consultations (e.g. regarding EU enlargement and the free movement of persons). Much attention was devoted to the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, customs issues and joining the Schengen Area.

²¹ *Joint Political Statement of the Visegrad Group on the Strengthening of the European Neighbourhood Policy*, www.Visegradgroup.eu.

²² *Czech Presidency of the Visegrad Group (June 2007–June 2008)*, www.Visegradgroup.eu.

²³ Speech of Prime Minister Topolánek in the Chamber of Deputies on 3 May 2007 (stenoprotokol 14. schůze, čtvrtek 3. května 2007), www.psp.cz.

Discussions also concerned the “eastern dimension” of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the visa regime with Belarus, Central Asia, the Far East (including the special trade with China) and cooperation with Japan. Actions aimed at eliminating visas to the USA and Canada were also coordinated.²⁴

The Brussels consultations were to lead to decisions on “European” topics in which the V4 states would support the Czech presidency in the EU. In the autumn of 2007, a convergence of standpoints was achieved with regard to the free movement of workers, the support of the “eastern dimension” of the European Neighbourhood Policy (including the reduction of visa fees) and integration-oriented efforts of Western Balkan states. In January 2006, Prime Minister Topolánek stated that the Czech Republic was submitting an “agenda consulted within the Visegrad Group” as part of its presidency projects.²⁵

Issues of particular importance for Poland included action taken by the Visegrad states on the EU forum on behalf of the **eastern neighbourhood of the Union**. In the first half of 2007, cooperation between the V4 and the Germany, which held the EU presidency, was increased. On 22 January, during the session of the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council these states presented a joint political standpoint on strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy, a step which was aimed at supporting the efforts of the German presidency on this issue.²⁶ Another common political position of the Visegrad states discussed during the informal meeting of ministers of foreign affairs in the Gymnich formula in Bremen (30–31 March) made reference to it. In April, the V4 states formulated another position on the use of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI).²⁷ Cooperation with Germany was also continued during Portugal’s EU presidency. Cooperation with the Baltic States—**Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia**, was successfully maintained, largely thanks to Polish efforts. Another meeting of foreign ministers of the V4 states and the three Baltic States took place on the sidelines of the GAERC session, held on 17 June in Luxemburg. Minister Fotyga strove to turn such meetings into a regular

²⁴ M. Kořan, “Státy Visegrádské skupiny a Rakousko v české zahraniční politice,” in: M. Kořan *et al.*, *Česká zahraniční politika v roce 2007*, Prague: Analýza ÚMV, 2008, pp. 115–116.

²⁵ Speech of Prime Minister Topolánek at the Chamber of Deputies on 31 January 2008 (stenoprotokol 27. schůze, čtvrtek 31. ledna 2008), www.psp.cz.

²⁶ *Joint Political Statement of the Visegrad Group...*

²⁷ The Slovak representative presented, on behalf of the Visegrad Group, the joint statement on the allocation of the Governance Facility and Neighbourhood Investment Fund during the session of the COEST working group in Brussels on 20 April 2007.

forum for exchanging views and coordinating action before each EU conference on the European Neighbourhood Policy.²⁸ During the summit in Ostrava on 10 December 2007, the prime ministers of the Visegrad countries reiterated their intention to deepen cooperation with the three Baltic States and four days later, before the session of the European Council, the first meeting of prime ministers of the V4 states, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia took place. During the meeting, participants declared their support for strengthening the “eastern dimension” of the European Neighbourhood Policy and for EU enlargement, and discussed prospects for a common energy policy and a joint approach to Russia. An understanding was also reached with regard to supporting the candidacy of the former Latvian president Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga to the EU reflection group. Prime Minister Tusk announced that representatives of the seven states would meet regularly before every European summit to work on joint positions and strategies and that the Baltic-Visegrad summit on an energy strategy for the region would be held in Poland in the autumn of 2008.²⁹ In 2007, the V4 states also devoted more attention to cooperation with **Sweden**, which will take over the EU presidency from the Czech Republic in July 2009. The Visegrad Group perceives Sweden as an ally in the process of strengthening the EU's interest in its eastern neighbourhood. Efforts were also initiated to renew consultations with the Nordic Council (which were taking place in 2003–2004).

Ukraine plays a special role in the activities of the Visegrad Group, and it has frequently taken part in the group's meetings, largely on Poland's initiative. The V4 states were in agreement about the desirability of supporting Ukraine's aspirations for membership in both the EU and NATO. In the latter question, a particular role is played by measures aimed at informing Ukrainians about the Alliance. An example of such measures was the Visegrad Group and Ukraine Forum in Dnepropetrovsk devoted to the reform of the defence industry, organised by Slovakia, whose embassy functioned as the NATO liaison office in Kiev.³⁰

²⁸ In September, following the initiative of Poland and Lithuania, the ministers of the Visegrad states and the three Baltic States met in Brussels with the representatives of Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan on the eve of the conference on the European Neighbourhood Policy.

²⁹ *Tusk zapowiada stałą współpracę Wyszehrad—kraje bałtyckie*, PAP dispatch of 14 December 2007.

³⁰ *Fórum V4 a Ukrajiny v Dnepropetrovsku*, 21 November 2007, www.mzv.sk.

In 2007, the Visegrad Group also manifested an interest in Moldova and Belarus. Cooperation with **Moldova** was initiated by Slovakia during its presidency, and this involvement was continued during the Czech presidency (several years ago Moldova became a priority partner for the Czech Republic). In October 2007, in Štířín, a meeting of foreign ministers of the V4 states and Moldova, devoted to the issues of Moldova's integration with the EU, took place.³¹ The region's states' formulation of a common position with regard to **Belarus** is particularly beneficial for Poland. The regional "diversification of responsibility" for Belarus also leads to better lobbying in the EU's greater involvement in helping to build civil society in Belarus. Belarus proposed to work with the Visegrad Group on the European Neighbourhood Policy, but in May 2007, the V4 declared their readiness to work with Belarus in the V4+ context only after democratic changes take place in that country.³² Along with other V4 states, Poland established a coalition within the EU which strove, successfully, to lower visa fees for citizens of Belarus (in conjunction with restrictions for representatives of its regime). The Visegrad Group also made efforts to raise Slovenia's awareness of this problem, as this country was preparing to take over the EU presidency. This process gave rise to some controversies, however, which seemed to suggest that Poland preferred to "specialize" in Belarusian affairs rather than "cooperate."³³

Another group in which Poland and other V4 states (particularly Slovakia) see opportunities to shape EU external relations is **GUAM** (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova). The initiative to develop ties with this group was taken by Slovakia, then holding the presidency in the V4.³⁴ The steps taken are aimed at supporting GUAM in solving the so-called frozen conflicts and initiating cooperation in the field of energy, particularly with regard to GUAM countries' transit role on the supply route of Caspian Sea natural gas and oil to the EU.

³¹ *Joint Statement from the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Visegrad Group Countries and Moldova, Štířín, 25 October 2007*, www.Visegradgroup.eu. See also *Joint Statement by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Visegrad Group on the Situation in Burma/Myanmar, Štířín, 25 October 2007*, www.visegradgroup.eu.

³² *Zhodnotenie slovenského predsedníctva V4* (1 July 2006 – 30 June 2007), www.rokovania.sk.

³³ The Czechs unsuccessfully tried to obtain Poland's support for the international project Radio for Belarus, co-inaugurated by them in the autumn of 2005 in Warsaw (the Polish media projects for Belarus had begun to develop at the time). After the change of the government in Poland the Czech party received signals indicating interest on the Polish side in the joint radio project. M. Koran, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

³⁴ On 2 March 2007 the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ján Kubiš, met with the ambassadors of the GUAM states—TASR of 2 March 2007.

On the EU forum and in the foreign policy of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, issues relating to the **Western Balkans** played an important role, but they did not become the subject of closer quadrilateral cooperation. Poland's standpoint on Kosovo's independence differed from the policies of its partners from the V4, who manifested a certain restraint in supporting projects for the province's independence. Consequently, it was reluctant to hold discussions on this issue on Visegrad Group forum, being most probably of the opinion that it would not lead to a common position and would distract the attention of the V4 from issues of greater importance for Warsaw. For Poland's V4 partners, supporting the pro-Atlantic aspirations of the Western Balkan states, particularly Serbia, was of great importance. In 2007 the issues of the Western Balkans continued to be shifted to the Regional Partnership forum, comprising the V4 states, Austria and Slovenia. In February a working dinner of foreign ministers was held in Vienna with, among other persons, the UN Secretary General Ban-Ki moon and his special envoy for Kosovo, Matti Ahtisaari in attendance. The meeting's participants focused on easing the visa regime for the inhabitants of the Western Balkans and transferring aid to those countries, with a special emphasis on development programmes for Serbia and Montenegro.³⁵ In July, the foreign ministers of the Regional Partnership, during a meeting with the Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs in Bratislava, discussed Serbia's aspirations, particularly those concerning the further development of cooperation with the EU.³⁶ In November, the Regional Partnership's ministers of foreign affairs met on the occasion of the GAERC meeting, including the new Polish minister, Radosław Sikorski.³⁷ They expressed their support for the UN special envoy and the special EU representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Miroslav Lajčák, and his reform efforts.

The prime ministers of the V4 states and Slovenia devoted more attention to Balkan issues during their meeting on 10 December 2007 in Ostrava. They discussed the matter of the Kosovo's expected declaration of independence, but due to differences in their standpoints the joint statement contained only a general formula of support for the integration efforts of the entire Balkans. They also agreed that the EU, in resolving the problem of Kosovo's future,

³⁵ *Štrofiová na Regionálnom partnerstve vo Viedni*, 23 February 2007, www.mzv.sk.

³⁶ *Spotkanie Ministrów SZ państw Partnerstwa Regionalnego i Serbii*, 3 July 2007, www.polskevelvyslanectvo.sk.

³⁷ *Vyhlasenie ministrov zahraničných vecí krajín Regionálneho partnerstva*, 19 November 2007, www.mzv.sk.

should also take the expectations of Serbia into consideration. The V4 leaders also declared that they would maintain their efforts within the Visegrad Group in seeking a compromise in the matter of Kosovo.³⁸

In EU external relations, the eastern and south-eastern neighbourhood is a high priority issue for V4 countries, but Visegrad cooperation also includes consultations of the representative offices in Brussels on other issues, taken up by the EU work groups for external relations. For example, in June, during the work of the work group for Europe and Central Asia (COEST), the V4 states issued a joint document on the implementation of the new partnership strategy between the EU and Central Asia. Following this, in December, the representatives of the Commission, the Visegrad states and the EBOR held an informal meeting. Cooperation with Japan was also pursued. On 28 May the foreign ministers of the V4 states met with the head of the Japanese foreign ministry on the occasion of the ASEM (Asia Europe Meeting) summit and declared their intention to deepen cooperation, which is to contribute to strengthen relations between Japan and the EU.³⁹

Poland worked with other V4 states and Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia on behalf of the lifting of tourist visas to the USA and Canada. In March Slovakia, the then president of the Group, approached the German EU presidency for assistance in the matter. Although common lobbying efforts were undertaken, the stability of this coalition was in question from the beginning—the states involved reserved the right to take separate steps.⁴⁰ When, in August 2007, the USA adopted new regulations concerning visa-free movement, lowering the percentage of the rejected visa applications below 10%, on 9 August, the ambassadors of Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and the Czech Republic in Washington issued a letter in which they declared that some of the American allies would nevertheless be limited by “artificial barriers which do not correspond with their commitments and involvement in strengthening

³⁸ *Informácia o priebehu a výsledkoch summitu predsedov vlád krajín Východnej skupiny a Slovinska (Rožnov pod Radhoštěm, Ostrava, 9.–10.12.2007)*, www.rokovania.sk.

³⁹ *Press Statement from “V4 + Japan” Foreign Ministers Meeting, Hamburg, 28 May 2007*, www.Visegradgroup.eu. In October the heads of departments in foreign ministries of the Visegrad states and Japan held consultations regarding Russia and anti-missile defence, and in December directors of the ministries discussed the issues of the environment, pollution and climate changes with the Japanese partners.

⁴⁰ Poland also failed to show determination in establishing the coalition; in the spring of 2006 it accepted the project of Senators Barbara Mikulski and Rick Santorum with satisfaction, even though it was unjust towards other states of the region.

transatlantic and global security.” The Czech Republic, the only state meeting the 10% criterion, joined the letter, but Hungary was not among its signatories. At the end of 2007, the Czechs reached visible progress in bilateral negotiations with the USA, while cooperation on the Visegrad forum in the matter of eliminating American stopped working.

The variety of areas of cooperation between the V4 states reduced the importance of discord among them, but could sometimes lead to the impression that their positions lacked cohesiveness (giving rise to overly optimistic expectations in Poland). Opinions on Poland's EU policies expressed during the meetings of presidents were more favourable than those voiced during intergovernmental discussions involving Slovakia and Hungary. In addition, the parliamentary dimension of Visegrad cooperation seemed more favourable to Warsaw's priorities. For example, during the Cracow meeting of the commission for European affairs in January 2007, a declaration was adopted which showed a convergence of views on major EU matters, both in the internal and external dimensions.⁴¹ Support was also expressed for Poland's efforts to get Russia to lift its embargo on food. Thanks to the common position, issues related to the eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy were included in the agenda of the COSAC meetings, an outcome presented by Poland as a success.⁴² Although differences of opinions on EU institutional reform practically ruled out the any rapprochement of positions among the V4 states, the parliamentary commissions for European matters and Slovenia continued the discussion during the meeting in Bojnice on 2–4 September 2007. The Polish representative there had an impression that these states showed “no resistance whatsoever” to Poland's proposal for a “strengthened Ioannina” mechanism.⁴³ The favourably developing parliamentary cooperation, particularly in the commission for European matters, offers good prospects for the future, when, after the Lisbon Treaty comes into force, the controlling role of national parliaments in the EU

⁴¹ The commissions developed a joint statement for the European Parliament, COSAC and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. *Statement of the 5th Meeting of the European Union Affairs Committees of the National Parliaments*, Kraków, 15–16 January 2007, www.visegradgroup.eu.

⁴² Statement by Karol Karski in the discussion over *Government Information on Polish Foreign Policy in 2007*, 11 May 2007, www.sejm.gov.pl.

⁴³ *Biuletyn no. 2324/V (Komisja Spraw Zagranicznych, no. 91)* of 4 September 2007, www.sejm.gov.pl.

will increase, an expression of which will be the, for example, the “yellow card mechanism.”⁴⁴

An important component of the V4 cooperation is the **cooperation of individual ministries**, also during meetings of the EU Council. The cooperation between ministries of internal affairs during the period of adoption of the Schengen *acquis* became of particular significance, also within the broader coalition of states aspiring to the Schengen zone and on the forum of the Salzburg Group (meeting of ministers, 12–13 July 2007 in Innsbrück).⁴⁵ On 25–26 May 2007, a meeting of ministers and experts responsible for implementing the SiSone4ALL project in all states preparing to enter the Schengen area took place in Warsaw. Representatives of Germany and Portugal as well as of the European Commission also participated in the discussions. The V4 states, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Slovenia and Portugal issued a joint declaration expressing their determination to implement the project.⁴⁶

No major achievements were made in the field of **energy**, in spite of its political significance. Although the Visegrad Group strongly supported discussions on energy security, Poland’s partners in the V4 chose not to pursue joint energy-related projects with Poland, as this would have undermined their good relations with Russia. The V4 countries perceive the challenges connected with energy security in different ways. Poland was more apprehensive of Russia’s actions to a much greater extent than its southern partners, particularly in the context of the planned construction of the Nord Stream pipeline on the bed of the Baltic Sea. They also failed to work out a common position on the European Commission’s proposal for a Third Package liberalizing trade in gas and electricity. Slovakia joined the group of decisive critics of the project, whereas other states adopted more of a wait and see attitude. Although developing a common standpoint on the EU forum was difficult, cooperation at the expert level was continued.

From the perspective of Poland, which had declared the will to expand EU defence capabilities, cooperation on military issues was important. On 27 January 2007, at the Slovak air base of Sliač, the chiefs of staff of the V4 states

⁴⁴ “Lisbon Treaty, Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality,” *EU Official Journal*, C 306/150 of 17 December 2007.

⁴⁵ *Meeting of Ministers of the Salzburg Forum 12–13 July 2007, Joint Declaration, Innsbruck, 13 July 2007*, www.mswia.gov.pl.

⁴⁶ *Spotkanie ministrów SiSone4ALL w Warszawie, 28 maja 2007 r. Wspólna deklaracja ministrów*, 28 May 2008, www.mswia.gov.pl.

discussed the possibility of establishing a EU battle group from the Visegrad countries by 2015. According to Prime Ministers Kaczyński and Topolánek, the plan is to reflect the “political power of the Group.”⁴⁷ An invitation to participate in the undertaking is also to be extended to Ukraine (Poland proposed that Ukraine be a permanent participant in the meetings of V4 chiefs of staff). During the ministers’ meeting on 12 April in Bratislava, participants “welcomed the discussion” on the possibility of establishing a V4 Battle Group,⁴⁸ but progress in this direction went no further than the conceptual preparation phase before the end of the year. Quadrilateral consultations of experts also took place on issues such as the modernisation of armaments, transformation of the military forces, and participation in international missions.

In 2007, the ministers of agriculture held consultations on the future of the EU Common Agricultural Policy as well as on current issues: milk production limits, reform of viniculture and of the sugar industry. At the end of May, during a meeting in Slovakia, an understanding was also reached on the joint filing of a complaint to the European Court of Justice against the European Commission regarding the manner of imposing penalties for the excessive food reserves amassed before accession to the EU.⁴⁹ The Common Agricultural Policy was also discussed during the meeting of the ministers of V4 countries as well as Romania and Bulgaria. The Ministers of Transport dealt with, among other issues, the development of road infrastructure within the network of Pan-European Transport Corridors. The Ministers of the Environment issued a joint statement on the waste directive.⁵⁰ The Ministers of Regional Development of the V4, Romania and Bulgaria discussed the renewal of cities, particularly the housing developments built of prefabricated concrete slabs, popular in Central Europe.⁵¹ In December 2006, the ministers unsuccessfully appealed to the European Commission to exclude the housing industry from limitations arising from public assistance rules. The states went on to declare that efforts should be harmonised to finance the rehabilitation of housing developments and buildings made of prefabricated concrete slabs from the European Regional Development

⁴⁷ J. Kaczyński, M. Topolánek, *Polak, Czech...*

⁴⁸ *Joint Communiqué of the Ministers of Defence of the Visegrad Group Countries, Bratislava, 12 April 2007*, www.visegradgroup.eu.

⁴⁹ *Spor o oštiepok je zo stola, V4 plánuje žalobu na Komisiu*, 5 June 2007, www.euractiv.sk.

⁵⁰ *Meeting of the V4 Ministers of Environment, Prague, 24–25 May 2007*, www.visegradgroup.eu.

⁵¹ *Conference of the V4 Ministers of Regional Cooperation and their Counterparts from Bulgaria and Romania (Conclusions), Sliac, 25–26 June 2007*, www.visegradgroup.eu.

Fund. In the cooperation of ministries responsible for tourism the most important role was played by the joint promotion of the region in other states, mostly in the Far East.⁵² Meetings were also held among ministers of justice,⁵³ and representatives of central agencies, including the heads of supreme auditing institutions.⁵⁴

During the two meetings of the ministers of culture (on 10–12 January in Budapest and on 27–28 September in Bratislava) the publishing project of the Visegrad Library was discussed. In January, Poland obtained a favourable opinion of the ministers on the candidature of Wrocław as the organiser of Expo 2012. On Poland's initiative, a project to establish a work group was adopted for researching the influence of social and economic transformations on the cultural heritage of the V4 states.

A specific area of the Visegrad cooperation is its inter-personal dimension, somewhat loftily referred to as the creation of the Central European Visegrad identity. An important administrative role in this area is played by the International Visegrad Fund. For the eighth year in a row, its resources have been used to finance cultural, science and research, academic, youth exchange, trans-border cooperation, and tourism promotion projects. Increasing the budget of the Fund from €3.2 to 5 million in 2007 (€1.25 million from each Member State) made it possible to provide a larger number of grants and scholarships (from 68 to 171). It is worthwhile to note that almost 9% of the funds were granted to beneficiaries from Ukraine, and with 73 grants for Ukrainian students, the Fund is one of the largest donor institutions involved in Ukraine.⁵⁵

Polish-Czech Relations

In an article co-authored by Jarosław Kaczyński and Mirek Topolánek, the two prime ministers wrote that “Polish-Czech relations are going through the best period in the modern history of the two states and nations.”⁵⁶ There is no exaggerated courtesy in this statement. The political, economic, cultural and

⁵² *Spotkanie ministrów odpowiedzialnych za turystykę w krajach Grupy Wyszehradzkiej*, 2 April 2007, www.mg.gov.pl.

⁵³ *Meeting of the V4 Ministers of Justice, Hévíz, 8–10 March 2007*, www.visegradgroup.eu.

⁵⁴ *V4+2 Meeting of the Heads of the Supreme Audit Institutions Ended, 16 October 2007*, www.rs-rs.si.

⁵⁵ *Visegrad Fund. 2007 Annual Report (Guideline to 2008 Programs)*, pp. 8–10, www.visegradfund.org.

⁵⁶ J. Kaczyński, M. Topolánek, *Polak, Czech...*

social relations of the two states were developing in an excellently, and the two countries were important partners for each other, although the existing potential was not fully used.

The **political relations** between the two countries were influenced by the convergent standpoints of the Polish and Czech political right on fundamental issues concerning European integration and transatlantic relations. Although in his policy statement the Czech Prime Minister did not mention Poland or Central European regional cooperation, his government devoted considerable attention to this dimension of foreign policy. Prime Minister Topolánek, and particularly the Prime Minister for European Affairs, Alexandr Vondra (a former Polish-Czech Solidarity activist), clearly demonstrated their friendly attitude towards Poland. The close relations between the two countries were reflected by the frequency of high-level political meetings. Presidents Lech Kaczyński and Mirek Topolánek demonstrated their similarity of views about various problems of international politics during the visit of the Czech president to Poland on 25 January 2007. In February 2007, Prime Ministers Jarosław Kaczyński and Mirek Topolánek voiced reservations about “reviving” the Constitutional Treaty and agreed that they would probably respond positively to the American proposal concerning the deployment of an anti-missile shield in the respective countries. The July visit of President Václav Klaus to Poland was a demonstration of the exceptionally good relations between the two countries. On this occasion, Klaus published an article entitled “Poland Is Our Important Ally,” in which he referred to Polish-Czech relations as above standard. He stated that “the Czech and Polish voice is audible in discussions concerning fundamental issues of international and European politics.”⁵⁷

The Czech Republic was Poland's main ally in its efforts aimed at institutional reform in the European Union. It supported Poland's proposed changes to the voting system as “better and more just” than the double majority system provided by the Treaty. Prime Minister Topolánek declared that he would do everything in his power to prevent the isolation of Poland, but in the course of coalition negotiations, he did not obtain support for a possible adherence to the Polish veto.⁵⁸ In contacts with the German presidency, Czech politicians tried to play the role of an intermediary with a friendly attitude towards

⁵⁷ V. Klaus, “Polsko je naším důležitým spojencem,” *Lidové noviny* of 10 July 2007.

⁵⁸ M. Topolánek, “Poprzemy pierwiastek, ale nie chcemy za niego umierać,” *Dziennik* of 21 June 2007.

Poland.⁵⁹ At a critical moment of the talks during the summit, the Czech Republic and Lithuania (joined by Portugal) objected to the German proposal of adopting the mandate for the Intergovernmental Conference without the consent of Poland. Although a convergence between the Polish and Czech standpoints existed on issues of institutional reform, preserving the open character of the EU or strengthening its eastern dimensions, there were also certain signals (other than objective reasons) that some EU issues, particularly the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy and the formulation of the EU budget, will be viewed differently by the two countries in the future. Prime Minister Topolánek indicated the place of the Czech Republic in these discussions: “the EU is clearly beginning divide into states that drain it and states interested in greater liberalisation and freedom. The Czech Republic belongs naturally to the second group, along with countries such as Great Britain and Denmark.”⁶⁰ By the time the next EU budget will be drawn up, the Czech Republic will most probably be one of the net payer countries, unlike Poland, which—as a EU budget beneficiary—will be more interested in that budget’s size and its cohesive role.

Both countries informed each other on negotiations conducted with the Americans about the deployment of the anti-missile shield system, although—in spite of the declared intention to deepen cooperation—their actions were not coordinated. The two countries adopted a somewhat different negotiation tactic. The Czech Republic presented a more modest package of demands, and during the talks with the US it refrained from publicising differences of standpoints and declared its readiness to come to an understanding. It did state, however, that the agreement with the USA would only be submitted to the Parliament when the understanding concerning the anti-missile base was reached with Poland.⁶¹ Poland also originally spoke of the negotiations as a foregone success, but it gave up such rhetoric after the change of government. Although the negotiation strategies of the two states drifted apart, the Czechs offered Poland closer cooperation and Prime Minister Tusk declared, during the summit of the V4 in December, that Poland wanted to coordinate discussions regarding the deployment of elements of the American shield with the Czechs.⁶² During Donald

⁵⁹ See L. Jesień and B. Wojna (eds.), “The Status of the Debate on Institutional Reform in European Union Member States (update—July 2007),” *PISM Research Papers*, October 2007, p. 60.

⁶⁰ *Lidové noviny* of 11 July 2007. Quoted after: M. Kořan, *op.cit.*, p. 141.

⁶¹ T. Pojar, “Vyjednáváme z pozice sebevědomého státu,” *Listy ODS*, 2007, no. 3, p. 16.

⁶² *Premier: Grupa Wyszehradzka powinna budować relacje ze wschodnimi sąsiadami UE*, 10 December 2007, www.kprm.gov.pl.

Tusk's visit to Prague on 10 January 2008, both prime ministers announced that the Czech Republic and Poland should agree on "as many issues regarding the installation as possible" and that their consent to placing the shield elements in Poland and the Czech Republic would be conditional upon the expectations of the two states being met. Tusk met with "complete understanding" on the part of the Czech prime minister and president with regard to Poland's conditions for the deployment of elements of the anti-missile shield.⁶³

The lively contacts of both country's presidents and prime ministers were not reflected by equally intense contacts of their foreign ministers. Besides the V4 meeting in Štiřín, Anna Fotyga did not visit the Czech Republic once. Working and expert consultations between the Polish and Czech foreign ministries took place at a lower level than the Czech consultations with the remaining V4 states. The need to intensify day-to-day exchange of information was increasingly clear, however, and it could not be replaced by meetings on the Group forum or bilateral meetings at the highest level. This situation worsened during the electoral campaign in Poland. A certain revival was noted after the formation of the new government. At the end of the year, an agreement on the cooperation of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs was signed, at the initiative of the Czech ministry.

The shortcomings of day-to-day cooperation between the foreign ministries most probably affected also the manner in which the matter of one of the Polish schools in the Zaolzie area was resolved. The local government's hasty decision, taken on 27 February, to close the school, justified by a falling number of students, led to discontent on the part of the Polish minority in the Czech Republic. The good climate of relations between the two countries helped alleviate tensions, but not without the intervention of the highest Polish authorities.⁶⁴ Representatives of the Czech government managed to convince the Třinec town council to change their decision. Prime Minister Topolánek pledged that the ministry of education would take their decisions regarding Polish schools in consultation with representatives of the Polish minority.⁶⁵ The exclusively

⁶³ PAP dispatch of 10 January 2008.

⁶⁴ *Planowana likwidacja szkoły polskiej w Trzyńcu—list prezesa rady ministrów do premiera Republiki Czeskiej*, 10 April 2007, www.polonia.premier.gov.pl.

⁶⁵ The future of the school will depend on the number of pupils enrolled to the first grade. See *Odroczenie decyzji o likwidacji szkoły polskiej w Trzyńcu*, 4 września 2007, www.polonia.premier.gov.pl. See also Biuletyn no. 2192/V (Komisja Łączności z Polakami za Granicą, nr 31), 4 July 2007, www.sejm.gov.pl.

economic grounds for the dispute were also stressed by President Klaus in the Polish senate.

In 2007, after almost 50 years, a breakthrough took place in the resolution of the so-called territorial debt problem, i.e., the necessity for the Czechs to transfer 370 hectares to Poland.⁶⁶ Until February 2007, the decision in force, taken by Kaczyński's centre-right government, provided only for financial compensation. It is only during the meeting of ministers of internal affairs on the occasion of Prime Minister Topolánek's journey to Poland in February 2007, that an understanding was reached on repayment of the debt by transfers of land.⁶⁷ An opportunity thus arose to make some corrections to the course of certain stretches of boundary so as to eliminate the difficulties encountered by a number of farmers in the Racibórz powiat, who owned land on the Czech side of the border. During the meeting of foreign ministry representatives of both countries on 26 November 2007 the Czech party suggested the return of the land in two stages: 132 hectares in the first and the second was to be defined later. Poland preferred the return in a single stage.⁶⁸

Economic relations were characterized by dynamic expansion.⁶⁹ From 2004, trade had grown almost twofold and the Czech Republic became one of the five most important Polish trade partners in the EU (with a share of 6%, the Czech Republic is preceded only Germany, Italy, France and Great Britain). Poland, in turn, is the Czech Republic's third most important trade partner (following Germany and Slovakia with a share of 5.9%). In 2007, this growth continued. Overall trade amounted to €9.68 billion, which is a 15.4% increase in

⁶⁶ Pursuant to the agreement between Poland and the Czechoslovakia on the ultimate establishment of the state border of 13 June 1958, in order to "straighten" the border in the field (it was made shorter by 80 kilometres) Poland transferred approximately 1205 hectares to Czechoslovakia and obtained about 838 hectares of land in return. The difference, referred to as the territorial debt, amounted to approximately 370 hectares.

⁶⁷ M. Kořan, *op.cit.*, pp. 144–145. Cf. *Spotkanie Ministra SWiA Janusza Kaczmarskiego z Ministrem SW Republiki Czeskiej Ivanem Langerem*, 20 February 2007, www.mswia.gov.pl.

⁶⁸ See the parliamentary question of H. Siedlaczek, MP on the course of the Polish-Czech state border in the area of Rudyszwałd, the Krzyżanowice commune in the Silesia province (announced during the 8th session of 7 February 2008) and the response of the undersecretary of state in the Ministry of Interior and Administration, Piotr Stachańczyk (announced at the 11th session of 27 March 2008), www.sejm.gov.pl.

⁶⁹ Based on the note of the Trade and Investment Promotion Section in Prague, entitled "General characteristics of the level and dynamics of the bilateral economic relations of the Czech Republic with Poland."

comparison with 2006, with a positive balance of €1.46 billion.⁷⁰ In Polish exports to the Czech Republic, highly processed goods account for an increasingly high volume,⁷¹ along with general consumption products, particularly of the clothing, footwear, furniture, household appliances, food processing, and construction industries. These products have achieved a very high competitive position on the Czech market. On the other hand, Czech exports to Poland are dominated by products of the automotive industry.

In 2007, there was a considerable influx of Polish investments in the Czech Republic. According to data of the Czech National Bank, in the previous year they amounted to over €250 million,⁷² and were made mainly in the IT sector and in retail trade.⁷³ For the first time, the cumulative value of the Polish investments in the Czech Republic exceeded one billion euro.⁷⁴ On the other hand, the cumulative value of Czech investments in Poland amounts to approximately €600 million, and the greater part of this amount was represented by acquisitions of the Czech ČEZ concern in 2006.⁷⁵ This concern was interested in further investments in the Polish energy sector, but the privatisation processes in Poland was halted. Similarly, the number of Poles taking-up employment in the Czech Republic increased, as that country struggles with labour shortages in certain areas (e.g. the automotive industry, and mining). In 2007, the number of Poles working in the Czech Republic came to over 23,000.⁷⁶

The Polish-Czech **trans-border cooperation** is one of the most developed in Central Europe. The very long border between the two countries also influences the diversity of this cooperation. In 2007, the two countries entered the

⁷⁰ Polish exports amounted to €5.57 billion (an increase of 14.2%) and imports to €4.11 billion (an increase of 16.9%). In 2006 the balance amounted to €1.35 billion.

⁷¹ In 2007 the export of electrical machinery increased by 21.9% and accounted for 25.2% of total Polish exports to the Czech Republic (an increase of almost 2% as compared with 2006).

⁷² *Přímé zahraniční investice do ČR za rok 2007*, www.cnb.cz.

⁷³ Major Polish investments in 2007 included the purchase of the chemical company Kaučuk a.s. in Kralupy on the Vltava (for €195 million) by Dwory Oświęcim (presently Synthos), the purchase of an IT company AT Computers Holding a.s. by AB S.A. (for €30 million) and the takeover of the Czech IT leader PVT a.s. company by Asseco Poland and the launch of the Internet mBank on the Czech market.

⁷⁴ Including investments made by Polish capital entities operating outside of Poland.

⁷⁵ In May 2006, the ČEZ concern took over the PSEG Elcho Power and Heating Plant and the Skawina Power Plant from the American company PSEG, for approximately €390 million.

⁷⁶ See *4 lata członkostwa Polski w UE. Bilans korzyści i kosztów społeczno-gospodarczych związanych z członkostwem w Unii Europejskiej*, www.ukie.gov.pl/raport2008.

Schengen area. The importance of this event was reflected by the participation of the Polish and Czech prime ministers and the President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso in the celebration at the border crossing of Porajów-Hrádek nad Nisou on 21 December. Within the framework of the measures coordinated by the Polish-Czech Intergovernmental Commission for Trans-border Cooperation, the work of the Interreg IIIA Czech Republic-Poland 2004–2006 Community Initiative Programme was finalized and preparations were made for the implementation of the Polish-Czech Trans-border Co-operation Operational Programme 2007–2013 (€219 million), adopted by the European Commission on 11 December 2007. In connection with the lifting of border controls, an understanding on joint patrolling of border areas was signed on 17 December between the police and the border guards of both countries.⁷⁷

In **social and cultural relations**,⁷⁸ in spite of a certain asymmetry, a positive evolution was observed. The Czech media showed considerable interest in Polish political developments, but this resulted primarily from the emotions generated by the government of PiS and their coalition partners. In Poland, Czech culture is consistently popular, whereas the presence of the Polish culture in the Czech Republic, in spite of the two countries' geographical and linguistic closeness—continued to remain the domain of connoisseurs. However, a growing interest of Czech publishers in Polish modern literature was noted. The translations of books by Dorota Masłowska, Michał Witkowski, Jerzy Pilch, Olga Tokarczuk and Andrzej Stasiuk were published. Polish classical music was present in the Czech Republic to a greater extent. Polish cultural institutions performed a rich programme within the context of the Szymanowski Year, including the staging of the opera *King Roger* in the National Philharmonic Hall in Prague. The reactivation of the Chopin Festival in Mariánské Lázně, in cooperation of the Polish Institute, in Prague was also a success.

Polish culture was also successfully promoted in the Czech Republic thanks to the involvement of the Polish provinces. The Polish-Czech exhibition “Silesia—a Jewel in the Czech Crown,” devoted to the art of Lower Silesia from the Middle Ages to the 18th century and the place of Silesia in the history of Czech culture was most successful. It lasted for 6 months and attracted 40,000 visitors.

⁷⁷ *Podpisanie porozumienia o wspólnych patrolach*, 18 December 2007, www.mswia.gov.pl.

⁷⁸ This fragment was written on the basis of a note by Maciej Ruczaj from the Polish Institute in Prague.

The traditionally important role in the animation of the cultural cooperation is played by the towns of Cieszyn and Český Těšín, where the film review “Cinema on the Border” and the “No Borders” theatre festival were organised under the auspices of the Polish-Czech-Slovak Solidarity Association. Czech interest in recent Polish history also grew, with special attention devoted to the Katyń tragedy. The film by Andrzej Wajda earned many favourable reviews and a book on the Katyń massacre by Paul Allen was published, leading to many articles on the issue. The Czech media presented the problems of post-communism and vetting in Poland, particularly with regard to the numerous parallels connected with the emergence of the Czech equivalent of the Polish Institute of National Remembrance—the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes.

A problem remaining to be solved is the personnel, conceptual, and financial weakness of Polish philological studies in the Czech Republic. Efforts to restore the accreditation to the Polish studies at Charles University were only successful in 2007, although only at the BA level. Efforts to further academic and scientific cooperation include the actions of the Polish-Czech Scientific Society, established in May 2007 in Wrocław. At the end of the year the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed the interesting initiative of creating the Polish-Czech Forum, which would be a dialogue platform for academic milieus, NGOs and persons interested in the Polish-Czech cooperation.⁷⁹

An important role in the development of social and cultural contacts is played by the Polish minority. For the Polish community in the Zaolzie area, the implementation of the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages on 1 March 2007 was of considerable importance. Its provisions mean that in 31 towns and villages of the Zaolzie area, Polish can be used in an official capacity, including the use of bilingual place names. By the end of 2007, 10 communes made use of this opportunity. In his New Year address, the Polish president for the first time mentioned Poles in the Zaolzie area in his wishes, which was received as a symbolic expression of the growing interest of the Republic of Poland in contacts between the Polish minority and their motherland.

Polish-Slovak Relations

During his visit in Warsaw on 5 October 2006, Prime Minister Róbert Fico described Polish-Slovak relations as “above standard,” which was surprising,

⁷⁹ M. Kořan, *op.cit.*, p. 145.

inasmuch as the phrase had been “reserved” for Polish-Czech relations. Still, diplomatic contacts were scarce: throughout the year, the foreign ministers did not meet even once and no consultations at the deputy-ministerial level were held either. Moreover, the president of the Republic of Poland in January decided on an early recall of the Polish ambassador.⁸⁰

The low intensity of the political communication was probably the result of a lack of any major disputes in bilateral relations in the strict sense. Both countries were aware of the differences in their views on the European integration process, the shape of transatlantic relations and relations with Russia. Slovakia generated contradictory opinions on the subject of deploying elements of the American anti-missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. The Foreign Minister Ján Kubiš believed that it would serve the security of the whole transatlantic community, including Central Europe, whereas Prime Minister Fico shared the views of Russia and declared that he would never consent to having the elements of the shield placed in Slovakia. Although during his visit in Moscow Fico spoke on the issue in one voice with president Putin, Prime Minister Kaczyński did not cancel his visit to Bratislava.⁸¹ He reminded his hosts that the placing of the shield in Poland depended solely on Polish-American decisions, but assured his hosts that Poland wished to inform Slovakia about the preparations and Poland’s participation in the realization of the shield project. Commenting on differences in opinions, particularly with regard to relations with Russia, he expressed his hope that they would not impede good Polish-Slovak cooperation. He also stated his understanding for Slovakia’s cool position on the issue of the possible proclamation of Kosovo’s independence.⁸²

Although Slovakia was a passive participant of the negotiations on the EU institutional reform, it criticised Poland’s policy fiercely.⁸³ At the same time, however, it sent signals indicating its desire to maintain good neighbourly relations. The Prime Minister of Slovakia supported the candidature of Wrocław for the organisation of the Expo exhibition in 2012. Presidents Lech Kaczyński and Ivan

⁸⁰ The president of the Republic of Poland decided to recall Ambassador Zenon Kosiniak-Kamysz on 31 March (*Monitor Polski*, no. 5, item 5), but he ended his mission in Slovakia only on 30 June.

⁸¹ The decision came as a positive surprise to some Slovak commentators, see, for example, P. Schutz, “Deň a noc,” *Sme* of 12 May 2007.

⁸² *Prezident SR prijal poľského premiéra Jaroslava Kaczyňského, 11 máj 2007*, www.prezident.sk.

⁸³ See, for example, the statement of Deputy Prime Minister Dušan Čaplovič, “Hovorím, čo mám v duši,” *Týždeň* of 23 July 2007, p. 26.

Gašparovič also maintained good relations. At the beginning of December 2007, in Tatranská Javorina, the two presidents held an informal meeting and emphasised the need to increase cooperation between the two countries, also within the Visegrad Group. Speaking on the potential for Polish-Slovak cooperation, President Kaczyński stressed that it was not burdened by any historical disputes.⁸⁴

During the meeting of prime ministers of the Visegrad Group in Ostrava, Prime Ministers Fico and Tusk held talks, during which the Slovak Prime Minister said that his country acknowledged Poland's being—due to its size—the leader in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in the V4. In his opinion the weight of the common voice of the V4 in Europe is considerable and, consequently, the V4 states should try to reach a consensus in those European issues where this is possible.⁸⁵

Another topic of high-level talks was the improvement of the infrastructure and transport connections between the two countries. Although another understanding on the construction of the Žyľina–Skalité highway and the Bielsko-Biała–Zwardoń expressway was signed in February, during the visit of the Slovak Minister of Transport in Poland, it is difficult to talk of any fundamental work progress, and the many years of delays affected mutual trust and the parties' determination in the realization of this project.

Polish-Slovak cooperation is one of the most fruitful within the framework of the Interreg IIIA Community Initiative Programme, but in 2007, the scale of needs exceeded the financial resources of the programme. The EU budget of 2007–2013 financed Polish-Slovak Trans-border Co-operation Operational Programme, amounting to €157 million.⁸⁶

The year 2007 was a time of rapid growth of in **economic relations**.⁸⁷ This resulted from Slovakia's record economic growth, exceeding 10% of GDP. According to data of the Slovak Statistical Office, Slovak foreign trade was 22.4% higher than it had been in 2006 and amounted to €84.7 billion.⁸⁸ Trade

⁸⁴ *Spotkanie Prezydentów Polski i Słowacji*, 3 December 2007, www.polskevelvyslanectvo.sk.

⁸⁵ *Informácia o priebehu a výsledkoch summitu...*

⁸⁶ *Protokół z XII posiedzenia Polsko-Słowackiej Komisji ds. Współpracy Transgranicznej* (Bardejovské Kúpele, 2–3 July 2007), www.mswia.gov.pl.

⁸⁷ This fragment was written on the basis of information obtained from Milan Wenit from the Commercial and Economic Department of the Polish Embassy in Prague.

⁸⁸ The value of exports increased by 27.1% and amounted to €42.1 billion, whereas the value of imports rose by 21.6% and came to €42.7 billion. Slovakia's trade deficit decreased three-fold as compared with 2006 and amounted to €633 million.

with Poland accounted for 4.42 billion euro, which meant a 22.5% increase compared with the previous year. For Slovakia, Poland was the sixth trade partner with an approximately 5% share of overall turnover, whereas Slovakia is Poland's eleventh trade partner with a 2% share of overall turnover. For Slovakia, Poland is an important export market, accounting for 6.2% of Slovak exports in 2006, which made it the sixth largest recipient of Slovak goods.⁸⁹ The value of the Slovak exports to Poland amounted to €2.61 billion, a 27.7% increase, whereas the corresponding import figures were €1.8 billion and 15.8%, respectively. However, for several years now, Slovak data has differed from that of the Polish Central Statistical Office, according to which, in 2007, the Polish exports to Slovakia amounted to €2.16 billion (an increase of 18%) and imports to €2.15 billion (an increase of 21%).

The largest turnover is noted in the electrical machinery and metallurgical products, with the share of agricultural and food products growing rapidly for several years, mainly due to the stagnation of the Slovak agricultural sector and the competitiveness of Polish products. Thanks to the boom in the Slovak construction industry, the share of construction materials in Polish exports increased. Another favourable phenomenon is the growing interest of Polish entrepreneurs in investing in Slovakia. Internet mBank (owned by BRE Bank) and Merkury Market were among the largest Polish investors in Slovakia in 2007. Slovak investments in Poland include the grocery market chain Żabka, purchased by the Slovak-Czech capital group Penta for over €130 million and the takeover of the cable network operator Stream.

In **social and cultural relations**, an important role is played by embassies and cultural institutes. The embassy of the Republic of Poland in Bratislava organised a number of promotional events (including journalist workshops, discussions among historians), with the aim of improving the quality of Poland's image and Polish-Slovak relations in the Slovak media.⁹⁰ In turn, Slovak institutions in Poland organized a cycle of cultural events entitled "Slovakia in Polish Cities," using a network of honorary consulates.

Certain emotions were stirred up in connection with the commemoration of Józef Kuraś (*nom de guerre* "Ogień"), a monument to whom was unveiled in August 2006 in Zakopane in the presence of President Kaczyński. In the opinion

⁸⁹ After Germany (21.5%), the Czech Republic (12.4%), France (6.8%) and Italy (6.4%).

⁹⁰ B. Wrzochalski, "Polsko-Slovensko: čo fascinuje a spája," *Pol'sko—náš sused a hospodársky partner* (a supplement to the *Hospodárske noviny* daily) November 2007, pp. 14–15.

of the activists of the Slovak minority in Poland, Kuraś did not deserve state honours because, among other reasons, he persecuted Slovaks in the Spisz and Orava regions. The issue was not publicized, but nevertheless raised during the visit of Deputy Prime Minister Dušan Čaplovič, who visited Poland at the invitation of the Council for the Protection of Memory of Combat and Martyrdom.⁹¹ In response to the emotional reactions President Gašparovič, in a letter to the Association of Slovaks in Poland dated 29 June, described the matter of “Ogień” as a “delicate issue, which has long burdened the well-developing mutual Polish-Slovak relations.”

Polish-Hungarian Relations

Political relations with Hungary in 2007 can best be described as cool correctness, although in the context of the tradition of friendship between the two countries, the term crisis would be more apt. The post-communists in power in Hungary did not conceal their negative view of political developments in Poland under the PiS-led government or of Polish policy on the EU forum. In turn, the government in Warsaw openly declared that it was hoping for the swiftest possible change of government in Hungary. Not a single meeting of prime ministers took place, although the presidents maintained good relations. In March, President László Sólyom paid a three-day visit to Poland. He met with President Lech Kaczyński and Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński, along with whom he expressed his support for an open perspective for Ukraine in the European Union and NATO and for reinforcing Visegrad cooperation. A symbolic reference to the tradition of brotherly relations between the two nations was made when both parliaments adopted resolutions establishing 23 March as the day of the Polish-Hungarian friendship.

As we have seen above, differences of opinion regarding institutional reform in the EU led to certain tensions between Poland and Hungary on the Visegrad Group forum. Along with some other countries (Spain, Italy, Portugal, Belgium and Luxemburg), Hungary actively opposed concessions towards critics of the Constitutional Treaty. They criticised the Polish proposal of the voting system especially sharply. During the European Council summit Prime Minister Gyurcsány rejected the Polish rhetoric of the “historical rebate” and emphasised that a possible Polish veto would harm not so much an “abstract EU,” but specific countries, such as, for example, Hungary.⁹²

⁹¹ *Spotkanie z Wicepremierem Republiki Słowackiej*, 22 January 2007, www.mswia.gov.pl.

⁹² PAP dispatch of 21 June 2007, quoted after *Handelsblatt* (online) and APA.

After the elections in Poland symptoms of a possible thaw were observed. At the end of 2008, Prime Minister Tusk met with Prime Minister Gyurcsány at an informal lunch.⁹³

Signs of stagnation were visible in **economic relations**.⁹⁴ In 2007, Hungary was Poland's eighth trade partner—the fifth in the EU, after Germany, Austria, Italy and France. According to the data of the Polish Central Statistical Office, the overall trade with Hungary amounted to €5.45 billion. However, Polish exports, after two years of a high growth (over 30% a year) dropped to less than 10%. The positive trade balance decreased, although it remained important (417.6 million euro). Poland is Hungary's second supplier of food (after Germany). However, simple export growth reserves, resulting from the elimination of customs and administrative barriers following EU accession, have been exhausted while the appreciation of the zloty and growing domestic demand in Poland have also contributed to the existing situation. Other factors of importance included Hungary's unfavourable economic situation and drop in real earnings, which adversely affected import levels of entire groups of goods. In 2007, the Hungarian economy grew at a rate of approximately 1.3%, the lowest in a decade. Over the year, the structure of Polish exports to Hungary changed—the share of machines, equipment and vehicles increased decisively. For the first time in many years, a drop was noted in several groups of goods: the value of exported livestock, metals and mineral products decreased by 16%, 6.5%, and 15.8%, respectively. Poland's principal imports from Hungary are machines and equipment, vehicles and their parts, and synthetics. Among Polish investments in Hungary, the most publicized was the opening in Budapest of the first overseas office of Echo Investment, which became one of the largest investors in the Hungarian capital.

The traditionally good **social and cultural contacts** were not particularly intense in 2007 as compared even with the previous year, which abounded in ambitious enterprises connected with the commemoration of the events of 1956. One of the main cultural events was the “Pole, Hungarian ...” exhibition organized within the “Our Neighbours—a New View” cycle, opened on 3 December 2007 at the National Library in Warsaw. An interesting local initiative involved the journey of a special train from Krosno to Sáropatak, and which was supposed to be the harbinger of the “Retro Portius Express Train” Polish-Slovak-Hungarian rail line.⁹⁵

⁹³ *Spotkanie premierów Polski i Węgier*, 31 January 2008, www.kprm.gov.pl.

⁹⁴ This fragment was written on the basis of information from the Trade and Investment Promotion Section of the Polish Embassy in Budapest, www.wphi.hu.

⁹⁵ *Kolej na przyjaźń Krosna z Sáropatak*, 18 July 2007, www.fakty.interia.pl.

On the other hand, some discord could be observed on historical issues. Hungary, under the center-left government, did not show any "regional empathy" in their attitude to the post-war resettlement of Germans, something that caused some friction in Polish-Hungarian relations. In November, the Budapest conference commemorating the exodus of the Hungarian Germans was attended by, among other people, the president of the Expellees' Association Epellees, Ericha Steinbach. The Speaker of the Hungarian parliament, the socialist Katalin Szili, who once again condemned the legal grounds for the expulsions, received a Expellees' Association decoration from Steinbach.

Assessments

In spite of relatively unfavourable political circumstances and the deepening differences in the opinions of Visegrad countries on important issues of European integration and transatlantic relations, the multilateral cooperation within the Visegrad Group continued to grow. The Group remained an important platform for consultations and, to a lesser extent, for decision taking. The cooperation in the area of the enlargement of the Schengen area had been good. Cooperation was also shown in the area of strengthening the eastern dimension of EU policy. On the other hand, the shifting of Balkan issues to the forum of the Regional Partnership undermined the comprehensive character of Visegrad cooperation with close neighbours, and thus limited the synergy effect of the regional cooperation, focussed on non-EU neighbours.

Poland declared its intention for greater involvement in decision taken by Visegrad states on common positions and for moving from consultations to joint action. In practice, however, it did not show great activeness to that end. On the issue of the Western Balkans, one of high priority for its partners, Poland remained passive. The role of Visegrad cooperation in Polish foreign policy 2007 increased in 2007, but mostly due to the Czech presidency in the Group. Visegrad cooperation was also to a large extent a surrogate for traditionally perceived bilateral relations. This phenomenon could be observed in Poland's relations with Slovakia, and especially with Hungary. The Group's achievements that were especially convergent with Polish preferences include the maintaining of cooperation with Ukraine, growing cooperation with the Baltic States, and efforts in activating the EU in matters of the eastern neighbourhood. Another field of success was the joint action of the V4 states concerning the entry to the Schengen area. In spite of general agreement on the need to shape a common EU energy policy, differences of standpoints in the matter of increasing energy security became more entrenched among the V4 states. It may be too early to

evaluate the infrastructure projects on the north-south axis (particularly in the road transportation network), but nevertheless their promotion by Poland improved the climate of Central European cooperation. Achieving other goals of the V4 which are in Poland's interest—e.g. establishing closer cooperation mechanisms on EU matters and better coordination of cooperation at the ministerial level—depends also on the manner in which Poland will continue and expand efforts in these areas during its presidency in the Group, which will begin in the middle of 2008.

In the Visegrad space, the most important role in Polish policy was played by the Czech Republic. It was Poland's close ally in the EU as well as an important transatlantic partner. The political and economic cooperation of the two countries also expanded dynamically and positive trends were observed in social and cultural contacts. This fact should also be an incentive for the permanent shift of political relations with the Czechs to a higher level, one corresponding to the increase of that country's role in the EU and its importance for Poland. There is much untapped potential for cooperation in this area.

Relations with Slovakia showed differences in political issues of importance for the European Union. Along with minor bilateral misunderstandings, this situation gave rise to questions about the true nature of the "above-standard" character of mutual relations, declared by both parties. However, the diversity of mutually beneficial ties between the two countries helped mitigate the existing differences. In general, Poland was right not to overstate problems and to seek benefits from growing cooperation instead.

Relations with Hungary cooled visibly. Poland seemed to await a better political environment in that country.

Polish foreign policy in the Visegrad Group clearly oscillated between the idealist assumption of "having natural allies in the region" and the realistic awareness of existing differences of interests. Showing disappointment in multilateral cooperation was successfully avoided, in contrast to earlier times, when cooperation had been only too often harmed by excessive expectations. The V4 states were close partners for Poland, with the Czech Republic as the most important among them. However, in the future Poland should devote more attention to improving consultation mechanisms in Central Europe, so as to mitigate the political costs of diverging positions, particularly in the EU forum. This would make it possible to formulate a community of interests and cooperate more effectively in areas where common denominators can be found.

Poland's Policy Regarding Lithuania

In 2007, Poland's policy regarding Lithuania was dominated by issues of energy security. Contentious questions, arising from historical and national minority issues, which affected mutual relations relatively strongly in the past, particularly in the 1990s, currently play a decreasing role. In spite of the difficulties and misunderstandings which still occur, in 2007 both countries tried to focus on specific initiatives that are meant to bring them tangible benefits and consolidate their position in their immediate area and in the European Union.

Background

Poland's internal situation had a substantial impact on its foreign policy in 2007. Misunderstandings and crises within the coalition government headed by Jarosław Kaczyński led to early elections in October. As a result, the Law and Justice party lost power to Civic Platform.

Prime Minister Kaczyński was a proponent of an offensive foreign policy in the service of Poland's national interests.¹ His attitude on the EU forum, particularly his position on institutional reform, led to disputes with other member states. This was most clearly visible at the European Union Council summit in June, when Polish reservations about the double majority voting system at the European Union Council led to a stalemate in the negotiations. The new Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, focused primarily on the need to change the style of Polish foreign policy. He emphasized that his government will pursue a policy of dialogue, taking into account the dignity and interests of other states.²

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¹ See *Europa solidarnych narodów: program polityki europejskiej Prawa i Sprawiedliwości*, www.sea.dmkhosting.com/seango/historia/2005/11.03.05/PIS.pdf; *Debate: Jarosław Kaczyński vs. Aleksander Kwaśniewski, 2 October 2007*, www.pis.org.pl/article.php?id=10068 (16.04.2008).

² See *Opening address of Prime Minister Donald Tusk, 23 November 2007*, www.premier.gov.pl/s.php?id=1389&path=10325 (08.01.2008); *Good foreign relations of Poland are this government's priority*, www.kprm.gov.pl/templates/admin/userfiles/files/1632_stenogram-korpus%20dyplomatyczny.pdf (16.04.2008).

Poland's policies in connection with Lithuania were also affected by the position of the Lithuanian authorities on cooperation with Poland. In July 2006, following the formation of Gediminas Kirkilas' government, the new Lithuanian prime minister chose Warsaw as his first foreign visit, thus indicating one of the primary directions of his foreign policy. The Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania, a Lithuanian party representing the interests of Poles, received a number of government positions in exchange for their support of Kirkilas: the prime minister's advisor for national minorities, deputy minister of foreign affairs, and advisor to the minister of the economy.³ The government's positive attitude as regards cooperation with Poland was in line with the policy President Valdas Adamkus had been promoting ever since the start of his first term in office in 1998.

An expression of Polish-Lithuanian cooperation is the concept of strategic partnership incorporated in a joint declaration signed by the presidents of Poland and Lithuania, Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Algirdas Brazauskas in 1997. The parties agreed then that the partnership would be sustained by consistent strengthening of bilateral relations and mutual support on the international stage, in line with the states' respective interests. Closer relations were seen as contributing to stability and security in Central Europe.⁴ Initially, the strategic partnership was to serve primarily for integration with European and Atlantic structures, but it was maintained after these objects had been reached by both parties.

After the accession of the two countries to NATO and the EU, a new conditions for cooperation emerged. Poland and Lithuania see the EU as an important plane for the pursuit of their political and economic interests, although their potential for independent action in this respect is limited. For this reason, they are making efforts to rally the states in their immediate neighborhood together on common challenges and this, in turn, reinforces their position in the Union and their security, and favours a more effective pursuit of their common interests.

Relations between Poland and Lithuania are largely determined by the convergence of their foreign policy aims, such as the development of an EU policy on energy that includes the principle of solidarity and the diversification of sources, suppliers, transmission routes, and energy resources. Russia's energy

³ Tadeusz Andrzejewski became the prime minister's advisor for ethnic minorities, Jarosław Niewierowicz became deputy minister of foreign affairs, and Beata Maluszyn became advisor to the minister of the economy.

⁴ "Wspólna deklaracja prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Prezydenta Republiki Litewskiej, 19 czerwca 1997," *Zbiór Dokumentów*, 1997, no. 2, www.zbiordokumentow.pl/1997/2/3.html (16.04.2008).

policy remains an important challenge and could negatively affect the internal and external situation of both countries. The construction of Russian pipeline projects that bypass Poland and Lithuania could pose an additional threat to the delivery of energy and to the countries' entire economies in the future. Therefore, both Poland and Lithuania are interested in shifting the contentious issues in their relations with Russia to a broader forum, particularly the European Union, and in offering a common response to attempts by a non-EU state to sow dissension among EU member states. Cooperation with Lithuania in the area of energy took on additional importance with the purchase of a Lithuanian refinery in Mažeikiai by PKN Orlen and after oil deliveries through the Druzhba pipeline were interrupted in 2006. The official reason for the suspension of deliveries was the pipeline's failure on the section leading to Mažeikiai. It has been suggested, however, that this was Russia's response to the purchase of the refinery by a Polish company.

Poland is also facing the necessity of reconciling growing demand for energy with environmental protection requirements, such as the obligation to limit greenhouse gas emissions. One solution to this problem could be the development of nuclear technology, an area in which the Lithuanians have already gained considerable experience.⁵ Lithuania, in turn, is interested in involving Poland in the construction of new reactors in Ignalina.

The construction of new reactors in Ignalina is also related to the project of an "energy bridge" between Lithuania and Poland, a project of particular interest for Lithuania. Currently, the Baltic Interconnected Power System, covering Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, is part of the UPS/IPS power system, connecting the states of the former Soviet Union. The Polish-Lithuanian energy bridge would be a section of the so-called Baltic ring, connecting the electrical power systems of the Baltic Sea states, and would allow the systems to be connected with the European UCTE electrical power system. This would create the possibility of delivering electrical power to Lithuania, and would be particularly important for all the Baltic States, especially in the years 2009–2015, the period between the shut-down of the old reactors in Ignalina and the start-up of the new ones, when there will be a serious energy shortage in this region. After the

⁵ See "Polityka energetyczna Polski do 2025 roku," *Przegląd Rządowy*, 2005, no. 1, pp. 94–141; *Polityka energetyczna Polski do 2030 roku, Projekt, wersja 3.2 z dn. 10.09.2007*, www.mg.gov.pl/NR/rdonlyres/8C3B84AA-C9EF-471A-9B33-A66E2C700CC0/37509/PEPwer3210092007.pdf (08.01.2008); "Skazani na atom? Rozmowa z dr. Mirosławem Dudą," *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 17 January 2007.

construction of the new nuclear power plant in Ignalina, a portion of the energy produced will be directed to north-eastern Poland.

The emergence of the “energy bridge” between Western Europe and the Baltic States would decrease their dependence on energy from Russia and increase their sense of security. The construction of this bridge was recognized by the European Union as a priority project within the framework of the Trans-European Energy Networks (TEN-E), since it would enable the creation of a common energy market. Poland and Lithuania also support the development of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T), above all the projects for transport connections between the two countries and the other Baltic states on the one hand and Central and Western Europe on the other. This applies especially to Via Baltica, Rail Baltica, and the route connecting Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary, as set forth in the Łańcut Declaration of 27 October 2006.

Poland can also count on Lithuania’s support for its policy with regard to Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus. Both countries are interested in a stable political and economic situation in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, in transformations in Belarus, and the inclusion of these countries in European policy. As a result, the two countries are taking steps aimed at supporting democratization and transformation processes. They are also trying, in this manner, to ensure the stability of countries on which their energy security may depend. The political crises in Ukraine and Georgia in 2007 were foreign policy challenges for Poland and Lithuania.

Objectives

Kaczyński’s government declared that it would pursue the interests of the state with determination, ensure good conditions for growth and strengthening of its position in Europe by means of steps taken on the EU, regional and bilateral planes. Lithuania was treated as Poland’s partner in international initiatives and bilateral projects. In 2007, its support was important for Poland in connection with the debate on EU institutional reform, on energy security, and on cooperation with Eastern European states.⁶

Poland attempted to change the structure of imported energy resources, sought new and stable sources of gas and oil as well as alternative energy

⁶ *Opening address of Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński, 19 July 2006, www.kprm.gov.pl/archiwum/1433_18017.htm (08.01.2008); Informacja rządu na temat polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2007 roku, www.msz.gov.pl/Expose,2007,10299.html (08.01.2008).*

sources, and also planned to develop its own delivery infrastructure and connect it with the infrastructure of other states.⁷ Poland was interested, among other things, in securing oil supplies from Central Asia and the Caspian Sea region using routes that by-passed Russia. To this end, it attempted to encourage interested states in the extension of the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline to Adamów and further, to Płock and Gdańsk. The interested states were Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan as producers and Ukraine and Georgia as transit countries. In the future, this pipeline could also supply oil to the refinery in Mažeikiai. Poland and Lithuania hoped that such joint undertakings would improve the energy situation across the region and, over time, might become part of the European Union's energy policy.⁸

The cooperation with Lithuania was important in connection with the above-mentioned plans to build new reactors at the nuclear power plant in Ignalina and because of the Polish-Lithuanian Olita-Ełk electrical power hook-up. Poland's participation in the project would ensure energy deliveries to the country from Ignalina, particularly to Poland's north-eastern regions, and would give Poland the chance to gain experience and to train its own personnel in nuclear energy.

Poland also emphasized that it was interested in carrying out the projects related to transportation infrastructure that have been planned by both parties for many years now, especially the construction of the Via Baltica road connection and the Rail Baltica railway line.

Poland's interests were also supposed to be served by its cooperation with Lithuania within the framework of the policy with regard to countries of Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus. The steps of the Polish authorities were aimed at the development of the European Neighborhood Policy and the further enlargement of the EU and NATO to include the states of Eastern Europe. Poland also made efforts to support the processes of transformation in those countries in a way that furthered democracy, a market economy, and pro-European policies, and to provide assistance in solving political crises.

A permanent feature of Poland's policy regarding Lithuania since the restoration of bilateral relations in 1991 is a desire to improve the situation of the

⁷ "Polityka energetyczna Polski do 2025 roku...;" *Polityka energetyczna Polski do 2030...*

⁸ *Informacja rządu...*; Interview with the President of Poland Lech Kaczyński and the President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus for TVP1 of 28 August 2007, www.prezydent.pl/x.node?id=12543132 (08.01.2008).

Polish minority in that country. Prime Minister Kaczyński's government attached considerable importance to helping Poles who, for various reasons, reside beyond Poland's borders, to maintain links with Poland, preserve their Polish culture, and protect their rights under international law and bilateral agreements. In 2007, the most important issues for Poles in Lithuania were respect for their rights as regards land restitution in the Vilnius region, that is, an area inhabited in large measure by Poles; support for Polish education, including higher education; and Lithuania's observance of its international law obligations concerning the right of national minorities to write their names using the alphabet and spelling of their mother tongue.⁹

The improvement of relations with all of Poland's partners, especially with its neighbors, has been Prime Minister Tusk's primary foreign policy objective. He announced the continuation of efforts in areas that had played an important role in the previous government's cooperation with Lithuania, such as the policy with regard to Central and Eastern European states, notably Ukraine and the states of the Southern Caucasus, and on European Union infrastructure projects, which could increase energy security in Poland and on the entire continent. In addition, while emphasizing the need to reinforce good relations with Lithuania and the other Baltic states he stated that he will strive to increase cooperation between these countries and the Visegrad Group.¹⁰

Bilateral Relations

Political relations. 2007 abounded in the mutual visits of Polish and Lithuanian politicians, particularly the presidents,¹¹ who attended, for instance, important national commemorative events: Lech Kaczyński visited Lithuania on 16 February in connection with the 89th anniversary of Lithuania's independence, while Valdas Adamkus attended the 89th anniversary of Poland's independence in November. On 21 December, both presidents met at the border

⁹ *Rządowy program współpracy z Polonią i Polakami za granicą*, www.msz.gov.pl/files/docs/polonia2007.pdf (08.01.2008).

¹⁰ See *Opening address of Prime Minister Donald Tusk...*; *Good foreign relations...*

¹¹ The Lithuanian president also visited Poland in January, August, October and November. The president of Poland, in turn, visited Lithuania in February and April. Both presidents also met on other occasions in broader forums, e.g., on subsequent conferences on energy cooperation in Krakow and Vilnius in May and October, at the GUAM summit in June and in Georgia in November.

crossing in Budzisk during ceremonies held to celebrate the accession of both countries to the Schengen area.

Intense discussions were also held between the prime ministers, ministers and parliamentarians. In June, the Council for Cooperation between the Governments of the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Lithuania, a consultative and advisory body, was revived.¹² Prime Minister Donald Tusk's selection of Vilnius for his first foreign visit was a symbolic gesture.

The two countries also cooperated on the European Union forum. Lithuania supported Poland on several occasions, for instance, regarding the veto on initiating discussions on the new partnership and cooperation agreement between the EU and Russia. Towards the end of February, Lithuania gave warning that it would adhere to the Polish veto should Russia fail to resume oil deliveries through the Druzhba pipeline. The use, or threat of using, the veto with respect to EU-Russian relations meant that Lithuania and Poland were perceived as allies on issues having to do with relations with Russia.

At the European Council summit meeting in July, President Adamkus actively brokered negotiations between President Kaczyński, German chancellor Angela Merkel, and French president Nicolas Sarkozy about the voting system in the Council of the European Union. When the German chancellor proposed the calling of an intergovernmental conference without the participation of Poland, Lithuania and the Czech Republic opposed the idea.

The Lithuanian government also endorsed the position of the Polish government on the construction of the Augustów bypass road through the Rospuda Valley and the bypass road around Wasilków in the vicinity of Białystok, in the Knyszyńska Wilderness. In October, at the request of Transport Minister Jerzy Polaczek, Lithuania supported Poland before the European Commission and the European Court of Justice.

Cooperation between Poland and Lithuania in 2007 focused primarily on joint energy projects, however. Efforts were still being undertaken to form an alliance between EU states opposing the construction of the Nordstream pipeline at the bottom of the Baltic Sea. In July, Minister of the Economy Piotr Woźniak announced the drafting, along with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, of a motion

¹² The Council was established in 1997. It was to contribute to a more efficient and effective cooperation and implementation of bilateral projects. The last meeting took place on 5 February 2001.

to the European Commission for a feasibility study to be conducted concerning a land pipeline that could be an alternative to the Baltic one.

Both countries were also engaged in initiatives for the import of energy resources from the Caspian Sea region. On 11–12 May, an energy summit organized in Cracow was attended by the presidents of Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, and by a representative from Kazakhstan. The talks revolved mainly around possibilities of oil supplies from the Caspian Sea region. In a Joint Declaration, the parties set the objective of creating conditions for energy delivery from the Caspian Sea region, facilitated by the construction of new delivery routes, particularly the Odessa–Brody–Płock–Gdańsk oil pipeline. It was also announced that an intergovernmental agreement would be drafted to set the share of states and companies in the project, and to appoint an intergovernmental work group to work out the details of setting up and operating a company responsible for common energy projects.¹³

This initiative was not intended to create a closed regional group, but rather to be a first step towards broader European energy cooperation and a common position on the issue.¹⁴ In addition, energy cooperation is closely related to Polish and Lithuanian policies regarding Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.¹⁵ The involvement of these countries in a European project would enable the strengthening of their ties to the European Union.

The topic of Azerbaijan oil supplies was also discussed at the June summit of the GUAM heads of states in Baku, with the presidents of Poland and Lithuania as honorary guests. The summit confirmed the member countries' interest in exporting Caspian oil through Georgia and the Black Sea to Odessa, and on by pipeline to Gdańsk.

Another energy summit, attended by the presidents of Lithuania, Poland, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine, was held on 10–11 October in Vilnius and ended with the signing of an agreement regarding cooperation on the Odessa–Brody–Gdańsk project. On the basis of this agreement, new shareholders were added to the Sarmatia Company. Next to UkrTransNafta of Ukraine and PERN

¹³ *Wspólna Deklaracja Prezydentów*, www.prezydent.pl/x.node?id=1011848&eventId=11027987 (08.01.2008).

¹⁴ "Nie tolerujemy monopolu Rosji," interview with President Valdas Adamkus, *Dziennik* of 14 May 2007; "Wygramy z Rosją w regionalnej grze," interview with Polish President Lech Kaczyński, *Dziennik* of 14 May 2007.

¹⁵ Interview with the President of Poland Lech Kaczyński and the President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus...

Przyjaźń of Poland, the Sarmatia company was joined by the SOCAR concern of Azerbaijan, GOGC of Georgia and Klaipėdos Nafta of Lithuania. Lithuania's share was initially set at 1%. Despite this, Vilnius became involved in the project as this could benefit the refinery in Mažeikiai.¹⁶ The consortium is supposed to prepare a feasibility study and continue with the realization of the project. Azerbaijan's president offered assurances that the Odessa-Brody-Gdańsk pipeline would be able to rely on Azerbaijan's crude oil resources.¹⁷

Poland and Lithuania also sought to resolve matters of dispute concerning the construction of the nuclear power plant in Ignalina and the Olita-Elk electrical power hook-up. On 2 March, the prime ministers of Poland and Lithuania, Jarosław Kaczyński and Gedyminas Kirkilas, signed a *communiqué* which expressed the two countries' intent to build jointly a nuclear power plant in Ignalina. The signing of a joint declaration by the prime ministers of Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Poland on the project was scheduled for 6 July. However, at the last moment Prime Minister Kaczyński cancelled his visit to Vilnius owing, it was stated, to the situation in the Polish health care sector. The media, however, reported that the reason was a law adopted in June by the Lithuanian parliament, in keeping with which Lithuania would have a 34% share in the project, while all other states would have 22% shares, despite the fact that the equal shares of the four states had been agreed upon in December 2006. In January, Lithuania had explained that it would have to shoulder more responsibility for the infrastructure and the security of the power plant, as the plant would be located on its territory, and consequently, it argued, it should have a greater share in the project.¹⁸ It was also stressed that this was necessary to obtain the approval of the International Atomic Energy Agency for the project.¹⁹

Poland primarily wanted to obtain guarantees of access to 1000–1200 MW of power, a quantity making the construction of the energy bridge project feasible for Warsaw.²⁰ This would not be the case, however, if access to power

¹⁶ A. Łakoma, "Sarmatia dla piątki," *Rzeczpospolita* of 27 September 2007.

¹⁷ A. Łakoma, R. Mickiewicz, "Koalicja na rzecz kaspijskiej ropy," *Rzeczpospolita* of 11 October 2007.

¹⁸ Interview with Prime Minister Gediminas Kirkilas for the radio *Šiniø radijas* on 4 January 2007, www.lrvk.lt/main.php?id=aktualijos_su_video/p.php&n=4233 (08.01.2008).

¹⁹ See A. Łakoma, "Atomowe porozumienie," *Rzeczpospolita* of 30 June 2007; R. Zasuń, E. Kuszlewicz, "Elektrownia w Ignalinie na razie bez Polski," *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 6 July 2007.

²⁰ Interview with the President of Poland Lech Kaczyński and the President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus...

were proportionate to the share in the project and if the entire power plant's output were to remain at 800–1600 MW.²¹ Lithuanian authorities, however, made the increase of the plant's output dependent on an environmental impact study drawn up to determine the total output for the new plant.²²

The signing, scheduled for October, of the agreement on construction of an energy bridge between Poland and Lithuania also fell through. It was to have been one of the key items on the agenda of the energy conference in Vilnius. Lithuanian authorities were negatively affected by Minister of the Economy Piotr Woźniak's statement that if Poland did not obtain access to the power volume it expected, the construction of the energy bridge would be delayed. Lithuania's president and prime minister reacted by canceling meetings with the Polish minister.²³ The parties stated, however, that the problem was not in the agreement itself, but rather in technical details, and that the agreement would be signed in the days to come. Despite these misunderstandings, the two countries have not withdrawn from the project. They stressed that it would be carried through, the more so as it has been included in the plans of the European Union.²⁴

Another difficulty in concluding the agreement was Lithuania's problems with forming a national investment company responsible for funding the construction of the new power plant in Ignalina and the energy bridge with Poland.²⁵ In addition, opinions emerged that Poland feared the participation in the investment projects of private concerns not controlled by the governments of individual states, such as, for instance, NDX Enerģia of Lithuania, which could use the future energy bridge to re-export cheaper, and thus more competitive, Russian electricity to Poland and Western Europe.²⁶

²¹ A. Łakoma, "Atomowe porozumienie"...

²² Interview with Prime Minister Gediminas Kirkilas for the radio *Lietuvos radijas* on 9 October 2007, www.ministraspirmininkas.lt/Default.aspx?Element=ViewArticle&TopicID=116&ArticleID=793&Page (08.01.2008).

²³ See A. Kublik, R. Zasuń, J. Komar, "Szczyt napięć w Wilnie," *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 11 October 2007; K. Girnius, "Geras kaimynas, o ne strateginis partneris," *Veidas*, no. 45.

²⁴ *Wizyta Prezydenta RP w Wilnie*, www.prezydent.pl/x.node?id=1011848&eventId=14527853 (08.01.2008).

²⁵ R. Mickiewicz, "Budowa mostu energetycznego oddala się w czasie," *Rzeczpospolita* of 16 November 2007.

²⁶ R. Mickiewicz, "Trudne polskie warunki," *Rzeczpospolita* of 26 July 2007; R. Zasuń, "Most z rosyjskim prądem?," *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 29 October 2007.

During the negotiations on the energy bridge, Poland tried to separate political from economic issues. It stressed that it was aware of the need to construct the bridge. Market considerations required the consent of the enterprises participating in the project, however. Additionally, the project is very expensive and requires large scale investment, even considering the financial support promised by the EU. According to estimations, Lithuania will invest some €261 million in the project, while Poland's contribution will amount to some €442 million. Such investments require carefully prepared documents.²⁷

On 30 November, during a visit in Vilnius of the new Polish prime minister Donald Tusk, it was announced that talks between the Polish and Lithuanian ministers of the economy on the power plant and the energy bridge would take place shortly after the visit. It was stated that Poland and Lithuania needed to cooperate in the formulation of future policy with regard to the region's other countries, including Russia. However, the agreement on the energy bridge was not finalized by the end of 2007.

Poland and Lithuania continued to support political and economic transformations, as well as democratic methods of solving political crises, particularly in Ukraine and Georgia.

During Lech Kaczyński's visit to Vilnius, developments in Ukraine were discussed by the presidents of Poland and Lithuania. Both leaders declared their readiness to help the Ukrainian authorities resolve the conflict. On 5 May, they issued a joint declaration where they expressed their satisfaction with the compromise reached by Ukraine's president and prime minister on early parliamentary elections, as well as their hope that these elections would take place in keeping with democratic principles and not hold back the reforms that would bring Ukraine closer to the European Union.²⁸ Both presidents also expressed their interest in solving the crisis in Georgia. In November, on the fourth anniversary of the "Revolution of Roses," the two presidents went to Tbilisi, where they attempted to alleviate the conflict between President Mikheil Saakashvili and the opposition, to convince the Georgian president to govern the country through democratic means, to stop repressions against opposition, and to abolish censorship.

Poland and Lithuania are also tied by their policies regarding Belarus. In February, during President Kaczyński's visit to Lithuania, it was emphasized

²⁷ Interview with Ambassador Janusz Skolimowski, *Lietuvos žinios* of 30 November 2007.

²⁸ *Wspólne oświadczenie Prezydentów Polski i Litwy*, www.prezydent.pl/x.node?id=1011848&eventId=11027963 (08.01.2008).

that both countries were jointly striving to give the European Union a better understanding of Belarus' affairs. In addition, Lithuanian television joined the initiative to establish Bielsat TV, an independent Belarusian television station.

2007 saw progress on points of contention that have existed since the resumption of bilateral relations. These are related to different approaches to the countries' shared history, especially those events that are interpreted differently by each party, and to the situation of the Polish minority in Lithuania. In January, Lithuanian MP Emanuelis Zingeris put forward a motion to establish the 3rd of May as a day of national remembrance. In his motion, he argued that the Constitution of the 3rd of May is part of the shared heritage of Poland and Lithuania and that its proclamation had been an occurrence of note not only for the two countries, but also for European political thought and that celebrating this event will help Lithuanians become more familiar with the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.²⁹

On 2 May, a conference was organized at the Lithuanian Sejm, entitled "A Shared Past, a Shared Future: from the First Constitution in Europe to a Common Future in Europe." Then, on the initiative of Lithuania, parliamentarians from both countries commemorated the anniversary of the adoption of the Constitution of the 3rd of May by telebeam.³⁰

The issue of the spelling of Polish surnames in Lithuania still remains unresolved. Poles insist that their right—pursuant to Lithuania's obligations under international law—to spell their names in official documents in accordance with the principles and letters of their mother tongue should be observed. In May, the Lithuanian government approved a bill on national minorities, with provisions which, among other matters, guaranteed the spelling of a person's first and last names in his/her mother tongue, and the use of the mother tongue in offices and for public inscriptions in areas inhabited in large measure by the minority. Lawyers of the Lithuanian Sejm found, however, that the bill was contrary to the Constitution by reference to the Constitutional Tribunal's ruling of 1999, according to which non-Lithuanian surnames in Lithuanian documents may be spelled without Lithuanian endings but using the letters of the official language, i.e., in Lithuanian. The original, non-Lithuanian

²⁹ *Atmintinø dienø ástatymo 1 straipsnio papildymo ástatymo projekto aiðkinamasis raðtas, 2007 m. sausio 15 d.*, www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter2/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=290740 (08.01.2008).

³⁰ The initiative is not a novelty. The Polish and Lithuanian Constitutional Courts have jointly celebrated the anniversary of the 3rd of May Constitution for some time now. "Profesor Alfredas Bumblauskas o istorii mknæcej na sygnale," *Kurier Wileñski* of 2 May 2007.

name can only be given in brackets. In response to the objections to the bill, Prime Minister Kirkilas made it understood that in the multicultural community of the EU, to which Lithuania also belongs, there should be no doubt as to the appropriateness of changing the previous provisions on the spelling of non-Lithuanian names.³¹

Polish-Lithuanian relations were not disturbed by the January call by Lithuanian MEP Vytautas Landsbergis, who, during the local government electoral campaign, encouraged Lithuanians residing in Vilnius but owning houses outside the capital to change their place of registered residence, in order to enable them to vote in constituencies where Poles—supporters of the Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania (EAPL)—had until then been in the majority, and thus to secure a “historic victory” over them. According to Landsbergis, the move was not against Poles as such, but rather against the monopoly and bad governance of the EAPL.³² The actions of the MEP met with negative comments from Lithuanian politicians and public opinion.³³ Nevertheless, the EAPL asked Polish parliamentarians, among others, to send independent observers to the election.³⁴

The election proved successful for the EAPL. It joined the ruling coalition in Vilnius, and its representative, Artur Ludkowski, became one of three deputy prime ministers. He is responsible, among other matters, for the restitution of land to persons residing in the Vilnius region and dispossessed of their land expropriated in the 1940s and 1950s. This electoral success enabled Poles in Lithuania to have a direct influence on the way their problems were being resolved. The coalition agreement provided for the setting aside, during the first year after the election, of 1,000 parcels of land earmarking for persons whose land had been expropriated for municipal or other purposes.³⁵ In September, the administration of the Vilnius *powiat* received maps of the areas to be divided for the purpose, although probably it will not be possible to return land to everyone who was dispossessed.³⁶

³¹ A. Martiņiūtė, “Lenkø ušgaidos kirgina Lietuvà,” *Respublika* of 17 July 2007.

³² “Rozmowa z Vytautą Landsbergisem,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 8 February 2007.

³³ “Rozmowa z Rimvydasem Valatką,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 1 February 2007; “Litwin przeprosza Polaków,” *Rzeczpospolita* of 28 February 2007.

³⁴ J. Komar, “Wileńszczyzna wybiera,” *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 26 February 2007.

³⁵ “Ważne, by człowiek walczący ze smokiem sam nie stał się smokiem,” interview with Artur Ludkowski, *Kurier Wileński* of 26 May 2007.

³⁶ S. Tarasiewicz, “855 ha wolnej ziemi w Wilnie dla byłych właścicieli,” *Kurier Wileński* of 7 September 2007.

Economic relations. The disproportion between Poland and Lithuania's economic potential has a significant impact on the two countries' economic relations. The share of Poland's exports to Lithuania in 2007 amounted to 1.6%, of all Polish exports, while its imports from Lithuania came to 0.56% all its imports. In comparison to 2006, exports rose by 23.7%, and imports by 12.9%.³⁷ Poland, on the other hand, was one of Lithuania's most important trade partners. In 2007, Poland ranked fourth, with 6.3%, on the list of states to which Lithuania exports (behind Russia, Latvia, and Germany) and third, with 10.6%, among states from which Lithuania imports (behind Russia and Germany).³⁸

Polish investments in Lithuania in 2007 amounted to 22.4% of all foreign direct investments, and Poland ranked first among foreign investors.³⁹ That year, the principal foreign investor was, still, the owner of the refinery in Mažeikiai, PKN Orlen, which in 2007 invested above all in projects helping to restore the operational status of the refinery installations that had been damaged in the October 2006 fire, as well as those upgrading the refinery and increasing its efficiency. It proved impossible to resume oil deliveries, which had been halted in July 2006, through the Druzhba pipeline, however. This required cuts in production, supply of oil by the more expensive sea route, using the terminal in Būtingė, and additional investments related to the reconstruction of the damaged installations.

In addition, the issue of unequal remuneration to Lithuanian and Polish workers still remains to be solved. Poles earn several times more because, as foreigners, they are not employed directly by PKN Orlen, but by external companies. Such a situation could have a negative impact on relations between Lithuanian population and Poles in Mažeikiai, and also on Poland's image in Lithuania. The problem was discussed during the June meeting between the prime ministers of Poland and Lithuania. Jarosław Kaczyński promised at that time to follow the matter.⁴⁰

³⁷ *Syntetyczna informacja o eksporcie i imporcie Polski za 2007 r.: dane wstępne*, www.mg.gov.pl/NR/rdonlyres/BE7F17AE-EE68-4306-9B26-B948DFE300A4/43589/infhz2007_dw.pdf (16.04.2008).

³⁸ *Lietuvos užsienio prekyba 2007 m.*, www.stat.gov.lt/lt/news/view/?id=2496 (16.04.2008).

³⁹ Author's own calculations based on *Tiesioginės užsienio investicijos metų pradžioje pagal dalis investuotojas*, www.stat.gov.lt/lt/pages/view/?id=2410&PHPSESSID=bbc62aaf2a6c9674b72b9452a512e4e6 (16.04.2008).

⁴⁰ B. Vygñiauskaitė, "Kremlius spaudžia, kaimynai vienijasi," *Lietuvos rytas* of 4 June 2007.

Despite the difficulties, the management of PKN Orlen is planning further expansion in the Baltic States, by, for instance, increasing their share in the fuel retail sales market up to 20%. They also intend to buy a share in the company Klaipėdos Nafta, which manages the terminal in Klaipėda to which PKN Orlen plans to run a pipeline. The same route could be used to supply oil to the refinery in Mažeikiai and to export PKN Orlen's products.⁴¹

Polish investments in other sectors have also increased. In June, the Polish Pharmaceutical Group began procedures to acquire a controlling packet of shares in several companies dealing in the wholesale and retail sale of medication in Lithuania. These include the pharmaceutical wholesaler Limedica and the Gintarinė Vaistinė pharmacy chain. In September, the IT company Asseco purchased a 56.24% share in the Lithuanian company Sintagma, which deals with software production and the integration of IT systems.

In 2007, work continued on the Via Baltica and Rail Baltica projects. In March, during Transport Minister Jerzy Polaczek's visit to Vilnius, an understanding was signed, which determined, among other matters, the crossing point for the Rail Baltica corridor.⁴² The talks resumed in June in Warsaw. In addition to the state of advancement of the two projects, items discussed included the possibilities for restoring a direct passenger rail connection between Poland and Lithuania, and cooperation between rail transport companies concerning intermodal shipments. Issues related to the development of infrastructure and transport were also discussed by the Consultative Committee of the Presidents of Poland and Lithuania, at its 26–27 June session.

Avian flu outbreaks in Poland in December created a challenge in bilateral relations. Initial news of Lithuania's temporary suspension of imports of live poultry and of turkey meat from Poland were quickly denied. Nevertheless, the Lithuanian authorities applied to the European Commission for permission to impose a temporary ban on poultry imports, including from areas not affected by the avian flu. However, the Commission rejected the application, claiming that existing safety measures and the ban on imports from areas at risk were sufficient.

Social and cultural relations. The most important event in cultural and social relations between the two countries was the opening in Vilnius of a branch of the University of Białystok, a project on which the university had been working for several years, supported by the Association of Polish Scholars in Lithuania. The

⁴¹ See Ž. Damauskas, "Mažeikių nafta metį pabaigoje dirbs pelningai," *Lietuvos rytas* of 29 May 2007; A. Łakoma, "Plany dla następów," *Rzeczpospolita* of 22 November 2007.

⁴² *Projekt Rail Baltica*, www.plk.warszawa.pl/inwestycje/projekt-rail-baltica.html (08.01.2008).

establishment of the branch was announced by prime ministers Jarosław Kaczyński and Gediminas Kirkilas at the beginning of June and permission to establish a department of computer science and economics was granted on 19 June. In October, 177 students began to attend classes: 124 economics students and 53 computer science students. In the future, the university plans to offer other majors. Enrolment is open to all Lithuanian citizens, although Polish is the language of instruction, which may prove to be a barrier.

During their June talks, the Polish and Lithuanian prime ministers also announced the establishment of a seminar program devoted to Lithuanian language and culture at the University of Białystok and signed an agreement on establishing the Polish-Lithuanian Youth Exchange Fund, operating under the honorary patronage of both prime ministers. Polish commitments under the fund are managed by the Foundation for the Development of the Educational System. One of its primary tasks is to support and fund joint projects.⁴³

In February, the Polish Ministry of Culture and National Heritage started working with the local authorities of Vilnius to establish the Stanisław Moniuszko Museum. The project was initiated by Apolonia Skakowska, chairwoman of the Polish Culture Centre in Lithuania. The museum is to be a integration center for Polish, Lithuanian, and Belarusian culture.⁴⁴

In March, anxiety was awakened among the Poles in connection with the reconstruction in Vilnius of the Basilian monastery, which houses Konrad's Cell—a symbol of Polish romanticism, the place where Adam Mickiewicz was once confined and where artists met. The Basilian monks wish to turn the building into a hotel. They gave assurances that the cell will be rebuilt in the link between the monastery and the Church of the Holy Trinity, where, they argue, it was originally located and where a museum for the poet could be located. On the occasion, doubts emerged as to the actual location of the prison cell. The designation of the building has changed several times in history and has been rebuilt. Poland claims that the cell was located on the third floor of the monastery. The version favoring the location in the link was allegedly originates with the Belarusians, who had a junior secondary school, a scientific society, and a museum in the building in the interwar period.⁴⁵

⁴³ *Umowa między Rządem RP a Rządem RL o Polsko-Litewskim Funduszu Wymiany Młodzieży*, www.frse.org.pl/files/umowa_fundusz_pl_lt_2008.pdf (08.01.2008).

⁴⁴ W. Masenas, "W Wilnie jednak powstanie Muzeum Stanisława Moniuszki," *Kurier Wileński* of 15 February 2007.

⁴⁵ R. Mickiewicz, "Romantyzm kapitulował przed biznesem—nowa Cela dla Konrada," *Kurier Wileński* of 24–26 March 2007.

In June, during a visit to Varėna of the members of the Consultative Committee of the Presidents of Poland and Lithuania, the subject of a monument to Polish soldiers that had been dismantled in connection with the planned renovation of a church next to which it stood was raised again. Poland maintained its previous position and continued to demand that the monument be rebuilt. The Lithuanians, however, delayed their answer. According to the Varėna mayor, the decision lies with the local government council, which is collecting various propositions. The monument could be reconstructed in a different form, one more acceptable to the Lithuanian public. During talks with the members of the Consultative Committee, the mayor of Varėna stressed that restoration of the statue's original form may prove difficult as the monument was not on the list of protected monuments.⁴⁶

Conclusion

2007 did not bring any breakthrough changes in Poland's policy towards Lithuania. The Polish policy with regard to Lithuania is a process of adapting to a situation that emerged following the accession of both countries to the European Union and of searching for new means to achieve the two country's aims. Although Poland's policy thus far has focused more on searching for larger and more influential allies in the EU, its cooperation with Lithuania may prove useful for a number of issues of importance, above all in the areas of energy and of regional cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe.

Both countries have common foreign policy interests; both desire to form alliances "for the common cause" to boost the effectiveness of their actions in the international stage. Both countries are striving to maintain a good atmosphere in mutual relations, thus contributing to the more effective realization of their interests within the European Union and cooperation in strategic areas. In addition, Poland's greater interest in Lithuania in 2007 could have partially resulted from the deterioration of its relations with Germany. Poland needed a partner in its immediate neighborhood that would share its principal foreign policy goals and support its projects in strategic areas. This shift in focus could also have been an attempt by Kaczyński's government to show that Poland's objectives could be achieved without the support and help of the strongest EU states.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ *Derybos dėl kolonos atstatymo tėsiasi*, www.varena.lt/lt/Naujienospradinis/lenkaivarenojedelkolonos/ (08.01.2008).

⁴⁷ Cf. Interview with Polish President Lech Kaczyński and Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus.

One success in Polish-Lithuanian relations was the gradual shift in the mutual perceptions based on issues centered on history and the situation of national minorities. Occasional contentious historical issues or unfortunate incidents failed to have a substantial impact on relations between the two countries in 2007. For several years now, historical discussions have tended to focus on the Second World War and its consequences for states in the region, issues on which Poles and Lithuanians have less divergent views. For this reason, the inclusion of the Vilnius region in Poland in 1920, which is regarded as the most controversial event in the history of relations between Poland and Lithuania, did not become the dominant issue. This does not mean, however, that it will not resurface on the occasion of various anniversaries and that all history-related disputes between Poles and Lithuanians are a thing of the past. Certain sensitivities are still present on both sides as regards history, and this is often exploited by politicians and the media, for instance, by Lithuania on the occasion of the talks on the need to accelerate land restitution to persons expropriated in the Vilnius region in the 1940s and 1950s, or of talks about the need to respect the rights of Poles in Lithuania. Nevertheless, the joint celebration of the proclamation of the 3rd of May Constitution, which has often been differently assessed by the two sides, inspires hope that the state authorities will more often stress those common historical events that unite, rather than divide Poland and Lithuania.

Polish-Lithuanian relations were also marked by a gradual shift of the attempts to solve the problems of the Polish minority from the sphere of bilateral relations to that of Lithuania's internal affairs. In 2007, it could be observed that the Lithuanian authorities were more interested in these issues than previously. This was most probably due to the EAPL's joining of the governing coalition in Vilnius and the appointment of Artur Ludkowski as deputy mayor of Vilnius. In this way Poles began to have a growing influence on the resolution of their own problems which, in any case, depend more on national and local government authorities than on bilateral relations. The active involvement of Lithuanian Poles in the public affairs of their country of residence on the same terms that apply its other citizens has turned out to be a development that contributed to the improvement of their situation. The Polish authorities, in turn, attempted to support Poles in Lithuania by raising issues of importance to them during discussions with representatives of the Lithuanian authorities and by stressing Vilnius' obligation to respect the rights of Poles in Lithuania pursuant to international law.

Moreover, misunderstandings between Polish and Lithuanian politicians in one area did not rule out the possibility of realizing common initiatives in others. Although accusations of anti-Polish sentiments surfaced following Landsbergis'

call, this did not hamper his cooperation with Polish MEPs on the organization of an exhibition in October devoted to the situation in Chechnya.

Another shift in Poland's policy towards Lithuania, and a change in mutual relations, was the move away from generalized declarations and assurances of friendly and neighborly relations to specific initiatives and projects aimed at the achievement of common strategic objectives offering tangible benefits to both parties. In 2007, these were primarily the countries' attempts to strengthen their energy security. Providing the concept of strategic partnership with concrete projects gave it a chance of becoming reality. Although 2007 did not bring agreement on all issues, it would appear that this is only a matter of time.

Other challenges for Poland and Lithuania in 2007 were the political crises in Ukraine and Georgia. Although the Polish and Lithuanian presidents did not engage in spectacular mediation such as during the "Orange Revolution," further cooperation in the area, even after Poland's change of president, testifies to the lasting nature of certain trends in mutual relations.

The multilateral nature of many common projects, where Poland and Lithuania tried to involve other countries from various regions, both within and without the European Union, is also promising. Such projects have had a positive influence over a broader area, whose political, economic, and social cohesiveness they enhanced. At the same time, they have strengthened the positions of Poland and Lithuania and offered a broader, and thus more effective possibilities of action.

The change of government in Poland should not substantially affect the objectives of state policy regarding Lithuania. However, the style and framework for cooperation or the weight given to different goals may change. Although Vilnius was Prime Minister Tusk's first official foreign destination, it is difficult to say whether he intended to highlight Lithuania as a priority of Poland's foreign policy. The honors with which he was received may testify to the fact that Lithuania does indeed desire to maintain the present state of cooperation. The new Polish government will, as announced, be focusing more on strengthening relations with Germany and France. Relations with Lithuania will be probably concentrated on common projects in the area of energy security: the nuclear power plant and the energy bridge, as well as on policy regarding Eastern Europe.

Poland's Policy Regarding Ukraine

Background

In 2007, the conditions for Poland's policy aimed at consolidating democracy, the rule of law, and support for the European integration process in Ukraine were less favorable than they had been in the previous two years. This was primarily the result of the political situation in Ukraine. After Viktor Yanukovich, President Viktor Yushchenko's political rival, formed a government in August 2006, the reform process in Ukraine and even the day-to-day administration of the country was undermined by the growing rivalry between the president and the government, which was made up of members of the Party of Regions, the Socialist Party of Ukraine, and the Communist Party of Ukraine. When President Yushchenko decreed the dissolution of parliament on 2 April 2007, this rivalry turned into a sharp political crisis, as the ruling coalition refused to recognize the binding force of the presidential decree. New elections were only made possible by the dissolution of parliament on other legal grounds, following a political agreement concluded on 27 May between the prime minister and the president and signed by the chairman of the Supreme Council.

The elections, held on 30 September, gave a narrow majority in the Supreme Council to the "Orange" camp: the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, and to the pro-president coalition of Our Ukraine and the People's Self-Defense Bloc, but Tymoshenko's government was sworn into office as late as 18 December. That government's personal makeup and its pro-Western agenda including, among others elements, a provision to embark on the NATO Membership Action Plan (from which Prime Minister Yanukovich had withdrawn in September 2006),¹ gave rise to great expectations in Poland. For the larger part of the year, however, ongoing political disputes *de facto* paralyzed the executive branch of the Ukrainian government and the spring crisis made plain to all observers the weakness of Ukrainian democracy and of the country's low political culture.

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¹ See *Prohrama diyalnosti kabinetu ministriv Ukrainy "Ukrains'kyi proryv: dla ludey, ne dla politykiv"*, www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=104231107&cat_id=47292901.

Tymoshenko's difficulties in forming a government, her extremely low level of support in parliament, the lack of consensus in matters of primary importance for the country—including on foreign policy issues—as well as incessant bickering and mutual distrust among the camps of Yushchenko, Yanukovych, and Tymoshenko are undermining the Ukrainian transformation process. It is unlikely that Ukraine will manage to complete any significant reforms by the end of 2009, i.e., by the next presidential elections. Moreover, despite some progress, a large portion of Ukrainian elites and society still either fails to understand the essence of the rule of law, democracy, and transparency in public life or fails to abide by such principles in practice. It is becoming increasingly evident that Ukraine's efforts to achieve a degree of political and economic transformations that would allow for its speedy accession to the European Union, or even for the initiation of negotiations on this subject, are seriously hampered by the current state of the Ukrainian collective consciousness, and by the cultural divide among Ukrainian citizens: some feel part of Europe, while others see themselves as belonging to a distinct Eastern Slavic cultural realm, along with Russia and Belarus, and feel distrust or even hostility toward the West (this cleavage largely corresponds to the division into Ukrainian and Russian-speakers).

Poland's internal affairs also affected its policy with regard to Ukraine. The collapse of Jarosław Kaczyński's coalition government in July 2007, the electoral campaign to the Sejm and Senate, and the process of forming a new government (which ended as late as 16 November) detracted attention from foreign policy. Moreover, in the first half of 2007, Polish diplomats were mostly absorbed by the future of the EU Constitutional Treaty. The unfavorable opinions about the Polish president and prime minister voiced in the media—especially the foreign media—and by western European politicians indirectly weakened the effectiveness of Poland's efforts on Ukraine's behalf.

The granting to Poland and Ukraine of the right to organize the 2012 European Football Championships (Euro 2012) on 18 April 2007 by the Executive Committee of the Union of European Football Association (UEFA) was an important event. The decision will affect relations between Poland and Ukraine in the political and social levels, as well as economically, since preparations for the event will require the intensification and better coordination of the already close cooperation between the two countries, and it will also provide opportunities to promote tourism in both countries. The state of sports, transport and accommodation infrastructure will also improve. Ukraine will also gain additional benefits, as Euro 2012 may in a substantial way bring the country

closer to the European Union and change the mentality of Ukrainian society. Euro 2012 will allow the West to get better acquainted with Ukraine (and vice versa) and this will assist Poland's efforts aimed at officially granting Ukraine the prospect of EU membership. "Euro 2012 enhances our sense of affiliation with Europe. [...] People who will come to watch the games will see for themselves what Ukraine looks like, and will share their impressions and knowledge of our country and of Ukrainians with the world. I am convinced that this will contribute to increased confidence in Ukraine," said President Yushchenko.²

Polish-Ukrainian economic relations are thriving, a fact that makes cooperation with Poland and the European Union more attractive to the Ukrainian financial and political elites. In 2007, Ukraine ranked third in terms of Poland's top export markets, behind the EU and Russia, and Poland was the eleventh largest investor in Ukraine.

After Poland regained its full sovereignty, and Ukraine became independent, a process began during which both societies became more familiar with each other and established closer cultural ties. Although in 2007 the number of Poles who dislike Ukrainians still prevailed (39%)³ over those Poles who like them (25%), the share of the former is systematically falling while that of the latter is increasing.⁴ Since the Orange Revolution, the Polish people, especially the Polish intelligentsia, have become increasingly interested in Ukraine. This is due partly to tourism and to trips to that country for sentimental reasons, and partly to the favorable stance adopted by the majority of the Polish media toward Ukraine. Another important factor is the largely positive experience of many Polish families with Ukrainian workmen or nannies.

Poland also enjoys a good reputation in Ukraine. Ukrainian opinion polls show a growing affinity for Poles. According to the reputable weekly *Korrespondent*, which carried out a survey on the issue in 2007, Ukrainians consider Poland to be Ukraine's closest friend (48%) of all countries. Russia took second place (45%). At the same time, as many as 28% of Ukrainians regard Russia an enemy, while the figure for those disliking Poland was

² "Wielu chciałoby widzieć Ukrainę rozdartą," interview with V. Yushchenko, *Rzeczpospolita* of 27 April 2007.

³ *Sympatia i niechęć do innych narodów. Komunikat z badań*, Warsaw: Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej, September 2007, p. 2, www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2007/K_144_07.PDF.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 4. A sudden growth in positive responses to Ukraine in 2004 was probably related to the Ukrainian election campaign and the "Orange Revolution" effect.

negligible.⁵ Poland owes this high showing to residents of the western and, to a lesser extent, the central part of Ukraine. The poll results are the more inspiring as the most tragic conflicts between Poles and Ukrainians took place precisely in the western part of Ukraine. Contrary to the opinion of certain Polish commentators,⁶ this is evidence that the inhabitants of Galicia and Volhynia share common values with Poles and rarely show the anti-Polish sentiments that are beginning to emerge in eastern Ukraine under the influence of a distrustful attitude toward the “West” transplanted from Russia.

Poland's positive image was tarnished, however, following its accession to the Schengen area on 21 December 2007. While membership in the Schengen area offers many benefits to Poland, it also contributes to the weakening Ukrainian society's contacts with Poland. Previously, Ukrainian citizens could obtain Polish national visas free of charge and, more importantly, on very lax terms. At present, those who want to visit Poland must, in the majority of cases, apply for a Schengen visa, which entails completing and submitting many documents and certificates, as well as paying fees which are high from the Ukrainian point of view (€35). As a result, tourist, business, or scholarly trips from Ukraine to Poland have been made considerably more difficult.

Objectives

For a long time, the primary objective of Poland's policy toward Ukraine has been to support the growth of democracy, the rule of law, and market reforms in that country, as well as its integration with the European Union and NATO. As regards this objective, a consensus rare in other areas was achieved in 2007 among the main political forces in Poland. Even in heat of the autumn electoral campaign for the Sejm and the Senate, Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński stated that former president Aleksander Kwaśniewski's greatest merit had been his successful mediation in Ukraine during the Orange Revolution.⁷

During her foreign policy address at the Sejm on 11 May 2007, Foreign Affairs Minister Anna Fotyga reiterated the same policy objectives toward Ukraine that had been in place for many years. She stated, for example, that

⁵ “Korrespondent nazwał głównych друзej i wrogów Ukrainy,” *Korrespondent* of 19 October 2007, <http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/212756>.

⁶ See R. Ziemkiewicz, “Rzeczy ukraińskie,” *Rzeczpospolita* of 23 April 2007.

⁷ See Transcript of debate on foreign policy: J. Kaczyński vs. A. Kwaśniewski, PAP, 2 October 2007.

Poland was a proponent of European Union enlargement to the east, above all to Ukraine and Moldova, and underscored that this approach resulted from the principle of solidarity and was omnipresent in Polish diplomatic initiatives. “Poland unchangingly, continuously, in every conversation and address, supports the further enlargement of the European Union to embrace the entire Balkans, Ukraine, Turkey, and other states.” Referring to Ukraine specifically, she noted that the granting of the right to organize, jointly with Poland, the finals of the European football championships in 2012 would contribute to the further consolidation of relations between the two countries and would open up new opportunities for cooperation and interaction. She expressed the hope that this would be conducive to strengthening the pro-European stance of the Ukrainian state. Minister Fotyga also said that Poland was trying to gather support for its concept of an EU assistance package for Ukraine and was seeking to alleviate visa restrictions for Ukrainian citizens. Finally, she declared that “Poland is a great promoter of both the European and transatlantic aspirations of Ukraine.”⁸

Anna Fotyga’s address drew the attention of commentators by the fact that Ukraine and Ukraine’s inclusion in the EU were no longer mentioned in first place, as had been the case in the exposés of previous foreign ministers.⁹

The declared principles of Polish policy on Ukraine did not change when the coalition between Civic Platform and the Polish People’s Party, with Donald Tusk as prime minister, came to power. The new head of government stated in his exposé that it was Poland’s ambition to participate in the shaping of the European Union’s eastern dimension and that “expanding the area of security, cooperation, and democracy in this very direction will have a fundamental and positive impact our future and the destiny of all Europe.”¹⁰ He also added that the government would continue to support Ukraine’s Western aspirations and that the future of that country should be the “key element of the European Union’s eastern dimension and neighborhood policy.”¹¹

⁸ “Government information on Polish foreign policy in 2007,” see above, p. 29.

⁹ See “Minister Fotyga i sąsiedzi,” *Rzeczpospolita* of 12 May 2007. Cf. also the address by Stefan Meller at the Sejm on 15 February 2006, www.msz.gov.pl/Informacja,Rzadu,na,temat,polskiej,polityki,zagranicznej,w,2006,roku,,4590.html, and the address by Minister Adam Daniel Rotfeld at the Sejm on 21 January 2005, www.msz.gov.pl/Expose,2005,1159.html.

¹⁰ See Opening address by Prime Minister Donald Tusk, www.kprm.gov.pl/s.php?id=1389&path=10325.

¹¹ *Ibidem*.

A number of the principles behind the Polish policy on Ukraine were also reflected in the document entitled “Road Map for Polish-Ukrainian Relations in the years 2007–2008,” signed by Presidents Kaczyński and Yushchenko on 27 April in Warsaw. The majority of its provisions are of a declarative and unspecific nature. They generally come down to the promise of intensified cooperation in many areas. Among other things, Poland undertook to support Ukraine in the process of reviewing and harmonizing Ukrainian legislation with European Union standards and in its efforts to lift the visa requirement currently in force with regard to Ukrainian citizens entering the European Union. It was announced that a visa-free regime for local border traffic would be established following Poland's accession to the Schengen area and that training programs for the Ukrainian administration would be set up. Other declared goals included improvements in the transportation infrastructure, further work to complete the construction of the pipeline from Brody in Ukraine to Płock in Poland, and the upgrading of existing border crossings and opening of new ones, also with EU funding. In addition, it was announced that work would continue on solutions making it easier to employ Ukrainians in Poland and Poles in Ukraine.¹²

During a visit to Ukraine on 6 December, President Kaczyński—competing with the new government for primacy in foreign policy—signed a *communiqué* with President Yushchenko entitled “Common Challenges—New Dimensions for Strategic Partnership.”¹³ The difference between the April declaration and this document was that it announced “the spread of joint border control practices and development of border infrastructure,”¹⁴ as well as promising that a bilateral agreement on small border traffic would be concluded as soon as possible. In addition, it stipulated that a “Polish-Ukrainian cooperation fund—‘Partnership for the Future’”—should be established, along with a “Polish-Ukrainian meeting centre for academic youth.”¹⁵

Bilateral Relations

Political relations. In 2007, the intensity of the dialogue between Poland and Ukraine did not diminish, judging by the number of top level meetings.

¹² *Mapa drogowa współpracy polsko-ukraińskiej na lata 2007–2008*, www.prezydent.pl/x.download?id=12025974.

¹³ See *Wspólny komunikat Prezydentów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Ukrainy “Wspólne wyzwania—nowe wymiary partnerstwa strategicznego”*, www.prezydent.pl/x.download?id=15526094.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

Lech Kaczyński visited Ukraine twice: on 9 July and on 6–7 December 2007. Viktor Yushchenko, in turn, visited Poland on four occasions. He paid official visits to Poland on 7 March and 27 April and he came to Cracow on 11 May to attend the international energy summit. On 21 July, he visited a Lemko culture festival organized in Zdynia, in the vicinity of Gorlice. Both presidents also attended meetings of the countries of the region held in Vilnius (10 October) and Baku (18 June), as well as meeting on 17 April in Cardiff, where they jointly presented the Polish and Ukrainian bid to organize Euro 2012. In addition, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich visited Poland on 19 April, followed by Foreign Affairs Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk.

It was undoubtedly a formidable challenge to adopt a proper position on the political conflict in Ukraine that broke out following Yushchenko's dissolution of the Supreme Council. The Polish authorities were cautious. President Kaczyński offered mediation, which was unsuccessfully attempted by former president Aleksander Kwaśniewski. Simultaneously, President Lech Kaczyński¹⁶ and, after a time, Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński,¹⁷ considered that the best way out of the political crisis in Ukraine would be earlier elections. They thus indirectly supported President Yushchenko's position, as Prime Minister Yanukovich's camp claimed that the head of state's decree on the dissolution of the Council was illegal. Indeed, the decree was based on feeble legal grounds, as President Yushchenko dissolved the Council in reference to a constitutional provision stating that the president is the guarantor of the observance of the Constitution, rather than to Article 90, which explicitly names three situations in which the president may dissolve parliament—none of which corresponded to the actual political situation in Ukraine in early April 2007. President Yushchenko justified his move by his concern that Ukraine should retain the achievements of the Orange Revolution and should continue reforms to bring it closer to the structures of the West. More importantly, whether the decree was legal or not was a matter for the constitutional court to decide and until that time the presumption of the legality of presidential acts was binding—also on the prime minister.

¹⁶ See *L. Kaczyński: Polska nie odmówi pomocy Ukrainie*, press release, 5 April 2007, <http://fakty.interia.pl/newsroom/news/l-kaczynski—polska-nie-odmowi-pomocy-ukrainie,892605> (on the website www.prezydent.pl there is no precise stenographic record of the press conference where the president allegedly said this).

¹⁷ See *Premierzy Polski i Litwy o sytuacji na Ukrainie*, release of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister of 17 April 2007, www.kprm.gov.pl/archiwum/070417-3.htm.

President Kaczyński's liking for the Orange camp was made even more evident during his visit to Ukraine on 6 and 7 December, when he told the candidate prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko that Poland pinned more hopes on this government than on the previous ones.¹⁸

Following the formation of the Civic Platform and Polish People's Party coalition, politicians from Law and Justice quickly started to accuse the new government of spoiling relations with Ukraine. Tusk's government paid a lot of attention to improving relations with Russia. In combination with the problems related to Poland's accession to the Schengen area, this led to accusations by representatives of the President's Chancellery, the opposition, and some commentators, including Bohdan Osadczuk, a collaborator of Jerzy Giedroyc and the doyen of reconciliation between Poland and Ukraine,¹⁹ that the new government was ruining relations with Ukraine.

Owing to the political situation in Ukraine, not a lot could be done to accelerate the integration of the country with the European Union and NATO, although Polish diplomacy was engaged in numerous initiatives to that end behind the scenes. The primary failure was that, in the negotiation mandate for the new agreement on cooperation with Ukraine, a provision was not included stating that the subject of the negotiations was equally the European Union's granting of membership prospects to Ukraine, the so-called "European prospect." Comments even surfaced that Poland had abandoned the effort to have Ukraine accede to the EU.²⁰ Minister Fotyga issued a *communiqué* where she denied such charges, emphasizing that Poland had failed to convince other EU member states that the new agreement should be of an associative nature and include the "European prospect" for Ukraine.²¹

An indirect success for Poland was the European Parliament's acceptance of a report,²² written largely by Euro-MP Michał Kamiński, an influential politician

¹⁸ See "Polsha rada Timoshenko bolshe chem Yanukovichu," *Korrespondent* of 7 December 2007, information based on UNIAN materials, <http://korrespondent.net>.

¹⁹ B. Osadczuk, "Jak Tusk przegrał Ukrainę," *Rzeczpospolita* of 29 January 2007.

²⁰ See J. Bielecki, "Porażka naszej dyplomacji w sprawie Ukrainy w Unii," *Dziennik* of 17 August 2007.

²¹ See *Oświadczenie minister spraw zagranicznych w sprawie poparcia Polski dla europejskich aspiracji Ukrainy*, 17 August 2007, www.msz.gov.pl/Oswiadczenie,Minister,Spraw,Zagranicznych,ws.,poparcia,Polski,dla,europejskich,aspiracji,Ukrainy,10692.html.

²² See *Report with a proposal for a European Parliament recommendation to the Council on a negotiation mandate for a new enhanced agreement between the European Community and its Member States of the one part and Ukraine of the other part* (2007/2015 (INI)),

of the ruling Law and Justice party and a close collaborator of Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński. The document recommended that the EU offer membership prospects to Ukraine. Obviously, such an offer would not automatically lead to membership, but would rather provide an incentive for the country to continue its Euro-integration efforts and would remove the difference in treatment between Ukraine and those Balkan states that have been granted such prospects.

Controversies also arose in relation to the planned deployment in Poland of the American missile defense system. President Yushchenko,²³ and the ministers he appointed under presidential constitutional powers, namely Defence Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko and Foreign Affairs Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, took a neutral or positive stance on the issue,²⁴ while representatives of the prime minister's camp, notably Deputy Prime Minister Mykola Azarov,²⁵ criticized the project. In addition to the unenthusiastic views of Viktor Yanukovich,²⁶ and the majority of the Supreme Council deputies,²⁷ the Ukrainian public also viewed the project negatively. In a survey, 69% of respondents opposed the deployment in Poland of missile defenses and a mere 12% held a positive view of the project.²⁸

Another event that created some tension was border crossings by individuals between Poland and Ukraine. In contrast to Hungary, the election campaign in both countries frustrated the plans to negotiate an agreement on local border traffic prior to Poland's accession to the Schengen area, to enable Ukrainians living within a radius of 50 km of the border, and generally living by trade and minor smuggling, to visit Poland without visas. (All Poles can visit Ukraine without visas, an advantage that is used by the population residing on the Polish side of the border and earning their living in similar manner. They have taken over almost all the local border trade.) The issue of the difficulties in visiting

²³ See "Nie zmarnowaliśmy szansy," interview with V. Yushchenko, *Dziennik* of 7 March 2007.

²⁴ See *Ukraina popiera rozmieszczenie u sąsiadów tarczy antyrakietowej*, PAP dispatch of 23 January 2007; "Minister Juszczenko chwali tarczę," *Rzeczpospolita* of 17 March 2007; interview with Arseniy Yatseniuk, *Rzeczpospolita* of 23 May 2007.

²⁵ "Wicepremier Ukrainy: tarcza nam zagraża," *Rzeczpospolita* of 6 February 2007.

²⁶ See *Yanukovich: SŚA zabuły spytyaty w Ukrayini i Rosii*, UNIAN dispatch of 27 February 2007 on the interview with V. Yanukovich in *Handelsblatt* of 27 February 2007, www.unian.net/ukr/news/news-185773.html.

²⁷ *Parlament Ukrainy zaniepokojony tarczą*, PAP dispatch of 22 March 2007; see also stenographic record of the session of the Supreme Council of the same day, www.rada.gov.ua/zakon/skl5/3session/STENOGR/22030703_20.htm.

²⁸ "69% ukraincev protiv razmeshcheniya PRO w Chekhii i Polshe," *Korrespondent* of 12 March 2007, www.korrespondent.net.

Poland, kept simmering by the Ukrainian media, has started to cast a serious shadow on Poland's image.

The long queues in front of Polish consular offices were directly related to the visa issue. During the summer, the matter of the consular office in Lviv, where the delays reached up to several weeks, was publicized by *Gazeta Wyborcza*. Following an investigation, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that it was the Ukrainian "visa mafia" that was to blame for the problems negatively affecting perceptions of Poland in Ukraine.²⁹ The mafia included hackers who had broken into poorly secured servers where visa applicants' details were stored and added fictitious names to the database, thus forming an artificial queue, and "intermediaries" who offered the speedy issuance of visas for an "extra payment," as well as the Ukrainian employees of consular offices, who submitted applications to Polish consuls in a different order than that of the electronic waiting list.

Moreover, Polish consular offices are understaffed, and visa processing in the most besieged consular office in Lviv was made even more difficult by insufficient working space. Only in July 2007, following several years of attempts, were the final formalities agreed on with the Lviv city council for the construction of a new consular office.

Controversies were also aroused by the November decision of the departing foreign affairs minister, Anna Fotyga, to set a high fee, namely €75, for the "national visa," which authorizes the holder to stay only within the territory of Poland, and whose issue does not fall under Schengen procedures.³⁰ Opponents pointed out that this was a prohibitive price, while proponents argued that some 50% of Ukrainians could, owing to various privileges, obtain the national visa for free and that this latter had to be more expensive than the Schengen visa to keep a proper balance between the numbers of applicants for the two visa types.

In general, the Ukrainian political elites welcomed Poland's pro-Ukrainian lobbying in NATO and EU countries, and those of Orange provenance are also grateful for Poland's involvement during the 2004 events. At the summit in Baku, President Yushchenko referred to Poland as "Ukraine's principal ally in the EU."³¹ In a survey commissioned by the Ukrainian weekly *Glavred*, two

²⁹ See M. Wojciechowski, "jd2hg from the picture: sposób na wizę," *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 7 August 2007, www.gazetawyborcza.pl/1,76842,4369964.html.

³⁰ See M. Wojciechowski, "Minister Fotyga stawia barierę wizową," *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 14 November 2007, www.gazetawyborcza.pl/1,76842,4670187.html.

³¹ See *Yushchenko nazwał głównego sojusznika Ukrainy v ES*, 18 June 2007, www.korrespondent.net.

Poles were among Ukraine's top ten lobbyists:³² former president Aleksander Kwaśniewski (in top position) and the above-mentioned Michał Kamiński (ninth place). Third place was taken by the famous American political scientist of Polish descent, Zbigniew Brzeziński. Additionally, for many ordinary Ukrainians, the Polish transformations and the politicians who carried them out are role models. Therefore it is even more unfortunate, that two deplorable incidents took place in 2007. The first was a visit to Kyiv by Polish Deputy Prime Minister Andrzej Lepper, who came to receive the title of honorary professor from the Interregional Academy of Personnel Management, which is notorious for its anti-Semitism (the visit met with protests from the Ukrainian intelligentsia).³³ The second was a lecture at the Taras Shevchenko University of Kyiv given in September by former president Aleksander Kwaśniewski, who was not entirely sober.

Economic relations. 2007 was another successful year for Polish-Ukrainian economic relations. Ukraine was the third largest export market for Poland (behind EU countries and Russia). Ukraine-bound exports accounted for 4% of Poland's total exports (EU countries accounted for 78.9% and Russia for 4.6%). The volume of exports to Ukraine in 2007 amounted to 15,297 million PLN (€4,034 million),³⁴ an increase of 23.5% in relation to the previous year (owing to the substantial strengthening of the złoty, the indicators of export growth in foreign currencies are even higher: 27.5% in euros and 39% in dollars). As of 1 October, 2.4% of all foreign investments on the Ukrainian market came from Poland.³⁵ Direct Polish investments in Ukraine nearly doubled in comparison to 2006 (\$482,600—as of 1 July 2007; \$251,600 as of the same date in 2006; and \$209,700 in 2005).³⁶

For Ukraine, Poland was the third largest investment market, with 3.4% of all Ukrainian foreign investments coming to Poland (in comparison, 62.5% went to Cyprus and 14.4% to Russia).³⁷

³² See PAP dispatch of 10 August 2007.

³³ See T. Serwetnyk, "Tytuł pogorszy stosunki," *Rzeczpospolita* of 3 February 2007.

³⁴ See *Foreign trade turnover in total and by countries, 1–12 2007, preliminary results*, www.stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbr/gus/PUBL_obroty_handlu_zagr_01-12_2007.pdf.

³⁵ See *Pryami inozemni investytsii v Ukrainu, obshchyn na 1.10.2007 r.*, as well as the status for 2005 and 2006, www.ukrstat.gov.ua.

³⁶ *Ibidem*.

³⁷ See *Pryami investytsii Ukrainy v ekonomiku krain svitu, obshchyn na 1.10.2007 r.*, www.ukrstat.gov.ua.

Throughout 2007, plans to extend the Odessa-Brody pipeline to Płock, to transport oil from Azerbaijan and Central Asia, were discussed. For many years, however, these plans were not acted upon owing to their dubious economic feasibility and the lack of adequate supply guarantees. The president, and Jarosław Kaczyński's government, wanted to revive the project, an occasion for which was to be the energy summit organized in Cracow in May 2007 with the interested states attending. Hopes were also awakened by declarations made by Prime Minister Yanukovych during his visit to Poland on 21 April, when he stated that his country wanted to extract its own oil from the Black Sea, and the operation of fields on the Black Sea shelf could start around 2012.³⁸ However, when Kazakhstan, an important oil exporter, withdrew from the plan to build an independent oil route to the European Union—as clearly indicated by President Nursultan Nazarbayev's cancellation of his visit to the Cracow summit—the undertaking was again put in question.

At the summit, with the presidents of Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan as participants, the project for an energy resources corridor leading from Baku to Gdańsk was discussed. The talks continued after the summit: on 18 June in Baku, on 10 October in Vilnius, and on 19 September at the Economic Forum in Krynica, where, however, top Ukrainian politicians were not present owing to the election campaign in progress in their country. On 8 December, Presidents Kaczyński and Yushchenko jointly stated that in several months oil could be transported from Brody to Poland by rail, as a temporary means of transport. Their enthusiasm abated after a few days, however, following a statement by the chairman of PKN Orlen, Piotr Kownacki, who reminded everyone that there weren't any concrete plans to supply oil by rail and that such an undertaking would be very complicated.³⁹ Furthermore, the most important condition for obtaining bank loans for the construction of the pipeline, namely guarantees of a sufficient supply of oil, remained to be met.

However, the re-opening of the Ukrainian market for Polish meat, which took place on 14 February 2007, was a certain success. Together with Russia, the Ukrainians had placed an embargo a year earlier, arguing that meat that was reaching did not have the appropriate veterinary certificates.

³⁸ "Ukraina sięga po ropę," *Rzeczpospolita* of 21 April 2007.

³⁹ See A. Łakoma, "Polska sama musi zadbać o gwarancje dostaw surowców," *Rzeczpospolita* of 13 December 2007.

Rapidly falling unemployment in Poland, combined with the emigration of workers to Western Europe, forced the partial liberalization of the labor market. Starting in July, the citizens of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia were allowed to work in Poland without special permit for three months during every half-year period. The only condition for receiving the appropriate visa was a declaration by the employer submitted to the district labor office. It quickly turned out, however, that this was not enough to provide the necessary number of workers in Poland. As a result, the relevant regulation of the Minister of Labor and Social Policy was amended and, since 1 February 2008, citizens of the above countries have been allowed to work in Poland without a permit for six months of the year (the period can be uninterrupted). Public opinion was divided as to the appropriateness of this move, however. In January 2007, 49% of society supported the opening of the labor market to Ukrainians, while 46% were against it.⁴⁰

Economic relations will definitely be enlivened by the decision to have the countries host Euro 2012, which forces the two countries to rapidly develop and upgrade their border infrastructure. Decisions have already been made to build new border crossings (at Budomierz–Hrushev, Dolhobyczów–Uhryniv, Malhowski–Nyzhankovychi, and Zbereże–Adamchuky), and talks are being held on investment details concerning four additional border crossings. The government has also announced plans to accelerate work on the development of the network of road connections with Ukraine, notably the extension of the A4 motorway, which currently connects Germany with Cracow, to the Ukrainian border, and the construction of the S17 and S12 expressways to connect Warsaw with the border crossings in Hrebenne and Dorohusk respectively.⁴¹ In addition, an increase in the number of train and air connections between Poland and Ukraine, and improvements to travel comfort, are planned.

In 2007, many Polish companies announced their intention to begin or intensify their activities in the East. Among these companies were the ceramic tile manufacturer Polcolorit S.A.; the men's wear manufacturer Próchnik S.A.; Ochnik Leather Wear; the security and services company Impel S.A.; the poultry breeding and processing company Konspol; the meat processor Polski Koncern Mięsny Duda S.A.; the grocery chain POLOmarket; and the trading company

⁴⁰ See M. Kochanowicz, "Czy boimy się ukraińskiego hydraulika?," *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 19 January 2007.

⁴¹ See www.droginaeuro.pl (managed by the General Directorate for National Roads and Motorways); *Program Budowy Dróg Krajowych na lata 2008–2012*, www.mt.gov.pl.

Emperia Holding S.A. They joined other large Polish firms that have been present in Ukraine for some time; PKO BP and Pekao S.A., Can-pack, TZMO Bella Center, Grupa Forte, Grupa PZU, Cersanit S.A. Smyk and Grupa Empik Media & Fashion are also active in eastern markets, with the latter opening subsequent Empik media stores. Fabryka Samochodów Osobowych (a Polish auto maker) delivers to the Ukrainian and Russian market.

The media industry is also worthy of mention. In 2007, Edipresse Polska, which has been present for many years in Ukraine and is the publisher of *Viva* and *Polina* (the sister publication of the Polish magazine *Przypiółka*), was joined by subsequent Polish companies. In May, Agora Ukraine was officially registered; it is a daughter company of the large Polish media concern whose standard-bearer is *Gazeta Wyborcza*. From that time, there have been speculations about Agora's launch of a new daily in Ukraine, or its acquisition of an existing newspaper or of another medium, e.g. the well-known Internet portal Ukrayinska Pravda. Based on media reports, ITI group (owner of TVN) is also considering expansion into Ukraine.⁴² Further investments were also announced by Rzeczpospolita publishing house, which is launching a monthly entitled *Farmer* in Ukraine.

We should also mention the commencement of close cooperation between the Warsaw Stock Exchange and the largest stock exchange in Ukraine—the First Securities Trading System. Their agreement of 16 May provides, among other things, for the exchange of information and for common measures aimed at the double listing of companies (on both markets). The Warsaw exchange is getting ready to open a branch office in Kyiv.⁴³ In 2007, a second company from Ukraine, Kernel Holding, a producer of comestible oils, was listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (the first company listed in Warsaw was Astarta Holding, a sugar producer and distributor).

Of the Ukrainian investments in Poland, the largest one is the acquisition by the East-Ukrainian Donbas Industrial Corporation (Industriálny Soyuz Donbasu) of a majority stake in the Gdańsk shipyards (Stocznia Gdańsk), which it intends to upgrade and expand. However, it is not yet certain whether this will actually take place. Believing that the political climate in Poland after the election would be less favorable for their investment plans, the Ukrainians bought the shipyard before the election, hurriedly and without tenders (thanks to

⁴² See "ITI zainwestuje w ukraińską telewizję," *Rzeczpospolita* of 29 May 2007.

⁴³ See E. Muciński, "GPW stawia na Wschód," *Rzeczpospolita* of 22 November 2007.

legal tricks,⁴⁴ according to some observers), although they knew that a dispute was underway with the European Commission over allegedly illegitimate public assistance having been granted to the shipyard in the past.⁴⁵

Social and cultural relations. In 2007, the troubled past of the Polish and Ukrainian nations resurfaced as the most important aspect of cultural and social relations between the two countries. 2007 was the 60th anniversary of Operation Wisła, which was carried out by the communist regime in Poland and which still arouses considerable bitterness toward Poland. Although the Senate had already condemned, in 1990, the forceful deportation of Ukrainians from south-eastern Poland, and in 2002 President Kwaśniewski had expressed regret that the event had occurred, it was disclosed in January 2007 that the Ukrainian World Congress demanded that Poland condemn the event again and compensate the victims.⁴⁶ In March, President Yushchenko proposed a debate in the Ukrainian parliament on Operation Wisła,⁴⁷ which did not take place owing to the dissolution of the Council soon thereafter. On 27 April, during Yushchenko's visit to Warsaw, a joint statement was signed by the presidents of Poland and Ukraine, condemning the forced resettlement of Ukrainians as an "injustice that resulted from the actions of the totalitarian, communist authorities."⁴⁸ During the commemorative events, President Yushchenko also visited, as a private person this time, the village of Zdynia, which is in the vicinity of Gorlice, where the Lemko Culture Festival "Łemkowska Watra" was taking place.

Tensions between the Polish and Ukrainian authorities also arose in connection with the exhumation of the bodies of NKVD victims in Bykivnia, not far from Kyiv, where many Polish citizens, among other victims, were executed. At least some of the Poles killed in Bykivnia are listed on the so-called Ukrainian Katyn list, which contains the names of some 3,500 Polish citizens taken prisoner after the Red Army's seizure of Eastern Poland in 1939. Their fate remained unknown for many years, although it was surmised that they could

⁴⁴ See W. Gadowski, "Stocznia w matni," *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 30 January 2007 (Internet edition).

⁴⁵ In January 2008 it emerged that, according to the Commission, the shipyard should return as much as 700 million PLN rather than from 30 to 106 million PLN, as had been previously estimated. Under the circumstances, speculations surfaced that the Ukrainian investor would attempt to nullify the transaction. See M. Chrzan, "Ukraińcy grożą zerwaniem umowy na zakup stoczni," *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 30 January 2007 (Internet edition).

⁴⁶ See "Zapłaćcie za akcję 'Wisła'," *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 31 January 2007.

⁴⁷ See "Juszczenko o akcji 'Wisła'," *Rzeczpospolita* of 30 March 2007.

⁴⁸ *Wspólne oświadczenie prezydenta RP i prezydenta Ukrainy z okazji 60. rocznicy akcji "Wisła,"* www.prezydent.pl/x.download?id=12025973.

have been killed in Bykivnia. For this reason, a group of visiting Polish experts, led by Professor Andrzej Kola, took part as guests in the exhumation work which had been conducted there since 2006, working with Ukrainian archaeologists. However, when Polish experts returned to Ukraine in 2007, it turned out that a dispute over competencies had broken out in Kyiv, namely over who had the right to conduct exhumations in Bykivnia: the Inter-ministerial Committee for the Commemoration of the Victims of War and Political Repressions or the Ukrainian National Remembrance Institute. The latter was de facto run by its deputy-president, Roman Krutysyk, a staunch nationalist who opposed commemorating the Polish victims of Bykivnia separately, as proposed by the Polish Council for the Remembrance of Struggle and Martyrdom. Krutysyk was also against the participation of Polish archaeologists in the exhumation work. He was supported in this by part of the media, e.g., by the popular “5 Kanal” television station. As a result of this dispute, the remains excavated by Polish archaeologists were kept for several months in black bags in a sealed tent at the exhumation site. Ultimately, the remains of 2,000 of Bykivnia victims, including some 400 Poles, were temporarily buried in a mass grave on 27 October, and their “proper” burial ceremony is to take place in 2008. President Yushchenko later regretted that lack of tact on both sides in the Bykivnia issue.⁴⁹

Some anxiety could be felt in Ukrainian circles, chiefly from Poland, following the establishment, during Law and Justice's government tenure, of the “Instytut Kresowy” (Institute of Poland's Former Eastern Borderlands) in Warsaw, commemorating the “Polishness” of areas currently a part of Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, and Latvia. The Warsaw authorities were also against the institute, but ultimately the capital's mayor, Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, decided not to close down the institution, but considerably reduced its budget.⁵⁰ The idea is being considered to incorporate the Institute into the History Meeting House, a local-government cultural institution. A lot of controversy arose in Ukraine and among the Polish intelligentsia involved in Polish-Ukrainian dialogue in connection with the idea of erecting in Warsaw an unusually graphic monument commemorating the victims of Ukrainian nationalism—it was to depict the mutilated bodies of Polish children, nailed to a tree.

Cultural exchange between the two countries and societies during this period was very lively. Ukraine was an honorary guest to the 52nd Book Fair in Warsaw,

⁴⁹ See the Ukrainian president's interview for *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 6 December 2007.

⁵⁰ See “Instytucja nie dla Warszawy,” *Rzeczpospolita* of 23 March 2007 (Warsaw edition).

held in May 2007. However, the Polish public was not overly enthusiastic in exploring the offerings of the Ukrainian guests.⁵¹ This confirmed a phenomenon which has long been observed: Ukrainians, particularly from the western part of the country, are more interested in Polish culture than the other way round.

Nevertheless, as a result of the lack of financing for Ukrainian research and cultural projects, Poland finances the majority of common cultural and research undertakings. In addition, there are no Ukrainian correspondents for the several Ukraine-focused centers in Poland. Although 2007 saw the establishment of the Centre for Polish and European Studies at the prestigious Kyiv-Mohyla Academy to promote Polish culture and knowledge about Poland among Ukrainian researchers and students, it only operated thanks to a modest grant from the Polish embassy. In 2007, the matter of a Polish-Ukrainian university also remained unresolved. The university was to be established in Lublin, through the common endeavor of Polish and Ukrainian colleges.⁵² This idea has been discussed for many years and, during president Lech Kaczyński's visit to Kyiv in December, President Yushchenko called for the university to be established as quickly as possible.

In connection with Poland's accession to the Schengen Area, the Sejm passed the Law on the Polish Charter, which grants to ethnic Poles or people of Polish descent who live in post-Soviet states the right to hold long-term national visas and to be treated by Polish state institutions on terms similar to those enjoyed by Polish citizens (the right to work, free university education). Although the criteria for ascertaining Polish identity are rather liberal (a candidate needs to demonstrate that his/her grandfather or grandmother or two great-grandparents were Polish, or were Polish citizens, and to show a certain knowledge of the Polish language and culture) and, as a result, rights pursuant to the Charter are likely to be granted to a part of the ethnically Ukrainian population, the authorities of Ukraine, unlike those of Belarus, did not publicly protest the step.

Conclusions

Polish-Ukrainian relations in 2007 can be considered to have been very good. Contacts between politicians from both countries were frequent, particularly between Presidents Lech Kaczyński and Viktor Yushchenko. A marked increase

⁵¹ See "Polska publiczność nie doceniła ciekawej oferty Ukrainy," *Rzeczpospolita* of 21 May 2007.

⁵² See PAP dispatch of 6 December 2007.

in trade took place, as well as a growth in Polish direct investments in Ukraine. In addition, there is increasingly more political acceptance for large Ukrainian investments in Poland, which were looked upon with great caution in the past. These are positive developments because, most often, the establishment of increasingly close economic relations naturally leads to the consolidation of political ties.

The award to both countries of the right to organize Euro 2012 was also a considerable success. If this honor is not taken away (as is sometimes forecast by pessimists, rather unrealistically it would seem), hosting this event will markedly strengthen ties between the two countries and will accelerate the process of Ukraine's integration with the European Union.

Another reason for satisfaction is that there were no serious disputes over the past, although history could offer plenty of reasons for such—such as Operation Wisła, the mass burials in Bykivnia, or the monument to the victims of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army—to those guided by ill-will.

It would appear that 2007 brought more realism to prognoses concerning political developments in Ukraine. Excessively optimistic views about Ukraine's chances of acceding quickly to the European Union were abandoned, and strategies for canvassing support among EU member states and for assisting Ukraine's efforts to carry out the necessary reforms were modified. Poland's policies became increasingly pragmatic. There are numerous examples testifying to this shift. Ukraine's accession to the European Union was not named as the primary enlargement-related task in Minister Fotyga's exposé. The Polish authorities did not block the commencement of negotiations between the EU and Ukraine on a new agreement governing their mutual relations, even though the Polish proposal to discuss the European prospect with that country was not incorporated into the mandate. During the Ukrainian political crisis, the Polish authorities remained neutral, and support for President Yushchenko, who is friendly toward Poland, was limited to the Polish president's and prime minister's suggestions that the best way out of the gridlock would be new elections to the Supreme Council.

The new government headed by Donald Tusk took steps to improve relations with Russia, something that was not necessarily welcomed by Ukrainian politicians. Ukrainian affairs were not neglected, however, and lobbying for that country on the European forum did not cease, a cause to which the Kaczyński government had been undoubtedly very committed and which was supported by the Sejm opposition and the Polish MEP. One indirect success for Polish

politicians, and Michał Kamiński in particular, was the European Parliament's adoption of a recommendation to offer the EU membership prospect to Ukraine. Kaczyński's government failed to appreciate the degree to which the effectiveness of such steps depends on Poland's image in the European Union and on shedding the labels of "Russophobes," "Eurosceptics," and "Germanophobes" that the government had earned owing to its often confrontational rhetoric. As a result, the attempt by Tusk's government to alleviate tensions with Germany and to improve relations with Russia should be seen as decidedly appropriate—also because it gives Poland more opportunity to lobby in favor of Ukraine.

The failure of Donald Tusk's government to include Kyiv as one of the first destinations for the new prime minister's official visits was a mistake (it should, however, be noted that the government in Ukraine was formed as late as 18 December). Perhaps the new government wanted to hint to Ukraine not to treat Polish lobbying on its behalf as unconditional and unchanging. In practical terms, Tusk's government continued the policy of his predecessors on Ukraine, although the failure to discern the symbolic significance of visiting Moscow before visiting Kyiv is difficult to justify. The media in both countries remarked that Ukraine had been pushed into Russia's shadow.

Equally hard to justify is the failure of Jarosław Kaczyński's government to draft an agreement on local border traffic between Poland and Ukraine and the fact that Donald Tusk's government overlooked this issue in its initial weeks in office. This is even more surprising as the Polish authorities had declared on numerous occasions that they would go to any lengths to facilitate border crossings by individuals between Poland and Ukraine (a provision on the start-up of local border traffic following Poland's accession to the Schengen area was included, for example, in the "Road Map," signed in April 2007). These oversights harmed Poland's positive image in Ukraine that had been built over the years. It is also a pity that, despite many declarations, not much was done to make crossing the border easier in general, as the crossing often takes place in conditions that infringe on human dignity (e.g. the foot crossing in Medyka).

Poland is only partially at fault for the situation at the Lviv consular office, and for the long queues in front of the consular offices in other cities. However, with a little more funding and increased staff for Polish consulates in Ukraine, the problems that are so damaging to the reputation of the entire country could have been avoided, at least to some degree.

Despite some progress and optimistic assurances by President Kaczyński, who is personally involved in the process, the matter of the Odessa-Brody-Płock

pipeline was not resolved. It was undeniably positive, however, that an attempt to revive this project should have been made at all.

The above issues should not, however, affect the overall balance of Poland's policy on Ukraine which, despite certain shortcomings, is positive.

Poland's Policy Regarding Countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia

Background

Poland's policy towards the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia in 2007 was more active than in previous years. As a result of the evolution of external and internal conditions since 2003, political and economic contacts with some states of the region intensified.

The secondary importance of these countries for Poland in the 1990s was reflected in successive opening addresses by Poland's ministers of foreign affairs. After some initial interest shown by Poland in the new states in 1992—as Poland recognized their independence and concluded agreements governing bilateral relations with them—they were relegated to the margins of Poland's foreign policy. Until the end of the previous decade, the government spoke only vaguely in its yearly statements about foreign policy about the need to intensify relations with those countries (mainly in the economic sphere) and to enhance the legal and treaty framework these relations rested on.¹ Poland's involvement in Central Asia and the South Caucasus briefly increased during its chairmanship of the OSCE in 1998, when the Polish minister of foreign affairs, Bronisław Geremek, visited all the countries of the region on behalf of the organization. It was not until 1999–2000 that new ideas began to be heard in foreign ministers' statements about the region, especially that of using the natural resources of the Caspian Sea region to diversify energy supplies to Poland, and that of security challenges in the context of the “frozen conflicts” in the Caucasus and of the unstable situation in Central Asia.

The insignificance of the region under discussion for Poland's foreign policy (including in its eastern policy, where the focus has been on Ukraine, Russia and Belarus) was determined by a mixture of many external and internal factors.

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¹ All foreign policy statements of the Polish governments in 1991–2005 are published in R. Stemplowski, *Wprowadzenie do analizy polityki zagranicznej RP*, second extended edition, vol. II—*Aneksy*, Warsaw: PISM, 2007.

Poland's priorities at the time were clear (accession to NATO and the EU as well as the establishment of optimum relations with its immediate neighbors), and did not include an active policy towards the states of the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Thus, Poland did not want to dilute its limited resources in undertakings conducted in the name of vaguely formulated interests and, generally speaking, limited itself to declaring support for political and economic reforms in those countries and for efforts aimed at strengthening their sovereignty.

External factors had an enormous impact on Poland's policy towards the republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia. One serious constraint was the region's unstable political situation, caused by economic crisis, the formative processes of the political systems, and ethnic strife. Over time, the conflicts became gradually frozen, and so were systemic reforms. Although the authoritarian regimes which had emerged in the entire region shared many internal characteristics, this fact did not result in their adoption of identical external strategies. Individual states had different aspirations and set different policy objectives: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were competing for regional leadership; Turkmenistan opted for economic autarchy, political self-isolation, and a cult of personality. Central Asian countries concentrated firstly on their immediate neighbors and, secondly, on countries that played important roles in the region, i.e., Russia, the US, Turkey, Iran, and China. Georgia was interested in cooperation with the West, Armenia established close ties with Russia, while Azerbaijan was balancing between the two options. The nature of these countries' political systems, which lacked stable institutions and were far from democratic, did not encourage the Polish authorities to get involved, the more so as the antagonisms among the countries of the region ruled out the pursuit of a cohesive policy in the area. Undoubtedly, the distances involved and the absence of developed transportation and communication infrastructure was a further obstacle.

In the first years of this decade, signs of limited change were beginning to emerge. Following its accession to NATO, Poland started to show increasingly clearly its support for the "open door" policy, declaring itself in favor of the future membership of Georgia and Azerbaijan in the alliance. In turn, after accession to the EU, Poland started to call for the EU's greater involvement in the entire region, mainly by reinforcing the European Neighborhood Policy. Thanks to the opportunity to contribute to the shaping of policies in both organizations, Poland obtained new instruments for its eastern policy. The long-term objective of this policy has become the drawing of some states of the South Caucasus into Euro-Atlantic structures (Georgia to the EU and NATO,

Azerbaijan to NATO). A similar rhetoric was used in relation to Central Asia, although, in practice, an increasingly greater emphasis was placed on energy issues. This was due to the petrification of authoritarian regimes in those states,² something that greatly limited opportunities for political cooperation but did not hinder it in the economic sphere.

An increase of Polish activeness followed in response to the “Revolution of Roses” in Georgia towards the end of 2003, when President Eduard Shevardnadze, accused of electoral fraud and under pressure from the opposition, had to step down from office. Poland interpreted this as a sign of revival of the democratization process in the post-Soviet area. The developmental model based on authoritarian rule proved to be less durable than it had initially appeared. The Ukrainian “Orange Revolution” which followed a year later reinforced this conviction. Ultimately, the wave of democratic transformations swept through Georgia and Ukraine only, and broke up against the existing structures of power in other countries of the region. Nevertheless, these events constituted a stimulus for countries of the West, including Poland, to increase their involvement and diversify their policies towards the region of the South Caucasus.

At the beginning of 2007, new possibilities arose for cooperation with Turkmenistan, which had been isolated until then. After the death of President Saparmurat Niyazov, the new authorities started to look more favorably on cooperating with other countries. Although their policies did not change radically, but if one considers their starting point, these changes were very significant.

Poland’s policy towards the states of the South Caucasus Central Asia was markedly affected by the change of government following the parliamentary elections of 2005, and especially after the cabinet reshuffle in the spring of 2006. The new cabinet decided to enliven relations with these countries, as it saw this as a chance to realize the strategic objectives of Poland’s foreign policy, above all to increase the level of Poland’s energy security.

Objectives

The change in the Polish government’s approach to the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia is reflected by the unprecedented amount of space devoted to this subject in the “Government Foreign Policy Information” of

² Until the “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005, all Central Asian heads of states had been in office continuously since Soviet times as Communist party secretaries turned presidents.

2007, presented at the Sejm on 11 May.³ Foreign Affairs Minister Anna Fotyga summarized previous measures taken in the area and announced new ones. Interestingly, the policy address was delivered on the eve of the so-called Cracow summit, Poland's principal political project directed at several states of the region. The summit was attended by the presidents of Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, and by a representative of Kazakhstan.

The most important elements of the policy towards the region in question, Minister Fotyga stated, were support for systemic transformation and for the European aspirations of some of the Caucasian states, particularly Georgia and Azerbaijan (Armenia was mentioned only pro forma, as its objectives differ). Poland unequivocally supported Georgia's efforts to join NATO. It also proposed greater involvement of the European Union in solving or alleviating conflicts in the South Caucasus, declaring that Poland would participate in such undertakings. These activities were of a long-term nature. In the shorter run, the main objective was to bring certain states closer to Euro-Atlantic structures by strengthening existing ties or establishing new forms of cooperation, such as Georgia's inclusion in the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP).

Enhancing Poland's energy security by diversifying the sources of supply of this energy was named the strategic objective of Polish foreign policy by Minister Fotyga. One of the government's most important plans was to gain access to Caspian oil and gas resources and, at the same time, to develop the Brody-Płock pipeline project. This project was intended to be part of the Euro-Asian transport corridor project, which has been planned for well over a decade, to help exporters (Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan) diversify their export routes, while transit countries (Georgia, Ukraine) could improve their bargaining position against Russia as a supplier, and importers (Poland) would have a chance to diversify their sources of imports. The Caspian Sea region would gain in importance especially as a potential source of crude oil. In the medium-term perspective, the Polish government intended to create appropriate political and institutional conditions for implementation of this project.

Bilateral Relations

Political relations. Polish policy towards the South Caucasus and Central Asia was composed of both measures of a bilateral nature and multilateral initiatives, although the latter did not include all the states of the region.

³ See above, "Government Information on Polish Foreign Policy in 2007," pp. 11–38.

A certain hierarchy of importance took shape in relation to Poland's partners of the Caspian region. In the political dimension, Georgia came to the fore, followed by Azerbaijan. In the economic dimension, on the other hand, above all in terms of energy resources, the Polish authorities attached greater importance to relations with energy exporters, that is Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, and Georgia as an integral part of the potential transit corridor. Owing to the political reasons behind the plans to establish closer energy cooperation with some states of the region, and the implications of these plans, energy issues should be analyzed in the context of the development of political relations, remembering, however, that these relations are of not inconsequential economic importance as well.

The bilateral dimension. Poland's relations with Georgia were the more animated than with any other state of the region in 2007, and were characterized by a high frequency of meetings between politicians, as well as consultations at various levels. This process started in 2006, when presidents Lech Kaczyński and Mikheil Saakashvili met on two occasions. In February 2007, foreign affairs minister Anna Fotyga visited Georgia, where she held talks with Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli, foreign affairs minister Gela Beshuashvili and Speaker of Parliament Nino Burjanadze. The main subject of discussion concerned preparations for the visit of the Polish president. Security issues were also discussed in the context of Georgia's efforts to join NATO.

In April, President Kaczyński paid an official, two-day visit to Georgia. The talks he held revolved mainly around energy security and military cooperation. The Polish president once again reiterated his support for Georgia's efforts to join NATO, as well as for the territorial integrity of the country, which was struggling with separatist movements in Abkhazia and Ossetia. President Saakashvili was invited to the Cracow summit, which was to initiate closer regional cooperation on energy. On the eve of the summit, the presidents of Poland and Georgia expressed their desire to intensify cooperation between their countries. They decided to establish the Consultative Committee of the Presidents of the Republic of Poland and Georgia, modeled on those that have been set up with Lithuania and Ukraine. The Committee's inaugural session took place in Tbilisi in November. Georgia was considered Poland's strategic partner in the South Caucasus.

President Lech Kaczyński also visited Georgia in November, on the occasion of the anniversary of the "Revolution of Roses." At that time, he personally participated in the peaceful resolution of a political crisis caused by a dispute between President Saakashvili and the opposition. The Polish president sought

to prevent the escalation of tensions and stabilize the situation. Ultimately, the Georgian president decided to hold early presidential elections in January 2008—a decision viewed favorably by Poland. Several days after President Kaczyński's visit, Adam Michnik traveled to Georgia, at the invitation of the authorities and with the support of the European Union, to observe the Georgian government and opposition media during the election campaign.

Georgia was the region's only beneficiary of the Polish program for bilateral developmental aid. Financial support from Poland (4 million PLN) was primarily spent on technical assistance to establish local self-governance, reform the public administration, mobilize rural areas, and stimulate economic growth.⁴

Azerbaijan was the second most important state in the region in terms of the intensity of political relations. At the turn of January to February, foreign affairs minister Anna Fotyga visited Baku. During her visit, a Memorandum on cooperation for European integration 2007–2008 was signed between the ministries of foreign affairs of Poland and Azerbaijan.⁵ Poland confirmed its support for closer ties between Azerbaijan and the European Union under the European Neighborhood Policy. Poland also called for closer cooperation between Azerbaijan and NATO under the Partnership for Peace program, with the aim of stabilizing the situation in the region. Discussions on current issues were dominated by the subject of energy, since Poland viewed Azerbaijan as a potential supplier of crude oil to the country.

On 30–31 March 2007, President Kaczyński visited Baku and invited President Ilham Aliyev to attend the Cracow summit. The presidents met once again in May during the summit, and then during the GUAM summit, and at the second energy summit in Vilnius in October 2007. During all these meetings the main subject of discussions was the development of energy infrastructure.

In 2007, the Polish government pursued a more active towards Kazakhstan, counting first of all on closer cooperation in the field of energy, particularly in terms of potential crude oil deliveries to the Odessa-Brody-Płock pipeline. Towards the end of March, President Kaczyński paid an official visit to Kazakhstan, where he met President Nursultan Nazarbayev and Prime Minister Karim Masimov. Three

⁴ *Program polskiej pomocy zagranicznej udzielanej za pośrednictwem MSZ RP w roku 2007*, Warsaw, 2007. The remaining countries were covered by the regional aid programme. The funding went primarily to Kazakhstan (owing to the sizeable share of the population of Polish descent there), followed by Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Armenia.

⁵ *Komunikat po oficjalnej wizycie minister spraw zagranicznych RP Anny Fotygi w Republice Azerbejdżańskiej, 1 marca 2007 r.*, www.msz.gov.pl.

intergovernmental agreements were signed during the visit: on cooperation in the area of tourism, on cooperation in the defense industry, and on the abolition of visa requirements for holders of diplomatic passports. Poland invited President Nazarbayev to the energy summit in Cracow; but it was his special envoy who eventually attended. In the political sphere, the government in Astana primarily strove to secure Polish support for its bid to chair the OSCE in 2009. Poland responded positively to these efforts.⁶ During the OSCE Ministerial Council in November 2007 in Madrid, Kazakhstan's presidency of the organization in 2010 was approved.

Bilateral relations with other states of the South Caucasus and Central Asia were definitely less intense in 2007. In February, Poland's minister of foreign affairs visited Armenia, where she met with President Robert Kocharian, Prime Minister Adranik Margaryan and Minister of Foreign Affairs Vartan Oskanian. A certain modification of relations with Turkmenistan took place in connection with the political changes which followed the death of President Niyazov in December 2006, and which coincided with the opening of the Polish embassy in Ashgabat. The presidents of Poland and Turkmenistan met in September in New York during the session of the UN General Assembly. However, the development of closer relations between the two countries remains a matter for the future. There were no significant developments in Poland's political relations with Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, or Kyrgyzstan.

The regional dimension. In 2007, Poland initiated regional energy cooperation with Lithuania, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. The primary task was a return to the concept of the Baku-Odessa-Brody-Płock-Gdańsk transport corridor. Ukraine completed the Odessa-Brody section in 2001. Currently, Russian oil is flowing through it to Odessa. However, plans for the extension of the pipeline to Poland came to a halt at the political decision stage, whose only result was the appointment of a potential contractor—the Polish-Ukrainian company Sarmatia. The deadlock resulted from political difficulties (lack of stability in Ukraine, the indecisiveness of Azerbaijan, and the ambiguous stance of the Polish authorities) and economic problems (doubts about the feasibility of the project, especially during a period of low oil prices on world markets) and uncertainty about the chance of acquiring sufficient volumes of Caspian oil.

⁶ *Prezydent Polshi L. Kachinski: Sushchestvuiet neraskritii potentsial polsko-kazahstanskikh otnoshenii*, Kazinform, 27.03.2007, www.kazakhstan.pl/www_ros/a2007ru/070404ru.htm.

The situation changed after the elections in Poland in 2005. The new government decided to resume work on the pipeline and to invite all potential participants in the project to the discussions.⁷ Azerbaijan and Georgia decided to join the Polish initiative. In keeping with Polish intentions, cooperation in the sphere of energy could be a convenient starting point for closer cooperation in other areas, such as trade, tourism, investments, and transport.

As a result of several months of efforts by the Polish authorities, the energy summit was held in Cracow in May 2007, and was attended by the presidents of the above-mentioned countries and by a special presidential envoy from Kazakhstan with the rank of secretary of state. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss plans to deliver Caspian oil to Ukraine and further to Poland (completion of the Odessa-Brody-Płock pipeline project). A political declaration was adopted about intensified cooperation “through the commencement of work on an intergovernmental agreement to determine the respective shares of states and companies in the construction project to supply Caspian crude oil to European and world markets (the Odessa-Brody-Płock-Gdańsk pipeline).”⁸ The appointment of a special work group to determine the principles of cooperation for the project was also announced. It was initially agreed that an international consortium would be established, with oil companies from states participating in the project as its members. The summit sought to produce a political rapprochement between the parties rather than a binding agreement. Participants decided to continue the discussions in Vilnius in October.

The meeting in Vilnius, held on 10–11 October 2007, was attended by the presidents of Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijani minister for energy and natural resources, the presidents of Latvia and Romania, and envoys of the European Union and the United States. A pentilateral intergovernmental agreement was signed (excluding Kazakhstan) on cooperation in the energy sector.⁹ The primary objectives of the agreement were the construction of an oil transportation corridor to connect parties to the agreement and the identification of potential sources of supply and transport routes. The agreement was supposed to provide the political framework for

⁷ Lithuania was included to emphasise that the initiative was not about energy only, but also about closer cooperation in general. The idea was also proposed to ship Caspian oil to the refinery in Lithuanian Mažeikiai, owned by PKN Orlen.

⁸ *Wspólna deklaracja prezydentów, Kraków, 11 maja 2007 r.*, www.prezydent.pl.

⁹ Monitor Polski (MP), 2007, no. 6, item 74.

implementing the Brody-Płock pipeline construction project. In addition, representatives of state oil companies of the five countries participating in the project signed an initial arrangement on the establishment of a new international consortium Sarmatia (the existing Polish-Ukrainian Sarmatia was joined by companies from Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Lithuania). The shareholders adopted the founding statutes in November 2007 in Odessa. The first task of the consortium was to conduct a feasibility study. It was further agreed that the next energy summit would take place in Kiev in 2008.

Talks continued at the 2007 summit of heads of states of the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development. Poland had already responded positively to attempts to integrate the efforts of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova in certain areas. In recognition for his involvement in the affairs of the region, Lech Kaczyński was invited to the summit in Baku as an honorary guest. During the meetings with leaders of GUAM states, not only energy issues were discussed, but also closer cooperation between Poland and GUAM in the areas of trade, tourism, investments, and transport.¹⁰ In addition, at the September session of the UN General Assembly in New York, a second meeting was held between the ministers of foreign affairs from GUAM states and Poland. Poland reiterated its support for the idea of a final resolution to the conflicts underway on the territories of some GUAM member states, with respect for the principle of territorial integrity of states as recognized by the international community.¹¹ Regular meetings of the so-called national coordinators for the development of GUAM-Poland relations were also announced. The first meeting took place in Warsaw in February 2008.¹²

Economic relations. For many years, the states of the South Caucasus and Central Asia have been very far down on the list of Poland's trade partners. Equally, Poland has never been a focus of economic interest for the countries of the Caspian Sea region. Although for Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan, the European Union is most important in terms of trade, this does not mean that Poland is a significant trade partner for these countries. The most important entity in the region still remains Russia, and it owes this position not only to trade cooperation, but also to investments and numerous business ties (formal

¹⁰ *The Baky GUAM Summit Communiqué*, www.guam.org.ua.

¹¹ *Communiqué of the GUAM-Poland Meeting, New York, 27 September 2007*, www.mfa.gov.az.

¹² *Informacja z pierwszego spotkania koordynatorów narodowych RP-GUAM w Warszawie w dniu 21 lutego 2008 r.*, www.msz.gov.pl.

and informal). This state of affairs is slowly changing, however, because Caucasian republics are gradually increasing their volume of trade with European Union countries at the expense of the Russian market. Kazakhstan still maintains close ties with Russia, but at the same time it is developing its relations with the European Union and China with growing intensity. In the case of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, Russia is still in first place, while the trade volume of those countries with the European Union only slightly exceeds trade volumes with their immediate neighbors. Kyrgyzstan's economy is primarily focused on China, and, to a smaller degree, on Russia and Kazakhstan.

The possibilities of satisfying Poland's trade ambitions with the countries of the Caspian Sea region were, quite obviously, slight. Trade remained at a low level throughout the 1990s. The situation deteriorated even further following the financial crisis in Russia in 1998, when many Polish companies were driven out of eastern markets. It was not until 2002–2003 that Poland's trade volume with Caucasian and Central Asian republics slowly began to recover as a result of a general improvement in the region's economic situation (chiefly Russia's economic growth), the greater absorption rates of local markets, the growth of Poland's export potential, and the more intense international activity of Polish enterprises. The accession of Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia to the World Trade Organization played a role as well, as it stabilized and improved mutual trade relations, by introducing lower tax rates, for example.

Table 1

**Volume of foreign trade between Poland and the states
of the South Caucasus and Central Asia in 2003–2007 (in million EUR)**

Country		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007*	Share (%)
Armenia	exports	4.1	5.4	6.0	6.6	7.4	0.01
	imports	0.5	0.8	8.2	8.3	6.1	0.01
	balance	3.6	4.6	-2.2	-1.7	1.4	
Azerbaijan	exports	9.8	36.6	42.0	56.3	50.7	0.05
	imports	4.2	5.7	8.9	5.2	3.2	0.00
	balance	25.6	30.9	33.1	51.1	47.4	
Georgia	exports	3.8	8.5	10.3	19.3	44.6	0.04
	imports	1.2	2.2	3.0	2.7	5.1	0.00
	balance	2.6	6.3	7.3	16.6	39.5	

Kazakhstan	exports	86.7	125.1	170.1	276.2	346.2	0.34
	imports	109.2	361.4	402.4	243.6	300.8	0.25
	balance	-22.5	-236.4	-232.4	32.7	45.3	
Kyrgyzstan	exports	4.5	8.4	7.8	12.7	20.2	0.02
	imports	1.8	1.7	1.9	1.2	1.6	0.00
	balance	2.7	6.6	5.8	11.4	18.6	
Tajikistan	exports	5.4	5.8	7.1	14.3	12.4	0.01
	imports	18.4	25.5	10.8	7.8	9.4	0.01
	balance	-13.0	-19.7	-3.7	6.5	3.0	
Turkmenistan	exports	3.4	5.9	16.5	16.3	12.1	0.01
	imports	39.6	83.4	63.1	2.6	5.5	0.00
	balance	-36.2	-77.5	-46.6	13.7	6.6	
Uzbekistan	exports	22.5	19.1	36.4	50.0	46.4	0.05
	imports	29.1	47.5	136.5	506.0	508.3	0.43
	balance	-6.6	-28.4	-100.1	-456.0	-462.0	
Total	exports	160.2	211.4	296.2	451.7	540.0	0.53
	imports	204.0	528.2	634.8	777.4	840.0	0.70
	balance	-43.8	-316.8	-338.6	-325.7	-300.0	
CIS	exports	3 306.1	4 685.7	6 220.3	8 268.1	10 228.3	10.11
	imports	5 823.8	7 117.0	9 471.4	12 462.9	13 502.8	11.37
	balance	-2 517.7	-2 431.3	-3 251.1	-4 194.8	-3 274.5	

Source: *Współpraca gospodarcza Polski z krajami WNP*, Warsaw: Analyses and Forecasting Department, Ministry of Economy, 2007. Statistics for 2007 from: *Syntetyczna informacja o eksporcie i imporcie Polski za 2007 rok. Dane Wstępne*, Warsaw: Analyses and Forecasting Department, Ministry of Economy, 2008.

The year 2007 saw continued growth in trade with Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. For the other countries, a slight drop was recorded in relation to 2006. The share of Caspian Sea countries in trade with Poland is negligible and, for structural reasons, it is difficult to expect any radical changes. In 2007, their overall share in Polish exports amounted to 0.53%, while imports came to 0.7%. It should also be emphasized that 99% of the growth in Polish exports to the CIS were exports to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, which indicates a the slight export expansion of Polish companies on the other markets. The reasons for this are the high reconnaissance costs, owing to the substantial distances involved, the absence of a proper transport infrastructure, non-familiarity with the local conditions, regulations, and customs, the high level of corruption there

and non-transparent legal systems. The prospects for extended economic cooperation depend in large measure on the ability of the region's countries to maintain economic growth at a stable level in the long run, which in turn depends on finding solutions to local conflicts. Without political stability in the region, the inflow of foreign investments to those markets and the development of trade will be seriously limited on account of the high risks involved.

The structure of Poland's exports to the region is significantly fragmented. Only several items exceed 5% of total exports or imports. Several hundred Polish companies contribute to this trade, primarily small and medium-size enterprises. Imports from Poland are dominated by food products, chemicals, machinery and equipment, metal processing products, plastics and wood products. Exports—which are less fragmented—to Poland are dominated (approximately 80%) by natural resources (mostly oil and its derivatives from Kazakhstan and natural gas from Uzbekistan), textiles, and metals and metallurgical products. Among the states of the region, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are most important from the Polish point of view, owing to the significant volumes of natural resources which Poland imports from those countries. Those two countries, and Azerbaijan, are regarded as potential sources of new energy.

The level of Polish investments in these countries is modest. The only country where there are relatively large Polish investments, particularly in the energy industry, is Kazakhstan. A few dozen or so companies with Polish shareholders are currently operating there, in the construction, food processing, pharmaceutical, and oil industries. The largest Polish investor is Petrolinvest, the owner of several joint-venture companies in Kazakhstan and of shares in natural energy deposits.

Table 2

**Poland's trade with chosen countries of the South Caucasus
and Central Asia (2006)**

Country	Exports	Imports
Armenia	Medication, furniture, foodstuffs	Ferromolybdenum, and non-refined copper (over 80% in total)
Azerbaijan	Food products, electrical machinery, chemicals, metal processing products, wood and wood products	Hazelnuts, propane, cotton, plastics

Georgia	Medication, furniture, foodstuffs	Ferroalloys, food products (notably hazelnuts), diodes, transistors
Kazakhstan	Electronics, furniture, cosmetics and drugs, metal products, tobacco, chemicals, construction materials and food products	Oil and oil products (over 90%), phosphorus, aluminum alloys and steel sheets
Uzbekistan	Sugar, machinery and equipment, automotive parts and accessories, drugs	Natural gas (over 80%), cotton and its derivatives

Source: *Yearbook of Foreign Trade Statistics*, Warsaw: Central Statistical Office, 2007.

To summaries, three important events should be mentioned in relations between Poland and countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The Polish National Exhibition-Poland Expo Kazakhstan 2007 was held in March in Astana and gathered several dozen Polish companies from different branches, but mostly from the construction industry. As a result of the unusually rapid growth of the Kazakh capital, there appeared an opportunity for greater investment by Polish companies. In October 2007, during a visit of the Polish Minister of the Economy in Uzbekistan, an intergovernmental agreement on economic cooperation was signed. In November 2007, the 2nd session of the Poland-Azerbaijan Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation was held in Baku. Ministers of the economy from both countries signed a declaration on cooperation in matters related to the accession of Azerbaijan to the WTO. These same days, the 2nd Polish National Exhibition in Azerbaijan was held in Baku, attended by a few dozen Polish companies from the cosmetics, food processing, construction, machinery, and energy industries.

Cultural relations. Cultural relations between Poland and the states of the South Caucasus and Central Asia in 2007 reflected somewhat the role of those countries in Poland's foreign policy. The increase in diplomatic activity translated to a certain extent into greater social and cultural ties. Owing to the efforts of the Polish government and of non-governmental organizations, a number of cultural events were held.

In April 2007, the Adam Mickiewicz Institute in Georgia organized a Polish-Georgian scientific conference in Tbilisi, as part of Polish Days, where researchers from both countries discussed the situation of Poland in the international arena, Georgia's European aspirations, and bilateral relations. The Institute also organized a number of exhibitions, featuring, for example, photos,

documents, manuscripts, and books published in Georgia in the Polish language. In June, the 3rd International Caucasian Cultures Festival—Transkaukazja 2007—was organized in Warsaw and presented a number of musical, multimedia, and film projects by persons from, among other places, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Northern Caucasus. In September, Poland was the honorary guest of the 2nd International Art House Film Festival in Batumi, where Polish films were shown.

The rapprochement between Poland on the one hand and Georgia and Azerbaijan on the other were emphasized by joint sacral projects. The Polish president assumed patronage over the construction of a Georgian church in Warsaw, while the construction of a Catholic church was completed in Baku, thanks to the support of the Azerbaijani authorities.

The development of relations with Turkmenistan, which had been almost entirely absent from Poland's foreign policy, should also be noted. In December 2007, the Polish embassy in Ashgabat organized Polish Film Days there, with the collaboration of the Ministry of Culture and Turkmenistan Radio and Television.

An important component of Poland's social and cultural policy was the maintenance and strengthening of ties between Poland and the Polish communities residing in the Caspian Sea region. The largest concentration of persons of Polish descent (mostly the descendants of prisoners, or persons exiled or deported at the time of Stalin's rule) is in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, while a less sizeable group lives in Kyrgyzstan. A dozen or so Polish organizations operate in those countries and are mostly engaged in teaching Polish and promoting Polish culture and traditions. Polish language departments exist in the universities of the majority of Caucasian states. In 2007, the Polish government supported, both financially and organizationally, the search for Polish language instructors who would be willing to work in those countries. In April, on the occasion of the Władysław Anders Year, an event commemorating the general was held in Uzbekistan, under the patronage of the Polish president. The Polish War Cemetery in Guzar was opened on the occasion, and a monument and a plaque were unveiled in Tashkent to honor Poles who joined the Polish army formed by General Anders in the USSR during the Second World War.

An element which is independent of the authorities and which contributed to closer social interaction was sport, in particular the rivalry between the national football teams of Poland, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan in the qualifications for the 2008 European Football Championships.

Conclusion

It is difficult to summarize Poland's policy regarding the region at this point in time, as Polish objectives are of a long-term nature (the diversification of oil supplies, the drawing of Caucasian states into Euro-Atlantic structures, and political stability in the region). It should therefore rather be asked whether Poland's actions have furthered these aims.

What deserves positive comment is Poland's diversified policy towards the individual states of the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The events of recent years, particularly the "color" revolutions, have shown that the region should not be treated as a homogenous whole, either in the political or economic sense. Three states of the region have come to the fore in Poland's foreign policy, namely Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan. In seeking to strengthen its eastern policy, which had been focused primarily on Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine until then, Polish diplomacy was most actively striving for closer relations with Georgia, which was regarded after Ukraine as its closest political partner in the post-Soviet area. The trend was reflected in the support of the Polish government for Georgia's European aspirations.

The element that bound together all of Poland's steps in its relations with the states of the South Caucasus and Central Asia in 2007 was energy concerns. The most important Polish initiative was the inauguration of regional cooperation in matters of energy leading to two summits, which were held in Cracow and Vilnius and were attended by the interested countries' heads of state. If we assume that the basic goal behind the actions of the Polish government was to establish a political framework for the joint implementation of infrastructural projects in the foreseeable future, this was definitely a step forward. If we want to measure success by results, then only the signing of the agreement on the establishment of a new, extended consortium for the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Odessa-Płock oil corridor can be considered as such. Still, there are many unanswered questions regarding the real possibility of implementing this project. Until feasibility studies are completed and the issue of accessibility to resources is resolved, the success of this project will remain in doubt. Undoubtedly, Kazakhstan's position has not made the resolution of these problems any easier, as that country at first clearly distanced itself from the project, declaring its support for the undertaking on the condition of Russia's participation. In any case, it is difficult to expect the authorities in Astana to jeopardize their good relations with Russia, which is the primary destination for Kazakh oil. Moreover, given the existence of far more advanced oil projects in

the Black Sea region (the Burgas-Alexandroupoli, Samsun-Ceyhan, and Constanta-Trieste pipelines), the route to Płock may not be competitive from Kazakhstan's perspective. However, considering the multi-faceted foreign policy of that country, which has been successfully balancing between Russia and the West, one should not entirely rule out chances for a positive outcome.

To conclude, Poland's actions should be viewed as a natural consequence of its strategic objectives, while the feasibility and time frame of those plans remain to be appraised.

Poland's Policy Regarding the States of the Middle East and North Africa

Background

After the collapse of communism in the 1990s, Poland lost interest in the Arab World. At that time, after all, Poland was concentrated on political and economic transformations, gaining membership in NATO and the European Union, the building of a strategic partnership with the United States, and the resumption of relations—severed by the People's Republic of Poland (PRP) in 1967—with Israel. As a result, relations with the traditional partners of the PRP, such as Libya, Syria, Algeria, or Iraq, cooled and loosened, or were even sidelined.

In the 1990s, Polish policy on the Middle East was characterised by three tendencies. Firstly, previous diplomatic contacts were maintained, and new ones established: for example, with Saudi Arabia in 1995. Secondly, attempts were made to improve economic relations. Thirdly, Poland gradually increased its involvement in activities aimed at propagating democracy and respect for human rights as universal values. These activities, conducted on a modest scale, did not encounter any determined resistance in the region, due in part to Poland's positive image in Arab countries as a result of Poles' respect for the Arabs' different culture and religion, and in part to Poland's lack of a colonial past. What's more, Poland's steps in this direction have been rather careful.¹

Owing to geography and the ad hoc nature of Polish political and economic interests in the Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa, these countries, with a few exceptions, do not play a significant role in Polish foreign policy. However, since the beginning of the 21st century, the importance of the entire region for Poland has been increasing. This is reflected in Poland's

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¹ J. Bury, A. Kołakowska, A. Szymański, "Polska a Szerszy Bliski Wschód (BMENA)—stosunki i perspektywy współpracy," *Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny*, 2006, no. 6, pp. 83–100 and J. Bury, A. Kołakowska, A. Szymański, "Poland and Broader Middle East—Relations, Initiatives and Prospects for Action," *Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe*, 2007, no. 1, pp. 81–92.

participation in the stabilising and training mission in Iraq (2003), resulting from the nature of Poland's relations with the United States and its obligations as a member of the European Union or NATO, as well as in the involvement of the Polish Armed Forces in UN peacekeeping missions, such as UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon and UNDOF in the buffer zone separating Syria and Israel.²

In 2003, along with the United States and the United Kingdom, Poland took military action against the Iraqi regime, which was suspected of having a program of building weapons of mass destruction and of supporting international terrorism. The charges, however, were not corroborated. Currently, Poland participates in the stabilisation and training mission in Iraq and, in doing so, it demonstrates its readiness to incur significant costs in material and personnel. In this manner, Poland also committed itself to actions for the stabilisation of the Middle East, and region which is significant for global security. In 2004, Poland's image in the world changed, following its accession to the European Union, from that of being a country of the poor East to being a member of the elite club of the rich North, and consequently its international obligations, including the provision of aid, also grew. In this manner Poland has become an active participant in the globalisation process.³ However, one can not overlook the fact that Poland's current policy regarding the Middle East is rather a function of its relations with the United States and the European Union.

One important factor affecting Poland's contacts with the Arab World, is the special nature of Polish-Israeli relations, which were resumed after 1990. On the one hand, these relations improve how Poland is perceived in the world, particularly in the United States, on the other hand, to a certain extent they negatively affect relations with certain Arab countries that were important economic partners for Poland before 1989. Some of them, which have a decidedly negative view of Israel, have started to ignore Poland, a development which has weakened and cooled bilateral relations, as was the case with Libya in 2007.

Premises

The premises of Poland's policy toward the Middle East and North Africa were formulated in general terms in two strategic documents adopted by the Polish government:

² *Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, Warsaw: National Security Bureau, 2007.

³ J. Bury *et. al.*, *op. cit.*

– Poland's strategy for cooperation on behalf of development of October 2003,

– Poland's strategy with regard to non-European developing states of November 2004.

The former document lists the developing countries where Poland has a political presence, and that should be the subject of pro-developmental measures. It also mentions humanitarian aid for the purpose of preventing crises or conflicts, which can be said to apply in large measure to the Arab World (for instance, Iraq, which is undergoing political transformations). In the latter document, the objectives, tasks, instruments, and areas of cooperation were indicated for the different regions of the world, including Asia and Africa. An analysis of this document's contents makes it possible to single out the main directions of Polish foreign policy regarding developing countries.⁴ These are:

- increased trade with simultaneous attempts to reduce Poland's trade deficit,
- increasing Poland's international prestige and strengthening its position as a significant player in international relations,
- ensuring external security and furthering balanced and sustained socio-economic development by shaping a stable and safe international environment.

Countries which Poland views as high priority states in the Arab world include Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, whereas Iraq and Libya were recognized as important. The choice of some of those countries was not incidental, as price fluctuations in world energy markets have made Poland aware of the need to develop relations with potential alternative suppliers of crude oil or natural gas, particularly with the Persian Gulf states. The document also stressed the importance of providing relations with legal, treaty-based, foundations, which constitute the fundamental instrument of international cooperation.

The cooperation between Poland and the Arab World in the area of science and higher education has been growing for years within the framework of agreements signed in the past. For over fifty years, Poland has educated scores of specialists, especially doctors and engineers who, not infrequently, later held important positions in their countries, and earned, decades ago, the good will and respect of the Arabs. In exchange, every year Polish students, chiefly Orientalists and archaeologists, headed to Arab countries.

⁴ See R. Włoch, *Polska a polityka Unii Europejskiej wobec państw rozwijających się*, www.uclm.es/lamusa/ver_articulo.asp?articulo=156&lengua=pl.

Currently, Poland is also involved in the Arab World as part of multilateral relations, resulting primarily as a result of its membership in the European Union. The Mediterranean Partnership, which is gradually being marginalized in favor of the European Neighborhood Policy, was a key element of this cooperation. Poland has also long been interested in establishing closer ties with the Gulf Cooperation Council. In turn, membership in the Atlantic Alliance entails Poland's participation in the NATO Mediterranean dialogue.

Poland is primarily interested in boosting its trade with the region, however, although this is progressing slower than in the case of other EU countries. Annual trade between Poland and the region amounts to over \$2 billion, which accounts for a tiny portion of Poland's total trade with developing countries, estimated at some \$40 billion.⁵

The principles of Poland's policy regarding the Middle East and North Africa in 2007 were formulated in addresses to the Sejm by Foreign Affairs Minister Stefan Meller in February 2006 and by Foreign Affairs Minister Anna Fotyga in May 2007 and partially also in Prime Minister Donald Tusk's opening address of November 2007.⁶

Stefan Meller pointed to the significance of the Middle East for Poland's involvement outside of Europe, both in political and economic terms. In his opinion, the region abounds in more than just challenges and Poland could find there "reliable friends and partners, both in the Arab countries and in Israel." The minister reiterated Poland's readiness to act on behalf of development, the reduction of hunger and poverty, and the search for new sources of funding to provide aid for the least-developed countries. He also expressed Poland's willingness to join international initiatives in the Middle East, including the EU Barcelona Process, or the American Wider Middle East initiative, which seek to support modernization and democratization processes. He also presented the idea of widening the scope of Poland's participation in Iraq by adding training

⁵ K. Zajączkowski, "Polityka zagraniczna Polski wobec pozaeuropejskich krajów rozwijających się na początku XXI w.," in: W. Gizicki, D. Gizicka (eds.), *Polska i świat wobec wyzwań współczesności. Aspekty polityczne, ekonomiczne i formalno-prawne*, Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2008. Cf. *Syntetyczna informacja o eksporcie i imporcie polski za 2007 rok. Dane wstępne*, Warsaw: Ministry of Economy, January 2008.

⁶ "Government Information on Polish Foreign Policy in 2006," *Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy 2007*; "Government Information on Polish Foreign Policy in 2007," see above p. 11; *Opening address by Prime Minister Donald Tusk on 23 November 2007*, www.kprm.gov.pl/s.php?id=435.

and advising activities to the stabilization mission, especially with reference to the newly emerging Iraqi administration.

Poland's involvement in the Middle East and North Africa was discussed in detail by Anna Fotyga. She called attention to strategic issues: international security in the region, and ensuring alternative sources for the supply of energy resources. She stressed Poland's military commitment to the Iraqi operation, the NATO missions in Afghanistan and to the UN operations in Lebanon and the Golan Heights. Minister Fotyga argued that Poland's presence in the Middle East contributes both to reducing the threat of terrorism and to consolidating transatlantic relations. Anna Fotyga also referred to an important aspect of steps taken to ensure peace, namely, measures against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. She also mentioned the international conference organized by the Centre for Strategic Studies in Abu Dhabi in May 2007, devoted to this issue (the importance of the Cracow Proliferation Security Initiative was stressed at the conference). The minister also expressed her conviction that the developmental and humanitarian aid provided by Poland not only helps to stabilize the countries in which Poland is involved, and also contributes to the security of Polish military contingents. The minister pointed to Iraq and the Palestinian Autonomy as hi-priority countries in terms of developmental aid for the region. In a further part of her exposé, she focused on Poland's cooperation with states that are exporters of crude oil from the Persian Gulf and North Africa. Algeria was supposed to play an important role in Polish plans for diversifying its sources of energy. The minister also emphasized the importance of Poland's relations with Israel, notably in light of President Kaczyński's successful visit in 2006, shortly after the end of Israel's military operations in Lebanon. In Minister Fotyga's opinion, Poland's good strategic relations with this state have not had a negative influence on Poland's relations with Arab countries, and positive cooperation with the Arab World will have a good effect on the Middle East peace process.

The address by Prime Minister Tusk was primarily devoted to Polish stabilization missions to Iraq and Afghanistan as instruments of Polish foreign policy. The prime minister announced, however, that Polish soldiers would be withdrawn from Iraq in 2008, following consultations with the allies, above all with the United States.

An analysis of the above documents and addresses makes it possible to present the most important objectives of Poland's foreign policy regarding the Middle East and North Africa in 2007. Firstly, Poland treats the states of the region, both Israel and the Arab countries, as friends, and is interested in

developing broader relations with them, especially in trade and energy. Secondly, Israel occupies a special place in Poland's policy towards the Middle East, owing to the strategic nature of the relations between the two countries. Thirdly, Poland's military involvement in the region is intended to increase its prestige and to strengthen the country's position in international relations. Fourthly, by providing aid to the states of the region, Poland contributes to the improvement of living conditions there, and to further economic and social development, which is in line with EU policy towards the region, as well as with US objectives under the Wider Middle East initiative.

Bilateral Relations

Political relations. In 2007, the following played major roles in Poland's relations with the region: military involvement in Iraq, support for the peace process in the Middle East, notably in UN missions and aid activities, as well as strategic partnership with Israel and measures aimed at developing relations with Persian Gulf states. Less space was devoted to the diversification of sources of energy than in previous years, owing to the lack of realistic plans to build a terminal for liquefied natural gas (LNG), imported, for example, from North Africa, and because of ongoing negotiations with Western European suppliers.

The year 2007 did not bring any breakthrough changes to relations between Poland and the states of the Middle East and North Africa. Despite several high-level meetings, e.g. with the President of the Palestinian National Authority, Mahmud Abbas, in April, or with King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia in June 2007 in Poland, relations with the region as a whole were not substantially intensified.

Political and military relations. Owing to Poland's involvement in the stabilization and training mission to Iraq, the country remained an important part of Poland's Middle Eastern policy. In 2007, Polish soldiers of the 8th and 9th rotation—around 900 soldiers in each—of the Polish Military Contingent (PMC) served in Iraq. From the moment control of the province of Wasit was transferred to Iraqi forces in 2007 and the nature of the mission changed, the number of military personnel has remained constant.⁷ Use of the diversified forces of the PMC is an

⁷ Soldiers from 15 countries were serving under Polish command in the Multinational Division Centre South, that is, soldiers from Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Romania, Salvador, Slovakia, the Ukraine, and U.S.

example of the Polish Armed Forces' ability to adjust to the specific circumstances of missions in regions where there are limited armed conflicts. The Multinational Division was responsible for the province of Al Qadisiyah.

The Polish presence in Iraq constitutes the most significant deployment of Polish Armed Forces beyond Poland's borders today, and is consistent with America's vision of international security. Despite the losses (since 2003, 22 Polish soldiers were killed in Iraq, of which 4 in 2007, and one Government Security Bureau officer) and numerous difficulties, the mission has been assessed positively by military circles. It has especially contributed to accelerating the gradual modernization of the Polish Armed Forces and to adapting them to new challenges.⁸ The Polish Armed Forces are becoming a "fighting" army, which can participate in difficult missions abroad in conjunction with Poland's allies. According to the initial estimates of past years, Poland brought relative stability to the Iraqi provinces they controlled, part of which has already been handed back to the Iraqis themselves. Yet in spite of the mission's substantial costs (some 900 million PLN from 2003 to 2007, which was only 40% of the total spent, as the remaining 60% was paid by the Americans) and the efforts of 14,000 Polish soldiers, no other benefits from Poland's military presence in the region, either for the country, or the army, are to be seen. Worse, on 3 October 2007 unknown persons attempted to assassinate Poland's Ambassador to Iraq, General Edward Pietrzyk, (one Government Security Bureau officer died in the attack); the attempt reflects the disastrous security situation in the country. As a result of the attack, and in connection with the fact that the mission's stabilization objectives had largely been achieved, the new Tusk government announced that the troops would be withdrawn from Iraq by the end of October 2008, as the situation in the country is unstable and Nuri al Maliki's government is paralysed by internal dissensions, fuelled by radical Shiite groups. There were also tensions in the zone controlled by Polish troops. Cases in which Polish troops were fired upon were becoming increasingly frequent. In August 2007, the governor and police chief of Al Qadisiyah province were killed in an attack. The only relatively stable region at present is the northern, Kurdish part of Iraq. Developments in the country are difficult to predict and it cannot be ruled out that chaos will return to Iraq once the stabilizing force has left it.

It should nevertheless be emphasized that following the withdrawal of the Polish contingent in 2008, a weakening of relations between Poland and Iraq is

⁸ *Szef SG WP pożegnał IX zmianę PKW Irak*, www.mon.gov.pl/pl/artykul/3340.

very likely to occur, along with a deterioration of Poland's position in the Middle East, and a decline in trade. Relations between the two countries were not improved by meetings between Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński and Iraq's Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki in Baghdad in December 2006 and May 2007.

Despite Poland's significant military involvement in Iraq, Polish developmental aid to Iraq is modest. A mere 1 million PLN was earmarked for this purpose in the 2007 budget, a one-third reduction in comparison with 2006.⁹ Nevertheless, Ministry of Defense surplus military equipment is provided free-of-charge to newly-formed Iraqi units.¹⁰

Another factor that influences Poland's Middle East policy is its participation in UN peacekeeping missions: UNIFIL in Lebanon and UNDOF in the Golan Heights. The former mission is important owing to the prolonged political crisis in Lebanon following the war with Israel in the summer of 2006; the crisis was aggravated after the resignation, on 23 November 2007, of President Emile Lahud, and may lead to another internal conflict, or even war with Israel. The Polish contingent in the UNIFIL mission of 13,000 soldiers is still rather small, despite the deployment of additional soldiers, from 200 soldiers before the 2006 war in Lebanon, to around 500. The presence of Poles is more visible in the Golan Heights, where a little over 350 Polish "Blue Helmets" are serving among 1,000 other mission soldiers. Both missions play an important role in preventing the resumption of conflicts in which Israel has been entangled in recent decades, and represent an important component of the Middle East peace process.

In 2006 and 2007, Poland distributed humanitarian aid worth 4 million PLN, particularly in southern Lebanon, which helped shape a favorable image of Poland in the entire region.¹¹ Reasons for Poland's limited share in UN missions in the region include recent difficulties with finding appropriately trained and experienced military personnel.

⁹ *Polski program pomocy zagranicznej udzielanej za pośrednictwem MSZ RP w roku 2007 (finansowanej z rezerwy celowej budżetu państwa poz. 43)*, Warsaw: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007 and *Polska pomoc 2007: działania realizowane przez Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych*, Warsaw: Development Co-operation Department, MFA [undated]. See also J. Stryjek, "Poland's Cooperation for Development," *Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy 2007*.

¹⁰ *Polski program pomocy zagranicznej...*, pp. 9–10. Polish military assistance, for obvious reasons, does not count as development aid.

¹¹ Information brochure: *Polska pomoc humanitarna 2006–2007*, www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/files/inne%20dokumenty%20PDF/pomoc_humanitarna.pdf.

Thus far, Poland's direct contribution to the Middle East peace process has been limited to the shipping of relatively modest developmental aid for Palestine (some 1–2 million PLN annually, compared with EU aid of some 400 million USD annually), which is in line with the steps taken by the EU. This falls short of Palestinian expectations, as the country, convinced of the special nature of relations tying Poland to the United States and Israel, has expected Poland to be more actively involved in the Middle East peace process. Polish aid initiatives for the Palestinian Autonomy are primarily support for good governance, the reinforcement of state institutions, the development of new administrative techniques, support for agriculture, the supply of drinking water (especially for the Gaza Strip), as well as the restoration of wells in the Jordan Valley, and the organization of training for diplomatic staff.¹² In 2007, Poland unfortunately failed to take part in two observation missions under the European Security and Defense Policy in the Gaza Strip (EU BAM Rafah) and the West Bank (EUPOL COPPS). The humanitarian crisis which broke out in the Gaza Strip following its Hamas' seizure of power there in 2006 convinced Poland to make an effort to provide provisional humanitarian and development aid to the Palestinian Autonomy.

Poland pronounced itself in favor of a peaceful solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, based on the co-existence of two states: Israel and Palestine, in keeping with the objectives of the Middle East Quartet. Poland contributed to attempts to revitalize the stalled peace process by initiating a Palestinian-Israeli-Polish dialogue with the participation of non-government organizations from Israel and the Palestinian Autonomy, in order to work out a system for teaching tolerance, reconciliation, and rapprochement to young people. In August 2007, workshops were held as part of this dialogue under the patronage of the Polish Presidential Chancellery, although they were not reported in the media. In addition, training was conducted at the Diplomatic Academy of the Polish Institute of International Affairs for diplomatic staff from the Palestinian Autonomy and Iraq. In addition, \$150,000 worth of medical equipment was given to the Palestinian Red Crescent Committee. Both material and non-material aid are planned for 2008 under the aid program for the Palestinian Autonomy, including grants for students totaling some \$1 million.¹³

¹² *Polski program pomocy zagranicznej...*, p. 9. Cf. with data in *EU Donor Atlas*, vol. 1, *Mapping Official Development Assistance*, European Commission, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Strategies, February 2006, p. 20 ff.

¹³ *Program polskiej pomocy zagranicznej udzielanej za pośrednictwem MSZ RP w roku 2008*, Warsaw: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008.

The Middle East peace process was the subject of the international conference held in Annapolis in November 2007. The attendance of Foreign Affairs Minister Radosław Sikorski should be treated as a sign of recognition for Poland's participation in peacekeeping operations in the region. Although the event itself was referred to as a breakthrough for the peace process, which has been frozen for several years, no real progress was actually achieved.¹⁴

Polish involvement in the Barcelona Process has been sidelined by Warsaw's attribution of greater priority to its Eastern policy, which also accords with the European Neighborhood Policy. Under the latter policy, Poland is trying to balance the eastern and southern components of its national policy. It should be remembered, however, that over two-thirds of the funds allocated for the European Neighborhood Policy go to the EU's partners to the south, while only one-third reaches the EU's eastern neighbors, including those that border on Poland.

The activities of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, with its Euro-Mediterranean Forum of Women Parliamentarians, also form a part of the Barcelona Process. The chair of the ad hoc Committee on Women Rights in 2007 was SLD's MP Grażyna Ciemniak. Poland will chair the Committee until March 2008.

In the last two years, Poland's policy regarding the Middle East has largely been determined by considerations of its strategic partnership with Israel. Poland can consider it a success that it has begun to be treated by Jerusalem as if it were Israel's ambassador to the EU, despite reservations in 2006–2007 about the membership of the League of Polish Families in the coalition government.¹⁵ Consultations between the countries' ministries of foreign affairs are regularly held in Warsaw and Jerusalem on the basis of the Memorandum of Understanding of 2004, which established institutionalized political dialogue. In the same year, both countries' defense ministries and institutions responsible for state security signed agreements on cooperation. Another success was the conclusion of an offset agreement for Poland's purchase of Israeli anti-tank "Spike" missiles. Perceptions of Poland in Israeli society have also improved, Poland being now seen through the prism of the EU, rather than only as a country associated with Jewish martyrdom or as a reservoir of anti-Semitism.

¹⁴ *Oświadczenie MSZ w związku z udziałem ministra spraw zagranicznych RP w międzynarodowym spotkaniu w Annapolis poświęconemu wsparciu dialogu palestyńsko-izraelskiego, 23 November 2007, www.msz.gov.pl.*

¹⁵ See A. Primor, "Poland's Twins and Israel: A Love Story," *Haaretz* of 21 October 2007 and A. Primor, "There is a New Poland," *Haaretz* of 27 January 2007.

Despite the establishment of solid treaty bases for mutual relations, certain issues, such as the restitution of private Jewish property, remain to be resolved and may unnecessarily complicate relations. Nevertheless, Israel remains Poland's most important strategic partner in the region.

In 2007, Poland also focused on improving its relations with the states of the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia came to the fore in this context. In June, King Abdullah and Prince Saud al Faisal, minister of foreign affairs, visited Poland at the invitation of President Lech Kaczyński. The purpose of their visit was to confirm the special nature of Polish-Saudi cooperation as well as to encourage the development of these relations. The visit was also a symbol of King Abdullah's warm feelings for Poland, as reflected in his paying for the operation to separate a pair of Polish conjoined twins. Several documents were also signed with a view to closer relations between the countries:

- Agreement on cooperation in science and technology between the Polish Academy of Sciences and the King Abdul Aziz Science and Technology Centre;

- Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Poland and the Ministry of Health of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on cooperation in the area of health;

- Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Sport of the Republic of Poland and the General Directorate for the Care over Youth of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the area of sport;

- Memorandum on cooperation in science and education between the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Poland and the Ministry of Higher Education of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia;

- Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on cooperation in the area of combating crime.¹⁶

Economic relations. Poland's most important economic partners in the region are Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia. Trade with the remaining countries is negligible. An exception here is Iraq, where Poland supplies special equipment under the contract awarded to Bumar. Although a rapid growth of imports from Kuwait was recorded in 2006, reaching some \$117 million, mainly as a result of a one-off purchase of

¹⁶ J. Bury, "Saudyjski księżę w Warszawie," *Stosunki Międzynarodowe*, 2007, no. 50–51, pp. 18–19.

crude oil, trade with that country in 2007 amounted to some \$30 million.¹⁷ Trade with the entire region exceed \$2 billion.

Poland's most significant trade partner in the region is Israel. Trade with that country is growing by some 20% annually. In 2006, the volume of trade reached \$431 million, with Polish exports coming to \$175 million, and imports to \$256 million. Poland mainly exported metals and metal products, machinery, paper products, foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco, furniture, bed linen and various processed goods. Israel, in turn, mainly exported chemical products, machinery and equipment, foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco, plastics and rubber. Israel also invests in Poland pursuant to the offset agreement connected with the Polish Ministry of Defense's purchase of weaponry from Rafael ("Spike" anti-tank systems). There are also 95 business entities with Israeli capital operating in Poland, including such investors as IT International Theatres—a shareholder in the Cinema City multiplex chain. BST, Solbit and Ashtrom are active in the construction industry, while companies with Israeli capital also operate in the insurance sector (e.g. Link4).¹⁸

Through closer political relations, Poland sought to improve its trade balance with the Persian Gulf states in 2007. Poland's improved trade relations, with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in particular, can be considered a success in Poland's economic relations with the region. In 2006, trade with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia totaled over \$300 million and as much as \$197 million in the first half of 2007. Poland sold the Kingdom mainly steel products, agricultural and food products, machinery and equipment, and metals, and importing primarily plastics and chemical and aluminum products. The good climate for the growth of trade relations with Saudi Arabia dates back to Poland's support for that country's attempts to gain membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Poland expects an increase in Saudi investments, which have been modest thus far. The organization in the autumn of the 3rd Polish-Arab Economic and Investment Forum in Dubai and the Polish National Exhibition was supposed to stimulate further cooperation, but did not produce any specific results.¹⁹

¹⁷ *Yearbook of Foreign Trade Statistics 2007*, Warsaw: Central Statistical Office, 2007, p. 108; *Foreign trade, January–December 2006*, Warsaw: Central Statistical Office, 2007, p. 89.

¹⁸ *List of Major Foreign Investors in Poland, December 2006*, Warsaw: Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency, 2007.

¹⁹ M. Kubicki, *Dni Polskie w Dubaju—czas na refleksje*, www.arabia.pl/content/view/291027/2.

Table 1

**Poland's trade with key partners in the Middle East and North Africa
in the years 2005–2007 (in millions USD)**

Country	Parameter	2005	2006	2007*
Israel (No. 1 in 2007)	Turnover	306.21	431.88	538.8
	Exports	119.89	175.41	211.5
	Imports	186.32	256.47	327.3
	Balance	–66.42	–81.06	–115.8
Saudi Arabia (No. 3 in 2007)	Turnover	233.65	293.13	402.6
	Exports	97.90	145.34	197.9
	Imports	135.75	147.79	204.7
	Balance	–37.84	–2.44	–6.8
United Arab Emirates (No. 2 in 2007)	Turnover	197.74	296.55	413.7
	Exports	142.81	218.00	295.6
	Imports	54.93	78.55	118.1
	Balance	+87.87	+139.44	+177.5
Morocco (No. 4 in 2007)	Turnover	195.29	233.64	280.7
	Exports	111.99	135.88	149.8
	Imports	83.30	97.76	130.9
	Balance	+28.69	+38.11	+18.9
Egypt (No. 6 in 2007)	Turnover	150.43	197.03	195.1
	Exports	125.89	164.86	148.6
	Imports	24.54	32.17	46.5
	Balance	+101.34	+132.68	+102.1
Algeria (No. 5 in 2007)	Turnover	119.74	115.82	203.1
	Exports	119.57	115.82	201.9
	Imports	0.17	0.00	1.2
	Balance	+119.40	+115.82	+200.7
Tunisia (No. 7 in 2007)	Turnover	108.93	146.09	177.1
	Exports	19.35	41.22	44.8
	Imports	89.58	104.87	132.3
	Balance	–70.22	–63.65	–87.5

* Estimated data.

Source: Central Statistical Office and Ministry of Economy.

Tourism also contributes substantially to economic relations with the region, particularly with Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and Israel, which is becoming increasingly more popular.

There was no breakthrough last year on Iraqi debt. In May 2007, in Sharm el-Sheikh, Minister Fotyga attended the founding conference of the Iraqi government's initiative "International Compact with Iraq" (ICI), seeking to strengthen peace and promote attempts to reconstruct Iraq. Many countries participating in the event promised to reduce Iraqi debts by up to 80%, or to support Iraq with different forms of aid, to a total of \$5 billion.²⁰ Such an approach by the world to Iraq's problems decreases Poland's chances for the repayment of its Iraqi loans, which come to over \$800 million for the supply of military equipment by the People's Republic of Poland to Iraq in the 1970s and 1980s.²¹ Moreover, there are no other tangible economic benefits from Poland's involvement in the country. Bumar was the only company that was awarded contracts, for the supply of military equipment valued at \$400 million; while the contracts are gradually being implemented, and while represent the bulk of Polish exports to Iraq country, their value is not equivalent to the company's profits. In 2006, the value of Polish exports to Iraq amounted to \$73.5 million, with negligible imports. The statistics for the first ten months of 2007 point to the continuation of a steady trend in Iraq-bound exports, which totaled \$62.8 million during this period. The chaos in the country since the 2003 invasion does not favor more comprehensive economic cooperation. The bad security situation and the unattractive and uncompetitive offerings of Polish companies preclude activities of a broader scope. Following the withdrawal of Polish troops, we should expect a gradual weakening of trade contacts. Nevertheless, after the

²⁰ *Komunikat MSZ z konferencji ICI w Szarm El-Szejk z udziałem minister spraw zagranicznych RP Anny Fotygi*, 4 May 2007, www.msz.gov.pl.

²¹ Recently, a document was declassified that explains the issue of Iraqi debt to Poland from the 1980s, which resulted from the supply of special equipment and weaponry, starting from 1969, through the Central Engineering Directorate of the Foreign Trade Ministry. Until 1984, the supplies, totalling at the time some \$743.3 million, were paid for in cash exclusively. Bank loans were later extended by Bank Handlowy (BH International S.A. in Luxembourg, the syndicating bank for Polish banks: NBP, Warsaw BH and PEKAO) for \$50 million in 1984 and 1985 and as much as \$700 million in 1986, the latter not having been repaid. At the time, Iraq primarily bought armoured equipment (tanks, tractors, APCs) and ammunition valued at over \$600 million. See *Notatka informacyjna dyrektora generalnego MHZ gen. bryg. mgr inż. Włodzimierza Seweryńskiego dla ministra spraw wewnętrznych gen. Czesława Kiszcza z 6 stycznia 1987 r.*, IPN Archive, collection BU 1585/15307, p. 109 ff.

return of peace to Iraq and the cessation of fratricidal struggles, the country could become an important trade partner for Poland.

Cultural and scientific relations. In 2007, Poland was primarily focused on promoting Wrocław as the candidate city to host Expo 2012. It was also striving to establish closer scientific cooperation with Middle Eastern and North African countries. As mentioned above, for many years Poland has been training doctors, engineers, and other experts from the region.²² In exchange, the states of the region offer stipends to Poles, particularly to Polish Orientalists and archaeologists.²³ However, it should be noted that the statistics of the Bureau for Academic Recognition and International Exchange indicate that in 2007 stipends were offered to Polish students and researchers only by such countries as Egypt, Israel, Yemen, and Tunisia. Despite existing agreements, negotiations continued with Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan, Sudan, and Syria.²⁴ Independently of government initiatives, many Polish universities established relations with various institutions in the region.

Poland's liveliest relations in the field of science were with Israel and Egypt. In November 2007, an agreement was signed in Jerusalem between the National Remembrance Institute and the Yad Vashem Holocaust Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance Authority, governing, among other matters, cooperation in the area of mutual archive queries and exchanges of document copies. Israel was especially interested in Second World War documents concerning crimes perpetrated on the Jewish nation. In turn, the National Remembrance Institute gained access to collections related to Polish citizens of Jewish descent.²⁵ Closer relations between Poland and Israel are also to be facilitated by broadcasting programs in Hebrew by the Hebrew desk of the Polish public radio, Polskie Radio. Activities to promote Poland were initiated in Tel-Aviv by the Polish Institute. Cultural and scientific relations were also actively supported by the

²² As reported in *Polska współpraca na rzecz rozwoju. Raport roczny 2006* (Warsaw: Development Co-operation Department, MFA, August 2007), in 2006 Poland awarded only 19 grants to students and researchers from the Palestinian Autonomy, 5 to Iraqis and 10 to Tunisians.

²³ Polish archaeology missions operate in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Libya, and Sudan.

²⁴ *Oferta stypendialna na rok 2007/2008*, www.buwiwm.edu.pl. The actual implementation of exchange projects depends on the said negotiations, rather than on the signing of a bilateral agreement itself.

²⁵ Communication of the National Remembrance Institute of 8 November 2007, entitled *Umowa o współpracy archiwalnej pomiędzy Yad Vashem a Instytutem Pamięci Narodowej*, www.ipn.gov.pl.

Adam Mickiewicz Institute in Warsaw, e.g. in connection with the preparations for the Polish Year in Israel (2008–2009).

In September, an event to commemorate 70 years of Polish archaeology in Egypt was held, with the unveiling of a bust of Professor Kazimierz Michałowski in the pantheon of eminent Egyptologists at the Museum of Egypt in Cairo. The event was combined with an exhibition promoting Poland. In the same month, at the request of the international, non-governmental Young Presidents' Organization, former Polish president Lech Wałęsa visited Egypt to participate in the organization's congress. He delivered a lecture entitled "United—the Solidarity Movement." In March 2007, the 17th Cairo International Film Festival for Children was held, with Poland as honorary guest. Polish representatives also attended events related to the 65th anniversary of the Battle of Al Alamain and a concert of Karol Szymanowski's music at the Cairo Opera House. We should also note that 2007, following a resolution passed by the Sejm, was the Year of Karol Szymanowski. In November, Polskie Radio broadcast a series of programs to make Poles familiar with the historic artifacts and culture of Egypt, as well as to promote tourism.

At the end of April, beginning of May, as part of the preparations to sign a framework agreement with the University of Tripoli, a delegation from the University of Warsaw, headed by the vice-chancellor, visited the city. A Polish archaeological mission has been operating in the country since March 2007. In April, a photo exhibition was organized at the National Museum in Tripoli, depicting Polish-Libyan archaeological cooperation. Similar promotional activities were held in Rabat during Polish Culture Days in May. Also in May, jazz pianist Artur Dutkiewicz gave a concert at the opera house in Damascus, while in November, a classical music concert by Marian Sobula was organized in Amman. Additionally, in November, Polish Culture Days were organized in the United Arab Emirates (Dubai and Abu Dhabi), where economic cooperation was promoted.

Conclusions

Poland's most important partner in the region is undoubtedly Israel, with which Poland enjoys special relations not only due to shared history, but also for strategic reasons. Diplomatic activities, as well as economic and scientific relations, sought to bring the two countries even closer together. Thus, Poland's policy regarding the Middle East, together with its involvement in Iraq, or even Afghanistan, became an important element of its transatlantic relations.

For economic reasons, Poland is interested in closer cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as it becomes increasingly evident any hopes of broad-scale economic or political cooperation can not be pinned on Iraq.

Polish developmental and humanitarian aid follows the aims of the European Union in this respect. However, this aid is fairly modest owing to the limited funds that Poland can earmark for this purpose.

Poland's policy on the region, not only in 2007 but also in previous years, was marked by excessive caution, which led to some opportunities being missed, notably in the area of trade. Therefore, the objectives of Poland's policy regarding the Middle East, fairly vaguely defined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were accomplished only to a limited degree, although it is also possible that such accomplishments were in keeping with Poland's potential.²⁶ Trade with the states of the Middle East and North Africa accounted for a few percent of Poland's total trade with developing countries, not to mention Polish trade in its global dimension.²⁷ For this and other reasons, some Arab countries have turned away from Poland, as evidenced by the closing down of the Libyan Popular Office in Warsaw. Still, the Arab World needs products that Poland has to offer, despite stiff competition from Western companies, especially American ones. The most sought-after products are food, medical supplies, specialized machinery and equipment, and vehicles. Therefore, greater openness on the part of Polish companies to contacts with the Arab World would be a good development.

Poland's activities in the region were uncoordinated, as a result of which its presence and the role it played were hardly discernible. An example here may be the ostensible Polish-Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. Developmental aid from Poland turned out to be an abstract, empty declaration, and the limited scope of this aid, owing to the unavailability of funds, meant that it was barely noticeable by the international community and thus achieved its objectives to a small degree only.

The lack of closer relations with Palestine in particular is a sorely missed opportunity. It should be remembered that Palestinians, despite the serious

²⁶ Poland lacks an overt, strategic plan of action for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a specific period. Such a document, clearly determining the principles and objectives for foreign policymaking is published as the *Strategic Plan* by the US Department of State and the American USAID Agency.

²⁷ The document *Handel zagraniczny: styczeń–grudzień 2006*, issued in 2007 by GUS, indicates that trade between Poland and developing countries in 2006 totalled some \$28 billion.

political and humanitarian crisis in the Palestinian Autonomy, still enjoy good relations with Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, and not only in the political or security spheres, but also in the economic sphere. By establishing closer relations with Palestine, which would not necessarily affect Poland's relations with Israel in an adverse manner, Warsaw could gain more influence on the situation in the region, and could thus facilitate closer trade contacts.

Economic cooperation between Poland and the states of the region is rather modest in comparison with that of other EU states, however. The reason is the un-competitiveness of Polish companies, as well as their resistance, reluctance, or even fears, which prevent them from investing in the region. Also, cultural factors definitely played a role as well, as did language problems or security concerns. Sometimes, the issue of the high cost of transportation is brought up. The roots of the present situation are due primarily to the 1989 cooling of Poland's relations with its traditional partners in the Arab World, as well as residing in the inertia of the Polish Foreign Service in the region since the 1990s. Relations with graduates of Polish universities who could have contributed to the promotion of Poland in the region have either been loosened or were severed.

The issue of diversifying sources for the supply of energy was not resolved, nor has it been settled since the collapse of Jarosław Kaczyński's government. The construction of the LNG terminal is still at the planning stage, as are supply contracts.²⁸ These matters are currently in the hands of Donald Tusk's government.

²⁸ See www.pgnig.pl/plng.

III.

Selected Problems of Poland's Foreign Policy

Poland's Foreign Economic Relations

In 2007, Poland achieved very good macroeconomic results. Economic growth was at its highest since the beginning of the decade, the budget deficit and public debt shrank, and the unemployment rate dropped sharply. Simultaneously, as a result of rising salaries and consumption-driven demand, the inflation rate rose, in response to which the Monetary Policy Council raised its base interest rates. Nevertheless, macroeconomic stability and good prospects for economic growth had a positive impact on the development of Poland's economic relations with other countries. Foreign trade continued to grow dynamically (despite the appreciation of the złoty, which increased the trade deficit), and foreign direct investments in Poland were at a record high.


The Polish Economy

The year 2007 saw the highest Gross Domestic Product growth (6.6%) in ten years, which amounted to 1,166.7 billion PLN. The greatest influence on this growth was consumption-driven demand, which increased last year by 5.3% and accounted for 76.8% of GDP. This was due to positive changes in the Polish economy, such as the recovery of the labor market and increases of wages. At the same time, the demand for consumer loans also increased, and expenditures for individual consumption increased by 5.2%. Gross accumulation also grew, by 19.7%. Growing investment outlays indicate that the rate of economic growth should not substantially decrease over the next few years, and good macroeconomic results, combined with good prospects for growth of the Polish economy, may turn out to be factors stimulating an increased flow of foreign direct investment to Poland.

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Fig. 1

GDP growth in 2001–2007 (in %)



Source: Central Statistical Office.

The increase in domestic demand and investment expenditures resulted in the Polish economy's greater demand for imports while, at the same time, small and medium-size enterprises shifted production to meet the increasing demand on the domestic market. As a result, the rate of growth of Polish imports in 2007 was greater than the growth rate of exports and led to a greater trade deficit. Last year, net exports contributed to the significantly slower GDP growth rate (by -1.8%) than was the case for 2006 (-1.1%).¹

The high rate of economic growth contributed to the reduction of the trade deficit and public debt. According to Ministry of Finance estimates, the budget deficit last year was lower than the forecasted 30 billion PLN. It amounted to 16.9 billion PLN and less than 30% of this sum was financed from foreign sources. The reduction of the trade deficit led primarily to higher than expected

¹ Informacja Głównego Urzędu Statystycznego w sprawie zaktualizowanego szacunku PKB za 2007 r., 18 April 2008, www.stat.gov.pl.

revenues from personal and corporate income taxes (by 11.4%),² something that is reflective of the good financial results of enterprises and of a growth in workers' wages. The combined deficit of national and local government institutions last year amounted to approximately 23.7 billion PLN, thanks to which it was possible to maintain the diminishing trend of the public finance deficit and, for the first time in the present decade, to bring it below 3% of GDP, i.e., to meet one of the five convergence criteria of the Treaty of Maastricht. Although the public debt increased in nominal terms, its ratio to GDP diminished by 2.4% percentage points.

Table 1

Deficit and public debt of national and local government institutions in 2001–2007
(in million PLN)

Specification	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)	779,564	808 578	843 156	924 538	983 302	1,060,194	1,166,721
National and local government sector deficit	39,951	40,487	52,832	52,685	42,519	40,163	23,697
% of GDP	5.1	5.0	6.3	5.7	4.3	3.8	2.0
National and local government sector debt	292,818	340,896	396,728	422,383	462,741	505,149	527,520
% of GDP	37.6	42.2	47.1	45.7	47.1	47.6	45.2

Source: Central Statistical Office.

The economic situation also led to a drop in the unemployment rate, from 15.1% in January to 11.4% in December 2007. The number of unemployed persons registered at labor offices at the end of 2007 was lower by 562,800 than in 2006, and amounted to 1,746,600, which was a drop of 24.4%.³ 13.6 million persons worked in the national economy, 380,000 persons more than in the

² *Szacunkowe dane o wykonaniu budżetu państwa za okres styczeń–grudzień 2007 r.*, Warsaw: Ministry of Finance, 16 January 2008, www.mf.gov.pl.

³ *Bezrobocie rejestrowane w Polsce. Raport miesięczny—grudzień 2007 r.*, Warsaw: Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, December 2007, p. 1, www.mpips.gov.pl.

previous year.⁴ The average monthly wage in 2007 grew by 8.7%, more than the inflation rate, and amounted to 2,691 PLN (3,046 PLN and 2,565 PLN in the public and private sectors, respectively).⁵

Following Poland's accession to the European Union, the Polish labor market underwent profound transformations. Even though unemployment in Poland is still higher than in other EU countries, there is a shortage of labor in some sectors of the economy. This is the case, for instance, for skilled and construction industry workers. One of the reasons for the shortage of labor is income-driven emigration to other EU countries, where wages are higher than in Poland. Of the old EU members, only in Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Germany was the labor market accessible to workers from Poland on principles in force before 1 May 2004. The Ministry of Labor and Social Policy estimates that some 610,000–645,000 Poles obtain a work permit in other EU countries annually. The majority take short-term, seasonal jobs while only about 180,000–200,000 decide to stay abroad longer. Despite restrictions in force, Germany remains the primary destination for Polish migrant workers, but more and more Poles emigrate to the UK and Ireland. Migration to those countries is of a substitutive nature in relation to migration to United States, which are losing popularity following EU enlargement.⁶


Despite a growing demand for workers, the unemployment rate remains at a double-digit level. This reflects the structural problems present on the Polish market, which are related to barriers in domestic income-driven migration (salaries are frequently insufficient to cover costs of living in a new location) and re-training of personnel. In addition, many people are simply not interested in employment, and register with labor offices only to be eligible for social benefits.

⁴ *Rynek pracy w Polsce: 2007 rok*, Warsaw: Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, p. 1, www.mps.gov.pl.

⁵ *Zatrudnienie i wynagrodzenie w gospodarce narodowej w 2007 r.*, Warsaw: Central Statistical Office, April 2007, p. 18.

⁶ *Polska 2007. Raport o rynku pracy oraz zabezpieczeniu społecznym*, Warsaw: Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, 2007, p. 63.

Chart 2

Change in the unemployment rate in Poland in 2007 (in %)

Source: Ministry of Labor and Social Policy.

The prices of consumer goods and services during the twelve months of 2007 rose by 4% (1.4 in 2006). This was caused by a rise in domestic demand and cost pressures due to the improving situation on the labor market, as well as to global factors, such as the rising world prices for food and raw materials, and especially for energy products. The inflation rate was alleviated by the falling prices of goods imported from countries with low-production costs and the appreciation of the złoty's nominal exchange rate.⁷

The prices of food and non-alcoholic beverages, as well as services related to flat maintenance, had the most important influence on the growth of inflation. In December 2007, the prices of food were higher by 8.2% than a year before, with the steepest increases in the price of poultry and flour (23% each), vegetable fats (by 22.4%) and fruit (by 20%). Inflation also grew as a result of the rising price of fuel for private means of transportation. Fuel prices went up by 18.1%, largely due to rising crude oil prices on world markets. During 2007, the price of footwear and clothing fell by 10.5% and 5.8%,⁸ respectively, largely due to growing cheap imports of those goods from Asian countries.

⁷ *Raport o inflacji*, Warsaw: National Bank of Poland, Monetary Policy Council, February 2008, p. 5.

⁸ *Wskaźniki cen towarów i usług konsumpcyjnych w grudniu 2007 r.*, Warsaw: Central Statistical Office, 15 January 2008.

Table 2

Core inflation indices by month

Month	CPI	Core inflation indices			
		after the exclusion of			net inflation*
		regulated prices	most volatile prices	most volatile and fuel prices	
	corresponding month of previous year = 100				
December 2006	101,4	101,2	101,1	101,5	101,6
January	101.6	101.5	101.2	101.5	101.5
February	101.9	101.8	101.5	101.7	101.6
March	102.5	102.3	102.0	101.9	101.7
April	102.3	102.6	101.8	101.8	101.5
May	102.3	102.6	101.9	101.9	101.6
June	102.6	102.7	102.2	102.2	101.8
July	102.3	102.3	102.0	101.9	101.5
August	101.5	101.4	101.6	101.7	101.2
September	102.3	102.2	102.1	102.1	101.2
October	103.0	102.9	102.9	102.6	101.4
November	103.6	103.4	103.5	103.0	101.5
December 2007	104.0	103.7	104.1	103.4	101.7

* Base inflation, excluding prices of food, non-alcoholic beverages, and fuel.

Source: National Bank of Poland, calculated on the basis of data from the Central Statistical Office, www.nbp.gov.pl.

Since 2004, the Monetary Policy Council (RPP) has been implementing the policy of maintaining inflation at the preset level of 2.5%, with a permissible fluctuation band of +/- 1percentage point. In comparison to the previous year, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in 2007 had already reached the inflation target by March. In subsequent months, inflation pressure increased and, in October, the overall inflation target set by the RPP was exceeded. For this reason, the RPP increased the NBP’s base interest rate on four occasions in 2007 (each time by 25 base points). The main reason for the RPP’s decisions to raise interest rates was growing wage and inflation pressure due to the high rate of economic growth, which was accompanied by growing domestic demand, significant growth in wages resulting from changes on the labor market, and increases in the

world prices of food and crude oil. The high probability that the inflation rate would exceed the preset target justified the increase of the NBP's base interest rates.⁹

Table 3

Changes in NBP base interest rates in 2007

Effective from	Reference rate	Lombard rate	Rediscount rate	Deposit rate
26 April	4.25	5.75	4.50	2.75
28 June	4.50	6.00	4.75	3.00
30 August	4.75	6.25	5.00	3.25
29 November	5.00	6.50	5.25	3.50

Source: National Bank of Poland.

The Governing Council of the European Central Bank raised base interest rates twice in 2007 (in March and June), each time by 25 base points, up to 4.00% for the reference rate. The disparity between Polish interest rates and the Euro zone rates increased from 0.5 to 1.0 percentage point, which both increased Poland's attractiveness for foreign investment and strengthened the zloty. At the same time, the average long-term nominal interest rate, being one of the convergence criteria for candidate countries for the Economic and Monetary Union, also increased. In December, it stood at about 5.55%,¹⁰ that is, below the reference rate (at 6.3%),¹¹ which meant that Poland met the long-term interest rate criterion.

The nominal rate of the zloty to the other base currencies, that is the euro and the American dollar, also increased in 2007. Toward the end of January, following a short depreciation of the zloty at the beginning of the year, exchange rates for both currencies reached their highest values in the previous year: PLN 3.94 for the euro and PLN 3.04 for the dollar. In subsequent months, in particular from September onwards, the zloty strengthened and, towards the end of the year, the exchange rate for the euro was PLN 3.58 and for the dollar PLN

⁹ See Communications from RPP sessions on: 24–25 April 2007, 26–27 June 2007, 28–29 August 2007, 27–28 November 2007, www.nbp.gov.pl.


¹⁰ The author's own calculations based on European Central Bank statistics, www.ecb.int/stats/money/long/html/index.en.html.

¹¹ This figure is determined on the basis of the arithmetic mean from percentage rates in three EU countries that are most stable in terms of prices, increased by 2 percentage points.

2.43.¹² Fluctuations in the value of the zloty were determined by both domestic and global factors. The appreciation resulted, for instance, from a higher credit rating given Poland by S&P, Poland's high economic growth, and a growing disparity between NBP and ECB interest rates. The main global factor was the dollar's fall against the euro.¹³

Chart 3

Fluctuations in the nominal exchange rates of the euro and American dollar in 2007 (in PLN)



Source: National Bank of Poland.

Changes in currency exchange rates affected foreign trade. The appreciation of the zloty, in conjunction with rising labor costs, exerted a negative impact on the competitiveness of Polish exports, particularly that of small and medium-size enterprises using domestic components in their production processes. However, it was possible to recoup such losses through growing sales on the domestic market due to rising demand. At the same time, exporters using imported components were less affected by strong zloty's impact on the competitiveness of their exports, owing to the lower import costs of such components. Nevertheless, the appreciation of the zloty in relation to the major currencies, especially the euro, in which about two-thirds of Polish foreign trade is settled, contributed to the increase of Poland's trade deficit in 2007.

¹² 2007 Archive of average exchange rates, National Bank of Poland.


¹³ *Raport o inflacji*, Warsaw: National Bank of Poland, Monetary Policy Council, April 2007, p. 36; *Raport o inflacji*, Warsaw: National Bank of Poland, Monetary Policy Council, February 2008, p. 40.

Foreign Trade

In 2007, Poland once again recorded a very high export and import growth rate, albeit a lower one than the previous year. The value of Polish exports in comparison to the previous year rose by €13.2 billion, that is, by 15.0% (by 8.1 percentage points less than in 2006), reaching €101.1 billion, whereas imports grew by €18 billion, that is by 17.9% (by 6 percentage points less than in 2006), reaching €101.8 billion.¹⁴ Poland's exports exceeded €100 billion for the first time ever. However, the higher growth rate of imports over exports led to the increase, by nearly €4.8 billion in comparison to 2006, of the trade deficit, which amounted to over €17.6 billion.

Chart 4

Polish foreign trade in 2001–2007 (in billion EUR)



Source: Central Statistical Office.

Although the internal and external conditions that affected Poland's foreign trade worsened slightly, this was not significant enough to substantially affect the export and import growth rate in 2007. Among the most important factors of


¹⁴ Based on Central Statistical Office statistics.

change in Poland’s foreign trade, one should mention the appreciation of the zloty to the euro and dollar, and increasing unit labor costs in industry sector. These factors affected the profitability of Polish exports negatively. However, the rate of economic growth of the member states of the European Union, Poland’s main trading partner, stayed at the relatively high level of nearly 3%, thanks to which demand for Polish exports was still high.

The value of exports, similarly to imports, grew faster than the GDP. Such a tendency has been present in the Polish economy for many years. It means that an increasing share of production is destined for foreign markets, and that the Polish economy’s ties with the global economy are increasing with every passing year.

Chart 5

Commodity structure of Polish exports in 2006–2007 (in billion EUR)




Source: Information synthesis about Polish exports and imports for 2007. Preliminary data, Warsaw: Ministry of Economy, January 2008.

In terms of exports, the most important commodity groups were machines and mechanical appliances, electrical equipment and parts thereof (section XVI in keeping with the classification of the Polish Combined Nomenclature for Foreign Trade—PCN) and vehicles, aircraft, vessels and related equipment

(section XVII), or electrical machinery products. The value of these exports amounted to nearly €42 billion, which accounted for 41.5% of all Polish exports in 2007. The largest export growth in this commodity group in relation to 2006 was recorded in the following categories: machines and electrical appliances, sound recorders and players and parts thereof (by 22.6%, to €12.7 billion), as well as furnaces, machines and mechanical equipment and parts thereof (by 19.5%, to €12.6 billion). In terms of the most important category of Polish exports, that is non-rail vehicles, their parts and accessories, exports grew by 12.7%, to €13.5 billion. The commodity groups that followed on the list of main export categories are: non-precious metals and products thereof (€13.5 billion, a growth of 17%), chemical industry products (€11.7 billion, a growth of 18.3%), and miscellaneous products, including furniture, bedding, mattresses, etc.; lamps, and prefabricated construction components (€6.4 billion, a growth of 10.7%).

Chart 6

Commodity structure of Polish imports in 2006–2007 (in billion EUR)



Source: See chart 5.

Similar commodity groups are predominant in the structure of imports. The most important category are products of the electrical machinery industry:

machines and mechanical appliances, electrical equipment and parts thereof (€28.9 billion, 24.4%), vehicles, aircraft, vessels and related equipment (€13.5 billion, 11.4%). Other important categories were: non-precious metals and products thereof (€15 billion, 12.6%), mineral products (€13.1 billion, 11%) and chemical industry products (€19.3 billion, 16.3%). The largest growth of imports among goods whose share in total imports is over 1%, was recorded in the following categories: optical, photographic, measuring, and medical instruments, tools, and apparatus, and parts thereof (by 50.3%, to €2.8 billion); iron, cast iron and steel (by 36%, to €5.9 billion); non-rail vehicles and parts and accessories thereof (by 28.6%, to €11.8 billion); as well as furniture, bedding, mattresses, etc., lamps, and prefabricated construction components (by 25.4%, to €1.4 billion).

The trends that could be observed in the structure of foreign trade during previous years continued to be present. The most important commodity group both for exports and imports was electrical machinery products. Still, changes were recorded in the trade balance for some groups, which largely contributed to the growing trade deficit in 2007 (by €4.8 billion).

Firstly, the deficit in mineral products increased by €1,559 million, to over €10.9 billion. This was primarily due to the higher value of imports of crude, diesel, and heating oils, as well as petrol, on account of greater purchases and prices. In addition, coal export revenues dwindled (by €230 million) with simultaneous growing expenditures for the import of this resource (by €110 million). Secondly, the trade deficit in metallurgical products increased by €1,060 million, to a total of about €1.5 billion. This was due to the high growth of imports of iron, cast-iron, steel, copper and copper products, aluminum and aluminum products (by €2.1 billion in total), with simultaneous growing exports of these products by about €1.1 billion. Thirdly, the trade deficit in electrical machinery products increased by €756 million, to about €2.5 billion. This was due to slower growth in the export of vehicles, aircraft, and vessels (by some 11%, or €1.6 billion), than in imports (by some 25%, that is, €2.7 billion), and a significant growth in the import of optical instruments and apparatus, especially equipment with LCD screens (an growth in imports of €337 million) and optical fibres (by €137 million). Fourthly, the high trade deficit in the category of chemical products grew by an additional €583 million, to over €7.6 billion. Of paramount significance for the trade deficit in this commodity group was the

increased import of pharmaceutical products (by €170 million over exports) and synthetic products (by €300 million over exports).¹⁵

Poland's most important foreign trade partners were European Union countries. Following the accession, on 1 January 2007, of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU, the share of Polish exports to EU markets in the total of Polish exports increased by 1.3 percentage point, to reach 78.7%, or €79.6 billion, while the share of imports from the EU grew by 0.6 percentage point, reaching €75.8 billion. Next to the European Union, other important markets for Polish exports in 2007 include CIS countries—10.1%,¹⁶ Asia—4.3%, North America—1.9%, Africa—0.9%, and Central and South America—0.9%. The origin of Poland's imports (not including the EU) is the following: Asia—16.9%, CIS countries—11.4%, North America—2.7%, Central and South America—1.8%, and Africa—0.8%.¹⁷

Countries with which Poland had the largest surplus in trade balance in 2007 included Ukraine (€2,793 million, an increase of €680 million), followed by the UK (€2,265 million, an increase of €135 million), the Czech Republic (€1,457 million, an increase of €101 million), Lithuania (€951 million, an increase of €234 million) and Romania (€946 million, an increase of €422 million), while the largest trade deficit was in Poland's trade with China (€7,794 million, an increase of 2,232 million), Russia (€5,794 million, a decrease of €184 million), the Republic of Korea (€2,592 million, an increase of €451 million), Germany (€2,254 million, an increase of €1,922 million), and Japan (€2,061 million, an increase of €547 million).¹⁸

The improving trend in Poland's trade balance with EU countries slowed down, and the surplus shrank from over €5 billion in 2006 (including Romania and Bulgaria, which were not EU members at the time) to €3.8 billion in 2007. This was due mainly to the results in trade with Germany, Poland's most important economic partner. In trade with that country, the deficit grew to €2.3 billion, from the previous year's €332 million. The export growth rate dropped from 18.5% to 9.4%, and that of imports from 20.9% to 17.3%. This was primarily due to the appreciation of the złoty to the euro, which had an adverse

¹⁵ *Ocena handlu zagranicznego Polski w 2007 r. (na podstawie danych wstępnych)*, Warsaw: Ministry of Economy, April 2008, pp. 35–37.

¹⁶ Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.

¹⁷ Based on Central Statistical Office statistics.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

impact on exports, especially those of small and medium-size enterprises; to the depreciation of the American dollar in relation to the euro; and to increasing consumer optimism, which translated into higher demand and growing imports from the United States and the European Union.¹⁹ In terms of the commodity structure in Poland's trade with Germany, net imports grew in the following categories: vehicles, aircraft and vessels (by €900 million), mineral products (by €345 million), and chemical products (by €225 million).

In trade with other European Union countries, Poland recorded the largest growth in exports to Italy (by €1,128 million, or 19.6%), the UK (by €948 million, or 18.9%) and Spain (by €738 million, or 33.7%), and in imports in its trade with Italy (by €1,229 million, or 17.9%), the Netherlands (by €822 million, or 25.9%) and the UK (by €813 million, that is 28.1%). Poland has a negative trade balance with half of the old EU members, although a surplus in trade with France was recorded, with €56 million (compared to a deficit of €45 million in 2006). In turn, Poland enjoys a positive trade balance with all the new EU states, except Slovenia. In 2007, this positive balance increased by €876 million and amounted to €4,914 million. As a result, Poland managed to retain a positive trade balance with the European Union.

In its 2007 trade with CIS countries, Poland managed to reduce the negative trade balance by €920 million, to €3,275 million, as the result of a high increase in exports to CIS markets (by 23.7%), while imports grew moderately (by 8.3%). This positive outcome was affected by greater export of vehicles and parts for them (by €446 million, that is, by 26.7%), machines, mechanical and electrical equipment and parts thereof (by €445 million, that is, by 43.6%), as well as non-precious metals and products thereof (by €363 million, that is, 39.6%). This was accompanied by moderate growth of the imports of mineral products (by 5.7%, or €479 million), and a relatively high growth of the import of non-precious metals and their products (by 38.2%, or €414 million).

Two countries account for over 85% of Poland's trade with CIS countries, namely Russia and Ukraine, but the situation in trade with these two countries is different. Poland's trade balance with Ukraine is positive, while Poland's second-largest trade deficit (after China) is in its trade with Russia.

¹⁹ *Ocena handlu zagranicznego...*, p. 31.

Table 4

Volume of Polish trade with European Union countries in 2006–2007

Country	2007			2006			Dynamika	
	exports	imports	balance	exports	imports	balance	of exports	of imports
	in million EUR			in million EUR			in %	
Poland	101,142	118,771	-17,628	87,926	100,784	-12, 858	115.0	117.8
EU	79,662	75, 810	3,802	69,429	64,394	5,035	114.7	117.7
Germany	26,123	28, 377	-2,254	23,870	24,202	-332	109.4	117.3
Italy	6,880	8,077	-1,197	5,751	6,848	-1,097	119.6	117.9
France	6,111	6,055	56	5,486	5,531	-45	111.4	109.5
UK	5,969	3,704	2,265	5,021	2,891	2,130	118.9	128.1
Czech Rep.	5,567	4,110	1,457	4,873	3,517	1,356	114.2	116.9
Netherlands	3,862	3,995	-133	3,381	3,173	207	114.2	125.9
Sweden	3,229	2,614	614	2,822	2,224	598	114.4	117.6
Hungary	2,934	2,516	418	2,672	2,164	508	109.8	116.3
Spain	2,926	2,511	415	2,188	1,988	200	133.8	126.3
Belgium	2,706	3,026	-320	2,432	2,534	-103	111.2	119.4
Slovakia	2,169	2,156	13	1,839	1,782	57	118.0	121.0
Denmark	1,941	1,489	451	1,735	1,312	422	111.9	113.5
Austria	1,897	1,949	-52	1,612	1,724	-112	117.7	113.0
Lithuania	1,615	664	951	1,305	588	717	123.7	112.9
Romania	1,538	592	947	1,032	508	524	149.0	116.5
Latvia	780	183	597	629	120	509	123.9	151.6
Finland	720	1,543	-824	595	1,299	-704	120.9	118.8
Estonia	580	101	479	451	80	370	128.7	125.5
Greece	414	239	175	309	201	108	134.0	119.3
Bulgaria	394	197	196	318	187	129	123.8	104.7
Ireland	370	657	-287	289	570	-280	128.0	115.4
Slovenia	342	545	-202	285	449	-164	120.2	121.3
Portugal	338	287	52	421	299	122	80.3	95.8
Luxembourg	121	187	-66	65	175	-110	185.7	106.7
Cyprus	70	13	57	37	7	30	187.5	181.6
Malta	17	16	1	12	10	2	146.1	155.8

Source: Information synthesis about Polish exports and imports for 2007. Preliminary data,
Warsaw: Ministry of Economy, January 2008.

In trade with Russia in 2007, it was possible to reverse the unfavorable tendency of the deficit to grow, as it amounted to €5,794 million, €184 million less than in 2006. This was due to a high growth of exports (by 25.2%), resulting from increasing consumer demand in Russia. In terms of commodity structure, the largest growth of exports was recorded for electrical machinery products (by 35.8%) and for chemical products (by 20.7%). The export of agricultural and food products grew by 9.7%, despite the Russian embargo on Polish meat, which was in place throughout 2007, and restrictions on the import of Polish vegetable products. However, these goods accounted for a small part of Poland's total exports to the Russian market, and reduced export of these products to Russia were compensated for several fold by rising exports of meat to other markets, especially the European Union.²⁰ Mineral products, including crude oil and gas, accounted for nearly 90% of imports from Russia.

Trade with Ukraine was, for another year in a row, characterized by high growth of exports (by 27.5%), with a smaller growth in imports (by 18%), which, in effect, led to a further increase of Poland's trade surplus with Ukraine by €680 million, to €2.8 billion. No significant changes were recorded in the structure of Ukraine-bound exports in comparison to 2006; exports were still dominated by electrical machinery products (36.9%), chemical products (17.9%) and metallurgical products (14.7%). In turn, metallurgical products (37.5%) account for the biggest share of imports from Ukraine, followed by mineral products, particularly metal ores (22.8%), and chemical products (15.2%). The award to Poland and Ukraine of the right to organize the 2012 finals of the European football championships should act as a stimulus for economic cooperation between the two countries in the years to come. This end is to be served by the implementation of the "Road Map on Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation in the Years 2007–2008," signed on 27 April 2007 by presidents Lech Kaczyński and Viktor Yushenko, and providing for, amongst other things, the resolution of problems in bilateral trade, especially by eliminating protectionist practices, and support for growth in trade between the two countries.²¹

²⁰ *Zmiany w eksporcie z Polski produktów rolno-spożywczych w kontekście ograniczeń importu z Polski do Rosji*, Warsaw: Ministry of Economy, January 2008, p. 5.

²¹ See *Mapa drogowa współpracy Polsko-Ukraińskiej na lata 2007–2008*, www.prezydent.pl.

Table 5

Volume of Polish commodity exchange in trade with non-European Union countries in 2006–2007

Country	2007				2006				Change	
	turn-over	exports	imports	balance	turn-over	exports	imports	balance	exports	imports
	in millions EUR				in millions EUR				in %	
Poland	219,913	101,142	118,771	-17,629	188,710	87,926	100,784	-12,858	115.03	117.85
Russia	15,208	4,707	10,501	-5,794	13,500	3,761	9,739	-5,978	125.15	107.82
China	9,237	721	8,516	-7,795	6,776	607	6,169	-5,562	118.78	138.05
Ukraine	5,275	4,034	1,241	2,793	4,217	3,165	1,052	2,113	127.46	117.97
U.S.	4,038	1,518	2,520	-1,002	3,905	1,682	2,223	-541	90.25	113.36
Norway	3,131	1,828	1,303	525	3,030	1,695	1,335	360	107.85	97.60
South Korea	3,012	210	2,802	-2,592	2,497	178	2,319	-2,141	117.98	120.83
Turkey	2,668	1,101	1,567	-466	2,308	1,046	1,262	-216	105.26	124.17
Japan	2,492	216	2,276	-2,060	1,817	152	1,665	-1,513	142.11	136.70
Switzerland	1,882	716	1,166	-450	1,664	653	1,011	-358	109.65	115.33
Belarus	1,652	821	831	-10	1,643	780	863	-83	105.26	96.29
Taiwan	968	86	882	-796	1,129	87	1,042	-955	98.85	84.64
Brazil	696	198	498	-300	618	140	478	-338	141.43	104.18
Canada	656	378	278	100	578	345	233	112	109.57	119.31
Kazakhstan	647	346	301	45	520	276	244	32	125.36	123.36
India	631	118	513	-395	540	160	380	-220	73.75	135.00

Source: Information synthesis about Polish exports and imports for 2007. Preliminary data, Ministry of Economy, Warsaw, January 2008.

For many years, Poland's primary problem in its attempt to maintain a balance in foreign trade has been the growing deficit in trade with East Asian countries. In 2007, the largest negative trade balance existed in trade with China (with Russia in 2006), followed by Japan and the Republic of Korea. The trade deficit with those countries represented over 70% of Poland's total foreign trade deficit. Polish entrepreneurs find it very difficult to develop exports to Asian markets, as evidenced by the value of imports from China, Korea, and Japan, which are over ten times greater than the value of Polish exports to those

markets. Interestingly, IT and telecommunications products account for an increasingly larger share of Chinese exports to Poland, whereas Polish exports are dominated by semi-processed goods, especially non-precious metal products (primarily copper) and chemical industry products. The chances for change in the structure of exported goods and for increased exports to East Asian markets are rather slim, since the Polish offering is not very attractive (it includes few technologically advanced products), there are no recognized brands, and the weakness of institutions supporting promotion of Polish exports and Polish companies on those markets.²²

Foreign Direct Investments

The inflow of foreign direct investments to Poland reached record levels in 2007. According to the provisional data of the National Bank of Poland, they amounted to €12,834 million.²³ Although the total for the previous year was in excess of €15 billion, it also included “capital in transit,”²⁴ that did not directly affect the Polish economy. The adjusted value of foreign direct investments in Poland in 2006 amounted to €11,974 million, that is, 887 million less than in 2007.

The €12,834 million of foreign direct investments included the capital earmarked for increasing company capital (purchase of stocks and shares), in the amount of €3,859 million, reinvested profits of €5,330 million, and the positive balance of inter-company loan of €3,645 million.²⁵ It should be emphasized that important changes took place in the structure of the capital inflow. In previous years, capital earmarked for the purchase of stocks and shares made up the biggest share of foreign direct investments, whereas the importance of reinvested profits grew in 2007, with the simultaneous fall in importance of the other two constituents. This is evidence of the very good condition of the foreign companies which operate in Poland making good profits, and perceive our

²² E. Kaliszuk, M. Paszyński, B. Kowalski (eds.), *Podstawowe uwarunkowania deficytu w polskim handlu z azjatyckimi krajami rozwijającymi się na tle sytuacji w wymianie handlowej z krajami o podobnym poziomie rozwoju (m.in. WNP, Ameryka Łacińska) i szanse poprawy sytuacji*, Warsaw: Foreign Trade Research Institute, November 2006, p. 37, www.mg.gov.pl.

²³ Full statistics on direct foreign investments will be published by NBP towards the end of 2008.


²⁴ Capital in transit means foreign funds that increase company capital of foreign entities operating in Poland, subsequently invested by those companies in companies or subsidiaries formed abroad.

²⁵ *Zagraniczne inwestycje bezpośrednie w Polsce w 2007 r.*, Warsaw: National Bank of Poland, 16 April 2008.

country as an attractive place to conduct business. As a consequence, they decide to reinvest their profits in Poland and to expand their activities here.

Chart 7

Inflow of foreign direct investments to Poland in 2002–2007 (in million EUR)



Source: Provisional data of the National Bank of Poland.

Poland is an attractive investment location for a number of reasons. It has the largest economy of all the new EU member states and has a substantial pool of qualified workers, whose salaries are relatively lower than in the “old” EU. Very good macroeconomic results, a low risk of economic instability, as well as a sizeable domestic market bring to Poland twice the amount of funds in foreign direct investment as are received by Poland’s competitors, such as the Czech Republic (€6.7 billion in 2007), Bulgaria (€6.1 billion), or Hungary (€4 billion).²⁶ However, following the accession to the European Union of Bulgaria and Romania, Poland may begin to lose individual investment projects, particularly if the key factor in selecting the investment location is labor cost, as those countries have an advantage over Poland.

The greatest amount of funds constituting foreign direct investments (as classified by the NBP), the largest share was placed in manufacturing (20%), real estate services, IT, science, machine rental and other business activity-related services (19.8%), financial intermediation (15.3%), and trade and repairs (11.9%).

²⁶ *Ibidem.*

Over 85.3% of foreign direct investments came from EU countries, mainly from France, Germany, Austria, Italy, and Sweden. Most foreign direct investments from outside the EU came from the United States, the Netherlands Antilles, South Korea, and Japan.²⁷ This testifies to the very close investment relations between Poland and other European countries in particular. Among these, as of the end of 2006, the largest amounts of capital were invested in Poland by the Netherlands (€18,836 million), Germany (€15,508 million), France (€10,822 million) and Luxembourg (€7,422 million). Among non-European Union countries, the largest investments were made by the United States (€6,889 million). Investment coming from other countries was much lower in value (the Republic of Korea—€940 million, Japan—€808 million).²⁸ Nevertheless, investors from East Asia are still interested in Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland, as this facilitates their access to the EU market, and the majority of products manufactured by facilities they own in the region is earmarked for export. Thus far, the Republic of Korea and Japan have been the largest Asian investors in Poland, although China shows a growing interest in doing business in Poland, as is reflected by Lenovo's decision to invest €20 million to build a computer factory in Poland. Investors from Asian countries primarily operate in the automotive and electronics industries in Poland.

The largest single investment in Poland was made by Toyota Manufacturing Poland, which was awarded the title of 2007 Investment of the Year by the Ministry of the Economy and PAiIZ. The group already operates two factories in Poland, in Wałbrzych and Jelcz-Laskowice, where five-speed gearboxes and diesel engines are manufactured. Toyota's overall investments in Poland amount to €600 million, and the company's plants in Poland employ some 3,000 persons. The new factory is to manufacture six-speed gearboxes and employ 255 persons. In turn, the greatest number of new jobs (1,200) was created by Indesit Company Poland. Currently, this company employs some 2,500 persons at two facilities manufacturing refrigerators and kitchen ranges in the Łódź Special Economic Zone. This company's total investments in Poland amount to €120 million. On 30 May 2007, the president of Indesit signed an agreement with the Polish government on the construction in Radomsko of a new washing machine and dishwasher production plant, for the sum of about €80 million.

²⁷ *Ibidem*.

²⁸ *Zagraniczne inwestycje bezpośrednie w Polsce w 2006 roku*, Warsaw: National Bank of Poland, January 2008, pp. 61–66.

The Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency (PAIiIZ) participates in the realization of a number of major foreign investment projects. It collaborates especially actively on automotive, electronics, and chemical projects as well as on the establishment of service centers (Business Process Outsourcing, BPO). The Polish government plans to increase the agency's role in promoting the Polish economy abroad, although there are still problems with opening its foreign representation offices.

Table 6

Chosen investment projects conducted by PAIiIZ in 2007

Company	Country of origin	Sector	Value (in million EUR)	No. of employees	Location
P&G	United States	chemical	40	100	Warsaw
Unicorn Chemical LLC	United States	chemical	48	100	Brzeg Dolny
Cadbury	United Kingdom	Food	20	550	Bielany Wrocławskie
Toshiba	Japan	electronics	42.8	1,006	Kobierzyce
Dell	United States	electronics	200	3,000	Łódź
Indesit	Italy	electronics	77.7	1,313	Radomsko
Tensho Denki	Japan	electronics	40	200	Łysomice
Sumika	Japan	electronics	34	250	Łysomice
Michelin	France	rubber	150	150	Olsztyn
ABN Amro	Netherlands	BPO	4.3	590	Warsaw
Wasiak GmbH & Co. KG	Germany	automotive	5	400	Nowe Miasto Lubawskie
Wienerberger	Austria	construction	44	60	Oleśnica
UPM Raflatac	Finland	packaging	82	149	Kobierzyce
P&G	United States	chemical	37	210	Aleksandrów Łódzki
Toyota	Japan	automotive	134	255	Wałbrzych
Reuters	Switzerland	Business Process Offshoring (BPO)	1.7	300	Gdańsk
HSBC	United Kingdom	BPO	4.2	493	Kraków

Company	Country of origin	Sector	Value (in million EUR)	No. of employees	Location
Humax	South Korea	electronics	10	400	Bełchatów
Funai	Japan	electronics	18	500	Nowa Sól
TPV Technology	China	electronics	40.7	1,200	Gorzów Wielkopolski
Johnson Controls	United States	automotive	36.1	1,000	Siemianowice Śląskie
KPIT	India	BPO	3.5	500	Wrocław
UBS	Switzerland	BPO	5.6	250	Kraków
Printpack	United Kingdom	packaging	40	150	Kutno
Valassis Ltd.	United Kingdom	BPO	2	600	Białogard

Source: Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency.

The value of Polish foreign direct investments in 2007 amounted to €2,395 million, a decrease in comparison with the previous year (€7,134 million).²⁹ However, on the 2006 result huge impact had a single transaction, namely the purchase by PKN Orlen of the refinery in Mazeikiai, which was the biggest investment project carried out by a Polish company abroad. The lower value of Polish investments abroad in 2007 was also affected by the appreciation of the złoty, since the cost of purchasing shares in foreign entities was higher than in the previous year, as well as by the recovery in the domestic market, which was a factor in the enterprises' decision to invest in Poland.

Data from previous years indicate that the majority of Polish investments are located in the European Union,³⁰ (over 80% of the total), of which over 60% in the fifteen "old" member countries. The geographical structure of Polish enterprises' expansion abroad is indicative of the fact that distance plays a fundamental role in the investment decision-making process. However, this is a universal tendency, as the dominating trend in the world economy is to expand business operations in the same region. Expansion into remote markets entails much greater costs, which few Polish companies can afford. As a result, not

²⁹ NBP data on Poland's balance of payments.

³⁰ Detailed statistics on Polish foreign investments in 2007 will be published by NBP towards the end of 2008.

many Polish investments are located in the dynamically growing Asian countries, or in African countries that are attractive in investment terms. In the latter case, the expansion is made the more difficult by problems with acquiring exhaustive practical information about regulations for conducting business on those culturally and institutionally different markets.

Most Polish investments in the European Union are located in the services sector, including services for businesses. Their specific trait is that they often involve a type of financial flow classified as foreign direct investment, although they are not related to the take-over of foreign companies, the purchase of shares, or the implementation of greenfield investments. The reason for the significant outflow of capital to such countries as Luxembourg, Switzerland, the Netherlands or the United Kingdom, which are both European and global financial centers, is that Polish enterprises frequently transfer profits realized domestically to those countries, owing to the more favorable taxation there. In addition, in those countries are registered Polish subsidiary companies, whose principal goal is to pursue business activities in third markets. Funds forwarded to such subsidiaries are merely "capital in transit."³¹

Positive developments include Polish investment activities in Central and Eastern Europe. The region is one of world's fastest-growing markets, and Polish enterprises are trying to take full advantage of this situation, considering the proximity of the Polish market and its similarity. The competitive advantage of Polish enterprises on those markets lies in that they are usually larger than their local competitors and have a better understanding of the specificity of those countries than investors from Western Europe. The greatest opportunities for expansion exist for manufacturers of simple goods. The most common method to initiate business activities on those markets was the acquisition of companies recognized as leaders on those markets, companies with recognized brands, or, owing to good export results, the construction or purchase of facilities there, to reduce transportation costs and to bypass customs barriers. The best example of the growing interest in Central and Eastern European markets is Ukraine, where Polish companies invested over \$300 million in 2007, nearly as much as the combined figure for the four previous years.³²

³¹ *Polskie inwestycje bezpośrednie 2006/2007*, Warsaw: Ministry of the Economy, March 2008, p. 15.

³² J. Krześciński, "Teraz czas na Ukrainę," *Forbes*, 2008, No. 5, pp. 109–113.

Table 7

Top Polish Investors in Central and Eastern Europe

Rank	Company	Value (in million USD)	FDI projects in the region	Location
1	PKN Orlen SA	2,944	2	Czech Republic, Lithuania
2	Bank Pekao SA	292.2	1	Ukraine
3	Synthos SA	268.8	1	Czech Republic
4	Cersanit SA	157.4	3	Lithuania, Romania, Ukraine
5	PKO BP	134.3	2	Ukraine
6	Barlinek SA	118.7	2	Romania, Ukraine
7	Ciech SA	96.7	1	Romania
8	Asseco Poland SA	92.1	14	Croatia, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia

Source: J. Krzemiński, *op.cit.*, p. 110.

The Polish economy's very good macroeconomic results in 2007 had a positive impact on the development of Poland's economic relations with other countries. Even though the foreign trade deficit increased, it should be stressed that the value of Polish exports exceeded €100 billion. The commodity structure of Poland's foreign trade shows that technologically advanced products account for an increasingly large share, which indicates a positive qualitative transformation of the Polish economy. Prospects for further changes are good, considering the foreign investors' vivid interest in doing business in Poland, a country marked by a stable and dynamically growing economy, and the largest new European Union member. This is confirmed by studies of multinational corporations, which ranks Poland among the ten most attractive foreign investment locations in the years to come.³³

A characteristic of Poland's foreign economic relations is that country's strongly ties with other EU countries, which account for over 70% of Polish foreign trade and provide over 80% of foreign direct investments in Poland. This concentration is due primarily to the proximity of those markets as well as the

³³ *World Investment Report 2007*, Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2007, p. 30, www.scribd.com/doc/2539169/World-Investment-Report-2007.

fact that Poland is part of the European single market. In 2007, no decision was taken as to Poland's accession to the Economic and Monetary Union, which would reduce transaction costs and further stimulate economic cooperation with other EU members. Polish politicians mentioned 1 January 2012 as the likely date for the adoption of the common currency.

The greatest problem in Poland's foreign economic relations is the substantial trade deficit in with East Asian countries. This deficit is of a structural nature and the chances of reducing it in the next years are slim. It should, however, be noted that Asian investors are interested in Poland. Many components used in the manufacturing process in Korean or Japanese factories in Poland are imported from East Asia. This fact further increases Poland's trade deficit with the region, although this is compensated by the export of the majority of the goods manufactured in those facilities to other European markets.

Poland and the United Nations

Background and Objectives

The United Nations Organization still remains the most comprehensive institution on the international stage and has the greatest potential to influence the world. At the same time, for many years there has been talk of a crisis at the UN. Recently, this organization failed to respond effectively to the humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur, the Iranian nuclear program, or even the proclamation of independence by Kosovo. It also fails to show sufficient flexibility and innovation. This weakness of the UN is the function of the policies pursued by that institution's member states, many of which are not concerned with implementing the objectives of the UN or with enhancing its role in the world.¹

The year 2007 did not bring any new initiatives for UN reform. European Union countries, including Poland, remained interested in the organization's reform, stressing the importance of multilateral cooperation for building security and economic growth in the world.² However, differences of opinion between the major powers, as well as between countries of the North and South, remained too great. More animated discussions on the issue of UN reform took place in academic centers or think-tanks than between governments.

From year to year, the importance of the UN in Poland's policies has decreased, particularly in the areas of security and political problems. Poland pursues its policies mainly within the European Union and in NATO. However, the United Nations, owing to its universal nature, is a forum where Poland can take a stand on global issues such as arms control or non-proliferation, climate change or human rights, and where it can consolidate its cooperation with non-European countries.

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¹ See S. Stebelski, "Poland in the United Nations," *Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy* 2007, pp. 189–204.

² *EU Priorities for the 62s General Assembly of the United Nations*, Brussels: Council of the European Union, 5 June 2007, Doc. 10184/07.

One of Poland's successes at the UN was its election, on 8 November 2007, as member of the Economic and Social Council for a three-year term.³ Poland's membership in Council was supported by two-thirds of the General Assembly. The nomination by the president of the General Assembly of Poland's permanent representative as co-chair of the Working Group on Revitalization of the General Assembly was an additional expression of recognition for Poland. This was the first such nomination of a Pole in many years. This group is to prepare, within the framework of the UN reform debate, a report on the possibilities for increasing the role and effectiveness of the General Assembly.⁴

Poland has also made efforts to be chosen as a non-permanent member of the Security Council for the period coinciding with its presidency in the European Union, scheduled for 2011. Both functions would offer Poland wide possibilities to influence policy in the European and global stage.

Poland and the Disarmament, Arms Control, and Non-proliferation Processes

Poland belongs to a group of states interested in enhancing the political instruments used in the area of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. Together with the entire European Union, Poland supports all initiatives in this respect, e.g., the drafting of an arms trade treaty or measures to counteract illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons. On the forum of the crisis-plagued Conference on Disarmament, Poland called for reinforcing the NPT regime and the restoration of its credibility, as well as for the inclusion of a verification mechanism in the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC). Poland also supported a rapid start of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).

As a member of the Conference on Disarmament, Poland expressed disappointment with the many years' long deadlock in discussions of the Conference's work agenda. Speaking in Geneva on 13 March 2007, Foreign Affairs Minister Anna Fotyga pointed out the threats that the Conference on Disarmament should tackle. She mentioned terrorism, the proliferation of weapons—both conventional weapons and those of mass destruction—and the potential acquisition of such weapons by terrorist or criminal groups.⁵

³ MFA press release of 11 November 2007.

⁴ Doc. A/62/PV.57.

⁵ "Conference on Disarmament Hears Statements from Seven Dignitaries on Disarmament and Non-proliferation," in: *News & Media*, The United Nations Office at Geneva, 13 March 2007.

As was noticed by delegates to the 62nd session of the General Assembly, Poland had contributed to organizing the debate in 2006, as one of the six states chairing the Conference on Disarmament.⁶ Ambassador Zdzisław Rapacki, permanent Polish representative to the UN Office in Geneva, also made reference to this fact in addressing the meeting of the UN First Committee dealing with international security issues and disarmament, during the 25 October debate on so-called disarmament machinery. Debates on specific issues were introduced in 2006 along with a new system of cooperation between chairpersons, consisting in the coordination of actions and close consultations to facilitate discussions. Polish initiatives increased the possibility of reaching a consensus and of adopting a working agenda for the Conference. Ambassador Rapacki noted that the Conference should deal with as many issues as possible during plenary meetings and that a balance should be maintained between formal and informal meetings, which the participation of experts delegated by the member states, if possible.⁷

Besides its interest in the Disarmament Conference and in promoting cooperation at the UN within the framework of the Cracow Initiative for counteracting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Proliferation Security Initiative, PSI), Poland has been particularly engaged in promoting the ban on chemical weapons. As it has done every year at the meeting of the UN General Assembly First Committee, Poland was the initiator of a resolution on the implementation the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. The resolution, the most important elements of which largely reflected the provisions of the previous year's draft, was finally adopted by consensus. The resolution emphasized, among other things that universal acceptance and implementation of the Convention's provisions were of fundamental importance for the achievement of its objectives; it noted that some progress had been made in this respect; and it called on states to ratify the convention as soon as possible. The resolution also pointed out that under the Convention, those states that still hold stockpiles of chemical weapons are obligated to destroy them. The postulate is important, since such states as China, Russia, the US, Japan and

⁶ Along with the Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Senegal and Slovakia.

⁷ Address by Ambassador Zdzisław Rapacki, permanent representative of Poland to the United Nations in Geneva, at the meeting of the United Nations General Assembly First Committee on 19 September 2007.

South Korea, having declared that they are unable to destroy their chemical weapons before the deadline, were granted a deferment.⁸

The draft resolution authored by Poland also made reference to the 10th anniversary of the Convention's coming into force. In connection with this anniversary, Poland and the Netherlands organized a high-level meeting on the occasion of the First Committee session on 27 September 2007. Foreign Affairs Minister Anna Fotyga and Dutch head of diplomacy Maxime Verhagen spoke about the victims of chemical weapons. The meeting was also attended by UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, General Director of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Rogelio Pflirter and representatives of 124 states, including 40 foreign affairs ministers. It is worthwhile to note that 183 countries are currently party to the Convention. In addition, five countries have signed but not yet ratified it: these are the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Israel, and Myanmar. Seven states have not taken any steps to adopt the convention, namely: Angola, North Korea, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Somalia, and Syria. The high-level meeting ended with the adoption of a declaration in which interest in the full, effective, and universal implementation of the convention was expressed.⁹ In addition, Poland's position in the discussion on countering the threats related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was stressed.

Another expression of Poland's interest in the above issues was its hosting of workshops in April of 2007 in Krynica on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the OPCW (this organization was established at the time the convention took effect). The purpose of the workshops was to discuss problems with implementing the convention at the national level.

The year 2007 brought more anniversaries related to international security and disarmament, and these had an impact on the shape of discussions in the First Committee. The anniversaries included the 40th anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, and the 10th anniversary of the adoption of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction. Issues related to the implementation of these

⁸ For problems related to the implementation of the Convention on chemical weapons see *Rocznik Strategiczny 2006/2007*, p. 82.

⁹ *Statement of the High-Level Meeting on the Tenth Anniversary of the Entry into Force of the Chemical Weapons Convention*, New York: United Nations, 27 September 2007.

conventions were also tackled during informal panel discussions. In reference to the latter convention, which it signed in 1997 but for which it has not yet started the ratification procedure, Poland announced that it would proceed with ratification following the Polish Armed Forces' acquisition of mine substitutes. Initially, Poland made its ratification dependent on the convention's adoption by the permanent members of the Security Council, but this met with ongoing criticism, notably from the EU countries and from non-governmental organizations gathered in a coalition called the International Campaign to Ban Landmines.

In 2007 saw the beginning of the difficult process of preparing for the next Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to be held in 2010. The last Review Conference, which Poland co-chaired in 2005, did not bring any results. The primary objectives of the preparation process were to overcome the crisis provoked, among other causes, by the nuclear programs of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Among the points of contention was the observance of international obligations under the NPT. In the UN, developed countries primarily stressed the need for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, while developing countries pointed to the general need for disarmament in terms of nuclear weapons and their own need gain access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Poland decided to participate in the drafting of working documents for the next Conference. Together with six other NATO states (Belgium, Spain, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, and Turkey), Poland is preparing a document on the improved functioning of the Treaty and, together with Egypt, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Sweden, and Hungary, it is working on a project of education in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation.

The UN is also undergoing a crisis in its efforts aimed at disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. During the course of the discussions, deep rifts between the highly developed and developing countries, as well as differences of opinion between the major powers emerged. Contentious issues, also among European Union member states, arose in connection with an initiative to adopt new resolutions concerning a reduction in the level of combat readiness of ballistic missiles and weapons containing depleted uranium. During the discussions of the First Committee, Russia consistently opposed the construction

of elements of the American missile defense system in the Czech Republic and Poland, arguing that this would threaten its national interests and its security.¹⁰

Poland's Voice in the Discussion on Climate Change

In 2007, Poland took an active part in a very important discussion on climate change that was taking place in the UN. The involvement of politicians in the problem of climate change has also grown along with the rising awareness that global warming may bring negative consequences for the world in terms of security, the economy, health care, and humanitarian aid. In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), established by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment Program, published its fourth report in which it assessed the risk of climate change in connection with human activity. The report was prepared by over 600 scientists, and reviewed by about 620 experts and representatives of national governments.¹¹ According to the opinions presented in this report, all countries will feel the effects of climate change, and none of them will be able to counteract those changes single-handedly. Commitment and international cooperation are necessary and the UN remains the best forum for addressing this type of world problems.

Global environmental management is to be served by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) of 1992 and the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, which set forth the obligations of individual countries in terms of the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. These instruments have been the point of departure for discussions on the long-term cooperation of states in the area of preventing climate change. Between 3 and 15 December 2007, the 13th session of the Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention, and the 3rd session of the Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol were held in Nusa Dua (Bali). Poland supported the position of the European Union, which called for determined, worldwide measures to stop the rise in carbon dioxide emissions by 2020, and to reduce such emissions by 50% by 2050. Poland also announced that the next session of the Conference would take place in Poznań in

¹⁰ "Sixty-First General Assembly: First Committee," *UN Chronicle*, March 2007, p. 34 ff.

¹¹ *Climate Change 2007*, IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (Working Group I Report: "The Physical Science Basis," Working Group II Report: "Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability," Working Group III Report: "Mitigation of Climate Change"), www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports.

2008.¹² The Polish delegation organized a special subject meeting during the conference, where it presented the implementation of Poland's obligations under the Kyoto Protocol, as well as the premises of its environmental policy and financing methods for pro-environment investments.¹³ On the occasion of the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in August 2002, Poland undertook to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 6% in comparison to 1988. Poland is one of 11 EU states,¹⁴ which have actually met their obligations. Poland reduced its greenhouse gas emissions by 32% in comparison to the base year, although this was primarily the result of the economic crisis in the nineties, rather than a deliberate policy.¹⁵ It is worthwhile to note that Polish experts are members of Kyoto Protocol organs (as representatives of the Central and Eastern Europe Regional Group—Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee) and of the Adaptation Fund Board.

A general debate at the 62nd session of the UN General Assembly was also devoted to the issue of climate change. Entitled "Responding to Climate Change," it was preceded by a meeting within the framework of High Level Dialogue, organized by the UN Secretary General in New York on 24 September 2007, and entitled "The Future in Our Hands: Addressing the Leadership Challenge of Climate Change."¹⁶ President Lech Kaczyński and Foreign Affairs Minister Anna Fotyga attended both events.

During the first event, President Kaczyński participated in the discussion on alleviating climate change. He recognized the need to assist poorer states in the transfer of low-emission technologies, including renewable energy source technologies. In this context, he appealed for so-called green solidarity. Speaking at the General Assembly, the president made reference to the report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and observed that not all

¹² The speech of Environment Minister Maciej Nowicki at the 13th session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, "Zmiany klimatu," *Biuletyn Informacyjny*, no. 16/17, Warsaw: Ministry of the Environment, 2007.

¹³ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴ The remaining ten are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, and the UK, www.energy.eu/#co2.

¹⁵ See also *Czwarty raport rządowy dla Konferencji stron Ramowej konwencji Narodów Zjednoczonych w sprawie zmian klimatu*, www.mos.gov.pl/.../ochrona_powietrza/konwencje_ekologiczne/konwencja_klimatyczna/IV_Raport_Rzadowy.pdf. *Polityka klimatyczna Polski. Strategie redukcji emisji gazów cieplarnianych w Polsce do roku 2020*, Warsaw: Ministry of the Environment, October 2003.

¹⁶ The event was attended by representatives of over 150 states.

scientists agree that climate change is caused by human activity. According to many, he argued, it is a natural phenomenon. Irrespective of its causes, however, the president pointed to these issues as one of the key challenges facing UN members, and he also reiterated Poland's interest in implementing and developing obligations aimed at slowing down the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. He also indicated that Poland had managed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 32% in comparison to the base year, while, during this period, its national income grew by 60%, which proves that it is possible to reduce emissions and enjoy economic growth at the same time. Many developing countries had voiced their concern in this respect. Their representatives argued that economic growth is more important for their country, and the implementation of pro-environment technologies is costly and may hamper growth. Therefore, they argued, it is developed countries that should shoulder the main burden of counteracting climate change and adapting to its consequences. Referring to these statements, President Kaczyński proposed the conclusion of a special solidarity pact which would require developed states to pursue their economic policies in a way that stimulates balanced growth in developing countries. He also called on members to use the instruments established by the Kyoto Protocol: trade in emissions, joint undertakings and the so-called clean development mechanism allowing for the transfer of the latest technologies to developing countries. He also stated that reforestation and counteracting desertification are effective ways to increase the level of carbon dioxide absorption from the atmosphere and return to natural biodiversity.¹⁷

In their majority, participants in the debate shared the view that, in the face of advancing climate change, the failure to act would be much costlier than taking action. At the same time, all undertakings should be economically justified. It was pointed out that counteracting climate change should form part of national strategies for growth or for the elimination of poverty.¹⁸

In April 2007, Poland took part in the debate on forest policy. Polish participants attended the 7th session of the UN Forum on Forests, held in New York, where they supported the UN initiative to establish 2011 as the International Year of Forests. The objective of the undertaking will be to increase social awareness of the importance of forests for present and future generations. Poland also called for energetic action for the sustainable management of forested

¹⁷ *Speech of President Lech Kaczyński at the 62nd Session of the UN General Assembly*, 26 September 2007, www.un.org.pl.

¹⁸ See. www.poznajmyONZ.pl.

regions, whose total area is shrinking by an average of 13 million hectares annually.¹⁹ At the High Level Meeting on Forests and Climate, held in Sydney between 23 and 25 July 2007, Minister of the Environment Jan Szyszko pointed to the connection between forest management and reducing carbon dioxide emissions.²⁰

Poland and Human Rights

In 2007, a year had passed since the Human Rights Council (HRC) was established to replace the Commission on Human Rights, which had been criticized for bias, politicking, and double standards. Furthermore, membership in the Commission of countries such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, or China, which are known for serious infringements of human rights, was considered embarrassing. Poland gained membership in the Council at the first vote on 9 May 2006.²¹ Its term was for a term of one year and ended on 18 June 2007. As a UN member, Poland could take part in the Council's discussions after the period but no longer had voting rights.

In the first year of its operation, the Council primarily focused on procedural and institutional solutions. These were primarily procedures for a new, universal periodic review (UPR) mechanism of human rights observance in all UN states, adaptation of the mechanisms used by the Commission for the needs of the Council, and the establishment of a framework agenda.

Poland, like all European Union states, argued that new procedures should improve the effectiveness of the Human Rights Council's work.²² It supported the adoption of the Commission's most important instruments: the passing of resolutions on individual states in cases of serious human rights infringements, and the extension of mandates for special rapporteurs, both on specific issues and for individual countries. Poland also submitted its candidacy for the first cycle of the universal periodic review, planned for April 2008, seeking to stress its interest in the new mechanism and to take part in the establishment of good precedents.

¹⁹ Address by H.E. Agnieszka Bolesta, Undersecretary of State on behalf of Prof. Jan Szyszko, Minister of the Environment of the Republic of Poland, www.mos.gov.pl.

²⁰ Releases of 25 and 17 July 2006, Ministerstwo Środowiska, www.mos.gov.pl.

²¹ A. Bieńczyk-Missala, "Rada Praw Człowieka ONZ—wyzwanie dla polskiej polityki zagranicznej," *Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny*, 2006, no. 4, pp. 33–47.

²² M. Łuczka, "Poland in the UN Human Rights Council," *Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy 2007*, pp. 304–308.

Three months before the adoption of the package of procedural and institutional solutions, Foreign Affairs Minister Anna Fotyga joined the Polish delegation at the 4th session of the Human Rights Council. She delivered an address during the Council's ministerial session on 13 March.²³ She presented the key points of Poland's position on the HRC. She expressed her hope that the Council would credibly, objectively, and effectively resolve human rights problems, guided by the principle of solidarity with the victims of violations. She made an appeal to ignore states' *ad hoc*, short term interests in the process of establishing mechanisms and procedures for the Council's functioning. Minister Fotyga also stated that the Council should be provided with mechanisms allowing it to react rapidly to crisis situations, during which massive scale human rights violations take place. She referred in this manner to the humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur, where international institutions proved powerless as Sudan's authorities would not permit the high-level international mission sent by the Human Rights Council to enter the country.

Not all members of the Human Rights Council shared the vision of establishing an effective institution. Some presented proposals that were disadvantageous in terms of the Council's future effectiveness, such as giving up resolutions concerning individual countries, limiting the competencies of the advisory body of experts, or revoking certain of the mandates of the special rapporteurs.²⁴

In addition, European states, which submitted the greatest number of projects to the Commission on Human Rights were insufficiently active in the first year of the Council's activities. They failed to present draft resolutions on human rights violations by states convinced that by doing so, they were creating a better atmosphere for the adoption of procedures and mechanisms allowing the Council to operate more effectively in the future. This placed them on the defensive with regard to those states that were skeptically predisposed to the idea of a strong Human Rights Council.

The document determining the basis of the Council's operations was adopted on the day that followed the end of Poland's term, on 18 June 2007.²⁵ It should be emphasized that Poland opposed to the very last day the revocation of the mandates of the special rapporteurs for Belarus and Cuba, and the reduction of

²³ Minister Anna Fotyga also met with UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour.

²⁴ A. Bieńczyk-Missala, "Pierwszy rok pracy Rady Praw Człowieka," *Biuletyn PISM*, 2007, no. 40.

²⁵ *Report to the General Assembly on the Fifth Session of the Human Rights Council*, UN Doc. A/HRC/5/L.11.

their numbers.²⁶ Countries seeking to weaken the Human Rights Council also managed to force through a new mode of selecting rapporteurs adopted in the founding document. In the past, rapporteurs were appointed by the chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights; now the entire Council will have to make the decision, which may hinder the selection.

As adopted, the document sets forth a procedure for a universal periodic review. The Council decided that the first cycle would last for four years. Therefore, the Council will evaluate 48 countries every year. The mechanism is to be based on cooperation, objective and credible data, and the equal treatment of states.

In keeping with the Council's decision, the expert Sub-commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, an auxiliary body of the Commission, was replaced by the Advisory Committee made up of 18 independent experts appointed by the Council for a three-year term. Its competencies were reduced in comparison to its predecessor. It was decided that the Committee would not be able to adopt resolutions, make decisions, or deal with the state of human rights observance in individual countries. The Council also maintained the confidential procedure for processing individual notifications concerning serious and systematic violations of human rights under resolution no. 1503 of the Economic and Social Council from 1970.

Since the adopted solutions gave rise to many doubts and did not guarantee the Council's effective operation in the future, European countries expressed disenchantment with the work of the new institution. This could be observed, for instance, during the general debate of the 61st session of the UN General Assembly. Indeed, the Council was not provided with effective instruments to induce states to cooperate and implement the accepted standards. It also proved impossible to eliminate bias, politicking, and empty declarations. The political nature of deliberations in an intergovernmental institution of this type is unavoidable, however. The future assessment of the Council's work will undoubtedly depend on the thoroughness of the universal periodic review, as well as on the practical implementation of the decisions made. It is argued that intensified activeness on the part of EU states at the Council would be desirable, as well as continuous efforts made to move away from regional solidarity, which in the past has often hampered productive dialogue on human rights.²⁷

²⁶ A similar stance was presented by Canada, whose term also expired one day before the vote.

²⁷ See Z. Kędzia, "Reformy programu praw człowieka ONZ," *Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny*, 2007, no. 5.

In connection with the shortcomings of the Human Rights Council, discussions held at the General Assembly Third Committee on humanitarian affairs and human rights, among other matters, gained in importance. The European Union, seeking to increase the importance of the Third Committee, proposed the adoption of a resolution condemning human rights violations in Burma, North Korea, Iran, and Belarus. Poland was especially interested in bringing up the case of Belarus. In its statement on the issue, Poland emphasized that the revocation of the mandate for the special rapporteur for Belarus was a mistake. Poland's position was supported by the United States, Canada, Israel, and some European Union states (the UK, France, the Netherlands, and the Czech Republic). The adoption of the resolution on the death penalty moratorium was a great success. The European Union decided to submit the related proposal as an inter-regional initiative. As a consequence, 99 states voted in favor of the resolution. Polish support for the resolution was important given that Warsaw had previously blocked the establishment of the European Day against the Death Penalty, an step that had been unfavorably received by the rest of the European Union.²⁸

Differences of opinions emerged, however, among European Union members on the problem of sexual and reproductive health rights in the context of the resolution on women's rights and development. The Scandinavian countries and Belgium unsuccessfully worked for the formulation of a common EU position on the problem. Polish representatives referred to the issue in a speech at the General Assembly Second Committee on economic and financial affairs. They emphasized that any reference to women's rights in the context of sexual and reproductive health rights does not entail Poland's acceptance of on-demand abortions. Malta and Ireland have adopted a similar position.

On 23 March 2007, Poland, together with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, organized a meeting in Geneva referring to the conference held in Warsaw on 8–9 November 2006 on fighting corruption, good governance and human rights. Senator Zbigniew Romaszewski delivered a speech on corruption in the age of globalization and the Office's representative presented the conclusions of the Warsaw conference and an update on progress in the implementation of the recommendations adopted. Poland presented a resolution on human rights and good governance, an item traditionally to be

²⁸ J. Kaczyński's veto on the issue was withdrawn by Prime Minister Donald Tusk.

found—at the initiative of Poland, among other countries—on the agenda of the Human Rights Council and the former Commission.

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Poland is striving to make a positive contribution to the debate on global problems at the UN. Poland's engagement in work on disarmament or climate change is indicative of its desire to present itself as an active, responsible and predictable state. Its membership in the European Union, its location in Central Europe, its lack of a colonial past, and its recent joining of highly-developed countries are good starting points for playing a conciliatory role in international relations. Poland can help alleviate friction between the North and the South, or the EU and the US. By putting forward its own initiatives, Poland is also strengthening its position not only at the UN, but also in its region, in the European Union, and in bilateral relations.

IV.

**Polish Foreign Policy
Discussion**

Polish Foreign Policy Discussion

Ślawomir Dębski: Let me welcome you here, gentlemen, at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, for yet another discussion to be published in the *Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy* for 2008, although, as usual, the publication will focus on previous year's events. I would like this meeting to be somewhat different from other public debates you participated in, mainly over the past two years, in order to sum up foreign policy events. Let us think about and elaborate on what we know as to how foreign policy is being shaped in our country and whether this will pay off in the future.

Undoubtedly, the previous year offered new experience in terms of shaping foreign policy in Poland. Serious controversies emerged around the objectives of this policy, transforming it into a platform for domestic political bickering. The list of problems is long: the Reform Treaty for the European Union, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Polish military involvement in Iraq, Ballistic Missile Defense, relations with Germany and, to a lesser extent, with Russia. The developments of 2007 prompt questions about the nature of these changes. Are we dealing with a collapse of the tendencies and traditional methods of foreign policymaking hammered out after 1989 that is only temporary, to be followed by a return to the traditional ways at some point, or perhaps—more optimistically—are we witnessing the emergence of new standards which we have to get used to and take into account when thinking about Polish foreign policy in the future?

The last issue I would like us to discuss, in order to inspire a broader debate, is our membership in the European Union and NATO. It is widely argued in debates that this membership—although a source of unquestionable satisfaction—is also responsible, in a way, for the conflict in the foreign policy; since we joined the EU and NATO, we have had to argue over foreign policy, while the objectives are no longer clear-cut. Does the determinist nature of our membership really preclude a foreign policy that is hammered out by way of consensus?

* The following persons took part in the discussion held on 6 March 2008: Ślawomir Dębski, Ph.D., Director, Polish Institute of International Affairs; Andrzej Olechowski, Ph.D., Foreign Affairs Minister in 1993–1995; Professor Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Ph.D., Secretary of State at the MFA in 2002–2005, Minister for Foreign Affairs from 5 January to 31 October 2005; Krzysztof Szczerski, Ph.D., Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Office of the Committee for European Integration in 2007–2008; Paweł Zalewski, MP, chairman of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee (2004–2007).

Paweł Zalewski: Let me start with the assumption your question was based on, namely that the traditional approach to working out a foreign policy had been challenged and drafted anew. We should, first of all, define what is it that you have in mind when you refer to the traditional approach.

Sławomir Dębski: I mean here the strive to build a consensus and base foreign policy on nationwide agreement. Mr. Minister, what is your opinion, considering your last year's experience?

Krzysztof Szczepiński: In terms of debates on foreign policy, or actually overtly confrontational public debates among political parties, three factors, in my opinion, have led to the present situation as regards the European policy. Firstly, the deep and sharp divide on the political scene, combined with the nature of this divide, resulting mostly from a metapolitical content of the debate. The divide has affected not only politicians, but also columnists, the media and commentators of political events, all of whom contribute to the image of foreign policy as seen by the public. The divide is dangerous, because it is not based on differing political objectives, but rather defines these differences as: "we can" versus "they cannot," "good" versus "bad," "capable" versus "incapable and having no concept whatsoever," "loonies" versus "those removed from posts with influence on foreign policy." The acute nature of the divide and the fact that it reached beyond just politicians from the parties represented in the Sejm, becoming a very widespread phenomenon, could not but exert a negative impact on foreign policy.

What also stirred up the debate over foreign policy was an attempt to set its new objectives. After earlier primary objectives had been achieved, an effort was made to define new ones, as the new situation generated a need as well as favorable conditions for redefining our role in international relations. Since the idea was new, essentially constituting an attempt to create new political concepts, some liked it, while others remained critical.

The third feature characteristic of European policy is that as a Union member we are dealing with the blurring of boundaries between internal and external policymaking. Many of our contacts with European partners did not address issues from the traditionally understood foreign policy realm, but dealt with joint political projects that introduced internal policy components into external relations. The construction of a motorway through the Rospuda Valley or, more broadly, environmental protection issues; shipyards privatization programs; Baltic Sea fishing and similar problems—all these, domestic as they may be, also have a Community context, not to mention the Russian embargo. There are more and more interests that can be interpreted in foreign policy terms,

although I would rather describe them as essentially both external and internal in nature.

Finally, let me ask one question: where is the point of equilibrium between accord, which is a certain asset in the state's foreign policy in terms of image and support for government policy on the one hand, and, on the other, an absence of diversified concepts and alternatives? How then can we distinguish between accord and TINA ("There Is No Alternative") ? While accord is an asset, TINA is a mistake.

Andrzej Olechowski: There is nothing wrong with disputes, also about foreign policy. An accord is truly valuable only if achieved by democratic means. The period when I was active at the state level was marked by consensus, in my opinion, and foreign policy was gradually migrating into the social domain as well. The dilemmas of foreign policy and proposals to address them were communicated to the political circles in the broad sense and to the public. I myself was a frequent speaker at Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee sessions or before the Chamber, reporting on foreign policy issues. I was also a regular guest during televised political debates and my statements were quoted in the press. Particularly bothersome in the last two years was the air of mystery surrounding policy formulation and uncertainty as to what would happen next. Let me give you an example. I had no idea what would happen about the Constitutional Treaty, but I thought that it was important enough for me to do something if it were to be blocked. We even had a small group of people who tried to monitor the situation, collect data, just as ornithologists do when they collect information on birds' behavior, so as not to be taken aback by the final decision, and, if necessary, try to mobilize public opinion in advance.

For me it is important to distinguish between "raison d'état" and "national interest." The former is determined by elites, or some of their representatives. This is what is happening in Russia today and what was done in Poland in the preceding two years. Members of the elite defined or decreed the *raison d'état*. National interest, in turn, is discussed, proposals are submitted and ultimately endorsed by a majority vote, in line with democratic procedures. That is what I feel was missing in those two years and little has changed since. For instance, I am in the dark on the missile defense system or referendum, because I know too little, because the information is communicated to me in a skimpy way and by stealth—that is how I see it. The impression I have is that this is meant to safeguard that I do not obstruct the authorities' room for maneuver in any way whatsoever. This is not the way it should be.

Ślawomir Dębski: Also, a thesis has been voiced about the government keeping Parliament inadequately informed of its plans.

Paweł Zalewski: I will comment on this in a second, but let me tackle two other issues first. Indeed, since around 2004 we have been witnessing a growing significance of foreign policy, including European, although I do agree with Minister Szczerski that European policy is increasing becoming domestic. Failure to realize this may be behind many of the mistakes we have made. The year 2004 also marks a growing role of foreign policy as a component of domestic political fighting. At some point during the following two years, foreign policy even became the key arena for political conflicts. My opinion about this aspect is very negative. Foreign policy ceased to be what it should be, namely one of the state's primary policies, a policy which everyone is seeking consensus on and where non-particularistic thinking should prevail. But in fact foreign policy was the domain that parties used to prove their patriotism or prove their opponents unpatriotic, to confirm their own competence or the incompetence of their adversaries. The discussion also featured such expressions as a policy on bended knees, incompetent policy or white flag party, so adventurism could not but follow. The debate touched on such crucial components of Polish tradition that it made internal political fighting more intense, doing little to strengthen foreign policy, which no longer was the subject of serious debate and analysis. In my opinion, in recent years, reaching as far back as 2003 so as to avoid associations with the rule of PiS (Law and Justice party) alone, we have not been engaged in any serious foreign policy debate. There have been no entities willing to moderate a discussion of this kind and no forums for conducting it. Or, perhaps, there have been both the entities and forums, but they simply have not been used.

What I believe has been a serious foreign policy problem is a lack of a long-term strategy based on defined key problems and interests from the perspective of state development, including those related to two fundamental aspects: the economy and security. One example: it was totally inconsiderate on Poland's behalf to agree to reduce greenhouse emissions. This decision is fundamental from the perspective of the Polish economy and was taken in the heat of the moment, rather than based on serious assessments and discussions with those concerned. At least I didn't see any discussion, perhaps it did take place, but I have not heard of it. I think that the drafting of a long-term strategy is crucial, because the government, or, generally speaking, politicians, including the opposition, should have clear and understandable criteria for the evaluation of certain political decisions, of what we think is right and what we think is wrong. As a matter of fact, criticism of the Constitutional Treaty was again

based on intuitive thinking rather than a reliable analysis and assessment of what it offers in the context of our interests. Everybody was relying on fragmentary opinions and the dispute over the treaty, so multifaceted, did not help to diagnose reliably the treaty's provisions *vis-à-vis* our interests. I have to add here that the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee was a forum where we at least tried to initiate a serious debate on various challenges, such as the treaty or missile defense. We had a lot of meetings and discussions on missile defense, also with the Americans, but it is not for me to judge how deep these discussions were.

Andrzej Olechowski: As regards missile defense, it is not about informing the general public about the particulars, because these naturally cannot be made public; it is the strategic justification of the project that I have in mind, as it has never been a subject of a serious debate.

Adam Daniel Rotfeld: I have the impression that we have convergent views in this room for a number of reasons. Firstly, our approach is somewhat more conceptual than the approach of those who implement the policy in its everyday and detailed aspects. Secondly, we look at foreign policy from the outside and in a broader context, which allows us to formulate our position in a similar manner, using similar rhetoric.

I agree with Minister Andrzej Olechowski that the dispute as such is valuable. Policies in the country with no disputes over them would be doomed to failure, as they would, sooner or later, produce negative consequences, failing to factor in public sentiments and views. Publicity is a must in today's world. Thanks to the Internet, anybody with enough time can be better informed today than the Minister for Foreign Affairs about what is going on—all you have to do is to follow developments. For years I headed an institution that did not have, and still does not have, access to classified information, but all special and secret services and intelligence agencies nevertheless sought to get access to what it could gather and analyze. The Internet enabled the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) to understand the heart of the matter. There is no better way to find information than to get access to what is available on the worldwide web. For instance, the UN asked SIPRI to verify data recorded in the Conventional Arms Register, submitted officially by states and concerning trade in conventional weapons. Let me add that conventional weapons are easier to hide than nuclear weapons, which can be monitored in a number of ways. The assumption that the world is what it was like before World War I, when you could keep certain things secret and block access to information, is simply a misunderstanding. This is anachronistic thinking reflecting provincial views. In Poland, global problems reach public awareness with difficulty, and the

Polish foreign policy agenda often does not include issues discussed by the whole world.

Since January 2008 I have been the Chairman of the UN Secretary General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (ABDM). The hottest item on the agenda right now is the nuclear disarmament of the world. Name only one Polish newspaper that has devoted a single sentence to the issue. The project, referred to as the Hoover Plan, was presented by a group of eminent American politicians, including Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, William Perry, Zbigniew Brzeziński and Madeleine Albright. The work of the group is supported by a special team of experts. Another example: in November–December 2008, a global conference on climate change is to take place in Poznań. It would seem that this should be the number one topic in Poland, as it is the most important and the biggest international conference in the country since the beginning of the state's existence, but in fact only a handful of experts know about it. Hence my first conclusion is that we have been witnessing a tabloidization of everything, including foreign policy. Every time journalists call me, irrespective of what they are calling me about, their question always is, "Is this going to be a turning point?" Prime Minister Tusk's visits to Moscow and the United States, to Brussels and Ukraine, were all to be turning points. My usual reply is that turning points happen once or twice in a century, once in a generation. The real turning points of the 20th century were the decisions taken at the Versailles Conference after World War I and at the Potsdam Conference at the end of the World War II.

Where does this come from, this drive towards a simplified and sensational picture of the world? One of the reasons is probably that never before in human history have the media played such a crucial role in shaping the attitudes of politicians, who strive to be present on television, radio and in the press, because their very existence depends on media presence. As a result, journalists force politicians to define their positions in line with the former's perception of the world, so politicians often say what the journalists want to hear. The media are more responsible for political agendas than we realize. This is a universal feature observed worldwide, a component of the new political culture. We have been living in a new, sovereign and independent Poland for more or less as long as interwar Poland existed after regaining independence. At the time, a number of interesting politicians emerged, such as Aleksander Skrzyński—this is a good moment to praise the Polish Institute of International Affairs for publishing a monograph on Skrzyński by Piotr Wandycz—who already in the early 1920s had a clear-cut strategy of Polish policy, with its guidelines valuable even today. Roman Kuźniar has recently published the first monograph on the foreign policy

of the 3rd Republic of Poland, launching the first attempt at a summary of this kind. Such publications are always welcome. While arousing reservations, objections sometimes, they nonetheless always inspire thinking and a critical reflection. It is difficult to offer a distanced view if you are both the creator and the commentator or researcher. I hope that Kuźniar's book, hopefully to be followed by others, will initiate a debate and deeper reflection on Polish foreign policy in all its aspects.

Minister Olechowski said that 2005–2007 saw a certain divide, not present previously. I have the impression that directly after 2005 the new authorities tried to preserve the continuity of Polish foreign policy. Stefan Meller was to some extent the symbol of the period, of the first intention not to break away essentially from the previous period. My feelings about his attitude were positive, as it was an indication of thinking in terms of the state and nation rather than in party-oriented categories. However, when the ruling coalition was enlarged to include Samoobrona (Self-Defense) and LPR (League of Polish Families) and Meller stepped down, we heard about “regaining the MFA.” If a party “regains the MFA,” this means a partisan or party-rooted approach to foreign policy. In a democratic state, foreign policy should not be partisan. The best and desired situation is whenever foreign policy is supra-partisan—focused on the nation and the state. Distrust in persons describing themselves as independent, pro-state and free from ideological considerations is reminiscent of communist Poland. The policy of discontinuation produced tangible damage, while the policy of continuation, for instance with respect to Ukraine or Israel, exemplifies the effectiveness and maturity of diplomatic efforts as well as concern for Poland's position in the world. Outstanding people who shaped such a policy in early 1990s are a credit to the state. The Chinese say that even the longest journey starts with the first step, and many believe this is just a cliché. But the wisdom of the proverb lies in the fact that the first step determines the direction. The direction once set by Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Krzysztof Skubiszewski, continued by Andrzej Olechowski, Władysław Bartoszewski, Bronisław Geremek, Dariusz Rosati and Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, this direction was never challenged, regardless of who was in charge of foreign affairs: Cimoszewicz, Rosati, Geremek or Meller. The foundations of this policy were in fact laid by Juliusz Mieroszewski and Jerzy Giedroyc, along with all the people organized around the Paris-based *Kultura* periodical.

Finally, lacking it the strategy referred to by Deputy Zalewski. I agree that the absence of a clearly defined strategy renders Polish foreign policy reactive. Let me quote the example of Kosovo. Poland should have adopted its own position on the issue, but such a position ought to be derived from an assessment

of the present situation and our national interests in the Balkans. When I was Minister for Foreign Affairs in 2005, I asked staff members responsible at the MFA for South-Eastern Europe what our policy on the Balkans was. I was told by one high official that—in his view as an expert on the region—Poland did not need any policy on the Balkans as long as the “commies” were there. I asked him when was the last time a Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs had paid a visit to Belgrade. The answer: 14 years ago. My next question was: Do you know any other European Union member that did not pay a visit at the ministerial level to the capital of Serbia for 14 years? Out of 25 EU Member States, as many as 24 sent their ministers to Serbia on several occasions. So I urgently ordered preparations for such a visit. We visited Belgrade, Montenegro and Kosovo. In all these places Poland was greeted with attention and hope that the biggest country of Central Europe would not demonstrate its lack of interest in states of the region. This was an important and much needed trip.

The minister of foreign affairs is often referred to as the head of diplomacy, and quite rightly so. Foreign policy and diplomacy are two areas of activity that are close to each other, but not identical. Let me also add that the head of the MFA is also a manager. Ultimately, the minister is responsible for staff decisions and financial aspects of the functioning of the MFA and its diplomatic posts abroad, for the buildings and funding. This requires a lot of effort and concern for constant professional development of MFA's staff. The structure of every ministry, including the MFA, often exists driven by inertia, resisting any innovation, and this does not encourage creative thinking. Why? It is a structural phenomenon, as no institution can reform and heal itself. Usually, this takes place only whenever necessary, when in the face of a serious crisis restructuring and fundamental reform come to the rescue of those seeking to avoid a collapse, dissolution or disgrace in the eyes of outsiders.

I experienced a similar situation at the ministry when, together with Minister Cimoszewicz, we set up the Diplomatic Academy. If the Academy had been created in 1992–1993, with 30 graduates joining the MFA every year, in 10–15 years we would have had 350–400 highly qualified young diplomats, free from the habits of the previous single-party system of government. If 70 candidates were to be admitted each year, ten years later we would have had 700 fresh diplomats educated in independent and sovereign Poland. This would practically mean a full replacement of the staff, because nearly 800 people are working at home at businesslike posts, excluding subsidiary positions. A replacement of 300 people would indicate a radical revival and injection of new blood to the MFA. Administrative and technical support for the MFA also requires swift reform. Polish diplomatic posts abroad are faced with a drastic shortage of

efficient administrators. But the establishment of the Academy designed to select young people on the basis of their qualifications alone and then to devote a year or more to train them for foreign service, where they were badly needed—this project was undermined, delayed, or even blocked under the slightest pretext. Graduates of the Academy are more than welcome at all MFA departments and diplomatic posts. The functioning of the Academy has been verified in practice by the high qualifications of the applicants. Nevertheless, a negative approach to this new form of young staff training prevailed for a long time. Concluding, the resistance of the matter at the MFA is intrinsic, incorporated into officials' way of thinking and reflecting their allergic reactions to change. Often they also have a strong feeling of solidarity within the inner circle and strong belief that they possess a monopoly on knowledge.

Another factor that explains the reactive nature of decisions is the fact that daily business often pushes vital issues into the background at every institution. A minister has to read and sign hundreds of documents, so he has little time left for conceptual, holistic or strategic thinking. Of primary importance for a person responsible for shaping foreign policy is not to lose sight—under the pressure of everyday business—of strategic objectives and axiology, as these facilitate judgments on the daily actions and decisions taken.

Śławomir Dębski: I have not interrupted you despite the variety of topics that you have touched upon, as these are very valuable and rarely discussed. What strikes me is that the German Diplomatic Academy releases 140 graduates annually, while 25 on average graduate from ours, or even less than 20 in the past two years. Since Germany's foreign service is twice as big, with a staff of nearly 7,000, this means that with our staff of under 3,000 we should be training some 70 people a year.

Andrzej Olechowski: Can I just say that the tabloidization of politics is a disaster in Poland, with the media obviously to blame here. This does not, however, apply to foreign policy. The media have always been noticeably cautious about foreign policy and their representatives have been careful not to tabloidize it. But this was done by politicians instead, with their black-and-white slogans and mental shortcuts, such as: "don't die for Nice," "Nice or death," "white flag," "policy on bended knees," "patriotic policy," etc. We could have a heated debate today using those words only.

Paweł Zalewski: There are several key issues that keep returning in my talks not so much with diplomats, because their self-restraint is usually very high, but with European politicians. The internal debate in the old European Union countries proceeds at a somewhat different level. It is not public, but more

businesslike, and the base for foreign policymaking is much broader there. We should propose that such a powerbase be expanded in Poland as well.

On a different note, I think that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has an important role to play here, as it should have the necessary funds and know how to spend them, thus inspiring the establishment of various foreign policy centers, but large Polish companies with interests abroad should also take part in the process.

Back to the main argument, what is important is thinking in terms of *raison d'état* and discipline among politicians who make statements on foreign affairs. I mean here parliamentarians from various European Union countries, for instance, who, when talking to the outside world, present similar points of view, both in terms of arguments and in terms of assessments, regardless of how deep the differences between them are. That is what is missing in Poland, in my opinion, and this is probably rooted in contemporary history and the fact that Poland has been independent for 19 years only. I think that what we should propose is greater discipline, refraining from using foreign policy to discredit political competitors externally.

Another aspect is the media policy. I agree with Minister Olechowski that the problem has been caused by politicians. It is true that the media, for various reasons, also competencies-related, did not dwell on those issues in detail, but nevertheless key state policies were held hostage by the media. This was, for example, the case with the Polish policy on the Treaty originally called Constitutional, and now the Lisbon Treaty. So the media component, in my opinion, impacted 90% of the policy.

And the final issue. I have an impression that, when speaking about continuation and discontinuation, we should define what we mean here. I would argue, risky as the argument is, that discontinuation affected the substance of foreign policy only to a slight degree. It was more about the verbal aspect, the style, which is very important in foreign policymaking and interpersonal relations alike.

Adam Daniel Rotfeld: I agree on other issues: missile defense, Russia, relations with the U.S., with the EU, but as for Germany... Well, the person who is appointed head of an institution aimed at improving Poland–Germany relations shortly before the elections publishes an article “Co Niemcom wolno?” (“What are Germans allowed to do?”). It follows from the article that the Germans are allowed nothing, as if we were back in 1945...

Paweł Zalewski: I will not comment on the article, because we could also discuss other texts, and this is not the point. In my opinion, there was no

discontinuation in terms of the policy on Germany and its objectives. More or less after 2002, the policy on Germany changed, and the Law and Justice (PiS) government reacted to those changes in a direct and very radical manner in terms of style, whereas other groupings did not actually have any chance for that. We discussed various symptoms of the change that took place in Germany, or at least what was perceived as change in Poland, to be more precise, and we shared many opinions with left-wing politicians. I think that we should discuss this in greater detail, because it is important in order to understand what happened in the last two years. There was one big difference, though. Previous governments, but again we have to consider the change that the previous governments had had no time to respond to, came to the conclusion that problems should be solved, and cooperation developed at the same time, whereas the PiS government formulated the objectives of the policy on Germany differently: let us solve the problems first and then, with a clean slate, we can initiate cooperation.

Krzysztof Szczerski: I am a good example that the MFA has not been totally partisan in recent years, as I came to the ministry from the academic world and, after my public service, I returned to the domain of science. Although a number of aspects have been touched upon in your statements that I could comment on in detail, explaining the various inaccuracies in evaluations, I would rather focus—from a scholarly perspective—on the difference between *raison d'état* and national interest, because it is an interesting intellectual issue. I understand that the national interest that Minister Olechowski has mentioned is an alternative to the *raison d'état*, understood as a liberal formula for the representation of the political community's objectives—first of all, we should discuss internal interests in the democratic realm for discussion, and only then present them externally as our common position and negotiate in a similar, but this time interstate bargaining process. The matter is not unconditional, however. Perhaps the inclination of those responsible for the state to understand the *raison d'état* as a policy guideline that is in itself “inferable,” results, among other factors, from the fact that the quality of the internal debate, this internal bargaining, the process of working out the policy contents, is of rather poor quality. It is not enough to provide the place, or newspaper columns, in order to achieve high quality of the internal debate. To achieve it, a number of conditions should be met, such as fundamental equality of debate participants, openness of the opinion market, tolerance for different ideas or non-bandwagoning intellectuals. So, what you gentlemen have mentioned, for instance tabloidization, provokes doubts as to whether these are appropriate forums that could guarantee a high quality of this internal discussion in which the national interest, in line with the guidelines presented, is to be hammered out. Also, the interstate context is not

clear and does not fully meet the criterion of an open and equal system of interest bargaining. In consequence, taking actions in the name of the inferred *raison d'état* is in a way an inevitable move by politicians, an escape forward by those whose actions are guided by responsibility for the state, or rather who have been burdened with this responsibility.

Andrzej Olechowski: Be careful, because this resembles Leninist thinking.

Krzysztof Szczerski: No, no, I am referring to the theoretical model mentioned by the minister. In my opinion, the *raison d'état* is a positive notion, because it refers to the valuable continuity of a state community and its subjectivity. The process of external and internal aggregation of interests, however, may be subject to deformations.

Andrzej Olechowski: Are you suggesting that consensus reached by the elite, the national elite, determines national interest? This is very Putin-style. When I read Russian texts on sovereign democracy, I cannot but notice the striking resemblances to the way of thinking of the camp in favor of a strong nation-state in Poland. Starting from the same authorities that Surkov and our ideologists refer to, to their positions on specific issues. For example, I have read an interesting text by Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev, who argues that the authorities imposed on Russian companies “state-mindedness,” turning them into state-minded enterprises. This reminded me of an interview with Jarosław Kaczyński, who noted with regret that Polish companies did not think in terms of national interests, but were primitive enough to focus on profits.

Paweł Zalewski: In my opinion, Russian thinking is completely different from what is developing in Poland and other countries where the tradition of Roman law remains dominant. For instance, understanding of what an obligation is in relations between people, between public entities. This is utter political Darwinism. Whatever you say about right-wing thought in Poland, it is not Darwinist, and the basis for Russian thinking on politics—domestic, but even more so foreign—is pure Darwinism. If someone is strong, they can trespass upon the property of others and cannot be blamed, because this is sanctioned as legitimate. Let me reiterate that this results from fundamental civilization differences, from the fact that the law of obligations was never in force there. Hence Russian thinking that you mentioned is totally incompatible with even the weirdest whims of all kinds of right-wing politicians in Poland.

Ślawomir Dębski: I have to interrupt you here, because we are moving away from the focus of our discussion.

Krzysztof Szczerski: I suggest that we stop elaborating on the similarities and differences between Poland and Russia. Instead, I would like to make two

more remarks on the issues raised. In order to be more public, foreign policy needs an ally, such as highbrow media reporting on the state's actions in this respect. In my opinion, we are scoring high in this category, with a world record in this regard observed during President Musharraf's visit to Poland, which passed totally unnoticed. He visited only two countries in Europe at the time, at a moment critical for global politics in the region, but the fact that one of these countries was Poland turned out to be of no interest to reporters, because the dominant information guideline at the time included Poland's isolation and the ignorance of authorities.

Adam Daniel Rotfeld: Public television's channel I can hardly be described as anti-Kaczyński.

Krzysztof Szczerski: The second remark has to do with parliament. Deputy Zalewski presided over the Foreign Affairs Committee, which had some achievements in the last term. I was a frequent guest, primarily of the European Union Committee. In the over 12 months when I attended its meetings, the Committee had no time to initiate any discussion on the strategy of the Polish policy in the EU, as MPs repeatedly emphasized, due to its very busy current legislative agenda. Similarly, there were no separate discussions on the EU objectives and policies in the foreign affairs committees of both houses. This is a serious weakness of the process of policy-shaping in Poland, in particular in the light of the growing role of parliament in the decision-making process in the EU. The parliament must become the venue for a serious and strategic debate on our political objectives in the medium and long term.

Sławomir Dębski: Thank you very much for your reflections on the overall atmosphere in which Poland's foreign policy was hammered out last year, and it is worth noting that a few conclusions were drawn. Politicians from all the factions are to blame for a number of problems, such as the communication policy deficit or tabloidization attempts, meaning such modeling of information that it is appealing to the media but detrimental to the quality of discourse. Finally, another important topic was brought up, namely the quality of policy "support," which can affect the picture too.

I would now like to ask another question, an interesting one from an analyst's perspective. Have we managed to learn more about ourselves, about the Polish potential as regards influencing the external environment? Recently, Poland has attempted to modify its foreign policy. We have made an effort, mobilized ourselves and...? What do we know about ourselves? What objectives are we trying to achieve using this method? If, in theory, we were to use our potential fully, eliminating the nuances that appeared in between the lines of

your statements, could we achieve more in the future? Does Poland have a potential that allows it to impact the policies of Germany, France, the UK or the U.S.?

Andrzej Olechowski: A short remark from me. What we have learnt is that Poles ultimately are interested in foreign policy. The 70% of the electorate that voted against Law and Justice in the last elections did so largely under the influence of the party's foreign policy, which they did not accept, which they were ashamed or afraid of. Earlier it seemed that foreign policy was of no interest to the public, just as in the U.S.

Adam Daniel Rotfeld: Going back to your question, do I think that the fundamental weakness of Poland's foreign policy is largely motivated by complexes? Complexes result from a sense of insecurity regarding our position in the world. There is no doubt a large gap between declared actions and the potential to implement them. What should be done to increase our efficiency? After Poland's accession to the EU, the best solution would be to win allies there and influence the position of the entire Union. There are certain areas where the EU, by the very nature of things, acknowledges our competencies, as is the case, for instance, with the eastern neighborhood or systemic transformations. Therefore, I would recommend the drafting of an outline EU strategy on Russia. It would be a mistake to aspire to a monopoly on the issue. A number of well-known figures from Germany and France should be invited to prepare the strategy and draft a summary report under the Weimar Triangle. The document could stimulate a debate in the EU on the new strategy on Russia. Our stance on relations with Russia is determined by a new development: we are a state of success, one that demonstrates a friendly attitude and readiness to cooperate with Russia, but at the same time is aware of the difficulties and threats related to the development of the domestic situation there, of the return to a kind of political Darwinism characteristic of the period before World War I, when the arguments of power prevailed over the power of arguments in diplomacy. Deputy Zalewski has noted that here a while ago. In foreign policy, it is very important to get rid of complexes, both superiority and inferiority complexes. We should talk with our partners as a state that has achieved a major domestic success and is aware thereof, but one that is also familiar with new challenges and threats.

There is one more aspect here, namely regional leadership. We should not refer to Poland as the natural leader, or subregional power. What determines our position is not so much self-assessment, but the way we are seen by our partners. If our policy is attractive to our neighbors and other states of the region, we will become a natural center of gravity for those countries and they will seek close

relations with us. The fact that we have been successful and are strong should induce our understanding, magnanimity and support for weaker partners. Sooner or later, this will bring the expected results.

Slawomir Dębski: Journalists often impose this kind of thinking, asking whether we are the leader or why we have lost the leading position, but also politicians say that we aspire to such a role.

Adam Daniel Rotfeld: We achieved a genuine success when we helped Ukrainians solve a serious political crisis. However, we failed to capitalize on the success fully, although the blame is not all ours here. We will lend credibility to our actions if we implement the policy of privileged partnership towards that country. The support for Ukraine serves our long-term strategic interests and, importantly, will also help to stabilize the region. It is not, and should not be, perceived as actions for Ukraine and against Russia. If the democratic transformation in Ukraine is accomplished successfully, it will benefit Russia as well.

Slawomir Dębski: In recent years, Poland has tried to promote and offer two big strategic projects to our partners: the so-called musketeers' pact and, last year, the square-root vote count in the EU Council. Those were two important concepts that we tried to push through and in both cases we failed. Does this give you an idea about Poland's potential to influence its external environment?

Paweł Zalewski: I would add one more concept—the common European policy towards Russia. Three things are important here. The most important one will come last. First, it is the professionalism of Polish foreign policy, the ways in which we communicate with our partners, thus reaching tactical targets. The last two years can be the starting point for a discussion on the topic. If we agree that we do not have a strategy, we consequently also agree that Poland's policy is largely reactive, and, as a result, that various tactical projects are reactive in nature, such as the alternative to Russian oil, i.e. the Odessa–Brody–Płock pipeline project.

For a number of reasons, tactical projects such as the “musketeers' pact” or “square root,” were poorly played, without thorough preparation, unprofessionally, without sounding potential responses, without winning allies for the project. A concept emerged first, which was actually not too carefully prepared, also in terms of arguments, and then it was presented in grand style. The most important link was missing that would connect those two extremes and pave a way for the success of the project. If our policy remains unchanged, we are doomed to failure even with good concepts, as both these concepts were good not only for us, but for all of Europe. An example here can be the proposal to set up a World War II museum in Gdańsk. It was announced as soon as it

emerged, and I am not sure that it was even discussed within the government. I believe that it is not the problem of the previous cabinet alone; it's a problem that mars Polish foreign policy in general. This is the first aspect, the problem of political engineering, political technology.

Another issue is the concepts themselves, their essence. My opinion about the concepts themselves is positive, because diversification of oil and gas supply to Poland is a challenge and we have to declare ourselves in favor of a solution. The common European policy towards Russia is a problem, and I think Samara came as Poland's success, with negligible follow-up, though. Various chances emerged there, for instance a potential solution to the embargo problem that Poland failed to use because, as you are well aware of, the concept of appointing four "Sherpas" emerged at the time, and they were to work out an agreement. A certain track for the talks was also agreed at the time with the Russians, who made a certain symbolic gesture, namely Putin stated that he would not block Polish livestock imports. The problem was, however, that there was no official embargo, but, owing to the various phytosanitary reservations, Polish exports to Russia were simply stopped. Putin withdrew all those unofficial reservations and Poland welcomed it in the way that we all remember. Poland did not join the group of "Sherpas." We simply failed to seize one out of many chances that were emerging.

The third most important and, to some extent, universal issue is that there has always been a certain dissonance in Polish foreign policy between the country's potential, or actually our belief in its potential, and the position of Poland in real terms. Some people involved in foreign policy believed, for various reasons, that our position failed to reflect the potential of the country and submitted various proposals to deal with the situation. In my opinion, none have been successfully implemented. One of the proposals to make the Polish contribution to EU decision-making more significant was the "square root." Disappointingly, the project was not implemented correctly. A question appears, then, how a medium-sized member of the European Union, such as Poland, located in the center of Europe, where all the contradictions meet, how can it build a position that would secure a successful pursuit of its strategic interests. I know that the question is too broad to discuss today, but I am only hinting at the tension that has been present, at least among some people dealing with foreign policy. To cut a long story short, it's about our actual versus potential standing.

Andrzej Olechowski: I have to comment on this. If there is a conflict between our potential and actual standing, we should report it to a psychiatrist. Leaving spiteful comments aside, let me ask you: what strategic needs of the

state do you have in mind that correspond to its potential standing, being broader, as I see it, than the actual dimension? In my opinion, all needs that the state has correspond to its actual size and dimensions. I think that the claim by Mr. Saryusz-Wolski, if I remember correctly, that Poland should have an influence on foreign policy corresponding to the position it would have had, had it not been afflicted by the atrocities caused by the external world, is misleading. In the real world, a man is never taller than his mirror image.

Paweł Zalewski: You mentioned a key issue, namely an assumption that follows from your argument is that the ability to use the potential corresponds to that potential. Generally speaking, you are right. If we didn't adopt that principle, we should be referred to a mental institution. However, the question is: does Poland have the tools, first of all domestic, that allow it to pursue a policy corresponding to that potential? In my opinion, we have neither the tools nor the opportunities. Perhaps this reveals our poor potential, but personally I believe it reveals something else.

Andrzej Olechowski: The needs. To correspond not to the potential, but to the needs.

Adam Daniel Rotfeld: Bismarck once said that Polish politics was romantic and poetry political. Today, our poetry is more romantic than politics.

Andrzej Olechowski: It is true that in some areas Poland does not have the necessary resources to fulfill its needs. That's why we joined the European Union and NATO. This is how Poland obtained Community funding, in some areas commensurate with the needs, because solidarity exists if we give more to those in need, and in other areas in correspondence with its position, because the partners are not keen to, for instance, acknowledge the right to add additional weight to the votes.

Where does this imbalance between reality and the perception of the potential come from? Partly from the complexes of those who had to work as kitchen help with their Ph.D. background, partly from the political nature of politics theorem and partly out of sheer stupidity.

Paweł Zalewski: Perhaps, Mr. Minister, you are trying to preach to the converted, because this is not my point. My point is that the Polish state, as a certain whole existing in time-space, does not have such instruments as would allow it to formulate and propose certain solutions that are important from our perspective. Poland does not have them, much as it should, and this is something to be addressed by the state. Greenhouse gas emissions can be an example here. Poland acted as if it were a country that had nothing to win or lose on the issue, which is not true, and it behaved like this because the quality of state functions

involved in the issue was poor, although in this particular case our potential is way above the position we have accepted.

Krzysztof Szczerski: Since the chairman brought up the topic of the embargo, we need to agree on certain facts of the case, because my knowledge and evaluation of what happened in Samara is somewhat different. It is not true that there were no talks and that we did not react to the Russian move. Let me also remind you that it was Poland that made the opening gesture, agreed with the EU partners, towards a solution of the embargo and veto problems, declaring, at the COREPER meeting, its willingness to agree to the commencement of talks after two conditions on the embargo and energy policy were met.

Again, I cannot agree with the philosophy of foreign policymaking that follows from Minister Olechowski's statement, because I do not agree with historical determinism in politics. The potential and needs can and should be modeled dynamically, rather than subject to the historical inevitability that has made us a country of this particular size rather than another, and located here on the world map rather than elsewhere, so the key is to move up, or, as the Romans would say, *semper in altum*. In any case, we know that we should not trust our senses fully, and that the mirror only tells us the simplest truth about men.

Several points raised by Minister Rotfeld were very important, I believe. Firstly, it is true that a problem of Polish foreign policy was the belief in spontaneous, or natural occurrences of various phenomena, good and bad. I remember one Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) minister saying, "Poland is by nature defenseless." This was in the context of energy issues. I was still a young man at the time and my reactions were more emotional, I personally felt hurt. He said that when he returned from negotiations with Gazprom, after signing contracts that were disadvantageous to Poland. If this assumption is present in politicians' mindsets, it means a disaster. Poland is neither by nature predestined to be a leader, you have to work hard and solicit for this, nor is it a defenseless country. We are not by nature a central state or a peripheral one; neither are we one with no dowry nor ugly. In consequence, I think that last year's attempt to reposition the state, to move away from the conviction of a somewhat natural position of Poland, or its standing, for example in relations among states in Europe, was very important. Here a question may appear about the assessment of the potential and needs. And again, the issue of the internal state discussion appears, because if we really cannot pursue policies beyond our potential and needs, the primary question is how we talk about it. We can, for instance, arrive at a conclusion that we don't have any potential at all and no needs other than to ensure minimum security for our natural defenselessness and favorable treatment from the "tycoons" of European politics. The situation, however, is

dynamic and the issue of security, including energy security, has reappeared on the agenda of the discussion on foreign policy and we had to tackle it independently. It looked like NATO and the EU guaranteed full security, and now the problem of threats ranks high on the external policy list of priorities.

In terms of home policy, a few shortcomings made their presence felt, for instance unprofessionalism. Some time ago, when the Civic Platform and Law and Justice were still discussing the coalition option, Jan Rokita suggested shortening the reins. The proposal was very difficult to implement in the Polish state management model. I think that today, owing to its staff and organizational weaknesses, only a limited mobilization of human resources is possible in the state administration. In reality, if we shorten the reins, the reins will be the only thing left in our hands. Even if we change the route, we cannot expect the entire train to switch to another track; most of the cars will remain on the original track.

As far as European matters and discussion on the treaty are concerned, I would like to say one thing. Following the presentation of our proposals to our European partners, we were left with two strategic allies only: Lithuania and the Czech Republic. The two countries were declaring their full solidarity with Poland all the time. Later, developments in the talks led us to the already known compromise, worked out also with other states.

Adam Daniel Rotfeld: Let me add that countries often adopt certain positions not because they support a specific solution, but because they do not want to end up in a similar situation at some point.

Krzysztof Szczerski: Motivations may vary. Importantly, however, certain situations during the negotiations verified the uniformity of this trio. Our insistence on the change in the voting system stemmed from the fundamental conviction that Poland must solicit for formal guarantees for its potential voting power. Certainly, there are other channels in the European Union, such as “soft” lobbying, and we need to learn how to use them. Primarily, however, we need to fight for our formal status, represented by the voting power or number of seats in the parliament, for the various formal guarantees of our influence in order to take actions to change our standing in the family of European states, to ensure continuous development of Poland for the benefit of the entire Europe. These formal guarantees, among other things, were among the reasons why Polish citizens decided to join the European Union.

Sławomir Dębski: Which means we need to do it, because we fail with soft instruments. This leads us to another question. Is it not so that the key problem of Polish foreign policy is the quality of its support and “service”? In order to

complete a complex—in terms of contents—foreign policy project, let us say the “square root,” we need to be able to extract the root first. In order to explain something to somebody, we need to understand it first and be absolutely convinced about the concept. The case of the conceptually complex “musketeers’ pact” was similar. One of the reasons for its failure, in my opinion, was that we didn’t know ourselves how to explain it. Many persons from the administration did not know what it was really about. Isn’t this dysfunction our flaw? We have this new “inexpensive state” slogan and to me, the administration is underfunded.

Andrzej Olechowski: Poland has built a reliable and sensible diplomatic service, I’m not saying brilliant. It is not a superb service, but neither is it the worst you can think of, or unable to implement and communicate reasonable political agendas. So let’s leave it aside.

I think that these two years and four initiatives we focused on show first of all that we are unable to impose the implementation of our proposals on others. We wanted to impose a new voting concept on the EU members. After the failure related to the Nice system, irrespective of how humiliating it was, we wanted more and came up with the “square root.” As regards the “musketeers” and “alternative oil,” definitely technical mistakes were made. Clearly, no politician can ever say: we are defenseless, even if he or she thinks so, because we pay them to control the situation.

Speaking of Russia, it is, in my opinion, an example of untapped potential in Polish foreign policy. However, we cannot say that we have managed to obtain a harmony of European voices on Russia in any way. Forecasts—ours and those of other countries—on Russia have become convergent, but the policies themselves have not.

Question from the audience: What about Samara?

Andrzej Olechowski: To some extent yes. Let me explain what I mean. We were sending warnings that the situation in Russia had been taking an unfavorable course and we were right. We did not, however, propose a reliable concept of a common policy on Russia. This was partly because of—so to speak—technical deficiencies, but partly also owing to our own indecision and disputes. Of key importance here has been the dispute with Germany. Our relations with that country essentially determine our position on Russia: if our relations with Germany are poor, we are also more nervous on Russia. This is a consequence of our location. With good relations with Germany in place, we can also be more at ease with Russia and formulate more balanced proposals. We can prepare them together with Germany. A Poland–Germany proposal on the common policy on Russia would be embraced by Europe with no major

difficulties, while a proposal that Poland and Germany do not agree on does not stand the slightest chance.

Pawel Zalewski: Let us get to the core of the problem. Firstly, the problem did not emerge in 2006, when Ms. Fotyga was appointed minister, but earlier, as a reaction to previous events. Let me just mention Minister Cimoszewicz here. This was the time of major changes, steps towards diplomats who were symbols of Solidarity-based diplomacy. As we discuss what happened in the last two years, we must not forget what had been happening earlier.

Secondly, I agree that the overall evaluation of Polish diplomacy should be positive, because it is an institution which, with all its conservatism, is able to implement various projects. Those people, irrespective of who they used to sympathize with, if they know that they can be of help, do implement projects. Some are very good, some just average in doing it, but they can still do it. Similarly to Minister Olechowski, I do not think this is a problem. Obviously, there is the question of further improvement of the MFA operation, but it's a different topic. The reasons for the failures are in my opinion not at the MFA, but in the transfer of political decisions taken at decision-making levels to the operational level. I would argue that persons taking decisions were more focused on the proposals themselves and their message in terms of publicity, than on their effective implementation. And this is a problem. If decision-makers have a good idea but do not hold their breath for a second to think about how to sell it to the public and have it implemented, nothing good will come out of it and we will still pursue a policy where the status is below the potential. A comforting word perhaps can be that we are not an exception in Europe. Let's consider, for instance, the recent "splash" by Sarkozy. We could say that the failure hurt even more, if we consider the scale.

Adam Daniel Rotfeld: I agree with a lot of remarks made here. For instance, as regards the "musketeers' pact," I think that it was doomed to fail not only because of its contents, but also the way it was presented. No allies were won for the project, either abroad or domestically. Diplomatic actions are taken discreetly also to make it possible to adjust one's position without losing face. The addressee of the project cannot, however, be taken by surprise. Even the best project will not be treated seriously by diplomats if they do not have a chance to analyze and consult it. In 2006, I attended a conference held in Riga simultaneously with the NATO summit. Senator Lugar was discussing a topic similar to the Polish proposal, he presented similar arguments, but did not refer to the Polish draft document. Perhaps we did not care to make him familiar with our project to be able to refer to it later. To an extent, this was a wasted

opportunity. Lugar could have promoted Polish thinking about economic security. The style and form are as important in foreign policy and diplomacy as the substance. Inappropriate form and style may ruin the best concepts. It is not my intent to start a debate on the personnel policy of Minister Cimoszewicz. Cimoszewicz is a politician with personality, assertive and very independent. He surely did not act on Democratic Left Alliance's instructions in his foreign policy. Two personnel decisions he had taken after he assumed the ministerial post received a lot of media coverage. At the same time, we should remember that the embassies in the most important countries, such as the United States, Russia or the UK, were headed by persons with no links whatsoever to the parties of the left; what mattered was professionalism only.

Paweł Zalewski: A short correction. I hate to comment on personnel issues. I did not actually plan to make any remarks on the period, but I talked to many diplomats whom I like and respect and the truth is that what has happened recently was a strong reaction to what had been happening at the MFA before. I totally agree, Sir, as regards the proper, reasonable assertiveness of Minister Cimoszewicz, as well as his position on European Union matters. These were much closer to me than, for instance, the policy pursued by the president. I have an impression that I could agree on more issues with Minister Cimoszewicz than with President Kwaśniewski.

Adam Daniel Rotfeld: Minister Cimoszewicz was highly respected in the EU. All the ministers in the EU knew he was a serious partner. His certain weakness was that he did not always initiate a personal or social interaction during the very first meeting. However, when he got to know a partner and took to him or her, not only did he initiate interaction, but also maintained friendly relations in the interest of the state. He earned respect from his partners, who were coming to visit him privately in Hajnówka in the Białowieża Forest, valuing his friendship, reliability and honesty.

Andrzej Olechowski: And, in the atmosphere of mutual respect, he lost the case for Nice.

Adam Daniel Rotfeld: The truth is that he squeezed the lemon to the full, contrary to what I had advised him. I thought we should have given up on it earlier. Today, I think that he was right, because he did not lose anything that was negotiable and he won support domestically, also from the Euro-skeptical opposition.

Paweł Zalewski: On sectoral issues, he managed to negotiate more than we could have expected.

Adam Daniel Rotfeld: I must say that he showed iron nerve on that. He knew from the very beginning what he wanted to achieve.

Krzysztof Szczerski: Referring to the question of organizational dysfunction of the administration in terms of foreign policy, I would like to bring up four general problems, including one specific issue. In general terms, our weakness is, in my opinion, the lack of a separate center for conceptual political strategies. We do have analytical centers, but we don't have a center for converting data into strategies, or a separate vice-minister responsible for thinking. Secondly, our weaknesses result from a reactive pattern of behavior of the Polish administration, and its non-familiarity with the techniques of historical data analysis; thirdly, from a low level of administrative innovation, a lack of modern tools to act; and, fourthly, from poor internal coherence and coordination of the policies within the government and within the various administration departments. I would add one more item to this list of practical flaws, which perhaps rendered the actions we referred to before ineffective. As a result of a mishmash of opinions and actions, as well as a falling level of confidence in diplomatic structures manifested by some representatives of the authorities, substitute techniques were used perhaps only too often, such as negotiating certain matters outside traditional channels, which could have also rendered our policy incomprehensible. On economic matters, there is a competency divide between the MFA and the Ministry of Economy, on European matters between the MFA and the Office of the Committee for European Integration. I have worked for both institutions in the same capacity, and I know that if we do not solve this issue, we are in for problems, notably in terms of effectiveness we need to display during the Polish presidency in 2011. There is also a problem of agreement between the actions taken by the president and the prime minister.

Paweł Zalewski: There is one very important aspect that we have failed to mention at all, namely that the way of thinking about regional policy has changed, by building infrastructural links that were previously missing. In my opinion, Orlen's investment projects, such as Mazeikiu Nafta and Unipetrol, changed the paradigm of Polish regional policy, introducing a long-lacking component. I was wondering why Polish policy was ineffective as regards the establishment of genuine alliances in Central Europe. The answer is: Central European countries were building their relations in a radial manner, primarily with the West, notably Germany, failing to establish mutual links at the metapolicy and security level, which actually did not always work, since, at some point, every state was looking for securities for themselves. The fact that Poland invested in Mazeikiu Nafta and Unipetrol has created such far-reaching interests that suddenly, in the network of radial mechanisms, new links emerged

that were actually running across the region. This is an extremely important factor in political terms. If we manage to maintain reasonable cooperation, from the economic perspective, and this is what ultimately counts most, or even get Slovakia and Hungary involved, this will change Polish policymaking dramatically.

Andrzej Olechowski: I am sure you know that this was implemented against the position of the government.

Paweł Zalewski: Not only am I fully aware of that, but also, in a way, I am responsible for obtaining support for the project from at least one important political player.

Adam Daniel Rotfeld: Let us have a holistic look. What should be the primary criterion to evaluate the effectiveness of the Polish foreign service? Several matters require redefinition, and these relate to the evaluation criterion. In the past, the decisive factor was military potential, and military cooperation was the key to regional cooperation. Today, military cooperation still matters, but, owing to membership of NATO and other multilateral structures, economic cooperation is of fundamental importance. It follows, therefore, that ambassadors should be evaluated primarily from the standpoint of the economic effects of their actions in relations with their host states. This will not be possible, however, unless the Ministry of Economy stops protecting this area as a kind of sinecure for close collaborators of subsequent economy ministers. This will not change all by itself. Even worse, there is a tendency to preserve the outdated economic policymaking style abroad. How can this be changed? Usually, a chance appears with each new government. During the initial weeks, the government can afford reforms, before it becomes entangled in inter-ministerial dependencies. I remember that I discussed the issue with the newly appointed Economy Minister Jerzy Hausner in 2005, and I remember saying that we had a unique chance to change the state of affairs that reflected a different reality, one in which the state had a monopoly on foreign trade, and the entire economy was state-managed. We were both to find out how much this outdated structure resisted any change in the *status quo*. After a few days, a deputy minister appointed by Hausner to endorse the reform told me, “I agree with both of you, but if I accept the change I will pass for a traitor at the ministry, and it is my natural work environment.”

Over 40 years ago, I got hold of the book *Dysproporcje polityki polskiej* (“Disproportions of Polish Policy”) by Tadeusz Kozłowski, an interwar Polish diplomat with a long professional record, published in Buenos Aires in 1964. The author attempted to list what he called the “faults and degenerations of

Polish politics.” Items on the list includes: lack of realistic approach, unwillingness to plan, extremity of proposals, rash decision-making, disregard for the temporal aspect of guidelines, subjectivity of attitudes, faulty form, careless execution, resentments and complexes. The list of the weaknesses is longer. The author formulates these charges on the basis of his experience from the interwar and World War II periods, although my impression was, when I re-read the book in 2008, that it was to a large extent about contemporary politics. In any case, it’s recommended reading for present-day diplomats.

Paweł Zalewski: That is why we should know what economic interests Polish foreign policy should pursue. Today, we are unable to answer this question.

Krzysztof Szczerski: Replying in short to the question about the legacy of the recent period in foreign policy, independently of the rhetorical aspects and the revival of the term of political realism, largely absent in the wishful mode of previous debates, I would indicate three components: status, presence and position.

Firstly, we are gradually evolving into a kind of reference point for the policy of states of the region, notably smaller ones, including the Balkan or South Caucasus states, and for remote countries. There is an increase in the number of visits by their representatives, who want to hear what Poland thinks as well as consult their decisions with us. I think that—also in the future—we should demonstrate concern for cooperation with smaller states rather than operate in the “great six” dimension only. This closer point of reference is at least just as important.

Secondly, Polish activity and presence in key areas on the geopolitical world map, as well as in talks on such global problems as security, have also intensified. We have started to pursue a policy of a player in the global arena, rather than in the European realm only.

Thirdly, it also appears that we have managed to get ensconced in the perception of European Union countries as an important partner for each vital agreement. Not for all of them, though, especially not for those that held sway previously, are we a natural, needed and desired partner, but we are a necessary one for sure.

Paweł Zalewski: Blocked potential.

Krzysztof Szczerski: So the message for the present government is: build on the status, presence and position such a policy so as to—without losing any of these resources—persuade other countries that we deserve to be a partner that is both necessary and desired.

Ślawomir Dębski: Thank you very much. The objective of PIIA is to support foreign policy rather than undermine it, so we cannot be responsible for the exhaustion of the participants in this discussion, as they are still actively involved in shaping Poland's foreign policy.

V.

Annexes

Chronicle of Poland's International Relations in 2007

General Affairs

16.01. During a new year's meeting with the diplomatic corps, President Lech Kaczyński emphasized the outstanding significance of the EU and NATO membership for Poland. "The European Union constitutes a reference of basic nature for my country. We intend to actively participate in its development, we want to actively participate in resolving its problems."

11.05. In the Sejm, Foreign Minister Anna Fotyga presented a report on Polish foreign policy in 2007.

23.11. Prime Minister Donald Tusk delivered a policy statement in the Sejm, where he presented, among other things, the priorities of Polish foreign policy.

21.12. President Kaczyński signed a decision on prolongation of the involvement of the Polish Military Contingent in International Stabilization Force in the Republic of Iraq until 31 October 2008, as well as a decision on the participation of the Polish Military Contingent in the International Force in Kosovo in the Republic of Serbia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period between 1 January and 31 December 2008. He also made a decision to prolong the involvement of the Polish Military Contingent in the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force in the Syrian Arab Republic in the period between 1 January and 30 June 2008.

Multilateral Cooperation

The Baltic Cooperation

12–13.06. Minister Fotyga took part in the meeting of the 14th ministerial session of the Council of the Baltic Sea States in Malmö, dedicated to the plans of reform of the organization. She also held a meeting with the Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Sweden, Carl Bildt.

Central European Cooperation

24–26.05. President Kaczyński paid a visit to Brno to take part in the 14th summit of the Central European states, dedicated to the current issues of the international policy, including in particular: the missile defense system, the Constitutional Treaty, the energy security, as well as the EU enlargement and the situation in the Balkans. He held meetings with Presidents of: the Republic of Croatia—Stipe Mesić, the Republic of Austria—Heinz Fischer, the Republic of Serbia—Boris Tadić, the Republic of Albania—Alfred Moisiu and of Bosnia and Herzegovina—Nebojša Radmanović.

The European Union

22.01. In Brussels, a meeting of the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council was held, dedicated, among other things, to the European Commission report on the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy. Attending the meeting, Minister Fotyga mentioned the issue of the Constitutional Treaty, emphasizing the need to introduce the reference to the Christian roots of Europe.

4–6.02. The Third Lisbon Strategy Forum was held in Brussels with the participation of Polish MPs.

9–10.02. European Commission President, José Manuel Barroso, paid a visit to Warsaw, where he held meetings with Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński and Minister Fotyga as well as President Lech Kaczyński. The talks concerned primarily the issue of the Constitutional Treaty. The Commission President was reassured that Poland will actively participate in the discussion concerning the Treaty. During the meeting with the Polish President, the issue of further EU enlargement was also discussed.

13–14.02. In Brussels, Minister Fotyga participated in the meeting of the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council on Kosovo. Moreover, Minister Fotyga paid a visit to the European Parliament and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, where she held a meeting with the President of the Court, Jean-Paul Costa.

2.03. Minister Szczygło participated in an informal meeting of EU Defense Ministers in Wiesbaden. The issue of involvement in peace missions was discussed.

8–9.03. President Kaczyński took part in the meeting of the European Council in Brussels and held a meeting with the President of the European Parliament, Hans-Gert Pöttering.

24–25.03. In Berlin, President Kaczyński participated in the meeting of the EU heads of state and government on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of signing of the Treaties of Rome. A Berlin Declaration was solemnly adopted.

30–31.03. Minister Fotyga took part in the meeting of EU Foreign Ministers in the Gymnich formula in Bremen.

18.04. During his working visit to the European Commission, Prime Minister Kaczyński held a meeting with President Barroso, Commissioner for Regional Policy Danuta Hübner, Commissioner for Health Markos Kyprianou, Commissioner for the Environment Stavros Dimas and Commissioner for Competition Neelie Kroes. He also held talks with the President of the European Parliament Pöttering. The meetings concerned the role of Poland in the EU and the issues of the future European treaty.

7–9.05. In Riyadh, Minister Fotyga took part in the 17th meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council—European Union Joint Council, where the developments in the Middle East and Iraq were discussed. She also held meetings with Foreign Ministers of Qatar Hamad al-Attiyah and of Kuwait Sheik Muhammad Sabah al-Salim as-Sabah. She also held talks with German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier.

28–29.05. Minister Fotyga took part in the 8th meeting of Foreign Ministers of ASEM states in Hamburg. Among topics discussed were regional and international developments, energy policy, climate change, fighting terrorism, as well as economic, cultural and social cooperation. She also held meetings with Foreign Ministers of the Republic of India Pranab Mukherjee and of the People's Republic of China Yang Jiechi.

4–5.06. The President of the European Parliament Pöttering paid a visit to Warsaw, where he held talks with the Speaker of the Sejm Ludwik Dorn concerning the developments in the consultations process concerning the European treaty and the scope of necessary changes in it.

21–23.06. President Kaczyński took part in the meeting of the European Council in Brussels. After a stormy debate a mandate was adopted for the Inter-Governmental Conference concerning the Constitutional Treaty.

7–8.09. In Viana do Castelo in the Portuguese Republic, Minister Fotyga participated in the meeting of EU Foreign Ministers in the Gymnich formula.

20.09. On his working visit to Warsaw, the President of the European Commission Barroso held a meeting with Prime Minister Kaczyński and participated in the meeting of the Polish MEPs, members of the European People's Party–European Democrats. He also met with former President Lech Wałęsa. Current EU affairs were discussed.

18–19.10. President Kaczyński participated in an informal EU summit in Lisbon. He also met with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Gordon Brown. Issues concerning the Reform Treaty were discussed.

7–8.11. On his working visit to Warsaw, President of the European Commission Barroso held a meeting with President Kaczyński. The October summit in Lisbon was summarized and found to be a success. Opinions were also exchanged on EU external relations, with particular stress put on the EU–Russia relations and the problems of the European energy security. The priority significance of the solidarity principle in EU external relations was also emphasized.

4.12. Prime Minister Tusk, on his first visit to Belgium after having taken office, paid a visit to European institutions. He held a meeting with the President of the

European Parliament Pöttering, the President of the European Commission Barroso, NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer and leaders of political groups of the European Parliament.

12–13.12. President Kaczyński, as head of the Polish delegation, comprising also among others Prime Minister Tusk and Foreign Minister Sikorski, took part in the solemn signing of the Lisbon Treaty, amending the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community.

14.12. Prime Minister Tusk took part in the meeting of the European Council in Brussels.

21.12. Presidents Kaczyński and Adamkus took part in the celebrations of the enlargement of the Schengen zone in Budzisko, where they met with officers of the Polish and Lithuanian Border Guard and the local Polish and Lithuanian community.

Prime Minister Tusk, the Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel, the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic Mirek Topolánek, the Prime Minister of the Portuguese Republic Sócrates, the President of the European Commission Barroso and the President of the European Parliament Pöttering, were jointly celebrating the enlargement of the Schengen zone in the border towns of Zittau, Radek and Porajów.

NATO

25–26.01. Minister Fotyga took part in the meeting of Foreign Ministers of NATO states, held in London. The situation in Afghanistan was discussed. She also held talks with NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer.

16.02. President Kaczyński held a meeting with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General John Craddock, to whom he presented the major goals of the country's security policy within NATO, while emphasizing that Poland's involvement in the operational activities of the Alliance reflected international solidarity. General Craddock expressed his gratitude for resolute and strong involvement of Poland in NATO operations.

22.02. During his visit to Brussels, Defense Minister Andrzej Szczykło held a meeting with NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer.

26–27.04. Minister Fotyga participated in an informal meeting of Foreign Ministers of NATO states in Oslo, dedicated to the issue of the missile defense system.

6.06. President Kaczynski met in Brussels with NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer. The major topic of talks was the Polish participation in the missile defense system and a possible deployment of its elements on Polish territory. The involvement of Polish Armed Forces in the missions in Afghanistan and in Kosovo was also discussed, as well as the situation in Iraq.

14–16.06. In Brussels, meetings were held: of Defense Ministers of NATO states, dedicated to the current NATO operations and missions; of the NATO-Russia Council; the NATO-Ukraine Council; the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Defense Planning Committee.

28–29.06. Minister Fotyga took part in the security forum of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in Ohrid. The meeting was dominated by the issues concerning the situation in the Balkans and in Kosovo as well as energy security.

6–7.12. In Brussels, Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski took part in the meetings of the North Atlantic Council, the NATO-Russia Council and the NATO-Ukraine Council. He also held meetings with heads of delegations of the countries participating in the Mediterranean Dialogue and with NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer. The issues discussed concerned current developments and the approaching 60th anniversary of the establishment of the Alliance.

OSCE

30.11. In Madrid, the 15th session of the OSCE Ministerial Council was held. Current issues were discussed, including the most important ones concerning: the elections in Russia, the future of the OSCE mission in Kosovo and its possible mission in Afghanistan.

The Visegrad Group

12–14.01. A meeting was held in Krakow of Parliamentary European Affairs Commissions of the Visegrad Group states, in which a delegation from Ukraine took part.

28–29.05. Minister Fotyga participated in the 8th meeting of Foreign Ministers of ASEM states in Hamburg. Moreover, she participated in the talks of Foreign Ministers of the Visegrad Group states with the Foreign Minister of Japan Taro Aso. The ministers expressed their hopes for the establishment of contacts with the Visegrad Group to strengthen the EU-Japan relations.

18.06. Prime Minister Kaczyński took part in the meeting of Prime Ministers of the Visegrad Group states in Bratislava, aimed at summarizing the year of Slovak presidency and the plans of the Czech presidency. The guest of the meeting—Prime Minister of the Republic of Portugal, José Sócrates—discussed the assumptions of the Portuguese EU presidency.

2.09. In Brussels, an informal meeting was held by Foreign Ministers of the Visegrad Group states and the Baltic states. Its aim was to develop common strategy for strengthening the eastern dimension of the European Neighborhood Policy. The ministers emphasized that all efforts must be made to increase the financial support from the EU budget for its eastern neighbors.

20–21.09. President Kaczyński took part in the meeting of the heads of Visegrad Group states, held in Keszthely. Three years of the Group's presence in the EU were summarized and the topics of its entrance to the Schengen zone and the future of the Group were discussed.

25–26.10. In Štířín, in the vicinity of Prague, Foreign Ministers of the Visegrad Group states held a meeting, together with the Foreign and the Minister of European Integration of the Republic of Moldova, Andrei Strătan. The ministers gave their support for Moldova's European ambitions and expressed their hope that the EU will continue its "open door" policy. They have also adopted a declaration on the situation in Burma.

10.12. In Ostrava, Prime Minister Tusk took part in the meeting of Prime Ministers of the Visegrad Group states and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Slovenia, Janez Janša, dedicated to the situation in Kosovo and the approaching Slovak presidency in the EU.

The Weimar Triangle

19.03. In Berlin, a meeting was held of the presidents of Foreign Affairs Committees of parliaments of the Weimar Triangle states. MP Paweł Zalewski participated in the meeting.

Others

12–13.03. Minister Fotyga participated in the 14th session of the UN Human Rights Council and in the meetings of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, where she held meetings among others with Director General of the International Labor Organization Juan Somalia, with representatives of states belonging to the Convening Group of the Communities of Democracies (CD), with the President of the International Red Cross Committee Jakob Kellenberg and with Director General of World Trade Organization Pascal Lamy. The issues discussed concerned the role of Poland in these organizations.

17–18.04. The President of the Palestinian National Authority Mahmoud Abbas paid a visit to Poland, where he met with President Kaczyński. The discussions concerned the relations between Palestine and the European Union, including Poland, the present situation in the Middle East and the perspectives for a peaceful resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

11–12.05. President Kaczyński, together with invited Presidents of: the Republic of Azerbaijan—Ilham Aliyev, Georgia—Mikheil Saakashvili, the Republic of Lithuania—Valdas Adamkus, Ukraine—Viktor Yushchenko, and the special envoy of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Lyazat Kinov, took part in the energy summit in Krakow, where the Joint Declaration of the Presidents was announced.

12–15.05. An official visit to Poland was paid by the Grand Master of the Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of St. John of Jerusalem, of Rhodes and of Malta, Andrew Willoughby Ninian Bertie, who held a meeting with President Kaczyński. In the presence of the President and the Grand Master, an agreement on healthcare cooperation was signed between the Republic of Poland and the Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of St. John of Jerusalem, of Rhodes and of Malta. The guest also met with Cardinal Stanisław Dziwisz. It was the first visit of the Grand Master to Poland since 1931.

18–19.06. President Kaczyński participated as a special guest in the summit of the GUAM states. He held meetings with presidents of: Azerbaijan—Aliyev, Georgia—Saakashvili, Ukraine—Yushchenko, Lithuania—Adamkus, and the Prime Minister of Moldova—Vasile Tarlev. The topics discussed concerned mostly the issues of energy security, and in particular the construction of the pipeline to connect the Caucasus with Central and Eastern Europe.

10–11.10. President Kaczyński took part in the conference on “Responsible energy for responsible partners,” organized in Vilnius with the participation of presidents: Adamkus of Lithuania, Aliyev of Azerbaijan, Saakashvili of Georgia and Yushchenko of Ukraine, as well as Kazakhstan’s Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Sauat Mynbayev. Other participants in the meeting included: the EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs and the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy Clay Sellas. An agreement was signed on cooperation in the construction of the Odessa–Brody–Płock–Gdańsk oil pipeline.

26–27.11. Minister Sikorski took part in the conference dedicated to the renewal of the peace process in the Middle East, held in Annapolis. He also held meetings with Foreign Ministers of the Republic of France—Bernard Kouchner, of Israel—Tzipi Livni, of Germany—Frank-Walter Steinmeier, as well as the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried, with whom he discussed current bilateral issues.

Bilateral Relations

Argentina

8–11.12. Speaker of the Senate Bogdan Borusewicz took part in the swearing-in of the President of the Republic of Argentina Cristina Fernández de Kirchner.

Armenia

25–27.02. During her official visit to Armenia, Minister Fotyga was received by President Robert Kocharyan, held a meeting with Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanyan and paid a visit to Prime Minister Andranik Margaryan. The visit to Armenia was the first stop on her trip to the countries of the region.

Austria

11–12.06. A working visit to Warsaw was paid by the Chancellor of the Republic of Austria Alfred Gusenbauer, who held meetings with Prime Minister Kaczyński and Speaker of the Sejm Ludwik Dorn. The meetings concerned bilateral relations and European issues.

Azerbaijan

1.03. Minister Fotyga paid an official visit to the Republic of Azerbaijan in order to prepare the visit of President Kaczyński. She was received by President Aliyev, and she held further meetings with Prime Minister Artur Rasizade, with Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov and Speaker of the Parliament Ogtay Asadov. Bilateral relations and cooperation on the international arena were discussed.

30–31.03. President Kaczyński paid an official visit to the Republic of Azerbaijan, where he held meetings with President Aliyev, Prime Minister Rasizade and Speaker of Parliament Asadov. Energy security issues were discussed.

Belarus

14–16.03. A seminar on “The opportunities of the Republic of Belarus related to the European Neighborhood Policy” was held in Minsk with the participation of Polish MPs.

Belgium

13.04. A working visit to Poland was paid by the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Belgium Guy Verhofstadt, who was received by President Lech Kaczyński and held a meeting with Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński. The topics discussed concerned current issues in bilateral relations, opinions were also exchanged on the EU debate related to the institutional reform, the EU's activity in external policy and cooperation in the area of security and defense.

4.12. A working visit to the Kingdom of Belgium was paid by Prime Minister Tusk. During talks with Prime Minister Verhofstadt, bilateral issues were discussed as well the issues related to the cooperation within the EU. Moreover, the Polish Prime Minister visited European institutions.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

16–18.12. An official visit to Poland was paid by the President of the Presidium of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Željko Komšić, who held meetings with President Kaczyński, Speaker of the Sejm Bronisław Komorowski and Prime Minister Tusk. A separate meeting was held of the Foreign Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina Sven Alkalaj with Minister Sikorski. Bilateral cooperation was discussed, as well as issues regarding the security in the Western Balkans, Kosovo and the European ambitions of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Bulgaria

31.05–1.06. Minister Fotyga paid an official visit to Sofia, where she was received by President Georgi Parvanov. She also held meetings with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ivaylo Kalfin, with the Minister for European Affairs Gergana Grancharova and the Deputy Chairman of the National Assembly Yunal Said Lutfi. Issues connected with EU membership were discussed.

Croatia

21–22.02. On her official visit to Croatia, Minister Fotyga held a meeting in Zagreb with Foreign Minister Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović and Speaker of the Croatian Parliament Vladimir Šeks. She was also received by President Mesić. European issues and the situation in the Balkans were discussed.

Cyprus

16–17.05. An official visit to Poland was paid by the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Cyprus Yiorgos Lillikas, who held meetings with Minister Fotyga and Speakers of the Sejm Ludwik Dorn and of the Senate Bogdan Borusewicz.

The Czech Republic

25.01. The President of the Czech Republic Václav Klaus paid a working visit to Poland, where he held a meeting with President Kaczyński. The Constitutional Treaty was the most important topic of talks. The agenda of the upcoming meetings within the EU and the project of deployment of the U.S. missile defense system on the territory of both states were also discussed.

19–20.02. The Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, Mirek Topolánek, paid an official visit to Poland, where he was received by President Lech Kaczyński. The future of the united Europe and bilateral relations were discussed. Prime Minister Topolánek also met with Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński and the Speakers of the Sejm Marek Jurek and of the Senate Bogdan Borusewicz.

21.05. President Kaczyński held a meeting in a castle in Lány with President Klaus. The two politicians emphasized that they share a common standpoint regarding the missile defense system and have very close opinion on the Constitutional Treaty.

10–12.07. An official visit to Poland was paid by the President of the Czech Republic Klaus. He held a meeting with President Lech Kaczyński, with whom he discussed the issues regarding the missile defense system. The Czech President was honored with the Order of the White Eagle. He also met with Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński and with Speakers of the Sejm Ludwik Dorn and the Senate Bogdan Borusewicz.

Denmark

16.03. Prime Minister Kaczyński paid a working visit to Copenhagen, where he held a meeting with Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Bilateral issues and the current EU agenda were discussed.

Estonia

3–4.04. A working visit to Poland was paid by the President of the Estonian Republic Toomas Hendrik Ilves, who held meetings with President Lech Kaczyński, Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński and Speaker of the Sejm Marek Jurek. Bilateral relations, energy security and the current situation in Ukraine were discussed.

12–13.06. An official visit to Warsaw was paid by the Prime Minister of the Estonian Republic Andrus Ansip, who held meetings with President Lech Kaczyński, Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński and Speakers of the Sejm Ludwik Dorn and of the Senate Bogdan Borusewicz. President Kaczyński, emphasizing the perfect condition of bilateral relations, presented the standpoint of Poland in the current European debate and the assessment of international situation in the region. The two parties expressed hopes for further tightening of cooperation, particularly in economic area.

Finland

25.05. The Foreign Minister of the Republic of Finland, Ilkka Kanerva, paid a working visit to Warsaw, where he held meetings with Minister Fotyga, with the Director of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) Christian Strohal and the Deputy Speaker of the Sejm Bronisław Komorowski.

12.09. Prime Minister Kaczyński paid a working visit to Finland, where he was received by President Tarja Halonen, and held meetings with Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen and paid a visit to the Speaker of the Parliament Väinämö Niinistö.

France

29.01. During the working visit of the Foreign Minister of the Republic of France, Philippe Douste-Blazy, to Poland, perspectives for bilateral cooperation in the European, security and defense areas were discussed.

4–5.02. Minister Fotyga took part in an international conference “Let Us Free the Children of War” and a meeting of Foreign Ministers with the Foreign Minister of France Douste-Blazy. She also met with the Minister for European Affairs Catherine Colonna.

14.06. A working visit to Poland was paid by the President of the French Republic Nicolas Sarkozy, who was received by President Lech Kaczyński and held a meeting with Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński. Current EU issues were

discussed, with particular attention paid to the debate concerning the Union's future and the Constitutional Treaty.

22.07. President Kaczyński paid a working visit to France related to the accident of a Polish bus near Grenoble.

7–8.10. President Kaczyński paid a working visit to France, where he held meetings with President Sarkozy and Prime Minister François Fillon. He also decorated French citizens who took part in the rescue of victims of the bus accident near Grenoble.

12.12. A working visit to France was paid by Prime Minister Tusk, who held a meeting with Prime Minister Fillon and President Sarkozy. Issues of cooperation within EU and bilateral relations were discussed.

Georgia

27–28.02. Minister Fotyga paid an official visit to Georgia, where she held meetings with Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili, Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli and the Speaker of the Parliament Nino Burjanadze. The talks concerned mostly the issues of energy security and Euro-Atlantic integration.

15–16.04. President Kaczyński paid an official visit to Tbilisi, where he held meetings with the President of Georgia Saakashvili and Speaker of the Parliament Burjanadze. The issues discussed concerned the Georgian-Russian relations, energy security and the ambitions of Georgia regarding the NATO and EU membership.

10.05. A working visit to Warsaw was paid by the President of Georgia Saakashvili, who took part, together with President Kaczyński, in the celebrations on the occasion of the 86th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Poland and Georgia.

13–14.09. Minister Fotyga took part in the meeting of the New Group of Friends of Georgia in Vilnius, which spoke in favor of Georgia's rapprochement with the European Union and NATO.

3.11. In Tbilisi, an opening meeting of the Consultation Committee of Presidents of Poland and Georgia was held, during which a Status of the Consultation Committee of the Presidents of the Republic of Poland and Georgia was signed, which defines its tasks and competences. The two parties agreed that the Committee should constitute a major forum of exchange of opinions on bilateral, regional and international issues.

22–23.11. The celebrations of the 4th anniversary of the Revolution of Roses in Georgia were attended by President Kaczyński, who held meetings with President Saakashvili, representatives of the Georgian opposition and with Prime Minister Lado Gurgenidze. A trilateral meeting was also held between President Kaczyński,

the President of Georgia and the President of Lithuania Adamkus, dedicated to energy security.

Germany

31.01. A working visit to Poland was paid by the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany Steinmeier, who held a meeting with Minister Fotyga. The talks concerned bilateral relations and European policy, among others the Constitutional Treaty and energy security.

15–17.02. At the invitation extended by the Speaker of the Sejm Marek Jurek, Deputy President of the Bundestag, Norbert Lammert, paid an official visit to Poland, where he held a meeting with President Kaczyński. First of all, the issue of the future of the Constitutional Treaty was discussed. The talks also concerned the priorities of the German presidency in the EU Council. The participants indicated that Polish-German dialogue should be channeled to the areas of cooperation that required close cooperation of both states in the bilateral and international dimension.

22.02. The Sejm was visited by the Minister for European Affairs of Germany, Günter Gloser, who talked with MPs mostly about the future of the Constitutional Treaty. The problems of Polish-German relations were also discussed. The German Minister also met with Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Paweł Kowal, Secretary of State in the Office of the Committee for European Integration Ewa Ośniecka-Tamecka, the Chairman of the Commission for the European Union, Karol Karski, and the representative of the Foreign Minister for Polish-German cooperation, Mariusz Muszyński.

5–6.03. In Berlin, a joint meeting of the Presidium of the Polish Sejm and Bundestag was held.

16–17.03. A visit to Poland was paid by Chancellor Merkel, who held talks with Prime Minister Kaczyński and gave a lecture at the University of Warsaw. Current issues in Polish-German relations and current European affairs were discussed.

16.06. A working visit to Germany was paid by President Kaczyński, who, after a meeting with Chancellor Merkel at Meseberg castle near Berlin, told the journalists that Poland and Germany sustained standpoints concerning the vote-weighting system in the EU Council and expressed his hopes that during the meeting in Brussels a solution that would satisfy Poland could be found.

12.09. A working visit to Bundestag was paid by the Speaker of the Sejm Ludwik Dorn.

12.10. Before an informal EU summit in Lisbon, a working visit to Germany was paid by President Kaczyński, who held a meeting with Chancellor Merkel.

29–30.11. An official visit to Germany was paid by a delegation of the Senate headed by its Speaker Borusewicz.

6.12. A working visit to Germany was paid by Minister Sikorski, who held a meeting with Minister Steinmeier.

11.12. A working visit to the Federal Republic of Germany was paid by Prime Minister Tusk, who met with Chancellor Merkel and was received by President Köhler. Among issues discussed were Polish-German relations in the context of the project of commemorating the expellees.

The Holy See

1–2.04. On the 2nd anniversary of the death of Pope John Paul II, President Kaczyński paid a visit to the Holy See, where he held a meeting with the Secretary of State, Cardinal Tarcisio Bertone, took part in a mass for John Paul II celebrated by Benedict XVI at St. Peter's Square. He later had a meeting with Pope Benedict XVI.

11–12.04. A working visit to the Holy See was paid by Minister Fotyga.

2–3.06. A visit to the Holy See was paid by President Kaczyński, who took part in canonization mass of Blessed Simon of Lipnica and was received on a private audience by Pope Benedict XVI.

14–16.09. A visit to Poland was paid by the Secretary of State of the Holy See, Cardinal Bertone, who met with President Kaczyński.

7.12. On the occasion of his visit to the Republic of Italy, Prime Minister Tusk was received in a private audience by Pope Benedict XVI.

Hungary

15.02. A working visit to Warsaw was paid by the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Hungary Kinga Göncz, who met with Minister Fotyga. The cooperation within the Visegrad Group and the EU was discussed.

22–24.03. During his official visit to Poland, the President of the Republic of Hungary, László Sólyom, held a meeting with President Kaczyński.

Iraq

2–4.05. Minister Fotyga participated in the opening of a conference “International agreement with Iraq,” held in Sharm el-Sheikh, where she held meetings with Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Iraq Barham Salih.

16.05. Prime Minister Kaczyński paid a working visit to the Republic of Iraq, where he held meetings with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the commanders and soldiers of the Multinational Division Central-South in Divaniyah.

Ireland

18–20.02. President Kaczyński paid a state visit to Ireland, where he held meetings with President Mary McAleese, Prime Minister Bertie Ahern, the Speaker of the Lower House of the Parliament Rory O'Hanlon and the Speaker of the Higher House of the Parliament Rory Kiely. The Polish President referred, among others, to the issue of the Constitutional Treaty. He emphasized that Poland was in favor of the Treaty, but the substantial changes had to be introduced to its present form.

Israel

27.03. A visit to Israel was paid by Minister Szczygło, who held a meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres. An annex was signed to the 1994 agreement on military cooperation between the two countries.

15–18.04. A working visit to Israel was paid by Minister Fotyga, who held meetings with Deputy Prime Minister Peres, members of Israel–Poland Parliamentary Group and representatives of the Knesset. She also held talks with the Minister of Industry, Trade and Labor Eliahu Ishai, the Minister of Education, Culture and Sport Yuli Tamir and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni. She met with the leader of opposition Likud party, Benjamin Netanyahu. The issues of regional security and Polish-Israeli cooperation were discussed.

Italy

30.05. A working visit to Poland was paid by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Italy, Romano Prodi. The good state of bilateral relations was confirmed, and current EU issues were discussed, particularly concerning the Constitutional Treaty.

7.12. During his working visit to the Republic of Italy and the Holy See, Prime Minister Tusk held a meeting with Prime Minister Prodi. Mutual economic relations and current EU issues were discussed.

Japan

30–31.05. The Foreign Minister of Japan, Taro Aso, was received by President Lech Kaczyński. The talks concerned bilateral and international issues related to the situation in North-East Asia, the future of the EU and the eastern dimension of the European policy.

Jordan

5–8.09. An official visit to Amman was paid by the Speaker of the Senate Bogdan Borusewicz.

Kazakhstan

28–30.03. President Lech Kaczyński paid an official visit to Astana, where he held meetings with President Nursultan Nazarbayev and Prime Minister Karim

Massimov. Apart from the issues of bilateral cooperation and energy security, the problems related to the Polish community in Kazakhstan were discussed. The most important were energy-related issues, particularly the plan of construction of the Odessa–Brody–Płock–Gdańsk oil pipeline.

Latvia

10–11.04. President Kaczyński held a meeting in Riga with the President of the Latvian Republic Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga and took part in an informal meeting of presidents of eight states (Austria, Finland, Latvia, Germany, Portugal, Hungary and Italy) and a joint press conference. The talks concerned mostly environmental protection and the role of the EU on the global market.

Lithuania

17.01. A working visit to Poland was paid by the President of the Republic of Lithuania Adamkus, who held a meeting with President Kaczyński. Bilateral relations were discussed, as well as the current EU agenda and joint Polish-Lithuanian projects on the European forum.

30.01. An official visit to Lithuania was paid by Minister Fotyga, who held meetings with the Speaker of the Seimas Viktoras Muntianas, Prime Minister Gediminas Kirkilas and Foreign Minister Petras Vaitiekunas.

16.02. President Kaczyński, at the invitation from the President of Lithuania Adamkus, paid a visit to Vilnius, where he took part in the celebrations of the 89th anniversary of the rebirth of the Lithuanian state.

2.03. A working visit to Poland was paid by Prime Minister Kirkilas, who held a meeting with Prime Minister Kaczyński.

10–11.04. A working visit to Vilnius, dedicated to the issues of energy security, was paid by President Kaczyński.

1.06. During a meeting of Prime Ministers Kaczyński and Kirkilas in Płock, talks were held with representatives of PKN Orlen SA, PSE and AB Lietuvos Energija. An intergovernmental agreement was also signed on Polish-Lithuanian youth exchange fund and a memorandum of understanding from the 9th meeting of the Council for Cooperation between the Governments of Poland and Lithuania.

15.07. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Vaitiekunas took part in the celebrations commemorating the accident of Lithuanian pilots near Myślubórz.

27–28.08. A working visit to the residence of President Kaczyński in Jurata was paid by Lithuanian President Adamkus.

1.10. President Adamkus took part in the inauguration of the academic year at Mikołaj Kopernik University in Toruń.

11.11. President Adamkus took part in the celebrations commemorating the regaining of independence by Poland. He was received by President Kaczyński, and also met with the leader of the Civic Platform party, Tusk, designated as Prime Minister.

30.11. A working visit was paid to Vilnius by Prime Minister Tusk, who was received by President Adamkus and held meetings with Prime Minister Kirkilas and Speaker of the Seimas Muntianas. Issues of bilateral cooperation and joint activities on the EU forum were discussed. Prime Minister Tusk also held a meeting with leaders of Polish organizations, Polish youth as well as leaders of the opposition Homeland Union party, Andrius Kubilius and Emanuelis Zingeris.

Luxembourg

11–12.06. A working visit to Warsaw was paid by the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg Jean Asselborn, who opened the new embassy of Luxembourg and held a meeting with Minister Fotyga.

Macedonia

8–10.05. An official visit to Poland was paid by the President of Macedonia, Branko Crvenkovski, who held a meeting with President Lech Kaczyński and Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński. An interstate agreement was signed on the regulation of bilateral treaty relations. Poland gave its support to the Macedonian ambitions for NATO and EU membership.

The Netherlands

15.03. During a working visit to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Prime Minister Kaczyński held a meeting with Prime Minister Jan-Peter Balkenende. Issues related to the Constitutional Treaty were discussed.

Norway

29–30.06. A working visit to Poland was paid by the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Norway Jens Stoltenberg, who held a meeting with Prime Minister Kaczyński. Current bilateral issues were discussed.

3.12. During his working visit to Poland, the Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Norway, Jonas Gahr Støre, held a meeting with Minister Sikorski and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy Waldemar Pawlak, as well as the head of the National Security Bureau Władysław Stasiak.

Pakistan

22–24.04. An official visit to Poland was paid by the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf, who held a meeting with President Lech Kaczyński and Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński. The following documents

were signed: a memorandum of understanding on cooperation between the Polish Institute of International Affairs and the Academy of Foreign Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; a memorandum on cooperation between the Pakistani Office for the Development of Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises and the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development; a program of cooperation in the area of science, education and culture between the government of the Republic of Poland and the government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for 2007–2009, and a declaration of cooperation, signed by Defense Ministers Szczygło and Rao Sikandar Iqbal. The Pakistani President gave a lecture at the Polish Institute of International Affairs titled “Pakistan: Building Regional Peace and Stability—Challenges and Opportunities.”

Peru

26.06. A working visit to Poland was paid by the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Peru José Antonio García Belaunde, who held meetings with Foreign Minister Fotyga and the Minister of Economy Piotr Woźniak. The tightening of economic and political relations with the EU was discussed.

Portugal

20.04. A working visit to Portugal was paid by Prime Minister Kaczyński, who held a meeting with Prime Minister Sócrates and paid a visit to President Aníbal Cavaco Silva. Bilateral relations were discussed, though most of the time was dedicated to EU issues. The experiences of Portugal related to organization of Euro 2004 European football championship were also discussed.

29–30.05. A working visit to Poland was paid by the Portuguese Foreign Minister Luís Amado, who held talks with Minister Fotyga and was received by Prime Minister Kaczyński. Minister Amado called for breaking an impasse in the talks on the Reform Treaty.

1–3.08. Minister Fotyga paid a working visit to the Portuguese Republic, where she met with Minister Amado. An agreement was signed on mutual protection of confidential information.

14.09. A working visit to Poland was paid by the Portuguese Prime Minister Sócrates, who met with President Kaczyński. Among the topics discussed were the works of the Intergovernmental Conference and the debate concerning the Reform Treaty and the priorities of the Portuguese presidency in the EU Council.

Romania

1–2.02. President Kaczyński paid an official visit to Romania, where he held meetings with President Traian Băsescu, Prime Minister Călin Constantin Popescu-Tăriceanu, the President of the Senate Nicolae Văcăroiu and the President

of the Chamber of Deputies, Bogdan Olteanu. The talks concerned mutual relations and cooperation in the EU forum.

Russia

17.09. President Kaczyński took part in the ceremony of laying of wreaths at the Katyn Cemetery.

Saudi Arabia

25–26.06. The king of Saudi Arabia Abd Allah ibn Abd al-Aziz as-Saud paid a state visit to Poland. He held a meeting with President Lech Kaczyński. The following documents were signed: an agreement on scientific and technological cooperation between the Polish Academy of Sciences and the King Abd al-Aziz University of Science and Technology; a memorandum of understanding between the Polish Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Health of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on cooperation in the domain of healthcare; a memorandum of understanding between the Polish Ministry of Sport and the General Presidency of Youth Welfare of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on cooperation in the area of sports; a memorandum of understanding in the area of science and education between the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education and the Ministry of Higher Education of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; and the inter-governmental agreement on cooperation in combating crime. The King also held meetings with Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński, the Minister of Science and Higher Education Michał Seweryński and the Rector of the University of Warsaw, Katarzyna Chałasińska-Macukow.

Slovakia

11.05. An official visit to the Republic of Slovakia was paid by Prime Minister Kaczyński. The talks mostly concerned cooperation within the Visegrad Group, the European Union and bilateral relations.

3.12. A working visit to Tatranska Javorina was paid by President Kaczyński, who met with President Ivan Gašparovič. The talks concerned bilateral cooperation, also at a local level.

Slovenia

14.05. An official visit to Poland was paid by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Slovenia Janez Janša, who held meetings with President Lech Kaczyński and Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński. Bilateral relations, the current situation in the Balkans and European issues were discussed. Prime Minister Janša emphasized the need to work out a compromise concerning the European constitution.

South Korea

9–10.10. An official visit to Poland was paid by Foreign and Trade Minister of the Republic of South Korea, Song Min-soon, who held a meeting with Minister Fotyga.

Spain

15.06. Prime Minister Kaczyński and the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Spain José L. Zapatero took part in the 4th Polish-Spanish Intergovernmental Consultations. The issues discussed concerned among others the future of the cohesion policy after 2013, bilateral cooperation in the area of transport, especially in rail transport, and the planning of structural funds for 2007–2013 and their use for the purpose of implementation of Lisbon Strategy objectives.

Sweden

19–20.02. The Foreign Minister of Sweden Bildt during his working visit to Poland met with Minister Fotyga. Bilateral relations and cooperation within the EU were discussed.

28.05 Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Sweden Frederik Reinfeldt paid a working visit to Warsaw, where he met with Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński and paid a visit to President Lech Kaczyński. Current EU affairs were discussed, with particular emphasis put on the debate concerning the future of the EU and the Constitutional Treaty.

19–20.12. A working visit to Sweden was paid by Minister Sikorski, who met with Minister Bildt and Minister for EU Affairs Cecilia Malmström.

Switzerland

10–11.04. The President of the Swiss Confederation, Micheline Calmy-Rey, held a meeting in Warsaw with President Kaczyński and Minister Fotyga. The talks concerned economic cooperation, the European Union and its enlargement, as well as relations with individual EU Member States. Cooperation within NATO, the situation in Western Balkans and in Kosovo were also discussed.

Tunisia

5–9.02. A delegation of MPs, headed by Speaker of the Sejm Marek Jurek, paid an official visit to Tunisia.

22–24.05. An official visit to Poland was paid by the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Tunisia Abd el-Wahab Abd Allah, who met with Minister Fotyga and Prime Minister Kaczyński, Speaker of the Sejm Dorn and Deputy Speaker of the Senate Ryszard Legutko.

Turkey

22–24.01. An official visit to Turkey was paid by President Kaczyński, who met with President Ahmet Necdet Sezer. Bilateral relations were discussed.

Ukraine

2.02. In Odessa, a meeting was held of the Consultation Committee of Presidents of Poland and Ukraine, dedicated to the ban on imports of Polish meat, bilateral relations, European integration and energy security, as well as to the European football championship Euro 2012.

7.03. A working visit to Poland was paid by the President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko, who held a meeting in Płock with President Kaczyński. Among topics discussed were energy security of both states and the European perspectives for Ukraine. The two presidents met with representatives of PKN Orlen SA and PERN Przyjaźń SA, with a goal of presenting the Odessa–Brody project.

19–21.03. In Kyiv, the 3rd session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland and of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine took place.

19.04. An official visit to Poland was paid by the Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, who was received by President Lech Kaczyński and held a meeting with Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński. Satisfaction was expressed from being granted the right to organize European football championship in 2012. The state of bilateral relations was also discussed, including the issue of common energy projects.

27.04. A working visit to Poland was paid by the President of Ukraine Yushchenko, who held meetings with President Lech Kaczyński and Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński. A statement was signed on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the operation “Wisła,” as well as a Road Map of Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation 2007–2008. The future of relations between the two states was also discussed.

21–22.05. An official visit to Poland was paid by the Foreign Minister of Ukraine Arseniy Yatsenyuk, who met with Minister Fotyga and was received by President Kaczyński. Economic cooperation and organization of Euro 2012 were discussed.

9.07. During his working visit to Ukraine, President Kaczyński held a meeting with President Yushchenko. Issues related to the organization of the European football championship Euro 2012 were discussed.

5–7.12. President Kaczyński paid an official visit to Ukraine, where he held meetings with President Yushchenko and the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Yatsenyuk and took part in a working lunch with Prime Minister Yanukovych. A declaration “Common challenges—new dimensions of strategic partnership” was signed.

United Arab Emirates

16–18.11. An official visit to Abu Dhabi was paid by the delegation of the Senate, headed by Speaker Borusewicz. The senators took part in the opening of the Polish National Exhibition.

The United Kingdom

16–18.01. An official visit to the United Kingdom was paid by Sejm Speaker Jurek.

19–20.03. During her visit to the United Kingdom, Minister Fotyga met with Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Margaret Beckett, with whom she discussed bilateral relations.

27.04. A working visit to Poland was paid by outgoing Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Tony Blair, who held meetings with President Lech Kaczyński and Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński. Current EU issues were discussed, especially those regarding the debate on the future of the EU and the Constitutional Treaty. Particular attention was paid to the issues of the U.S. missile defense system. Selected international issues were also discussed, including the situation in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran.

The United States

21.03. Talks concerning the missile defense system were held in Warsaw with the participation of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried, Minister Fotyga, Prime Minister Kaczyński and Minister Szczygło.

24.04. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates paid a visit to Warsaw. His talks with President Lech Kaczyński, Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński, Minister Fotyga and Minister Szczygło concerned Polish-U.S. bilateral cooperation, with particular emphasis on national security and defense. Opinions were also exchanged on the situation in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Middle East.

8.06. A working visit to Poland was paid by U.S. President George W. Bush, who was received by President Kaczyński. The talks mostly concerned the missile defense system.

15–18.07. A working visit to the U.S. was paid by President Kaczyński, who held talks with President Bush on bilateral relations, Polish presence in Iraq and the missile defense project.

23–27.09. President Kaczyński paid a working visit to the U.S., where he took part in the 62nd session of the UN General Assembly and a plenary session of the High-Ranking Meeting for Climate Change, where he gave a speech on alleviating the effects of climate change. He also met with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, the President of Brazil Inácio Lula da Silva, the President of the Republic of Latvia

Valdis Zatlers, the President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedov and with the President of the American Jewish Committee David Harris.

Vietnam

13–15.09. An official visit to Poland was paid by the Prime Minister of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Nguyen Tan Dung, who met with Prime Minister Kaczyński.

Compiled by Rafał Tarnogórski

Sources: www.prezydent.pl, www.premier.gov.pl, www.msz.gov.pl.

Management Staff of Polish Foreign Service

I. Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Minister

Radosław Sikorski. Born in Bydgoszcz in 1963. Graduated from Oxford University with a degree in philosophy, political sciences and economics. Chairman of the Students' Strike Committee during the events in Bydgoszcz in March 1981. In 1981–1989 in Great Britain as political refugee; worked as reporter covering the wars in Afghanistan and Angola (1986–1989). Deputy Defense Minister in 1992; in 1998–2001, Under-Secretary of State at MFA and Chairman of the Council of the Foundation for Assistance to Poles in the East. Resident fellow at the American Institute of Enterprise in Washington and Executive Director of the New Atlantic Initiative (2002–2005). Senator from Bydgoszcz (6th Senate), he served as National Defense Minister in 2005–2007. Elected deputy from Bydgoszcz to the 6th Sejm (2007), he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs on 16 November 2007.

Secretary of State

Jan Borkowski. Born in Łosice in 1952. Graduated from the Economics Department of the University of Technology in Radom (1977); Ph.D. in economics of agriculture (Economics Department, Warsaw University of Life Sciences, 1986). In 1980–1990, researcher at the Higher Agricultural-Pedagogical School in Siedlce; deputy voivode in Siedlce (1990–1993). Deputy to the 2nd Sejm (1993–1997); Chairman of the Committee on European Treaty Issues (1993–1996); Co-Chair of the Joint Poland–EU Parliamentary Committee (1993–1996). Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1996–1997. Research worker at Warsaw University's Centre for Europe (from 1998); member of the Polish Council of the European Movement (from 1995) and the Polish European Community Studies Association (from 1998). Appointed Secretary of State at MFA on 26 November 2007.

Under-Secretaries of State

Grażyna Maria Bernatowicz. Born in Warsaw in 1946. Graduate of Warsaw University's Faculty of Law (1968); completed post-graduate studies in journalism (Warsaw University, 1971), followed by a Ph.D. (1975) and degree of habilitated doctor in political sciences (1992). On the MFA staff since 1993 as adviser to the minister and Deputy Director of the Department of Strategic Studies at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM); Coordinating Director for European integration issues (from 1998); in 2000–2002, Under-Secretary of State at MFA; Poland's Ambassador Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary to the Kingdom of Spain

and the Principality of Andorra (2002–2007), again Under-Secretary of State at MFA from 28 November 2007.

Ryszard Schnepf. Born in Warsaw in 1951. Graduated from Warsaw University's Faculty of History (1974); doctoral studies at Polish Academy of Science's Institute of History, majoring in Latin and North America (1975–1979); since 1978 on the staff of the Department of Iberian and Ibero-American Studies, Warsaw University; professor at Indiana University, Bloomington, USA (1982–1983). Poland's Ambassador to Uruguay and Paraguay (1991–1996); minister plenipotentiary with the Polish Embassy in Madrid (from 2000); Ambassador to Costa Rica accredited throughout Central America (from 2001). In 1997–2000, with the Prime Minister's Chancellery (deputy director of International Department, then head of protocol). From January 2005 foreign minister's representative for celebrations marking the 25th anniversary of the Solidarity union. Secretary of State responsible for foreign and security policy at the Prime Minister's Chancellery (31 October 2005–1 June 2006). From July 2006 foreign minister's representative for global hazards; titular ambassador in the foreign service (from 2003); Under-Secretary of State at MFA from 22 November 2007.

Witold Jan Waszczykowski. Born in 1957 in Piotrków Trybunalski. Graduated from the Faculty of Philosophy and History of Łódź University (1980), the Department of International Affairs at the University of Oregon (1991) and received a postgraduate degree in international security and arms control from the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva (1993); Ph.D. in humanities. Long record as an employee of MFA (including Head of Polish Liaison Office to NATO, Deputy Representative to NATO, Poland's Ambassador to Iran). Since 4 November 2005, Undersecretary of State at MFA, retained the post in the new cabinet formed in 2007.

Director-General of Foreign Service

Rafał Wiśniewski. Born in Łódź in 1965. Graduate of the Faculty of Modern Languages, Warsaw University (1989). In 1988–1991, academic staff member at the Faculty and expert on Central Europe at the Senate's Centre of International Studies. In 1991–1992, second secretary for science at the Embassy of Poland in Budapest, subsequently (1992–1997) first secretary and counselor at the Embassy and director of the Polish Institute in Hungary. At the MFA since 1997; head of the Central Europe Department; foreign minister's representative for Polish culture and promotion (1998); coordinating director for information, promotion and culture (1998–2001). In 2001–2005, Poland's Ambassador to Hungary. In 2005–2007, Under-Secretary of State at MFA, titular ambassador at the Department of Strategy and Foreign Policy Planning. Director-General of the Foreign Service since 2007.

Secretariat of the Minister

Director: Tadeusz Chomicki

Deputy Directors: Cezary Król, Magdalena Rędziniak, Michał Węckowicz

Bureau of the Director-General

Director: Przemysław Czyż

Deputy Director: Mikołaj Kwiatkowski

Departments

1. Department of Strategy and Foreign Policy Planning

Director: Jacek Czaputowicz

2. Department of the European Union

Director: Jarosław Starzyk

Deputy Directors: Paweł Herczyński, Zbigniew Krużyński, Piotr Kobza

3. Department of Security Policy

Director: Robert Kupiecki

Deputy Directors: Tomasz Łękowski, Grzegorz Poznański, Marek Ziółkowski

4. Legal and Treaty Department

Director: Andrzej Kremer

Deputy Directors: Krzysztof Kocel, Janusz Łącki, Jacek Such

5. Department of the UN System and Global Affairs

Director: Mirosław Łuczka

Deputy Director: Marek Kuberski

6. Department of Foreign Economic Policy

Director: Grzegorz Gawin

Deputy Directors: Karina Kostrzewa, Marcin Nawrot

7. Department of Europe

Director: Jerzy Margański

Deputy Directors: Adam Hałaciński, Barbara Sośnicka

8. Department of Eastern Policy

Director: Jarosław Bartkiewicz

Deputy Director: Michał Łabenda

9. Department of the Americas

Director: Andrzej Jaroszyński

Deputy Director: Maciej Pisarski

10. Department of Asia and the Pacific

Director: vacant

Deputy Directors: Jolanta Janek, Beata Stoczyńska

11. Department of Africa and the Middle East

Director: Michał Murkociński

Deputy Directors: Maciej Kozłowski, Andrzej Świeżaczyński

12. Diplomatic Protocol

Director: vacant

Deputy Directors: Małgorzata Łatkiewicz-Pawlak, Tadeusz Żyliński

13. Department of Promotion

Director: Agnieszka Wielowieyska

Deputy Directors: Joanna Stachyra, Krzysztof Olendzki

14. Department of Information System

Director: vacant

Deputy Directors: Ewa Dębska, Robert Szaniawski

15. Department of Consular and Polish Diaspora Affairs

Director: Andrzej Jasionowski

Deputy Directors: Joanna Kozińska-Frybes, Mirosław Stawski

16. Development Co-operation Department

Director: Jerzy Pomianowski

Deputy Director: Barbara Szymanowska

17. Archives

Director: Henryk Szlajfer

Deputy Director: Małgorzata Mroczkowska

18. Bureau of Personnel and Training

Director: vacant

Deputy Directors: Beata Brzywczy, Roman Kowalski, (acting) Ryszard Moroz

19. Bureau of Administration and Finance

Director: Mariusz Skórko

Deputy Director: Cezary Góralczyk

20. Bureau of Communication

Director: vacant

Deputy Director: Dariusz Toruń, (acting) Zbigniew Powąła

21. Bureau of IT

Director: Grzegorz Pachulski

Deputy Director: Włodzimierz Marciński

22. Bureau of the Plenipotentiary for Classified Information Security

Director: Monika Sudar

Deputy Directors: Przemysław Leśniak, Dariusz Torchała

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23. Maintenance Services Unit

Director: Małgorzata Tyszkiewicz-Adamczyk

II. Polish Diplomatic Posts Ambassadors and Consuls (to States and International Organizations)

States

Afghanistan

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Kabul
Ambassador: Jacek Najder

Albania

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Tirana
**Head of the Mission: Zbigniew Sawicki—
First Counselor**

Algeria

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Algiers
Ambassador: Lidia Milka-Wieczorkiewicz

Andorra

No mission.

Angola

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Luanda
**Ambassador: Piotr Myśliwiec, also
accredited to São Tomé and Príncipe**

Antigua and Barbuda

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy
of the Republic of Poland in Panama.

Argentina

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Buenos
Aires

**Ambassador: Zdzisław Ryn, accredited
also to Paraguay**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland
in Comodoro Rivadavia

Honorary Consul: Enrique Juan Koprowski

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Mar
del Plata

Honorary Consul: Juan Estanislao Stachnik

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Oberá
Honorary Consul: Miguel Antonio Skowron

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Rosario
**Honorary Consul: Bartolome Estanislao
Moszoro**

Armenia

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Yerevan
Ambassador: Tomasz Knothe

Australia

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Canberra
**Head of the Mission: Grzegorz Sokół—
Second Secretary**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in
Adelaide

Honorary Consul: Dariusz Ross

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in
Brisbane

Honorary Consul: Brian Patric Kilmartin

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Darwin
Honorary Consul: Keith James Aitken

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in
Melbourne

**Honorary Consul: George John Zbigniew
Łuk-Kozika**

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland
in Sydney

Consul General: Ryszard Sarkowicz

Austria

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Vienna
**Head of the Mission: Jarosław Dziedzic—
First Counselor**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Graz
Honorary Consul: Gerold Ortner

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in
Innsbruck

Honorary Consul: Siegfried Resl

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in
Klagenfurt

**Honorary Consul: Albert Ferdinand
Sammer**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in
Salzburg

Honorary Consul: Jürgen Hinterwirth

Azerbaijan

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Baku
Ambassador: Krzysztof Krajewski

The Bahamas

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of

the Republic of Poland in Washington (United States).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Nassau
Honorary Consul: Edith Rebecca Powell

Bahrain

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Kuwait.

Bangladesh

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in New Delhi (India).

Barbados

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Caracas (Venezuela).

Belarus

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Minsk

Ambassador: Henryk Litwin

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Brest

Consul General: Jarosław Książek

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Hrodna

Consul General: Adam Bernatowicz

Belgium

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Brussels

Ambassador: Sławomir Czarlewski

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Antwerp

Honorary Consul: Eduard Lima A. van der Pluym

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Brussels

Consul General: Elwira Kucharska

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Gent

Honorary Consul: Jean-Marie De Baerdemaeker

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in La Louvière

Honorary Consul: Philippe Godfroid

Belize

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in San José (Costa Rica).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Belize City

Honorary Consul: Emil Arguelles

Benin

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Abuja (Nigeria).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Cotonou

Honorary Consul: Krystyna Hounkponou

Bhutan

No mission.

The nearest Embassy of the Republic of Poland is in New Delhi (India).

Bolivia

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Lima (Peru).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in La Paz

Honorary Consul: Esther Caroly Salzmänn Donig

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Sarajevo

Ambassador: Andrzej Tyszkiewicz

Botswana

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Pretoria (South Africa).

Brazil

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Brasília

Ambassador: Jacek Junosza Kisielewski

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Belo Horizonte

Honorary Consul: Jerzy Markiewicz

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Erechim

Honorary Consul: Maria Vanda Krepinski-Groch

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Curitiba

Consul General: Dorota Barys

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Rio de Janeiro

Consul General: Dariusz Dudziak

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in São Paulo

Consul General: Marek Kryński

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Vitoria

Honorary Consul: Adam Emil Czaratoryski

Brunei Darussalam

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Bandar Seri Begawan

vacant

Bulgaria

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Sofia

Ambassador: Andrzej Papierz

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Varna

Consul General: Monika Zuchniak-Pazdan

Burkina Faso

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Dakar (Senegal).

Burma—see: Myanmar

Burundi

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Nairobi (Kenya).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Bujumbura

Honorary Consul: Samuel Bigawa

Cambodia

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Phnom Penh

Head of the Mission: Leszek

Bondarek—First Secretary

Cameroon

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Abuja (Nigeria).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Yaoundé

Honorary Consul: Mirosława Etoga

Canada

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Ottawa

Ambassador: Piotr Ogrodziński

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Calgary

Honorary Consul: Zygmunt Potocki

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Edmonton

Honorary Consul: Frank John Szumlas

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Montreal

Consul General: Włodzimierz Zdunowski

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Regina
vacant

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Toronto

Consul General: Piotr Konowrocki

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Vancouver

Consul General: Maciej Krych

Cape Verde

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Dakar (Senegal).

Central African Republic

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of the Congo).

Chad

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Tripoli (Libya).

Chile

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Santiago de Chile

Ambassador: Jarosław Spyra

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Concepción

Honorary Consul: Mario Suwalsky

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in La Serena

Honorary Consul: Jaime Pozo Cisternas

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Viña del Mar

Honorary Consul: David Dahma Bertelet

China

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Beijing

Ambassador: Krzysztof Szumski (since 1 September 2005)

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Hong Kong

Consul General: Ryszard Potocki

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Guangzhou

Consul General: Piotr Sławiński

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Shanghai

Consul General: Andrzej Łysiak

Colombia

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Bogotá

Ambassador: Henryk Kobierowski

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Barranquilla

Honorary Consul: Luis Fernando Acosta Osio

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Cartagena de Indias

Honorary Consul: Benjamin Schuster Bejman

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Medellín

Honorary Consul: Gabriel Restrepo Santa Maria

Comoros

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Dar es Salaam (Tanzania).

Congo

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of the Congo).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Brazzaville

vacant

Costa Rica

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in San José

Ambassador: Andrzej Braiter, accredited also to Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador

Côte d'Ivoire

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of the Congo).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Abidjan

Honorary Consul: Tomasz Witold Iwanków

Croatia

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Zagreb

Head of the Mission: Dariusz Wiśniewski—First Counselor

Cuba

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Havana

Ambassador: Marzenna Adameczyk

Cyprus

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Nicosia

Ambassador: Zbigniew Szymański

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Limassol

Honorary Consul: Loukis Papaphilippou

Czech Republic

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Prague

Ambassador: Jan Pastwa

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Brno

Honorary Consul: Petr Mrkývka

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Ostrava

Consul General: Jerzy Kronhold

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Kinshasa

Ambassador: Bogusław Nowakowski, accredited also to Central African Republic, Congo and Gabon

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Lubumbashi

vacant

Denmark

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Copenhagen

Ambassador: Adam Halamski

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Århus

Honorary Consul: Ole Lykke Ravnsbo

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Kolding

Honorary Consul: Peter Taero Nielsen

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Roenne

Honorary Consul: Roar Bendtsen Schodu

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Svendborg

Honorary Consul: Jan Krossteig

Djibouti

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Addis Abeba (Ethiopia)

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Djibouti
vacant

Dominica

No mission.

The nearest Embassy of the Republic of Poland is in Caracas (Venezuela).

Dominican Republic

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Panama.

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Santo Domingo

Honorary Consul: Gustavo Eduardo Vega or José Radhames Miniño Rodríguez

East Timor

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Jakarta (Indonesia).

Ecuador

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Lima (Peru).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Guayaquil

Honorary Consul: Francisco Pablo Rizzo Pastor

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Quito

Honorary Consul: Tomasz Morawski

Egypt

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Cairo

Ambassador: Jan Natkański, accredited also to Sudan

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Alexandria

Honorary Consul: Samy Aly El Rashidy

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Port Said

Honorary Consul: Said Aly

Equatorial Guinea

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Abuja (Nigeria).

Eritrea

No mission.

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Asmara

Honorary Consul: Belay Tewelde Tesfe Mariam

Estonia

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Tallinn

Ambassador: Tomasz Chłoń

Ethiopia

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Addis Abeba

Ambassador: Jarosław Szczepankiewicz, accredited also to Djibouti

Fiji

No mission.

The nearest Embassy of the Republic of Poland is in Canberra (Australia).

Finland

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Helsinki

Ambassador: Joanna Hofman

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Espoo

Honorary Consul: Stefan Widomski

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Oulu
vacant

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Tampere

vacant

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Turku

Honorary Consul: Jari Alfred Rastas

France

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Paris

Ambassador: Tomasz Orłowski

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Bordeaux

Honorary Consul: Bertrand de Bentzmann

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Lille

Consul General: Wanda Kalińska

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Lyon

Consul General: Piotr Adamiuk

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in
Marseille

Honorary Consul: Rene Nostriano

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in
Paris

Consul General: Tomasz Wasilewski

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Rennes

Honorary Consul: Michel Dorin

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in
Strasbourg

Consul General: Piotr Szymanowski

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in
Toulouse

Honorary Consul: Longin Fourdrinier

Gabon

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of
the Republic of Poland in Kinshasa
(Democratic Republic of the Congo).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in
Libreville

**Honorary Consul: Andrzej Władysław
Dębski**

Gambia

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of
the Republic of Poland in Dakar (Senegal).

Georgia

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Tbilisi

Ambassador: Jacek Multanowski

Germany

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Berlin

Ambassador: Marek Prawda

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in
Hamburg

Consul General: Wojciech Paczkowski

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in
Cologne

Consul General: Andrzej Kaczorowski

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in
Leipzig

Consul General: Zbigniew Zaręba

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in
Munich

Consul General: Elżbieta Sobótka

Ghana

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of
the Republic of Poland in Abuja (Nigeria).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Accra

Honorary Consul: Enchill Kofi Asare

Greece

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Athens

Ambassador: Michał Klinger

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in
Heraklion

Honorary Consul: Stelios Golemies

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Patra

Honorary Consul: Alexander Panagopulos

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Piraeus

Honorary Consul: Michail D. Kokkinis

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in
Thessalonica

Honorary Consul: Minos X. Kiriakou

Grenada

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of
the Republic of Poland in Caracas (Venezuela).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in
St. George's

Honorary Consul: Andrew Bierzynski

Guatemala

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of
the Republic of Poland in San José
(Costa Rica).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in
Guatemala

Honorary Consul: Lizardo Marroquin

Guinea

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of
the Republic of Poland in Dakar (Senegal).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in
Conakry

Honorary Consul: Sadou Bailo Barry

Guinea Bissau

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of
the Republic of Poland in Dakar (Senegal).

Guyana

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Caracas (Venezuela).

Haiti

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Panama (Panama).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Port-au-Prince

Honorary Consul: Salim Antoine Succar

Holy See

Embassy of the Republic of Poland to the Holy See

Ambassador: Hanna Suchocka

Honduras

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in San José (Costa Rica).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in San Pedro Sula

Honorary Consul: Roberto Larios Silva

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Tegucigalpa

Honorary Consul: Epaminondas Marinakys Zelaya

Hungary

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Budapest

Ambassador: Joanna Stempińska

Iceland

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Oslo (Norway).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Reykjavik

Honorary Consul: Fridrik Gunnarsson

India

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in New Delhi

Ambassador: Krzysztof Majka, accredited also to Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Calcutta

Honorary Consul: Radhe Shyam Goenka

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Mumbai

Consul General: Janusz Byliński

Indonesia

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Jakarta

Ambassador: Tomasz Łukaszuk, accredited also to East Timor

Honorary Consulate in Bandung—consular district Western Java

Honorary Consul: Maria Jolanta Pawłowska-Budiman

Iran

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Teheran

Ambassador: Witold Śmidowski

Iraq

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Baghdad

Ambassador: Edward Pietrzyk

Ireland

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Dublin

Ambassador: Tadeusz Szumowski

Israel

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Tel Aviv

Ambassador: Agnieszka Magdziak-Miszewska

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Haifa
vacant

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Jerusalem

Honorary Consul: Zeev Baran

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Beer Sheva

Honorary Consul: Jack Fliderbaum

Italy

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Rome

Head of the Mission: Wojciech Ponikiewski—Counselor-Minister

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Bari

Honorary Consul: Domenico Centrone

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Bologna

Honorary Consul: Corrado Salustro

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Genoa

Honorary Consul: Giuseppe Taró

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Catania

Consul General: Gerard Pokruszyński

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Milan

Consul General: Adam Szymczyk

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Naples

Honorary Consul: Aniello Tuorto

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Padua

Honorary Consul: Ugo Zovatto

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Reggio Calabria

Honorary Consul: Antonio Giglio

Jamaica

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Caracas (Venezuela).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Kingston

Honorary Consul: Irena Cousins

Japan

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Tokyo

Ambassador: Marcin Rybicki

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Osaka

Honorary Consul General: Kazuko Takashima

Jordan

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Amman

Ambassador: Andrzej Biera

Kazakhstan

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Almaty

Ambassador: Paweł Cieplak, accredited also to Kyrgyzstan

Kenya

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Nairobi

Ambassador: Anna Grupińska, accredited also to Burundi, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles and Uganda

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Mombassa

vacant

Kiribati

No mission. The nearest Embassy of the Republic of Poland is in Canberra (Australia).

Korea (Democratic Peoples Republic of)

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Pyongyang

Ambassador: Roman Iwaszkiewicz

Korea (Republic of)

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Seoul

Ambassador: Marek Calka

Kuwait

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Kuwait

Ambassador: Janusz Szwedo, accredited also to Bahrain

Kyrgyzstan

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Almaty (Kazakhstan).

Laos

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Vientiane

Head of the Mission: Tomasz Gerlach—First Counselor

Latvia

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Riga

Ambassador: Maciej Klimczak

Lebanon

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Beirut

Head of the Mission: Tomasz Niegodysz

Lesotho

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Pretoria (South Africa).

Liberia

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Dakar (Senegal).

Libya

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Tripoli

Ambassador: Józef Osas

Liechtenstein

No mission.

Honorary Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Vaduz

Honorary Consul: Thomas Zwiefelhofer

Lithuania

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Vilnius

Ambassador: Janusz Skolimowski

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in
Klajpeda

Honorary Consul: Tadeusz Maciol

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in
Vilnius

Consul General: Stanislaw Cygnarowski

Luxembourg

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in
Luxembourg

Ambassador: Barbara Labuda

Macedonia

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Skopje

Ambassador: Dariusz Bachura

Madagascar

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of
the Republic of Poland in Nairobi (Kenya).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in
Antananarivo

Honorary Consul: Zbigniew Kasprzyk

Malawi

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of
the Republic of Poland in Harare (Zimbabwe).

Malaysia

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Kuala
Lumpur

**Ambassador: Eugeniusz Sawicki, accredited
also to Brunei Darussalam**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in
Kuching

Honorary Consul: Raziah Mahmud Geneid

Maldives

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of
the Republic of Poland in w New Delhi (India).

Mali

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of
the Republic of Poland in Dakar (Senegal).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Bamako

**Honorary Consul: Mamoudou Garba
Samassekou**

Malta

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of
the Republic of Poland in Rome (Italy).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in La
Valletta

Honorary Consul: Stephen Parnis England

Marshall Islands

No mission.

The nearest Embassy of the Republic of Poland
takes place in Canberra (Australia).

Mauritania

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of
the Republic of Poland in Rabat (Morocco).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in
Nouakchott

Honorary Consul: El Khalil Ould Oumar

Mauritius

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of
the Republic of Poland in Nairobi (Kenya).

Mexico

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Mexico

Ambassador: Jacek Gawryszewski

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Cancún

**Honorary Consul: Luis Miguel Cámara
Patrón**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in
Guadalajara

**Honorary Consul: José Manuel Gomez
Vazquez Aldana**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in
Guanajuato

**Honorary Consul: Hector Eduardo Webb
Cruces**

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in
Monterrey

Honorary Consul: Eduardo Macias Santos

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in
Tulancingo

Honorary Consul: Alberto Stebelski-Orlowski

Micronesia

No mission.

The nearest Embassy of the Republic of Poland
takes place in Canberra (Australia).

Moldova

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Chisinau

Ambassador: Krzysztof Suprowicz

Monaco

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Paris (France).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Monaco

Honorary Consul: Wojciech Janowski

Mongolia

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Ulan

Bator

Ambassador: Zbigniew Kulak

Montenegro

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in

Podgorica

Head of the Mission: Jarosław

Lindenberg—First Secretary

Morocco

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Rabat

Ambassador: Joanna Wronecka, accredited also to Mauritania

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Agadir

Honorary Consul: Krzysztof Albert

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in

Casablanca

Consul General: Włodzimierz Leszczyński

Mozambique

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Pretoria (South Africa).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Maputo

Honorary Consul: Alberto Tipsalo Mabjaia

Myanmar

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Bangkok (Thailand).

Namibia

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Pretoria (South Africa).

Nauru

No mission. The nearest Embassy of the Republic of Poland is in Canberra (Australia).

Nepal

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in New Delhi (India).

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Katmandu

Honorary Consul General: Hulas Chand Golchha

Netherlands

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in The Hague

Ambassador: Janusz Stańczyk

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Amsterdam

Honorary Consul: Willem Frederik Dutilh

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Apeldoorn

Honorary Consul: Johannes Gesinus Bax

New Zealand

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Wellington

Ambassador: Lech Mastalerz

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Auckland

Honorary Consul: John Roy-Wojciechowski

Nicaragua

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in San José (Costa Rica).

Honorary Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Managua

Honorary Consul: Edgard de Jesús Vargas Guzman

Niger

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Tripoli (Libya).

Nigeria

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Abuja

Ambassador: Grzegorz Waliński, accredited also to Benin, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana and Togo

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Lagos

Head of the Consulate: Dariusz Latoszek

Norway

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Oslo

Ambassador: Wojciech Kolańczyk, accredited also to Iceland

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Stavanger

Honorary Consul: Ulf-Einar Staalesen

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Trondheim

Honorary Consul: Harald Johan Lydersen

Oman

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Riyadh (Saudi Arabia).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Muscat

Honorary Consul: Mohammed Ali Al Barwani

Pakistan

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Islamabad

Ambassador: Krzysztof Dębicki

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Karachi

Consul General: Ireneusz Makles

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Lahore

Honorary Consul: Shahbaz A. Khan

Palau

No mission.

The nearest Embassy of the Republic of Poland is in Canberra (Australia).

Panama

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Panama

Ambassador: Marek Makowski

Honorary Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Colon

Honorary Consul: José Palermo

Papua New Guinea

No mission.

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Port Moresby

vacant

Paraguay

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Buenos Aires (Argentina).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Asunción

Honorary Consul: Jorge Aníbal Goldenberg Asrilevich

Peru

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Lima

Ambassador: Przemysław Marzec, accredited also to Bolivia and Ecuador

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Arequipa

Honorary Consul: Mauricio Chabaneix Belling

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Callao

Honorary Consul: Piotr Nawrocki

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Trujillo

Honorary Consul: Władysław Bobrek

Philippines

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Bangkok (Thailand).

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Manila

Honorary Consul General: Fernando V. Listing

Portugal

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Lisbon

Ambassador: Katarzyna Skórzyńska

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Algarve

Honorary Consul: Elidérico José Gomes Viegas

Puerto Rico

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in the United States.

Honorary Consulate of the Republic of Poland in San Juan

Honorary Consul: Bohdan Chester Hryniewicz

Qatar

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Qatar

Head of the Mission: Robert Rostek—Counselor Minister

Romania

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Bucharest

Ambassador: Krystyn Jacek Paliszewski

Russia

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Moscow

Ambassador: Jerzy Bahr

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Irkutsk

Consul General: Andrzej Janicki-Rola

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Kaliningrad

Consul General: Jarosław Czubiński

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Sankt Petersburg

Consul General: Jarosław Drozd

Rwanda

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Nairobi (Kenya).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Kigali

Honorary Consul: Charles Ngarambe

Saint Christopher and Nevis

No mission. The nearest Embassy of the Republic of Poland is in Caracas (Venezuela).

Saint Lucia

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Panama (Panama).

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Caracas (Venezuela).

Salomon Islands

No mission. The nearest Embassy of the Republic of Poland is in Canberra (Australia).

El Salvador

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in San José (Costa Rica).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in San Salvador
vacant

Samoa

No mission. The nearest Embassy of the Republic of Poland is in Canberra (Australia).

San Marino

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Rome (Italy).

São Tomé and Príncipe

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Luanda (Angola).

Saudi Arabia

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Riyadh

Ambassador: Adam Kulach, accredited also in Oman

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Jiddah

Honorary Consul: Sheikh Hassan Omar Saddik Attar

Senegal

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Dakar

Ambassador: Andrzej Łupina, accredited also to Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali and Sierra Leone

Serbia

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Belgrade

Ambassador: Maciej Szymański

Seychelles

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Nairobi (Kenya).

Sierra Leone

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Dakar (Senegal).

Singapore

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Singapore

Ambassador: Bogusław Marcin Majewski

Slovakia

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Bratislava

Head of the Mission: Bogdan Wrzochalski—Counselor-Minister

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in
Liptowski Mikuláš
Honorary Consul: Tadeusz Frąckowiak

Slovenia

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in
Ljubljana

Ambassador: Piotr Kaszuba

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Nova
Gorica

Honorary Consul: Nedjan Brataševac

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Novo
Mesto
vacant

Somalia

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of
the Republic of Poland in Dar es Salaam
(Tanzania)

South Africa

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Pretoria
Ambassador: Romuald Szuniewicz,
accredited also to Botswana, Lesotho,
Mozambique, Namibia and Swaziland

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Durban

Honorary Consul: Andrzej Kiepela

Spain

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Madrid

Head of the Mission: Jadwiga
Szpakowska—First Counselor

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in
Barcelona

Consul General: Marek Pernal

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Las
Palmas de Gran Canaria

Honorary Consul: Bogdan Dziekoński

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Murcia

Honorary Consul: Jerzy Matias Zieleniewski
Redziejowski

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Palma
de Majorca

Honorary Consul: Sylvia Riera Borrego

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in
Pamplona

Honorary Consul: Angel Tellechea Goyena

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Vigo
(Pontevedra)

Honorary Consul: Juan M. Veites Baptista
de Sousa

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in
Valencia

Honorary Consul: Ramón Sentis Duran

Sri Lanka

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of
the Republic of Poland in New Delhi (India).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in
Colombo

Honorary Consul General: Deshamanya
Kandiah Balendra

Sudan

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of
the Republic of Poland in Cairo (Egypt).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in
Khartoum

Honorary Consul: Hussein Mohamed Hasan

Surinam

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of
the Republic of Poland in Caracas (Venezuela).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in
Paramaribo

Honorary Consul: Dennis Kopinsky

Swaziland

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of
the Republic of Poland in Pretoria (South
Africa).

Sweden

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in
Stockholm

Ambassador: Michał Czyż

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in
Halmstad

Honorary Consul: Bo Ulf Roland Chronier

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in
Karlskrona

Honorary Consul: Magdalena Kurczewska-
-Svensson

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in
Malmö

Consul General: Jarosław Łasiński

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in
Stockholm

Consul General: Radomir Wojciechowski

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Uppsala
Honorary Consul: Ann-Catherine Haglund

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Visby
Honorary Consul: Inger Harlevi

Switzerland

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Bern
Head of the Mission: Jerzy Wiczarek—First Counselor

Syria

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Damascus
Ambassador: Jacek Chodorowicz

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Aleppo
Honorary Consul: Ahmad Azzam Zeitouni

Taiwan

Warsaw Trade Office in Taipei
Head of the Mission: Wsiewołod Strażewski—First Counselor

Tajikistan

No mission.
Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Tashkent (Uzbekistan).

Tanzania

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Dar es Salaam
Head of the Mission: Wojciech Bożek—Counselor-Minister

Thailand

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Bangkok
Ambassador: Bogdan Góralczyk, accredited also to the Philippines and Myanmar

Togo

No mission.
Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Abuja (Nigeria).
Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Lomé
Honorary Consul: Soumou Tchamdja

Tonga

No mission. The nearest Embassy of the Republic of Poland is in Canberra (Australia).

Trinidad and Tobago

No mission.
Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Caracas (Venezuela).

Tunisia

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Tunis
Head of the Mission: Julita Baś—First Secretary

Turkey

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Ankara
Head of the Mission: Krzysztof Lewandowski—Counselor

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Antalya
Honorary Consul: Talha Görgülü

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Mersin
Honorary Consul: Jan Taşçı

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Istanbul
Consul General: Marcin Wilczek

Turkmenistan

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Ashkhabad
Ambassador: Maciej Lang

Tuvalu

No mission. The nearest Embassy of the Republic of Poland is in Canberra (Australia).

Uganda

No mission.
Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Nairobi (Kenya).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Kampala
Honorary Consul: Ephraim Kamuntu

Ukraine

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Kiev
Ambassador: Jacek Kluczkowski

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Kharkiv

Consul General: Grzegorz Seroczyński

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Kiev

Consul General: Grzegorz Opaliński

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Lviv

Consul General: Wiesław Osuchowski

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Lutsk

Consul General: Tomasz Janik

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Odessa
Consul General: Wiesław Mazur

United Arab Emirates

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Abu Dhabi

Ambassador: Roman Chałaczkiwicz, accredited also to Qatar

United Kingdom

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in London

Ambassador: Barbara Tuge-Erecińska

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Edinburgh

Consul General: Aleksander Dietkow

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Gibraltar

Honorary Consul: Anthony Julius Lombard

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Hull

Honorary Consul: Joseph R. Carby-Hall

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in St. Helier

Honorary Consul: Rodney Hodges

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in London

Consul General: Robert Rusiecki

United States of America

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Washington

Head of the Mission: Wojciech Flera—Counselor-Minister

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Anchorage

Honorary Consul: Stanisław Borucki

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Bahama

Honorary Consul: Edith Rebecca Powell

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Boston

Honorary Consul: Marek Leśniewski-Laas

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Chicago

Consul General: Zygmunt Matynia

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Denver

Honorary Consul: Tomasz Skotnicki

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Honolulu

Honorary Consul: Bożena Jarnot

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Houston

Honorary Consul: Zbigniew J. Wojciechowski

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Los Angeles

Consul General: Paulina Kapuścińska

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Miami

Honorary Consul: Blanka A. Rosenstiel

Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in New York

Consul General: Krzysztof Kasprzyk

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Oxford, Ohio

Honorary Consul: Marek Dollár

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Portland

Honorary Consul: Thaddeus R. Winnowski

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Saint Louis

Honorary Consul: Robert Ogrodnik

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in San Francisco

Honorary Consul: Christopher Kerosky

Uruguay

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Montevideo

Ambassador: Lech Kubiak

Uzbekistan

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Tashkent

Head of the Mission: Jerzy Stankiewicz—First Counselor

Vanuatu

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Canberra (Australia).

Venezuela

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Caracas

Ambassador: Krzysztof Hinz, accredited also to Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Surinam and Trinidad and Tobago

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Maracaibo

Honorary Consul: Wojciech Gałązka

Vietnam

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Hanoi

Ambassador: Mirosław Gajewski

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Ho Chi Minh

Consul General: Przemysław Jenke

Yemen

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Sanaa

Head of the Mission: Henryk

Piaszczyk—First Counselor

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Aden

Honorary Consul: Abdul Karim Ahmed

Alsheibani

Zambia

No mission.

Territory under jurisdiction of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Harare (Zimbabwe).

Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Lusaka

Honorary Consul General: Maria Rosalia

Ogonowska-Wiśniewska

Zimbabwe

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Harare

Head of the Mission: Przemysław

Kowalczyk—Second Secretary

III. International Organizations

Council of Europe

Permanent Representation of the Republic of Poland to the Council of Europe

Ambassador-Head of the Permanent

Representation: Piotr Świtalski

European Union

Permanent Representation of the Republic of Poland to the European Union

Ambassador-Head of the Permanent

Representation: Jan Tombiński

NATO and WEU

Permanent Representation of the Republic of Poland to NATO and WEU

Ambassador-Head of the Permanent

Representation: Bogusław Winid

OECD

Permanent Representation of the Republic of Poland to OECD in Paris

Ambassador-Permanent Representative:

Jan Woroniecki

OSCE

Mission of the Republic of Poland to OSCE in Vienna

Ambassador-Head of the Mission:

Jacek Bylica

United Nations

New York

Permanent Representation of the Republic of Poland to UN in New York

Ambassador-Permanent Representative:

Andrzej Towpik

Vienna

Permanent Representation of the Republic of Poland to UN in Vienna

Ambassador-Permanent Representative:

Jacek Bylica

Geneva

Permanent Representation of the Republic of Poland to UN in Geneva

Ambassador Extraordinary and

Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative:

Zdzisław Rapacki

UNESCO

Permanent Representation of the Republic of Poland to UNESCO in Paris

Ambassador-Permanent Representative:

Maria Wodzyńska-Walicka

Compiled by Dorota Dolegowska and Agnieszka Kondek