The Warsaw Workshop:
Prospects for Information Sharing and Confidence Building on Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe

Warsaw
April 2013

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Table of Contents

Introduction ........................................................ 5
Summary of Key Points ............................................... 7
Rationales for Prioritising TCBMs for NSNWs ....................... 9
NSNW Definitions .................................................. 10
The Role of NSNWs in Nuclear Doctrines .............................. 11
Potential Transparency, Confidence Building and Verification Measures
for NSNWs ........................................ 11
  Relative Incentives ........................................ 11
  TCBM Options and Possibilities ................................ 12
  Early Priority Options for TCBMs ............................... 15
  Information Issues: Protection, Dissemination and Leakage of TCBM data . . 15
  First Procedural Steps: A Joint TCBM Cost Benefit Matrix ........... 16
The Wider Political and Strategic Contexts Surrounding Confidence
Building for NSNWs ........................................ 16
Conclusion and Summing Up ........................................ 18

Working Papers Submitted for the Workshop ........................ 19

The Warsaw Workshop Programme .................................. 21

Note on the Authors ............................................. 23
Introduction

On 7 and 8 February 2013 the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), the Nuclear Policy Program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland and with the participation of the U.S. State Department, arranged a workshop entitled “The Warsaw Workshop: Prospects for Information Sharing and Confidence Building on Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe.”

The workshop was intended to be an open arena, or “Track 1.5” setting, for NGOs and officials from NATO countries, Russia and other European nations, convened under Chatham House Rules to discuss possible ways forward for information sharing and confidence building on non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) in Europe. 80 participants attended, from 21 nations, including senior officials from NATO countries, representatives of the NATO International Staff, and nongovernmental experts from academic and think-tank communities in NATO member states and the Russian Federation (RF).

Papers prepared and circulated for the conference are available on the PISM website: http://www.pism.pl/Events/The-Warsaw-Workshop

This report aims to summarise and collate discussions during plenary sessions and the three parallel working groups whose deliberations were reported to the plenary. It has been prepared by representatives of the organizing think tanks and reflects their assessment of the proceedings. Any omissions or shortcomings are therefore the responsibility of the authors.

Summary of Key Points

Major points emerging from the workshop discussions were as follows:

– There was general agreement that the underlying security relationship between NATO and Russia was stable. Numbers of American and Russian NSNWs in Europe have been considerably reduced since the end of the Cold War. However, there was a lack of transparency regarding numbers, location, operational status and levels of security. This created very evident disagreement over the true size of the Russian NSNW arsenal, which some participants believed still remained asymmetrically large, while others felt might in fact have fallen to levels much closer to the combined levels of NATO Allies, although this would require a calculation in which French and British strategic systems were added to American non-strategic weapons.

– Discussion revealed significant problems in agreeing precise definition of NSNWs, but it was not argued that disputes over definitions and categories necessarily prevent pragmatic efforts at confidence building. A wide menu of possible TCBMs was identified for further study, including data exchanges, clarification of the important term “centralised storage,” visits and inspections, rebasing, declarations and joint work on verification. Areas of early focus and of potentially overlapping Russian and NATO interest were suggested. It was accepted that information exchange might throw up issues of protection, dissemination and leakage of TCBM data, but it was not asserted that these would prove insurmountable.

– Most participants from NATO countries believed that further confidence—and security-building measures for NSNWs were intrinsically desirable and should be developed as a step towards further nuclear disarmament efforts. Lack of transparency created insecurity for all parties. Opening up the discussion to include the numbers, types, roles and locations of nuclear weapons would in itself boost security for all parties, as well as lay the basis for considering future reductions. It would also help strengthen the NPT and represent a step towards the visionary aim of a world without nuclear weapons endorsed i.a. in the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept.

– On the Russian side there was far less belief that the Russian government had genuine incentives to meet NATO countries’ expectations over NSNW transparency. It was argued that the Russian decision-makers and public believed their country had given too many one-sided advantages to NATO since the end of the Cold War and that the Russian government would wish to avoid more. NSNWs were often regarded as an area of Russian numerical superiority, but from Moscow’s perspective they should not be considered without reference to other issues. There were multilateral implications involving new areas of technology — especially conventional strategic precision strike capabilities, ballistic missile defence (BMD), as well as French and British nuclear weapons stockpiles against which Russia would need to preserve its countervailing capabilities.

– There was a general consensus that the main track for any negotiations on numerical reductions in NSNWs would necessarily be bilateral, between the U.S. and Russia. TCBMs might well, however, also be discussed in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). In both cases the U.S. had committed to close consultations with NATO allies.

– The fundamental determinant of progress would be the Russian government’s decision on whether to engage with NATO over NSNWs. This would be a political choice, influenced by assessments of wider strategic considerations and balances such as missile defence, other conventional strategic weapons, and conventional forces. Some, mostly non-Russian, participants suggested that Russia had real interests in joining a confidence building process over NSNWs, as part of a wider attempt at a rapprochement to transform the presently distrustful relationship with the U.S. and NATO. Russian participants stated, however, that it was unlikely that Russia would
allow any substantive progress in negotiations on TCBMs on NSNWs, without some form of agreement on measures covering other weapon systems, notably BMD.

– The problem of NSNWs in Europe had at least two main, but so far separate, dimensions: the domestic political discomfort within some European NATO member states over future basing and modernisation of B-61s and dual capable aircraft (DCAs), and the more complicated longer term strategic conversation between the U.S. and Russia about the future of strategic stability under new technological circumstances. Both were also linked with concerns for the future of the NPT and the need to demonstrate movement towards further nuclear reductions. It would be desirable to find ways of better understanding and connecting the resultant discourses.

– Similarly, decisions to look seriously at NSNWs in the NRC in order to introduce TCBMs would have an intrinsically globally strategic dimension. They should therefore be embedded in a wider perspective, potentially capable of extending to other continents and to emerging nuclear powers. Careful consideration should be given to these wider implications in preparing for discussion in the NRC.

– Specifically, work towards TCBMs should aim at coherence with work in major multilateral fora. Resultant data should, for example, be as useful as possible in assisting the development of a data exchange mechanism among the P5, and thus in strengthening the NPT.

– Concerns over China would play an unspoken role in decisions over NSNWs in Europe, both as an unacknowledged determinant of Russian nuclear posture and regarding the position of China as a reticent member of the P5, who might be put under pressure for greater nuclear transparency if Russia was more forthcoming.

– Overall, it was felt that the Warsaw Workshop had once again demonstrated the complexities, wider interactions, and asymmetries of interest which surround U.S. and Russian NSNWs. But debate also revealed, and indeed re-emphasised, the strength and consistency of the arguments for continued attempts at confidence building in this field. Intensive discussions during the two days identified sufficiently encouraging new TCBM options, and suggested new mechanisms for analysing, appraising and prioritising them. There was, as a result, unanimous concluding agreement by participants that further efforts would be worthwhile for study and joint elaboration of possible TCBMs for NSNWs.

The following report elaborates on the discussions during which these key conclusions emerged.
Rationales for Prioritising TCBMs for NSNWs

Several participants emphasised the underlying stability of the contemporary security environment in the Euro-Atlantic region. Numbers of nuclear weapons, NSNWs in particular, had been enormously reduced since the end of the Cold War. Indeed, various participants repeatedly asserted that Russia was comfortable with the NSNW status quo (while much more concerned about emerging non-nuclear capabilities). Broadly speaking, NATO itself does not see a need, after the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR), to change its reliance on NSNWs, at least without new prospects of Russian reciprocation. The main problem seemed to be a deficit of confidence and trust, prompting the question: how could new arrangements over NSNWs contribute to a new cooperative security system which may be constructed?

Discussions also raised a more basic, and, to some, provocative, question about the rationale behind addressing this type of weapons. Would a world without NSNWs be unquestionably more secure than it is right now? Some participants warned against moving toward NSNWs disarmament that could destabilize the current balance. Russia might, for example, feel generally less secure without this kind of weapon. Others emphasised that working towards TCBMs was something very far removed from elimination or deep reductions in NSNWs. They also stressed the wide-spread international public notion that the existence of large numbers of NSNWs posed potential threats to safety and security. There was always a chance the weapons could be used or brandished provocatively in crisis, and many believed that NSNWs were more susceptible to terrorist seizure, or other loss of control, than strategic nuclear weapons. Some noted that an NSNW-related nuclear event, such as an accident or reported safety failure, would force both sides to weigh these weapons’ deterrence value seriously against such risks. One participant noted that the U.S. focus on NSNWs was driven by these factors, coupled with a desire to see the numbers of Russian and American NSNWs reach relative parity.

Some participants asserted that the U.S., as well as several of its allies, wished to see the end of NSNWs in the Euro-Atlantic area. It was strongly argued that NATO also had a collective interest in using cooperation on NSNWs as a tool for wider NATO-Russian confidence building and remediation of the trust deficit, as stipulated in the recent NATO documents such as the DDPR. American participants argued that it was essential to keep trying to enrich and strengthen consultative processes, by using concrete step-by-step approaches such as TCBMs, rather than hortatory statements.

Participants pointed to numerous interlocking potential security benefits. Progress in confidence building over NSNWs could further the long-term goal of a (presumably U.S.-Russian) treaty covering all types of warheads. The Alliance also wanted to demonstrate commitment to Article VI of the NPT, to better understand Russian nuclear doctrine (and thus also the significance of exercises involving NSNWs), and to bring more certainty to judgements of Russian implementation of the 1991/92 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs). NSNWs related to a broad range of security interests and concerns, and discussing them openly might assist wider future work.

At present, one participant said, the topic of NSNWs was salient partly because of the conditions imposed by the U.S. Senate when it had ratified the New START Treaty. It had demanded progress on NSNWs, a demand which had repeatedly recurred for various reasons, including a desire to address the numerical disparity between U.S. and Russian NSNW. President Obama had undertaken to seek to initiate negotiations over NSNWs, which was also an important expectation for some NATO European states, and which added to the gravity of the issue. Another American participant emphasised the U.S. was pushing for concerted movement among the P5, consistent with the NPT Action Plan. Progress on NSNWs could be a worthwhile part of that. Another participant noted that, in any case, there were too many NSNWs in existence for the roles they were intended to play. While reductions should be the practical course of action, bureaucratic inertia kept the system of NSNW production and maintenance running, and would probably continue to pose a challenge.
It was noted that NATO itself did not share a truly unified position over NSNWs. The DDPR had achieved consensus on using NATO’s remaining assigned NSNWs as leverage to engage Russia in negotiations, initially to achieve greater transparency, as first suggested by Poland and Norway in 2010. But the consensus appeared to have different motivations, as Allies differed over the value attached to U.S. B-61 bombs based in Europe. While removal of U.S. weapons from Europe was certainly not universally seen as desirable within the Alliance, it might be contemplated at some point, depending upon the broader security environment. As one participant noted, extended deterrence in Europe need not depend on any particularly weapon system. More transparency regarding Russia’s arsenal and doctrine would have a reassuring effect on its NATO neighbours and help to create an improved environment in which major changes could occur.

From this general perspective, participants from Alliance nations tended to see NSNWs as an important, and usefully distinguishable, stand-alone weapons category, over which joint progress with Russia could be made. But a critical part of the problem was of course that Russia currently saw no similar utility from discussing NSNWs. More than one Russian participant emphasised that, from Moscow’s perspective, since the end of the Cold War, NATO had given Russia little reason to offer trust and transparency, while missile defence plans for Europe, coupled with NATO’s refusal of juridical assurances, were now a major and growing cause of strategic suspicion for the Russian government.

NSNW Definitions

There was general agreement that there were no perfect or precise solutions to the definition of NSNW, and constant risks of confusion between non-strategic systems and non-strategic operational use. Participants gave widespread, but not total, acceptance to the judgement that the only practical way to proceed in the short term towards TCBMs would be to use the widely understood “definition by exclusion.” In this, NSNWs could be understood as weapon systems (warheads and associated delivery vehicles) that are not covered by existing nuclear arms control treaties (New START and INF). This was the basis of agreed terminology between the Russian and U.S. Academies of Science which, one participant asserted, had largely “solved” the definitional problem, and was intended to connect with the common nuclear glossary on which China was leading work within the P5.

There was some disagreement, even among those favouring definition by exclusion, over whether the focus should be warheads (generally supported by NATO participants) or warheads and delivery systems (supported by some Russian participants, and opposed by others).

Some participants also pointed out that starting with a definition by exclusion would inescapably imply a “top-down” approach, arising out of U.S. /Soviet agreements at the end of the Cold War. This would throw up certain anomalies, even between the two nuclear powers. For example, it was argued that the U.S. B-61 bomb could be delivered by both tactical and strategic aircraft. In addition, Russia had a number of different classes of “sub-strategic” nuclear warheads, including for air defense, BMD, and ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore naval missions, many of which it deemed critical to compensate for its conventional weakness relative to NATO. Definitional differences within the Alliance, notably over French ASMP air launched missiles (which France considers strategic), and different methods of counting weapons, further complicated matters. Moreover, the categories might have very little relevance to other nuclear states such as India, Pakistan or China.

A number of participants therefore called for doing away with the “Strategic/Non-Strategic” definition altogether, citing it as “outdated” Cold War thinking. Nuclear weapons would always have a strategic impact if used, irrespective of means of delivery, distance traveled, or yield. Traditional distinctions, it was argued, would thus actually impede work towards a more flexible and holistic modern approach, which could better facilitate wider multilateral reductions of nuclear weapons. There was consequently ample conceptual room, and some urgency, for a “bottom-up” set of definitions to be elaborated.
Nevertheless, many participants emphasised that lack of precise consensus definition need not and should not prevent progress on TCBMs. Some argued that, for NSNWs “fuzzy was good enough” when developing initial TCBMs, though it would not suffice for negotiating reductions. NATO and Russia would not have to be completely clear about all the systems they had in mind to enter a process for agreeing TCBMs. Such an approach would allow for some flexibility and could make it easier to provide comparably “fuzzy” (e.g. “0 to 200”) initial numerical data. Once a process had been initiated, NATO and Russia could become more specific about further types of weapon systems to be included, by progressive discussion that would expand the number of categories by “inclusion and accretion.” If the process moved beyond TCBMs towards reductions, it would be possible—and necessary—to introduce improved definitions, and additional, or more precise, categories.

The Role of NSNWs in Nuclear Doctrines

It was widely accepted by most participants that lack of clarity about the intended uses of certain NSNW systems continued to fuel suspicion and worst-case assumptions. Doctrinal discussions therefore seemed both desirable and relatively uncomplicated. The NATO-Russia Council had recently conducted a seminar on doctrines, and more are planned. Such discussions could build habits of cooperation among senior military staffs. It might be particularly useful to discuss linkage between TCBMs and implementation of doctrines. Several participants argued that there should be more transparency about the doctrines which would govern the use of NSNWs, before beginning to speak about numbers. Discussions of doctrine could also usefully focus on its exemplification in exercises involving simulated use of NSNWs.

Still, it was pointed out that the value of such a dialogue for both NATO and the Russian Federation should not be overestimated. Discussions on the topic of doctrines might very well be conducted with politicised declaratory language, giving little indication of deployments, capabilities, foreseeable operational red lines or strategic or non-strategic targets. Attempts to pin down the difference between NATO’s notion of “restoring deterrence” and Russia’s “de-escalation,” for example, are unlikely to be rapidly rewarding. In addition, nuclear strategies, postures, and implied numbers might well involve elements of bluff and reassurance which no side would wish to reveal. Moreover, one Russian participant suggested that doctrines, even though secret, might not in any case be very interesting and were likely to be written in a carefully unrevealing way.

One participant noted that Russia is rarely specific on nuclear weapons, and gives only general statements, so that information and transparency provided is understandably limited. He added that Russia sees NSNWs as a means to counter not only NATO, but also Chinese conventional superiority—and its concerns over China would be particularly difficult to reveal. Another participant pointed out that NATO did not enjoy a unified doctrinally coherent approach to its own NSNWs.

Overall, detailed discussion indicated a number of reasons why participants believed that, although the idea of initiating discussions over doctrine remained attractive, the actual contribution which they might make to trust building might be rather limited, at least in current political circumstances. There was a general recognition that joint work on TCBMs might have to be conducted without improved NATO-Russia understanding about doctrines.

Potential Transparency, Confidence Building and Verification Measures for NSNWs

Relative Incentives

Few participants disagreed that the case for each individual potential TCBM would have to be separately addressed by NATO and the Russian Federation. Questions would inevitably
include feasibility, overall purpose and relative impact on each side. TCBMs could also in turn be considered for consistency within different possible packages of proposals, which could be fine-tuned to achieve reciprocity. There were lessons which could be learnt from previous arms-control verification and transparency initiatives, especially the START Treaties (factoring in delivery platforms and uploads), from the U.S./Russian lab-to-lab experience during the 1990s, and from the Cooperative Threat Reduction programmes, plus the work emerging from the UK-Norway Initiative on the Verification of Nuclear Warhead Disarmament.

Several participants stressed the need to acknowledge that TCBMs in this area were simply not particularly interesting to Russia. It saw little to gain from them, as it is not afraid of the remaining few, politically controversial, American NSNWs based in Europe, while it discerns threats of a far bigger nature (like the weaponisation of space, missile defence and Prompt Global Strike) over which bargaining may eventually be conducted, and for which leverage should be conserved. One participant calculated that the United States had over 4,000 conventional missiles which, he claimed, the RF judged it needed to counterbalance with tactical nuclear weapons. He asserted that the mentality in Russia was “like NATO in the 1950s and 60s,” whereby the RF regards its NSNWs as a crucial counterbalance to grave conventional disparities. One Russian participant pointed to NATO’s own language in which conventional, nuclear and BMD are part of a unified deterrent posture. Several participants argued that Russia did not see information sharing on NSNW as implicitly desirable. Russian strategic culture still put a high-value on secrecy. Russia had no interest in transparency for the sake of transparency: TCBMs would have to advance clearly defined security interests.

Participants discussed what might be put on the table in order to engage Russia over TCBMs in the NSNW category alone. Was there anything Russia might gain in the exchange? What would be the “sweeteners”? Some participants assessed that, if there was movement over BMD and other strategic issues, Russia might possibly move towards agreeing to start a confidence building process. One participant specifically proposed that confidence building measures on BMD could be enacted in parallel to address Russian concerns.

Overall, however, it was widely asserted that, at present, Russia sees little need to engage with the United States or NATO on the issue of NSNWs. It was stated, by a Russian participant, that Russia would see only costs and not benefits from TCBMs. Others pointed out the political difficulty and improbability of Russia changing its attitude and appearing to warm towards NATO. The overall NSNW numerical picture was more or less clear for Russia, which was aware of its advantage. Accordingly, the current Russian policy on NSNW numbers and deployments is one of opacity. If the RF chooses to engage on NSNWs at all, it could be to reassure Russian neighbors that there is no issue for concern for them.

Discussion brought out two areas in which participants thought Russia might have an interest in greater transparency:

- **Sea-launched cruise missiles.** There are Russian suspicions that the U.S. still deploys nuclear-armed SLCMs on surface ships, and in NATO that Russia still deploys them on submarines, and might be developing a new system.

- **Location of NSNWs.** There are concerns in Russia that NSNWs could be returned to storage sites where the handling infrastructure had not been dismantled or that they could even be emplaced in new states (e.g. in the Baltic area under the guise of Air Policing); NATO was concerned that Russia has not fully implemented the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, especially regarding nuclear warheads for tactical missiles, which may be deployed close to NATO territory.

**TCBM Options and Possibilities**

A wide menu of specific proposals were mentioned and debated:

**Declaratory Postures**

- NATO could reaffirm and strengthen its “Three No-s” statement from the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 (No Alliance intention, no need, and no plans to deploy
nuclear weapons in the territories of the newer members), possibly in exchange for
new Russian assurances, perhaps concerning restraint in Kaliningrad.

– NATO, the U.S., and/or Russia could consider making a pledge not to increase
NSNW numbers.

– NATO could consider discussions with Russia about new European security
architecture which might contribute to solving the stalemate over NSNWs.

Data Exchanges

– Participants emphasised the desirability of providing historical data/information
about numbers of NSNWs, which was seen as less difficult than providing current
data/information.

– One participant argued that historical accounting could reveal very sharp and
encouraging reductions in NSNW. He pointed to estimates¹ that Russian operational
NSNWs had in fact fallen from about 8000 in 1991, to 2000 in 2005, and were now
around 1000, while total Russian NSNWs, including those in reserve, had similarly
dropped over the same years from 13,000, to 3,300, to about 1900 today. This
pattern, if confirmed, would largely parallel similar reductions in U.S. holdings.
Mutual transparency could therefore help remove fears of a huge opaque Russian
arsenal confronting an aggressively modernising American NSNW force.

– More difficult, but still, some argued, potentially feasible, would be providing
information about the PNIs and how they had been implemented.

– Some suggested that seeking assurances from the Russia that it was still committed to
the PNIs would be a good starting point for improved cooperation. If such
a commitment was forthcoming, parties could seek to define a set of parameters for
data exchanges, perhaps by declaring historical numbers of NSNWs before the PNIs.

– Declarations of historical data could be compared with intelligence assessments to
assess PNI implementation. It was pointed out, however, that apparent disparities
could increase mistrust (although this risk is inherent in all arms control).

– As part of the assessment of current underlying realities against PNI commitments, it
was judged helpful by one participant to seek specific reassurance from the Russian
government about whether it was undertaking, or contemplating, reintroduction of
nuclear weapons onto its ground based army units—shorter range missiles or artillery.

– Declaration of nuclear storage facilities.

– Disclosure of the locations where deactivated weapons had been moved.

– Definition of centralized storage facilities and, more problematically, providing
information about NSNW numbers stored there.

– Discussions and information exchanges about levels and indicators of operational
readiness.

– Declarations of existing NSNW weapons platforms.

– A final, radical, approach would be to decide from the outset to address all warheads
(e.g. with complete and comprehensive data exchanges) thus simplifying definitions
significantly.

¹ Igor Sutyagin, “Atomic Accounting: A New Estimate of Russia’s Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces “,
1211_OP_Atomic_Accounting_Web_updated.pdf. A Russian participant later expressed strong doubts
about Sutyagin’s numerical assumptions.
Rebasing

- The possibility of withdrawing American and Russian NSNWs from “forward bases to “centralised storage” was referred to several times. Various participants pointed out the geopolitical implications of this suggestion. The U.S. weapons would, as a practical result, need to be withdrawn entirely to the Continental United States, which Russia has repeatedly insisted is the precondition for any negotiations over NSNWs.

Verification

- Verification would be the most difficult, and therefore probably the last, part of a confidence building process. Some suggested that it might be best approached by developing criteria for exchanges of information which could lead to non-intrusive verification measures.
- Other participants stressed the importance of verifying all nuclear weapons categories, both those classified as strategic and as non-strategic. A major predictable problem here would be distinguishing strategic from non-strategic weapons when non-deployed. Providing specific signatures for each type of nuclear warhead would be difficult. It is not done for strategic warheads; could it be possible for non-strategic ones?

Verification Experiments/Visits and Inspections

- NATO-Russia work could benefit from the experience and lessons learned from the UK-Norway Initiative on the Verification of Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement, especially over the specific set of legal and technical problems which might be connected with the participation of non-nuclear states in a verification regime.
- Reciprocal inspections (or visits) could be arranged to storage areas from which TNWs had been withdrawn to centralised storage facilities (and should therefore be empty). It was stated that this would be much simpler than visiting active storage areas; would be helpful for assessing implementation of PNIs; and could involve a larger group of NATO states, especially Germany. Others judged this would require the exchange of sensitive information, and would thus be best done bilaterally, but could be the foundation for further cooperation.
- Allowing visits to some active storage sites could be more difficult for site security, strategic and political reasons.
- Further work could focus on developing techniques for counting warheads. There was reference to an existing public proposal that, to this end, the United States and Russia could, on a reciprocal basis, invite the other to one active storage facility or magazine to try to count warheads, using whatever security precautions the host state chose.²

Other related TCBMs

- According to one participant, there would be an advantage in putting particular emphasis on discussing naval nuclear weapons as a subject in itself, in order to understand their operational purposes.
- Further joint exercises for incidents involving nuclear weapons were also proposed as a desirable and perhaps relatively politically feasible activity (Nuclear terrorism is already a part of the NATO-Russia Council dialogue).

– It was suggested that NATO might offer TCBMs on missile defence as an inducement for Russia to agree them for NSNWs.

Early Priority Options for TCBMs

Several participants argued that early attention should be specifically directed to weapon systems where parity between NATO and Russia might be found, or where it might be relatively easy to find reciprocal solutions involving weapons of particular concern to states. Possible candidates were:

– **B-61s deployed in Europe.** These are clearly central to NATO’s involvement in the issue, and NATO could ask Russia to indicate its equivalent system(s), creating a basis for confidence building and arms control. Such an approach would not obviate the need for definitions since Russia would have to define the difference between tactical and strategic gravity bombs with sufficient specificity to be useful.\(^3\) Moreover, if tactical and strategic gravity bombs are stored in the same storage areas (as seemed likely) there could be major difficulties. Some participants argued that, even if there were no easy answers, a dialogue on these issues would be a good first step.

– **Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA) numbers and capabilities on both sides.** One participant further emphasized the advantages of concentrating on these, because he believed there was probably rough global parity between NATO and Russia. Part of the attraction, he argued, is that this was the area of great operational concern, to both sides, and NSNWs were most obviously significant only if they could be deployed on a delivery system. It was also an area where both sides are likely to be cutting back in future years because of the expense of the systems concerned. Information exchanges could highlight build-downs which were actually occurring, and therefore encourage further mutual reductions.\(^4\)

– **Nuclear-tipped sea-launched cruise missiles.** These had been addressed in a side agreement to START I, providing a precedent, including relevant definitions, and there had been indications of Russian concerns that U.S. SLCMs had not been reliably retired.

– **Non-deployed warheads.** Since almost all—if not all—TNWs are non-deployed, one possible focus would be all non-deployed warheads (both tactical and strategic).

– **Warheads awaiting dismantlement.** There were many thousands of both strategic and non-strategic warheads in this category, and they are less sensitive than warheads in the active stockpile. Focusing on warheads awaiting dismantlement could avoid the need to distinguish between tactical and strategic warheads.

Information Issues: Protection, Dissemination and Leakage of TCBM data

Participants disagreed over whether TCBM data should be made public or should be exchanged through classified NATO-Russia channels. Some doubted that such information could be kept confidential to NATO-Russia channels; others thought there were ways to do so.

\(^3\) For comparison, it was pointed out that the United States has both strategic and tactical variants of the B-61. It would probably be very hard for the United States to develop a definition, suitable for arms control or confidence building, capable of distinguishing between these variants. In practice, this problem is largely theoretical (at least in the European context) since only tactical B-61s are deployed in Europe. Nonetheless, this example illustrates the challenges faced by Russia.

\(^4\) Part of improved transparency over these aircraft could be further information over Russian arrangements to verify the absence of nuclear weapon capability on their SU-24 Fencers deployed on Ukrainian territory. The participant had been told of twice-yearly inspections to demonstrate that nuclear avionics had been removed from these Russian forward-deployed aircraft. A Russian participant was sceptical about the possibility of Ukrainian access to Russian nuclear capable systems.
Arguments in favour of public declarations and statements—showing historic reductions and current numbers of NATO and Russia’s NSNWs would demonstrate how the numbers had drastically decreased. This could demonstrate commitment to NPT process, especially if accompanied with no-increase commitment.

For some, any exchange of information between NATO and Russia ought also to be arranged as an integral part of the exchange of data that is expected between P5 countries before the 2015 NPT Review Conference. This would demonstrate common commitment to NPT obligations. Conversely, it was imaginable that information shared between the P5 could be brought into the NRC as a nuclear TCBM, and that the NRC could work on additional data from the 2015 Review Conference. Possibilities for this kind for cross-fertilisation ought not to be ignored.

Concerns were expressed about the political acceptability of giving out public (or even easily leakable) information about exact locations and numbers of NSNW in individual European states. Some feared also a paradoxical problem with revealing numbers, where information exchange might actually impede further reductions, because of domestic political considerations and governments’ desire to look tough on security.

First Procedural Steps: A Joint TCBM Cost Benefit Matrix

Responding to the potentially unmanageable number of potential TCBMs, a French participant made a pragmatic proposal for a decision process which could help matters move ahead by creating a joint TCBM cost benefit matrix. This would allow analysis of each possible TCBM against key criteria (e.g. relative contribution to security, stability and trust building; impact on deterrence/ survivability of NSNW and on arms control; ease of gaining acceptance; implementation costs; peace-time training complexities; other politico-military considerations).

As a practical measure, it was suggested that the development of such a matrix could serve as a goal for a Second Warsaw NSNW Workshop, for a NRC Working Group, or for Track 2 conferences. In such further deliberations, two teams—one from NATO states and one Russian—would be tasked to develop a matrix which could be used to help analyze specific TCBMs against several criteria. Each side would develop two matrices—one reflecting its own priorities and another assessing what it believed the other side’s priorities to be. The matrices would then be exchanged between the sides and discussed, with the goal of comparing them, to identify and understand differences in views, examine areas of agreement, and develop policy recommendations for pursuing common interests.

The Wider Political and Strategic Contexts Surrounding Confidence Building for NSNWs

Some participants stressed a double context to the NSNW problem. In Europe, it was argued, much of the impetus to address NSNWs arises from the domestic political discomfort of basing and modernising B-61s. Between the U.S. and Russia, it is part of a complex conversation about the strategic future of new technologies, stability and deterrence. The discrepancy between the two themes causes frustration and it would be very desirable to narrow the gap in discourse. An American participant agreed that the problem needed to be worked from two directions and that the U.S. was trying to do so, supported by NATO allies.

Several participants emphasised the need for discussions over strategic stability to move beyond issues of purely nuclear balance, and take account of emerging technologies which would dominate the 21st century. One Russian expert stated that role of NSNWs was particularly difficult to assess because new classifications and conceptual models were needed to cover the impact of strategic nuclear weapons, NSNWs, BMD, Prompt Global Strike, precision conventional munitions, and cyber capabilities.
Another Russian expert argued, however, that the real reason for the deadlock was an outmoded Cold War concept of strategic stability. New principles were needed, capable of producing composite bargains. Until this has been re-thought, progress would be difficult and perhaps impossible. Many participants referred to New START as a welcome exception to the deadlock in arms control, but it was questionable whether any follow-up process could ignore other dimensions of the strategic relationship with Russia.

The importance of the missile defence issue was again highlighted. Russia doubts that the ABM Treaty could be revived, judges that any successor Treaty would have to be multilateral because of the spread of BMD technology, but believes that interceptor numbers would have to be severely limited in each state if nuclear warhead holdings were significantly to decline.

In relation to those major global questions, efforts to agree on TCBMs for NSNWs needed to be thought through carefully to determine what were the real problems for which they were being offered as solutions: numerical opacity, uncertain doctrines, deadlocked arms control process, or wider strategic instabilities? Diagnosis of such basic questions of purpose should be a key dimension of any TCBM cost benefit matrix, and also influence the prioritization of particular TCBMs.

While many participants judged it would be unhelpful to create direct linkages between different elements of the wider agenda, the following additional questions would need to be carefully considered:

- Should the aim be a political or legal arrangement for NSNWs? (Russian participants generally favoured an early treaty completion. NATO participants usually argued that quicker progress could be made on TCBMs without formal legal arrangements.)
- Could there be an arms control and verification regime over NSNWs in Europe without a new conventional arms control regime, assuming that CFE was dead? (Some participants argued that there was no direct link between NSNW and conventional arms control.)
- How much, and what sort of the UK and French involvement could be expected, and at which stages, in the process?

One participant wished to re-emphasise that any decision to look at NSNW in the NRC in order to introduce TCBMs would be intrinsically globally strategic. It should therefore be embedded in a wider perspective, intended to maximise NATO and Russian credibility in non-proliferation efforts, and extending to the requirements of nuclear transparency on other continents and with emerging nuclear powers, such as China, India and Pakistan, and perhaps even the DPRK. Careful consideration should be given to these wider implications in preparing for discussion in the NRC. Work towards TCBMs needed to be coherent, and, ideally, create a common platform, assisting data exchange among the P5 and strengthening the credibility of the NPT.

Reflecting on the concluding discussion, another European participant agreed strongly with the importance of studying and debating future interactions between nuclear weapons and new conventional military technologies, which Russian participants had so frequently referred to.

He added that he also agreed on the importance of thinking through the real purposes of trust building and confidence building over NSNWs. Two concepts seem to exist in partial competition. The first was traditional and military-operational: to reduce incentives for preventive, pre-emptive or surprise attack. Nuclear weapons in themselves massively diminished such concerns, though issues of first strike capability were the rationale for ABM Treaty, and helped explain why Russia wanted it back.

But this consideration was not at the heart of the demand for confidence building over NSNWs. On the NATO side there was profound scepticism about whether these weapons have any operational role in Europe. Alliance politicians had not continued their support of these weapons because of sophisticated arguments about escalation dominance and pre-strategic strikes. The role of NSNWs was now much more about the internal politics of burden-sharing,
alliance solidarity and the symbolic importance of extended deterrence in Allied countries. If these weapons were not in Europe, there would be little pressure to reintroduce them. But in the current situation, the DDPR had shown a determination of Allies to continue that form of Atlantic solidarity and not risk its erosion.

The reason why NATO members wanted confidence building in this area, as demonstrated by the Warsaw event and many others, was more about a second concept of confidence building: a contribution to reassurance about wider strategic intent, meant to transform rather than simply manage an essentially confrontational relationship with Russia.

NSNW confidence building could not, of course, achieve this by itself. But it could contribute to that end, alongside measures in other political and military fields. If, therefore, the purpose of confidence building over NSNWs is to form a part of a wider political rapprochement, it would become important to consider some of the broader political implications. How might TCBMs in this area assist common NATO and Russian interests in strengthening the NPT in relation to Iran and the DPRK, and in moving towards mutual arms restraint with China, and indeed other nuclear armed states like Pakistan and India?

In this context, Russia could usefully duplicate the one-off U.S. statement on total national nuclear numbers. UK and France had already done so. If Russia were to follow, it would strengthen those in U.S. who had been vilified for providing information which was not reciprocated. It would also put pressure on China, which was hiding behind the U.S. on CTBT and behind Russia on transparency. Moral pressure could be taken further by other Nuclear Weapons States providing more disaggregated information in the P5/NPT context. This, rather than the NATO/Russia field, was where the nuclear forces of the UK and France might become included in data exchange.

NSNWs issue could be a “tester” for broader questions. If so, the attention to NSNWs and TCBMs which had led to this conference, and which indeed NATO had given in the DDPR, could be well justified. However, a Russian participant questioned whether China, which was not party to any nuclear arms control agreements, would in fact be incentivized in this way, and whether Russia would wish to be seen as pressing her.

**Conclusion and Summing Up**

In the concluding plenary session, it was repeatedly conceded that discussion had once again demonstrated the complexities, wider interactions, and asymmetries of interest which overhung the subject. Participants also emphasised that the proceedings had indicated the strength of the arguments for continued attempts at confidence building in this field. Intensive discussions had identified sufficiently encouraging new TCBM options, and suggested new mechanisms for analysing, appraising and prioritising them. Many participants therefore agreed—and no one disagreed—that further efforts would be worthwhile for study and joint elaboration of possible TCBMs for NSNWs.
Working Papers Submitted for the Workshop

1. Jacek Durkalec, NSNW Transparency and Confidence Building: Adapting Concrete Measures to Different Goals
2. Vladimir Dvorkin, The role of Russian tactical nuclear weapons and the problems of their control
4. Alexander S. Kolbin, Russia and NSNWs Reductions: Separating the Wheat from the Chaff
5. Vladimir Kozin, Russian Approach to Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons and Confidence Building Prospects [presentation at the Workshop]
7. Eugene Miasnikov, Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Possible Scope and Conditions for Information Sharing, Transparency Measures and Verification
8. Steven Pifer, Possible scope and Conditions for Information-Sharing and Confidence-Building Measures regarding Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe

The Working Papers are available for downloading on the PISM website: http://www.pism.pl/Events/The-Warsaw-Workshop
The Warsaw Workshop Programme
Prospects for Information Sharing and Confidence Building
on Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe

Workshop Venue
InterContinental Hotel, 49 Emilii Plater Street, Warsaw
7–8 February 2013

PROGRAMME
Language of the workshop: English

7 February (Thursday)

8.45–9.15 Registration and welcome coffee
9.15–10.00 Opening Session
   – Welcoming remarks by Marcin Zaborowski, PISM Director
   – Opening Address by H.E. Bogus³aw Winid, Undersecretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland
   – Opening Address by H.E. Torgeir Larsen, State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway
   – Opening Address by Hon. Rose E. Gottemoeller, Acting Under Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State
10.00–10.45 Plenary Session I: State of the Play
   Moderator: Paal Sigurd Hilde, Head of Centre for Norwegian and European Security, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies
   Introductory remarks:
   – Fred S. Frederickson, Director, Nuclear Policy Directorate, NATO
     NATO’s position on non-strategic nuclear weapons: 2010 Strategic concept, DDPR and the follow-up activities
   – Vladimir Kozin, Leading Researcher, Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, Member, Interagency Working Group on BMD issues with NATO, Presidential Administration
     Russian approach to non-strategic nuclear weapons and confidence building prospects
10.45–11.00 Coffee Break

Break-up into Three Working Groups,
working simultaneously on the same set of topics

11.00–12.30 Working Groups Session: Focus on definitions and doctrines
   – Is there a common understanding of which systems are encompassed by the term Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons?
   – What is the best way to discuss the role NSNW plays in the doctrines of NATO and Russia?
12.30–13.30 Lunch
13.30–15.00 Working Groups Session: Possible scope and conditions for information sharing, transparency measures, and verification
- What are the benefits and costs of greater information sharing regarding non-strategic nuclear forces in Europe?
- What lessons can be learned from previous transparency and verification initiatives?
- Which confidence building and information sharing measures should be the focus of first steps?

15.00–15.15 Coffee Break

15.15–16.45 Working Groups Session: Wider political and strategic context
- How can NSNW transparency and confidence building help advance European security goals?
- What topics related to NSNW based in Europe should NATO and Russia make a priority to better understand each other and promote confidence and security?

19.00 Reception (hosted by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
Venue: Foksal Palace, Foksal Street 6
Keynote speaker: Jacek Bylica, Head, WMD Non-Proliferation Centre, NATO International Staff and Co-Chairman, NATO-Russia Council’s Working Group on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

8 February (Friday)

9.30–11.00 Plenary Session II: Reports from the Working Groups
Moderator: Andrei Zagorski, Professor, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University) of the MFA of Russia (MGIMO); Director, Arms Control and Conflict Resolution Studies, IMEMO RAS, Moscow
- Working Group 1 report
- Working Group 2 report
- Working Group 3 report
Discussion

11.00–11.30 Coffee break

11.30–12.30 Closing Session: Next steps in promoting information sharing and confidence building—assessing the results of the workshop
Moderator: Paul Schulte, Non-Resident Senior Associate, Carnegie Europe and Carnegie Nuclear Policy
Introductory remarks:
- Malcolm Chalmers, Research Director, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
- Sergey Rogov, Director of the Institute for USA and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences
Discussion

12.30–13.30 Lunch

Workshop organized with the support of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Norway and Poland, and participation of the U.S. State Department
Note on the Authors

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Before joining PISM, Jacek Durkalec was a specialist at the Missile Defence Office at the Polish Ministry of National Defence from February 2009 to June 2010. He is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

Paal Sigurd Hilde is Associate Professor and Head of Section for Norwegian Security Policy at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies (IFS). His research interests include Norwegian security and defense policy, NATO, the High North (the Barents region and international relations in Arctic Europe), Russia and Central Europe.


Łukasz Kulesa is the Head of the Non-proliferation and Arms Control Project at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM). From 2003 he has been involved with the issues of international security at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, focusing on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, proliferation crises (North Korea, Iran), perspectives for nuclear disarmament, nuclear and conventional deterrence, the role of missile defence, and the future of arms control system.

In the years 2010–2012, he was working as Deputy Director of the Strategic Analyses Department at the National Security Bureau, a body providing support to the President of the Republic of Poland on security and defence issues.

Paul Schulte is a Nonresident Senior Associate in the Carnegie Nuclear Policy Program and at Carnegie Europe. His research focuses on the future of deterrence, nuclear strategy, nuclear nonproliferation, cyber security, and their political implications.

He is also a senior visiting fellow at the Center for Defense Studies at King's College, University of London, and at the Defense Academy of the United Kingdom. He is a research associate at the Center for International Studies and Diplomacy at the School of Oriental and African Studies. Previously, Paul Schulte held a number of positions in the UK government, and worked within the Coalition Provisional Authority for Iraq.

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Warsaw
April 2013

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