

PISM REPORT

POLISH PUBLIC OPINION ON THE UNITED STATES AND POLISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS



Report summarising the opinion poll carried out
for the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)



PISM

POLSKI INSTYTUT SPRAW MIĘDZYNARODOWYCH
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Introduction
Marcin Andrzej Piotrowski

Warsaw, January 2022

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INTRODUCTION

This **report summarises the key findings of two opinion polls** commissioned by the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) in August 2021. The subject of both polls was the attitude of Poles towards the United States and various aspects of Polish-American relations.

The surveys were preceded by PISM analysts' work on the development of a specific catalogue of interests and opportunities as well as problems and challenges in Polish-American relations. They were then grouped thematically into six categories and subjected to further sociological analysis and questions by public opinion researchers cooperating with PISM. **The main issues examined by us included:**

- the general attitude of Poles towards the United States;
- the perception of the principles and strategic objectives of U.S. foreign policy;
- the approach of Poles to security in bilateral relations with the United States;
- the perception of the style of American diplomacy in Poland;
- Poles' assessment of the bilateral economic and technological cooperation;
- expectations of Poles towards the United States.
- The issues analysed are likely to remain relevant in bilateral relations both in the short and long term.

The question of Poles' current attitude towards the United States has been repeatedly taken up in public opinion polls by domestic research centres, including the Public Opinion Research Centre's (CBOS) survey on Poles' sympathies and antipathies towards other nations, which has been conducted for more than two decades. The issue of perceptions of the current and previous U.S. presidential administrations have also been addressed within the broader and cyclical study "Transatlantic Trends" carried out by the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). This PISM report, however, is the first such comprehensive and public analysis focused exclusively on Poles' perception of the United States, Poland's key ally. We see this report as a first step towards future systematic and comparative studies of the attitude of Poles towards U.S. policies. We will aim to repeat such surveys every 2 to 3 years, which would allow us to capture elements of change or continuity in Polish public opinion's perception of the United States.

It is important to emphasise that the survey revealed **very good attitudes towards strengthening the relations in general, as well as in specific areas of Polish-American cooperation**. Almost two-thirds of Poles have a positive attitude towards the United States, while more than half believe that since 1989 the two countries have been linked by "special ties". Almost half of the respondents declare an interest in U.S. foreign policy. The level of responses indicating a generally positive assessment of the current state of bilateral relations, considered as based on partnership and serving common interests, was similar. Given the opportunity to indicate the most important ally, almost half of the surveyed Poles pointed to the United States (interestingly, one in five indicated "none"). The vast majority of Poles (62%) were convinced of the American will and readiness to react militarily in the event of a direct threat to Poland. There was also a strong preponderance (66%) of opinion among the respondents that the United States is right to demand that European NATO countries increase their national defence spending.

Paradoxically, **the coincidence of our polls and the fall of the U.S. and NATO-backed Afghan authorities in Kabul did not really influence the respondents' answers**. On the

contrary, the events in Afghanistan even strengthened Poles' affinity for America and confidence in its security guarantees for allies such as Poland (see also the "Introduction" and "Background of the Study"). The emotionality and tone of some of the comments on the end of the mission in Afghanistan may reflect a gap between the perception of these events by Polish opinion-makers or media and the opinion of the Poles randomly surveyed at the same time.

Nearly half of Poles (44%) believe that the United States remains a country that sets standards for democracy in the world, while only 10% express the opposite opinion. An even higher percentage of positive responses (jointly 72%) was noted in assessments of the importance of American investments in the Polish economy and benefits for Poland relating to the supplies of American liquefied natural gas (60%). Exactly half of the Poles surveyed also stated that the overall image of the United States in Poland has steadily improved over the past 20 years, with slightly fewer respondents (41%) expecting bilateral relations to improve in the future. Such high expectations are expressed despite the simultaneous conviction of Poles about the limited influence of Polish-Americans on U.S. domestic and foreign policy (only every tenth respondent consider this group highly influential).

The above opinions confirm the belief long expressed by experts and media that Poles have a positive attitude towards the United States. Some of the answers given, however, make it clear that **this is by no means an uncritically pro-U.S. approach.** For example, Poles express a negative assessment of the decision of the Biden administration to lift U.S. sanctions related to the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, with more than half considering it contrary to Polish interests. Most Poles (53%) are also against the possible deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Poland, regardless of the circumstances of this still very unlikely and hypothetical decision. Only 13% of Poles would accept the deployment of a nuclear arsenal in peacetime, while only one in four would allow it in times of a greater threat to Poland. This is one of the survey results that will require in-depth research as it opens up room for different interpretations (we assume that Poles' attitude to nuclear weapons is similar to other European countries).

Every second Pole (54%) expects that the acquisition of military equipment from the United States should always be linked to the creation of opportunities for the development of the Polish defence industry. It is also noteworthy that exactly three-fourths of the respondents expressed the belief that American troops deployed in Poland should be subject to Polish criminal law, while only 20% agreed that they should be subject to only American law (which is previously agreed and current). These responses, however, can be regarded as not particularly distinguishable from the views expressed by the populations of other U.S. allies where American troops are stationed. The results of the surveys on the perception of past deliveries of military equipment and the criminal immunity of U.S. forces in Poland require further attention from the authorities of both countries, ahead of action, especially given the potential for misunderstandings or ambiguities precisely against this background.

Also noteworthy are those responses that may pose a challenge to the future bilateral relations between the United States and Poland. Above all, the survey revealed very serious generational differences. The youngest respondents (aged 18–24) show little interest in United States foreign policy and do not see the benefits of the Polish-American alliance. This generation also less frequently identifies the United States as Poland's most important ally and thus sees no 'special ties' linking the two countries. The same group of respondents does not particularly care about the question of the country of origin of advanced technologies, and generally prefers Europe keeping distance from the

multidimensional Sino-American rivalry. Interestingly, these opinions are expressed in tandem with the generally high support of the youngest Poles for Biden's foreign policy. The issue of Europeans' attitude to the growing Sino-American rivalry would undoubtedly also require further research in Poland and other European countries. At the same time, it would be accurate to claim the youngest Poles have little knowledge on the subject, stemming from their selection of "I don't know" or neutral responses. This is the consequence of their low interest in international politics in general. However, the youngest respondents also seem quite susceptible to the current and future impact of China's disinformation campaigns aimed at its American rival. This group, unlike previous generations of Poles, has no direct political experience shaping a positive image of the United States, for example, the direct memory of the U.S. support to the anti-communist opposition before 1989 or with Poland's accession to NATO.

Not all elements of U.S. security cooperation seem to be understood by Polish public opinion. Only 24% of respondents declared that they know the purpose of the U.S. anti-missile base being built in Redzikowo. However, their answers to the subsequent question showed that they misperceived the purpose of this site, with only one in ten pointing to missile threats from Iran (correct answer), while the vast majority (64%) pointed to threats from Russia. More than a decade after this U.S.-NATO project began, these results demonstrate the low effectiveness of U.S. and allied public diplomacy communication. The results may also be linked to the relative effectiveness of Russian disinformation, which constantly presents the site in Redzikowo as being aimed precisely at Russia. The issue of clarifying the purpose of this component of the Atlantic Alliance missile defence system should be treated with more attention by decision-makers in Washington, Brussels, and Warsaw.

Polish-American relations have a unique and very strong legitimacy among Poles. Taking into account the objective asymmetry of their potentials as well as the priorities and interests of both countries, it is clear that Poles appreciate the balance of the Polish-American cooperation to date, which also translates into cooperation in NATO, the UN, and other international bodies. However, the analysis of Poles' responses to specific questions shows that this recognition is not due so much to sentiment or illusion about the nature of the "special ties" as it is to a **common-sense understanding of the asymmetry and convergence/divergence of interests of the two countries**, and even to the distance of Poles from certain decisions or priorities of a given administration in Washington. The already visible generational changes noted in the polls may in future bring an increase in the number of Poles critical of the United States, which currently are a small percentage of the respondents. This, in turn, would entail a parallel decline—although difficult to predict in terms of time and scale—in the level of Polish acceptance of American actions or the pursuit of specific interests in Poland and Central Europe.

We encourage you to read this PISM report in its entirety, treating the results provided as a contribution to the discussion on various aspects of bilateral and transatlantic relations conducted both in Poland and in the U.S.

Marcin Andrzej Piotrowski, PISM

I. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The subjects of Polish-American relations and differing attitudes to U.S. policy have recently been intensely present in the Polish public debate. This is influenced by the high dynamics of events in international politics that directly or indirectly affect Polish strategic interests, including in particular in the sphere of national and energy security. The decisions of the new U.S. administration to not block the completion of the Nord Stream 2 (NS2) gas pipeline, as well as the less dynamic relationship with Poland after the period of closer contact during the presidency of Donald Trump, are factors behind the revival of discussions on the Polish-American relations. The events in Afghanistan, the context and symbolism of which influence the debate on the role of the United States in the modern world, are also significant. These events actually culminated during the survey period.

However, the importance of assessing Polish public opinion on U.S. policy and Polish-American relations goes beyond the immediate context. The issues of Poland's place in international politics, the shape of its relations with allies, as well as Polish identity within the Western security system are important and interesting for many reasons, regardless of current events and decisions, especially since activity in this area is higher recently than in the past few decades. The narrative changes, events, and processes have become more dynamic. The information and media space in which international affairs are debated is being shaped differently than in the past. Public opinion is also subjected to a new kind of influence, specifically information warfare, waged at a far higher scale, including on social media. One of its aims is to undermine mutual trust between Western countries, to question the foundations and strength of the North Atlantic Alliance and especially the importance of the United States.

In Poland, there are a number of widespread opinions about the public's attitude towards the United States. The most frequently repeated view is that Poles are almost unconditionally pro-American and that there are special historical and emotional ties between the two nations. The common heroes of the struggle for independence are often invoked as symbols, and on many occasions the contribution of the Polish-American community to American society and the role of the American authorities in supporting Polish statehood now and in the past are emphasised.

The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) commissioned an opinion poll designed to assess U.S. policy and Polish-American relations. The results of the survey presented in this report allow a description of what Poles think about American issues and to what extent their opinions coincide with the stereotype. What is stable in their convictions and what changes under the influence of new circumstances? Are there any differences in views according to age, education, place of residence, political preferences, and other criteria of social differentiation? What effect does the presence of U.S. troops in Poland have on Poles' attitude towards the United States?

The presented report allows us to perceive and understand the nuances of Polish society's opinion on American affairs in conditions of strong political divisions in Poland, as well as in the reality of growing strategic tensions. The collected data—although they do not provide grounds for questioning the generally pro-American attitude of Poles—show realism in the assessments and a mature view of the conditions of the international situation rather than idealism and romanticism, so often attributed to Polish public opinion.

II. INFORMATION ABOUT THE STUDY

The study consisted of a quantitative measurement carried out by computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) within two independent surveys conducted at the same time. Each was carried out on a random sample of 1,003 adult Poles. Both samples were representative of the socio-demographic structure of Poland in terms of gender, age, level of education, and size of place of residence and voivodeship.

According to the guidelines defined by PISM, within each questionnaire respondents were asked a set of 14 questions and demographic questions. Splitting the survey into two independent questionnaires allowed optimisation of the length of the interview (respondents answered 14 questions from the main part of the questionnaire instead of 28 questions) and thus lowered the probability of the effect of respondent fatigue and, as a result, an increase in the quality of the results obtained. The interviews were carried out between 5 and 24 August 2021.

STRUCTURE OF THE SURVEY SAMPLES		
Gender	Women	52%
	Men	48%
Age	18–24 years	9%
	25–34 years	17%
	35–44 years	20%
	45–54 years	15%
	55–64 years	17%
	65 years and more	22%
Level of education	Primary, vocational	40%
	Secondary	35%
	High	25%
Size of the place of residence	Village	39%
	City with less than 20,000 inhabitants	13%
	City with 20,000–99,000 inhabitants	19%
	City with 100,000–499,000 inhabitants	17%
	City with 500,000 inhabitants or more	12%
Voivodeship	Dolnośląskie	5%
	Kujawsko-pomorskie	6%
	Lubelskie	8%
	Lubuskie	4%
	Łódzkie	6%
	Małopolskie	8%
	Mazowieckie	14%
	Opolskie	5%
	Podkarpackie	3%
	Podlaskie	3%
	Pomorskie	6%
	Śląskie	12%
	Świętokrzyskie	4%
	Warmińsko-mazurskie	3%
	Wielkopolskie	9%
	Zachodniopomorskie	4%

During the survey, respondents were also asked about their voting preferences. The averaged results for both completed samples (the maximum deviation between the results is 3 percentage points) are presented in the table below.

VOTING PREFERENCES		ALL RESPONDENTS	EXCLUDING PEOPLE WHO DECLARED THEY DO NOT VOTE
Which electoral roll would you vote for if the elections to the Sejm were held this Sunday?	Zjednoczona Prawica – Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, Solidarna Polska, Porozumienie [United Right – Law and Justice, United Poland, Agreement]	25%	28%
	Koalicja Obywatelska - Platforma Obywatelska i Nowoczesna [Civic Coalition – Civic Platform and Modern]	17%	19%
	Polska 2050 Szymona Hołowni [Szymon Hołownia's Poland 2050]	12%	13%
	[Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość] Confederation Liberty and Independence	6%	6%
	Nowa Lewica i Razem (wspólna lista lewicy) [New Left and Together (joint list of the Left)]	3%	4%
	Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe - Koalicja Polska [Polish People's Party – Polish Coalition]	2%	2%
	Other party	2%	3%
	I would vote but I don't know which electoral roll I would vote for	23%	26%
I would not vote	9%	-	

Although the survey was not a pre-election poll, the resulting distribution of support can be considered similar to the general political distribution in the period under study.¹ Voting preferences, specifically the opinions of supporters of the current major political forces, are included in the analysis of the results in addition to the demographic variables and can be found in the **Appendix** to this report.

During the course of the study, media widely reported the events in Afghanistan, including the takeover of Kabul by the Taliban (15 August) and the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops along with the evacuation of their associates, finally ending the American and NATO missions in this country. This situation was also considered when analysing the survey results to see if the fall of Kabul and its aftermath had an impact on the opinions and perceptions of the United States.

Note on the presentation of data in the figures: for questions with only one possible answer, minimal deviations from 100% are associated with rounding of percentages.

¹ For comparison, the following results of the three largest parties from a CBOS poll conducted between August 16 and 26 can be quoted: Law and Justice: 34%, Civic Coalition: 18%, Szymon Hołownia's Poland 2050: 11%; CBOS, *Preferences regarding political parties in August*, Warsaw, 27 August 2021.

III. MAIN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Polish public opinion on the United States and the Polish-American alliance includes both a strategic perspective and ad hoc assessments of specific actions by the U.S. authorities or the Polish government. There is a dominant belief in the importance of relations with the United States and a strongly positive attitude towards American values. However, this does not obscure the ability to critically assess those decisions that may pose a challenge to Polish interests.

In the opinions on the United States and Polish-American relations, just as with many other social and political topics, the key differences in views are related to the age and political preferences of the respondents.

Older respondents (aged over 55 and especially over 65):

- are more interested in U.S. foreign policy;
- are more positive about the state of Polish-American relations;
- more often point to the mutual benefits of these relations;
- are convinced of the existence of special ties between the United States and Poland;
- have a generally more positive attitude towards the United States;
- better assess Trump's policy, although at the same time they anticipate an improvement in mutual relations under President Joe Biden;
- point to the alliance with the United States as the more appropriate strategy in the face of the global rivalry with China;
- point to the United States as Poland's main ally;
- more often believe that the United States is a country that sets the standards for democracy in the world;
- assess the lifting of U.S. sanctions related to the construction of the NS2 gas pipeline as contrary to Poland's interests;
- are in favour of American technologies;
- note an improvement in the image of the United States in Poland.

Younger respondents (especially aged 18–24):

- have little interest in U.S. foreign policy;
- assess the state of Polish-American relations neutrally;
- more often are unable to assess whether there are any special ties linking Poland and the United States;
- are less positive about the benefits of the Polish-American alliance;
- are hoping relations will improve under Biden;
- are mostly in favour of maintaining an equal distance from the United States and China in the context of their global rivalry;
- less frequently indicate the United States as Poland's main ally;
- see the lifting of the U.S. sanctions related to the construction of the NS2 gas pipeline as neutral for Poland;
- appreciate the importance of American investments for the Polish economy;

- do not care about the country of origin of new technologies;
- anticipate an improvement in the attitude of Poles towards the United States;
- most often see the United States as an attractive place for labour migration and as a tourist destination.

An intergenerational gap in opinions and political divisions (which to some extent overlap: support for the main political forces is highly correlated with age) lead to different assessments of Polish-American affairs. There is a shift in emphasis and a different perspective on current politics. This is particularly evident in opinions on the current state of Polish-American relations. A more critical or more positive judgement on this subject results primarily from opinions about the policy of the current Polish government and the current American administration, and is not an opinion on the strategic dimension of the relationship as such. Political divisions are also clearly visible in opinions on current affairs, such as the statements by American politicians related to the situation in Poland.

Perception of more long-term issues and interests are less influenced by the current political agenda. Political and intergenerational differences reveal themselves with less force when it comes to the belief in the existence of special ties between Poland and the United States, the personal attitude towards the United States, the belief in the strength and importance of the military alliance, the appreciation of the standards of American democracy, the criticism of the lifting of sanctions related to the NS2 gas pipeline and the scepticism about the necessity of the presence of American nuclear weapons in Poland.

However, it is hard not to notice here a greater reserve in the opinions of the youngest group (aged 18–24). This may be due to several factors, above all, the relatively lower interest in foreign policy, less knowledge on the subject, and a tendency to answer “I don’t know” among this age group. The tendency to opt for neutral opinions and standing for a global “balance of power” is also typical here.


The implementation of the study coincided with the culmination of events related to the end of the allied military mission in Afghanistan. A comparison of the answers given before and after these events leads to important findings: the percentage of supporters of Biden’s policy fell and fewer people anticipate that the withdrawal’s impact on relations with Poland will be positive. At the same time, however, the number of supporters of an alliance with the United States, also as a counterweight to China’s global role, increased. In this case, once again, the understanding of the importance of the strategic role of the United States is combined with the ability to offer diverse opinions on events connected to the current political agenda.

IV. DETAILED RESULTS

1. GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES


The majority of Poles, almost two-thirds, describe their attitude towards the United States as positive; about one in five in this group describes it as definitely positive. Opinions across age groups are differentiated by the strength of sentiment. The percentage of people describing their attitude towards the United States as strongly positive increases with age, reflecting 24% for people aged 65 and over. Events in Afghanistan had no major impact on the way Poles perceive the United States. Comparing opinions from the period before and after the Taliban takeover of Kabul, one can see a similar percentage of respondents expressing a positive attitude towards the United States, while negative indications were less frequent (percentages before and after 15 August are, respectively, 7% and 3%).

FIGURE 1. ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES




Q5. (A1) What is your current attitude towards the United States?
Percentage base: all respondents.

FIGURE 1.1. ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES – AGE



The majority of respondents agree with the statement about the existence of special ties between the United States and Poland. This view is particularly prevalent among people in the oldest group (aged 65 and older) and those with lower levels of education. It is worth noting that among the respondents in the youngest age group, about one in five was unable to define their opinion. It can be assumed that the notion of “special ties” established in the consciousness of older generations has not developed amongst the youngest Poles.

FIGURE 2. OPINION ON THE EXISTENCE OF SPECIAL TIES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND POLAND



Q3. (A1) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the view that there are special ties linking Poland and the United States?

Percentage base: all respondents.

FIGURE 2.1. OPINION ON THE EXISTENCE OF SPECIAL TIES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND POLAND – AGE






FIGURE 2.2. OPINION ON THE EXISTENCE OF SPECIAL TIES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND POLAND – EDUCATION



2. ASSESSMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND BILATERAL RELATIONS

Almost every second Pole declared an interest in the foreign policy of the United States; and this level of interest was most often described as medium. Lack of interest in this subject was indicated by one in five respondents. Men are far more likely to show interest than women. Differences depending on age and education can also be observed—the higher the age and education level, the higher the level of interest. Among respondents in the youngest age group, i.e., those aged under 24, less than 30% indicated at least an average level of interest in U.S. foreign policy. The degree of interest in U.S. foreign policy issues was not affected by the events in Afghanistan.

FIGURE 3. INTEREST IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY



Q1. (A1) To what extent are you interested in U.S. foreign policy?
Percentage base: all respondents.

FIGURE 3.1. INTEREST IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY – GENDER




FIGURE 3.2. INTEREST IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY – AGE






FIGURE 3.3. INTEREST IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY – EDUCATION




Relations between the United States and Poland are mostly assessed as positive, although the prevalence of such responses is not huge. Just over a third of Poles perceive them as good, while almost a quarter perceive them as bad. People aged under 34 most often assess the relations between the United States and Poland as neutral, while those in the oldest age group (aged 55 and more) are more likely to have an opinion, whether positive or negative.

FIGURE 4. OPINION ON RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND POLAND




Q2. (A1) What is your overall opinion on the relationship between the United States and Poland? Do you consider them to be: (choices)?
Percentage base: all respondents.

FIGURE 4.1. OPINION OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND POLAND – AGE



Similar to the ambiguity about Polish-American relations, opinions as to which side has benefited more over the past 30 years are also divided. In this context, 35% of Poles point to Poland, while almost 30% to the United States; a similar percentage of respondents perceive both countries as equivalent beneficiaries. Men are more likely than women to indicate the United States in this context, and a similar view prevails among respondents aged 35–54.

FIGURE 5. BENEFICIARY OF POLISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS OVER THE LAST 30 YEARS



Q4. (A1) In the last 30 years of the Polish-American relations, has one of the sides benefited more?
Percentage base: all respondents.

FIGURE 5.1. BENEFICIARY OF POLISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS OVER THE LAST 30 YEARS – GENDER






FIGURE 5.2 BENEFICIARY OF POLISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS OVER THE LAST 30 YEARS – AGE



Almost half of respondents believe that Polish-American relations are of a partnership nature and serve common interests. In contrast, about a third of Poles consider only the United States benefits from them. This opinion is most often shared by people with higher education, men, and respondents aged 45–54. Only 12% of respondents claim that Polish-American relations serve above all Polish interests. After the events in Afghanistan, however, the percentage of people who see more benefits for Poland in the relations between the two countries increased (percentage of responses: “They serve Polish political and economic interests” before and after August 15 were, respectively, 10% and 16%).

FIGURE 6. OPINION ON POLISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS



Q12. (A1) Do you think that Polish-American relations: (choices)?
Percentage base: all respondents.

FIGURE 6.1. OPINION ON POLISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS – GENDER




FIGURE 6.2. OPINION ON POLISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS – AGE






FIGURE 6.3. OPINION ON POLISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS – EDUCATION



Almost half of Poles believe that Trump’s presidency had a positive impact on relations between Poland and the United States, and about one in four respondents expressed the opposite view. Men were more likely than women to express an opinion about the positive impact of Trump’s presidency on relations between the two countries. Differences in opinion depending on the age and education of the respondents are also noticeable. Higher age is more often associated with a positive opinion, while the level of education shows the opposite—the higher the level, the more often the opinion is negative.

FIGURE 7. OPINION ON THE IMPACT OF DONALD TRUMP’S PRESIDENCY ON POLISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS



Q9. (A1) How do you assess the impact of Donald Trump’s presidency on Polish-American relations? Do you consider it was: (choices)? Percentage base: all respondents.

FIGURE 7.1. OPINION ON THE IMPACT OF DONALD TRUMP’S PRESIDENCY ON POLISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS – GENDER




FIGURE 7.2. OPINION ON THE IMPACT OF DONALD TRUMP'S PRESIDENCY ON POLISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS – AGE






FIGURE 7.3. OPINION ON THE IMPACT OF DONALD TRUMP'S PRESIDENCY ON POLISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS – EDUCATION



A significant number of respondents (44%) anticipate that the policy of current U.S. President Biden will not affect Polish-American relations. Almost 30% of Poles expect a negative impact on mutual relations, while one in five expects a positive impact. It should be noted that the survey took place about seven months after Biden became president, and that the decision to accelerate the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan triggered events that resulted in the loss of control by the government in Kabul, which occurred during the survey period. Opinions of respondents after the cut-off date of 15 August were already somewhat more sceptical about the new president's policy. The opinion that it would improve Polish-American relations was expressed less frequently (percentages before and after 15 August were, respectively, 24% and 15%), difficulties in expressing an opinion on the matter were more common. Women were more likely to anticipate an improvement in relations than men, while in terms of age, respondents in the youngest group (aged 18–24) and those age 55 and older also were more likely to do so.

FIGURE 8. OPINION ON THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF JOE BIDEN'S POLICY ON POLISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS



Q10. (A1) What impact do you expect Joe Biden's policy to have on Polish-American relations?
Do you think it will: (choices)?
Percentage base: all respondents.

FIGURE 8.1. OPINION ON THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF JOE BIDEN'S POLICY ON POLISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS - GENDER






FIGURE 8.2. OPINION ON THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF JOE BIDEN'S POLICY ON POLISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS – AGE



3. NATIONAL SECURITY IN BILATERAL RELATIONS

From the survey, 46% of Poles perceive the United States as Poland’s main ally, which is a significant advantage over other countries indicated in this context. It is worth noting that one in five respondents did not indicate which country was Poland’s main ally. Pro-American attitudes are particularly evident among respondents aged 65 and over, with 55% identifying the United States as Poland’s most important ally. Among respondents aged 18–24, the proportion is just under 30%. The events in Afghanistan did not affect the perception of the United States as Poland’s main ally.


FIGURE 9. POLAND'S MOST IMPORTANT ALLY



Q1. (A2) Which country do you think is currently Poland's most important ally?
 Percentage base: all respondents.

The majority of Poles (62%) share the view that the United States will react to a direct threat to Poland's security by using military force. Sceptical opinions were more common among respondents aged 24 to 44 and those with higher education.

**FIGURE 10. OPINION ON THE POTENTIAL MILITARY REACTION OF THE UNITED STATES
IN THE EVENT OF A THREAT TO POLAND'S SECURITY**



Q2. (A2) Do you think that in the event of a real threat to Poland's security, the United States would react with military force?
Percentage base: all respondents

FIGURE 10.1. OPINION ON THE POTENTIAL MILITARY REACTION OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE EVENT OF A THREAT TO POLAND'S SECURITY – AGE






FIGURE 10.2. OPINION ON THE POTENTIAL MILITARY REACTION OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE EVENT OF A THREAT TO POLAND'S SECURITY – EDUCATION



More than half of Poles expressed the opinion that in the face of the growing rivalry between the United States and China, the European Union should keep equal distance from both of these powers. A preference for an alliance with the United States in this context was indicated by almost one in three respondents. Men and respondents in the oldest age group (over 55), are more likely to opt for an exclusive alliance with the United States. After the events in Afghanistan, the percentage of supporters of an alliance with the United States increased (percentages before and after 15 August were, respectively, 29% and 35%).

FIGURE 11. OPINION ON THE POTENTIAL ACTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION REGARDING RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND UNITED STATES



Q11. (A1) Do you think that in the context of the growing rivalry between the United States and China, the European Union should: (choices)?
Percentage base: all respondents.

FIGURE 11.1. OPINION ON THE POTENTIAL ACTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION REGARDING RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES – GENDER






FIGURE 11.2. OPINION ON THE POTENTIAL ACTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION REGARDING RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES – AGE



The prevailing opinion among Poles is that the United States is right to demand more defence spending from the European NATO member states. About two-thirds of the respondents expressed such a view, with one in four expressing a strong opinion. Support for the United States on the issue of defence spending is more often expressed by men, while the opposite opinion is most often held by people aged 25–34.

FIGURE 12. OPINION ON THE UNITED STATES' DEFENCE SPENDING REQUIREMENTS



Q3. (A2) Do you consider the United States to be right or wrong to demand that Europeans spend more on defence?
Percentage base: all respondents.

FIGURE 12.1. OPINION ON THE UNITED STATES' DEFENCE SPENDING REQUIREMENTS – GENDER






FIGURE 12.2. OPINION ON THE UNITED STATES' DEFENCE SPENDING REQUIREMENTS – AGE



Poles are quite sceptical about nuclear weapons: more than half of respondents would not allow the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Poland under any circumstances. Every fourth respondent agrees such a possibility only for a period of a military threat to Poland. Men (19%) and people aged 35–44 (22%) were more open to the possibility of the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Poland in peacetime.


FIGURE 13. OPINION ON THE POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN POLAND



Q7. (A2) Do you allow the possibility of the deployment of American nuclear weapons in Poland in the future?
Percentage base: all respondents.

The vast majority of respondents stated that they lacked knowledge of the purpose of the U.S. military base being built in Redzikowo. Women (87%) and people in the youngest group, aged 18–24 (92%), were more likely to declare a lack of knowledge. Only one in four respondents declared knowledge on this topic. These people were subsequently asked about the specific purpose of the U.S. military base being built in Redzikowo.

FIGURE 14. KNOWLEDGE OF THE PURPOSE OF THE U.S. MILITARY BASE IN REDZIKOWO



Q14. (A1). Do you know the purpose of the U.S. military base being built in Redzikowo?
Percentage base: all respondents

FIGURE 14.1. KNOWLEDGE OF THE PURPOSE OF THE U.S. MILITARY BASE IN REDZIKOWO – GENDER






FIGURE 14.2. KNOWLEDGE OF THE PURPOSE OF THE U.S. MILITARY BASE IN REDZIKOWO – AGE



Most of the people who declared their knowledge of the purpose of the U.S. military base in Redzikowo claimed that its task would be to defend Europe against Russia. Iran (the correct answer) was indicated by only about one in 10 respondents initially claiming to know the purpose of the base.


FIGURE 15. POLES' OPINION ON WHICH COUNTRY THE REDZIKOWO MILITARY BASE IS SUPPOSED TO PROTECT EUROPE FROM



Q14A.(A1) Do you consider that this base is supposed to protect Europe against missiles launched by: (choices)? Percentage base: respondents who know the purpose of the military base in Redzikowo, N=239


The vast majority of Poles (75%) declare the opinion that the American soldiers stationed on Polish territory should be subject to the Polish criminal justice system. About one in five respondents indicated U.S. law in this context. The belief in the primacy of Polish law was more often indicated by persons aged 25–34.

FIGURE 16. OPINIONS ON THE STATUS OF U.S. SOLDIERS STATIONED IN POLAND IN TERMS OF CRIMINAL CASES



P4. (A2) Do you think that U.S. soldiers stationed in Poland should be subject to the Polish or American criminal justice system?
 Percentage base: all respondents.


FIGURE 16.1. OPINIONS ON THE STATUS OF U.S. SOLDIERS STATIONED IN POLAND IN TERMS OF CRIMINAL CASES – AGE



4. STYLE AND OBJECTIVES OF U.S. DIPLOMACY IN POLAND


According to the majority of Poles, the United States is a country that sets standards for democracy in the world—almost half of the respondents (44%) tend to agree with this statement, while 17% have no response on this issue. This opinion is mainly expressed by respondents aged over 65. The opposite view is held by around a third of respondents (34%), predominant among people aged 25-34. After the seizure of Kabul by the Taliban, the percentage of people who oppose the claim that the United States has the right to determine the democratic order in the world decreased, while the percentage of people who were unable to express a clear response increased.

FIGURE 17. UNITED STATES AS A COUNTRY THAT SETS STANDARDS FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE WORLD




Q6. (A1) United States is considered to have high standards of democracy and respect for the law. Do you agree with the statement that the United States is a country that sets standards for democracy in the world? Percentage base: all respondents.

FIGURE 17.1. UNITED STATES AS A COUNTRY THAT SETS STANDARDS FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE WORLD – AGE



Opinions are divided about critical statements made by U.S. officials about the political situation in Poland. The largest percentage of respondents (38%) have a positive attitude towards them; this group is dominated by people with higher education. The opposite view is held by 25% of Poles, with a significant share of them men. A neutral opinion on this subject was declared by 29% of respondents.

FIGURE 18. OPINION ON AMERICAN COMMENTS ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN POLAND



Q8. (A1) Recently, U.S. officials have expressed some critical opinions of the political situation in Poland. How would you assess the American comments or opinions on Polish matters?
Percentage base: all respondents.

FIGURE 18.1. OPINION ON AMERICAN COMMENTS ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN POLAND – GENDER






FIGURE 18.2. OPINION ON AMERICAN COMMENTS ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN POLAND – EDUCATION



Over half of the respondents (54%) assess neutrally also the interventions of U.S. diplomats in Poland in support of the economic interests of American companies. Only 23% of Poles expressed a positive attitude towards this type of activity, most of them aged over 65. In contrast, only just over one tenth of respondents (13%) declared a negative attitude. This latter opinion was more often expressed by men.

FIGURE 19. OPINION ON THE INTERVENTIONS OF U.S. DIPLOMATS IN POLAND IN SUPPORT OF THE ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF AMERICAN COMPANIES.



Q7. (A1) There is an opinion that in the past years U.S. diplomats were putting pressure on the Polish authorities regarding the conditions for American companies to operate in Poland. How do you assess the interventions of U.S. diplomats in Poland in support of the economic interests of American companies?
Percentage base: all respondents

FIGURE 19.1 OPINION ON THE INTERVENTIONS OF US DIPLOMATS IN POLAND, IN SUPPORT OF THE ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF AMERICAN COMPANIES – GENDER






FIGURE 19.2 OPINION ON THE INTERVENTIONS OF U.S. DIPLOMATS IN POLAND IN SUPPORT OF THE ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF AMERICAN COMPANIES – AGE



5. BILATERAL ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION

More than half of respondents (54%) assess the lifting of U.S. sanctions related to the construction of the NS2 gas pipeline as contrary to Poland's interests. This view is particularly expressed by men and people in the oldest age group, while least frequently by people aged 18–24. Less than one-third of respondents say this decision is neutral for Poland. The youngest respondents (aged below 35) predominate among supporters of this opinion.

FIGURE 20. LIFTING OF U.S. SANCTIONS RELATED TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE NORD STREAM 2 GAS PIPELINE AND POLISH INTERESTS



Q13. (A1) President Joe Biden has recently lifted U.S. sanctions related to the construction of the Russian-German Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. Do you consider this decision: (choices)?
Percentage base: all respondents.

FIGURE 20.1. LIFTING OF U.S. SANCTIONS RELATED TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE NORD STREAM 2 GAS PIPELINE AND POLISH INTERESTS – GENDER






FIGURE 20.2. LIFTING OF U.S. SANCTIONS RELATED TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE NORD STREAM 2 GAS PIPELINE AND POLISH INTERESTS – AGE




The prevailing opinion among Poles is that the activities of American companies are of great importance to Poland. Over 70% of respondents consider investments by American companies and corporations significant to the Polish economy, with the plurality of responses (half of the respondents) selecting the “rather significant” answer. The opinion about the great importance of American investments to the Polish economy prevails especially among people from the youngest age group. The opinion pointing to little or no importance was expressed by 19% of Poles.

FIGURE 21. OPINION ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INVESTMENTS BY AMERICAN COMPANIES AND CORPORATIONS TO THE POLISH ECONOMY




Q8. (A2) How do you assess the significance of investments by American companies and corporations to the Polish economy?
 Percentage base: all respondents.

FIGURE 21.1. OPINION ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INVESTMENTS BY AMERICAN COMPANIES AND CORPORATIONS TO THE POLISH ECONOMY – AGE



The poll finds 60% of respondents believe that liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies from the United States are beneficial to Poland. The opposite view was expressed by 22% of respondents, who declared that they are definitely disadvantageous or rather disadvantageous. A relatively large group, representing almost 20% of respondents, was unable to give a clear answer to this question.


FIGURE 22. GAS SUPPLIES FROM THE UNITED STATES AND BENEFITS FOR POLAND



Q9. (A2) Do you consider gas supplies from the United States beneficial to Poland?
Percentage base: all respondents.


More than half of respondents (52%) say that they do not consider the origin of the advanced technologies used by Poland to be an important factor for them. This opinion is most strongly held by people aged below 34. Respondents aged over 65 were most often in favour of Poland using U.S. technology.

FIGURE 23. OPINION ON THE POTENTIAL COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES USED BY POLAND




Q6. (A2) In view of the Sino-American rivalry, do you consider that Poland should use advanced technologies from: (choices)?
Percentage base: all respondents.

FIGURE 23.1. OPINION ON THE POTENTIAL COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES USED BY POLAND – AGE



In the polling, 54% of respondents believe that the acquisition of military equipment by Poland should entail the possibility of developing the domestic defence industry. This view is expressed primarily by men. The opposite opinion is held by 38% of respondents, including the majority of women and people aged 25–34.

FIGURE 24. ACQUISITION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLISH DEFENCE INDUSTRY



Q5. (A2) Do you consider that the acquisition of military equipment should be made only when accompanied by an opportunity to develop the Polish defence industry, or do you find these acquisitions so important that they should be made also when there is no such benefit?
 Percentage base: all respondents.

FIGURE 24.1. ACQUISITION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLISH DEFENCE INDUSTRY – GENDER






FIGURE 24.2. ACQUISITION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLISH DEFENCE INDUSTRY – AGE



6. EXPECTATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

For half of Poles, the image of the United States has improved over the past 20 years. This opinion is more often expressed by women, people aged over 45, and those with a vocational or secondary education. Among respondents, 20% are convinced that it has deteriorated. The opinion that this image has deteriorated significantly is highest among the three younger groups.

FIGURE 25. OPINION ON THE IMAGE OF THE UNITED STATES IN POLAND OVER THE LAST 20 YEARS



Q10. (A2) Do you consider that the image of the United States in Poland over the past 20 years has: (choices)
 Percentage base: all respondents.

FIGURE 25.1. OPINION ON THE IMAGE OF THE UNITED STATES IN POLAND OVER THE LAST 20 YEARS – GENDER




FIGURE 25.2. OPINION ON THE IMAGE OF THE UNITED STATES IN POLAND OVER THE LAST 20 YEARS – AGE






FIGURE 25.3. OPINION ON THE IMAGE OF THE UNITED STATES IN POLAND OVER THE LAST 20 YEARS – EDUCATION



In total, 41% of respondents anticipate that the Polish attitude towards the United States will improve in the future. This opinion is presented mainly by people below age 25, the majority of whom stated that this will definitely be the case, and by respondents with primary and vocational education. At the same time, more than one-third of Poles believe that their attitude towards the United States will not change. The opinion that it will deteriorate is mainly held by people with higher education and men. Respondents aged 25–34 declared that they anticipate the attitude of Poles towards the United States is more likely to deteriorate. The end of the conflict in Afghanistan had a certain impact on the perception of the United States with the preponderance of positive votes decreasing in favour of those anticipating that Poles' attitude towards the United States would deteriorate in the future (percentages of responses anticipating improvement before and after 15 August were, respectively, 46% and 38%; negative responses: 15% and 22%).

FIGURE 26. OPINION ON THE ATTITUDE OF POLES TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES IN THE FUTURE



Q11. (A2) Do you consider that the attitude of Poles towards the United States will improve or deteriorate over time?
Percentage base: all respondents.

FIGURE 26.1. OPINION ON THE ATTITUDE OF POLES TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES IN THE FUTURE – GENDER




FIGURE 26.2. OPINION ON THE ATTITUDE OF POLES TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES IN THE FUTURE – AGE






FIGURE 26.3. OPINION ON THE ATTITUDE OF POLES TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES IN THE FUTURE – EDUCATION



More than half of the Poles surveyed—within this half, most are aged over 65 and have higher education—are of the opinion that the United States is not an attractive destination for labour migration. On the other hand, the opposite view is expressed by more than one-third of the respondents, above all by people aged below 25 and most women.

FIGURE 27. OPINION ON THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF THE UNITED STATES AS A PLACE FOR LABOUR MIGRATION



Q12. (A2) Do you currently consider the United States to be an attractive place for labour migration?
Percentage base: all respondents.

FIGURE 27.1. OPINION ON THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF THE UNITED STATES AS A PLACE FOR LABOUR MIGRATION – GENDER




FIGURE 27.2. OPINION ON THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF THE UNITED STATES AS A PLACE FOR LABOUR MIGRATION – AGE






FIGURE 27.3. OPINION ON THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF THE UNITED STATES AS A PLACE FOR LABOUR MIGRATION – EDUCATION



In turn, three quarters of Poles consider the United States to be an attractive tourist destination. This view is held mainly by younger respondents, those aged 18–44, among whom the answer “definitely yes” prevailed, and by people with higher education, while it is least shared by people aged over 55 and with vocational or primary education.

FIGURE 28. OPINION ON THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF THE UNITED STATES AS A TOURIST DESTINATION



Q13. (A2) Do you currently consider the United States to be an attractive tourist destination?
Percentage base: all respondents.

FIGURE 28.1. OPINION ON THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF THE UNITED STATES AS A TOURIST DESTINATION – AGE






FIGURE 28.2. OPINION ON THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF THE UNITED STATES AS A TOURIST DESTINATION – EDUCATION




Only about one in ten respondents assessed the influence of Polish-American organisations in the United States on the American domestic and foreign policy as high. This position is more often expressed by people aged over 65. More than half of Poles described this influence as limited, while about one in five said that Polish-Americans had no influence.

FIGURE 29. OPINION ON THE INFLUENCE OF POLISH-AMERICAN ORGANISATIONS ON AMERICAN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY



Q14. (A2) Do you consider Polish-American organisations in the United States to have influence on American domestic and foreign policy?
 Percentage base: all respondents.

FIGURE 29.1. OPINION ON THE INFLUENCE OF POLISH-AMERICAN ORGANISATIONS ON AMERICAN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY – AGE



APPENDIX

This appendix provides data and analysis on the link between the opinions on relations between Poland and the U.S. and respondents' voting preferences:

Zjednoczona Prawica – Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, Solidarna Polska, Porozumienie [United Right – Law and Justice, United Poland, Agreement]:

- assess the state of Polish-American relations more favourably;
- are more often convinced of the existence of special ties between Poland and the United States;
- at the same time, they are more sceptical about Poland's benefits resulting from these relations over the past 30 years;
- assess Trump's presidency more favourably, and have more concerns about Biden's policies;
- more often point to the United States as Poland's main ally;
- have greater confidence in the U.S. military response in the event of a threat to Poland's security;
- share the opinion that the image of the U.S. in Poland has improved over the last 20 years and are more likely to believe that the attitude of Poles towards the U.S. will improve in the future.

Koalicja Obywatelska – Platforma Obywatelska i Nowoczesna [Civic Coalition – Civic Platform and Modern]:

- are more critical in their opinions about the state of Polish-American relations, but have a more positive overall attitude towards the United States and believe in positive outcomes of Biden's policies;
- are strongly oriented towards an alliance with the United States (in contrast to relations with China);
- are more likely to believe that Polish-American relations are of a partnership nature;
- are more likely to believe that the United States sets the standard for democracy in the world;
- consider as positive the intervention of U.S. diplomats in Poland in support of the economic interests of American companies;
- see favourably American comments on Polish affairs.

Polska 2050 Szymona Hołowni [Szymon Hołownia's Poland 2050]:

- on many issues, they express opinions that lie between the views of the voters of the United Right and the voters of Civic Coalition (they find a "balance" between the opinions in these two blocs);
- are far less likely than voters of the two largest coalitions mentioned above to agree with the claim that the United States and Poland are linked by special ties;
- are quite critical in their opinion about the state of current Polish-American relations;
- their views on the issue of the benefits for Poland resulting from relations with the United States are closer to those of the voters of the United Right than to those of the voters of the Civic Coalition (i.e., they share scepticism on this issue);
- on the other hand, they are closer in their views to voters of the Civic Coalition than the voters of the United Right when it comes to assessing the impact of Trump's presidency;

- are mostly cautious in assessing the impact of Biden’s presidency on the Polish-American relations;
- are mostly in favour of the EU keeping equal distance from the United States and China (although not as strongly as the voters of Confederation);
- their opinions on the American comments on the political situation in Poland are varied;
- they perceive the image of the United States in Poland over the past 20 years very similarly to the voters of the Civic Coalition, although they are somewhat more reserved than them in anticipating that this image will improve in the future.

Nowa Lewica [New Left]:

- are more likely to be neutral about the state of current Polish-American relations;
- are critical about the impact of Trump’s presidency on Polish-American relations;
- are willing to believe the United States will react in the event of a threat to Poland’s security;
- recognise the United States as a country that sets standards for democracy in the world;
- mostly accept American comments on the political situation in Poland;
- are more likely to perceive a deterioration of the image of the United States in Poland over the past 20 years;
- they are, however, clearly more likely to believe that this image will improve in the future;
- are strongly sceptical about the influence of Polish American organisations on the American politics.

Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość [Confederation Liberty and Independence]:

- are more likely to have negative attitude towards the United States;
- are far more likely to identify the United States as the main beneficiary of Polish-American relations;
- are strongly convinced of the primacy of American political and economic interests in relations with Poland;
- are definitely positive about the impact of Trump’s presidency on Polish-American relations;
- are sceptical of a positive role of Biden’s presidency in this sphere;
- are overwhelmingly in favour of the European Union keeping equal distance from the United States and China;
- are sometimes more sceptical about the U.S. right to set standards for democracy in the world;
- are against the American comments on the political situation in Poland;
- are very critical of the intervention of U.S. diplomats in Poland in support of the interests of American companies;
- are more likely to anticipate the deterioration of the image of the United States in Poland in the future.

Due to the small number of respondents indicating they are voters of the Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe [Polish People’s Party] in the research sample, their responses were not analysed separately.

Below, the following figures illustrate the major differences of opinion related to voting preferences.

FIGURE 30. ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES – VOTING PREFERENCES




FIGURE 31. OPINION ON THE EXISTENCE OF SPECIAL TIES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND POLAND – VOTING PREFERENCES




FIGURE 32. OPINION ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND POLAND
– VOTING PREFERENCES




FIGURE 33. BENEFICIARY OF POLISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS OVER THE LAST 30 YEARS
– VOTING PREFERENCES




FIGURE 34. OPINION ON POLISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS – VOTING PREFERENCES




FIGURE 35. OPINION ON THE IMPACT OF TRUMP'S PRESIDENCY ON POLISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS – VOTING PREFERENCES




FIGURE 36. OPINION ON THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF BIDEN'S POLICIES ON POLISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS – VOTING PREFERENCES




FIGURE 37. OPINION ON THE POTENTIAL REACTION OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE EVENT OF A THREAT TO POLAND'S SECURITY – VOTING PREFERENCES




FIGURE 38. OPINION ON POTENTIAL ACTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION REGARDING RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES – VOTING PREFERENCES






FIGURE 39. UNITED STATES AS A COUNTRY THAT SETS STANDARDS FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE WORLD – VOTING PREFERENCES



**FIGURE 40. OPINION ON U.S. COMMENTS ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN POLAND
– VOTING PREFERENCES**



**FIGURE 41. OPINION ON THE INTERVENTIONS OF U.S. DIPLOMATS IN POLAND IN SUPPORT
OF THE ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF AMERICAN COMPANIES – VOTING PREFERENCES**




FIGURE 42. LIFTING OF U.S. SANCTIONS RELATED TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE NORD STREAM 2 GAS PIPELINE AND POLISH INTERESTS – VOTING PREFERENCES




FIGURE 43. OPINION ON THE IMAGE OF THE UNITED STATES IN POLAND OVER THE LAST 20 YEARS – VOTING PREFERENCES




FIGURE 44. OPINION ON THE ATTITUDE OF POLES TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES IN THE FUTURE – VOTING PREFERENCES





FIGURE 45. OPINION ON THE INFLUENCE OF POLISH-AMERICAN ORGANISATIONS ON AMERICAN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY – VOTING PREFERENCES





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