NATO Member States and the New Strategic Concept: An Overview

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Introduction

The North Atlantic Alliance has begun works on its new strategic concept. The document presently in force was adopted during the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 1999, on the 50th anniversary of the Washington Treaty. As the years went by, the majority of NATO members realised that it no longer fully reflected the strategic context in which the Alliance has to operate. During the past decade, NATO’s geo-strategic situation has changed fundamentally. Important changes have also taken place within the Alliance itself – the number of its members has increased by one third, a process of military transformation has been initiated and the Alliance embarked on its first mission beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. Profound transformations have also affected NATO’s direct proximity and its more distant perimeter, where the Allies have had to face threats of a new order – terrorism (in all its forms), instability caused by failed or failing states, risks attributable to climate change and problems related to energy security. More traditional threats and challenges to the security of NATO members, having to do with the activities of non-NATO states (Russia is one example in this context), or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other military technologies have not entirely disappeared but, quite to the contrary, have even become more acute in the last few years.

All these phenomena and processes have affected, albeit to a varying degree, a plethora of initiatives undertaken by NATO in the last few years. Despite this, until previous year, the Allies were reluctant to launch a serious debate about the revision or update of the strategic concept, even though many of them had expressed reservations or even dissatisfaction at the manner in which NATO was functioning and the directions in which it was evolving. The greatest obstacle was the increasing awareness among the Allies of the growing differences between the way they perceived threats to security and desirable ways and means to respond to them. The term in office of G.W. Bush was a particularly inconvenient time to initiate a discussion of key significance for NATO, since his policies (the intervention in Iraq, the manner in which the Afghan operation was conducted, the pushing for a missile defense project in a form that gave rise to serious reservations among some NATO members) and vision of the future and of NATO’s role in the world caused enormous controversies among the Allies and deepened the political divisions between them. Commencing a debate on the concept in such unfavorable circumstances could have increased the risk of further divisions and contributed to a further weakening of the Alliance. Thus the Allies deliberately postponed the debate.

Present political situation in and around the Alliance – following the easing of the internal tensions that had persisted since the invasion of Iraq, and especially after Barack Obama’s administration took over in Washington and since France returned to NATO’s integrated military structures – is more conducive to reaching a compromise on the most pressing problems the North Atlantic Alliance presently has to face, even if it is still not free of tensions and disputes (especially about NATO’s presence in Afghanistan). The mere fact that NATO member states decided to initiate this debate is a sign that they see greater chances of reaching a consensus on key issues than in previous years. They are nevertheless conscious that the process leading to it will require extraordinary efforts on their part in addition to political good will. For this reason, it is quite possible that the Allies took this decision more out of fear of the consequences that further postponements of the discussion about NATO’s future would entail than out of any
conviction about the similarity of their positions. Nonetheless, the political climate in US – European relations has improved fundamentally. As is shown by the 2009 edition of Transatlantic Trends, most NATO members continue to see the Alliance as the most important framework for the pursuit of trans-Atlantic relations. This makes it possible to presume that one of the most important preconditions for the success of the new strategic concept debate, i.e., the desire to maintain the Alliance as the principal organization through which its members can pursue their security interests, has been met.

The primary aim of the present report is to define the positions of NATO members with respect to the most important issues that are likely to be discussed in the debate on the new strategic concept. These include issues such as the hierarchy of NATO’s tasks and the future importance of threats and challenges of a non-military nature to its activities; the extent and nature of military and internal transformations; the issue of further NATO enlargement; and questions having to do with the Alliance’s relations with partners and states outside the organization as well as with the most important international organizations. It is also possible that the topics which only a part of the members see as worth discussing and taking into account in the Alliance’s future strategic concept will prove truly important. Such issues include NATO’s role in arms control and disarmament, its activities in the Arctic or questions of public information policy. In principle, the discussion on all these subjects has already begun, although for the time being, it has concentrated within an independent expert body, a 12-member Group of Experts headed by former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. This team has submitted its recommendations about the new strategic concept to the NATO Secretary General in May 2010. During further consultations at the North Atlantic Council and in bilateral contacts, the Secretary General will frame a more detailed draft of the document on the basis of these recommendations. Ultimately, the new concept has to be accepted by the Alliance’s member states. It has already been decided that this should take place at the earliest NATO summit meeting in Portugal in late 2010. In this manner, member states will retain the possibility of modifying the text until the very end of its formulation process. This points to the importance of identifying and analyzing their views on key aspects of the new concept, despite the relatively modest progress that has been made in drawing up this document. A detailed examination of the position of all allies will make it possible not only to identify the issues that are likely to be most controversial, but also to illustrate how the attitude of individual members may evolve and, above all, to point to potential informal coalitions and groups of proponents of different approaches during the course of the debate on the NATO strategic concept.

In order to identify the positions of individual NATO member states, the authors of this report have examined a wide range of sources. First of all, they examined the declarations made by individual governments (especially pronouncements made on various occasions by heads of government, and by foreign affairs and defense ministers), national security and defense strategies as well as other official documents. In many cases, identifying the position a given country was most likely to present during the debate was fraught with difficulties. So far only few countries have undertaken a serious and coordinated debate on this subject, thus leading to clear formulation of positions in a given matter. For this reason, interviews conducted by the authors with representatives of the state administration from countries being examined as well as of expert community (universities, research institutes and think-tanks) have played an enormous role in the preparation of this report. Each chapter holds statistical data

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concerning the size of the defense budget and the armed forces in NATO member countries. Unless stated otherwise, they are taken from the 2009 edition of the *Military Balance*.

Even a brief examination of the gathered material makes it possible to presume that the formulation of a new concept will most certainly be a difficult and lengthy process. What validates this observation is the scale of the differences between members’ positions on a number of fundamental issues, especially with respect to NATO’s actual mandate and to the catalogue and hierarchy of its basic tasks. Although some of the countries have a rather clear idea of what the aim of NATO’s activities and the shape of the organization in the nearest future should be, none of them have yet presented a comprehensive vision that would be attractive enough to increase the likelihood that all members would accept it. It seems unlikely for any member, including the United States, the most powerful and influential of them, to present such a project and secure its general acceptance. The analysis also confirms that the principal subjects in dispute and under discussion will be issues that have been pointed to on many occasions. The agenda will thus feature the hierarchy of NATO tasks, including the possible confirmation of the Alliance’s traditional functions in the area of collective security; the scope and nature of NATO’s out-of-area engagements; the degree to which NATO will address the problem of non-military threats such as climate change, demographic trends and energy security; relations with Russia and the issue of NATO’s further enlargement; and cooperation with the EU and outside partners. Differences about these very problems regarding the new strategic concept quite clearly marked out the main cleavages between the allies. On that account, it is possible to single out three main groups among NATO members.

The first of these are the **globalists** – countries that wish, above all, for NATO to become more involved in assuring international stability on a global scale and for the Alliance to assume increasing responsibilities in that respect. To be sure, they do not question the need to maintain the high priority of the Alliance’s original collective security tasks. Yet given the small probability of aggression in the traditional sense against member states, the globalists argue that NATO should focus on its ability to shape the international order and to prevent the emergence of threats to its members’ security, both in the immediate vicinity of the treaty area and in more distant areas. By doing so, they are calling for a continued intensive growth of the relevant Alliance’s capabilities, especially its expeditionary potential. The globalist position is relatively close to that of the United States, Great Britain and Canada, as well as some Western European countries such as Denmark and, to a certain degree, the Netherlands.

In a sense, the views of the globalists are counterweighted by the **Article 5 coalition**. It is a group of countries advocating a real, as opposed to a formal (declarative), primacy of NATO’s chief task, i.e. the ability to provide for defense of the treaty area. Still, the Article 5 coalition is not opposed to developing the Alliance’s capabilities in the sphere of international stabilization. A positive role that NATO can play in enhancing global stability and security is not questioned either. Adherents to this position stress, however, that the pursuit of these tasks should impinge upon Alliance’s ability to ensure the security of its members themselves, even in a situation when traditional threats to their territory and population are at present relatively slight. Such a view is close, albeit with varying degrees of intensity, to the majority of countries that joined the Alliance after 1990, especially Poland and the Baltic States. At the same time
it is not very remote from the thinking of some of the older member states such as Norway and Turkey.

Lastly, the third group of member states, whose final stance could turn out to be decisive for the ultimate shape of the new strategic concept, is made up of the passive, the undecided and the silent. This group includes countries which, for various reasons show relatively little interest in both the debate on the new strategic concept itself and the actions taken by NATO, as well as the directions in which it evolves. These countries largely view their situation – in terms of traditional military threats – as favorable and are as a rule more inclined to concentrate on their particular security interests. They do not necessarily view NATO as the sole – or even the principal – instrument by which these needs are satisfied. More than the other Allies, they are interested in limiting the costs (both material and non-material) that NATO membership entails. This attitude characterizes the countries of the Alliance’s “Southern Flank” i.e., Portugal, Spain, Greece or Italy. In principle, this group also includes countries such as Germany, which are trying to reconcile the programs of the globalists and the traditionalists while at the same time opposing an excessive increase of expenditure that could be generated by the Alliance’s activities. Countries of this group do not seem inclined to block decisions about the future NATO strategy (unless their particular interests are threatened), but will most probably tend to accept the position that is, in their view, the least costly in political and financial terms.

The ultimate shape of the new strategic concept, however difficult it is to foretell it at this stage, will probably emerge out of the discussion between these informal groups. Clearly, changes of position are possible during the debate. Similarly, as the debate unfolds, a new camp within NATO could emerge, one seeking an intermediate solution between the visions of the globalists and of the Article 5 coalition. Hence, drafting of the new strategic concept promises to be a stormy and intensive process. It can’t be ruled out that once achieved, the ultimate compromise will not fully satisfy neither of the Allies. This could mean that it will be a document of a very general character, formulated using a relatively vague language and allowing for various interpretations of both its spirit and individual provisions. In such a situation, the discussion about the strategic directions of NATO’s evolution and its tasks will be continued during the process of the formulation of additional documents related to the strategic concept, such as contingency plans or programs for the development of the Allies’ armed forces. It seems, however, that NATO members are conscious of the importance of the challenge they are facing and of the consequences the Alliance would face in case they failed. This makes it possible to expect that they will strive to overcome existing differences within the Alliance and turn NATO into an even more effective and valuable instrument of their security policies, one that will also reflect their existing community of values.
Albania

Introductory information

The Republic of Albania, along with Croatia, joined the Alliance during the last round of enlargement, which took place on 1 April 2009. The decision to accept Albania into the Alliance was taken a year beforehand, during the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest. Albania is one of the countries where popular support for NATO membership is the highest. At the beginning of 2009, accession to the Alliance was supported by over 90% of citizens. This high level of confidence in NATO arises from Albanians’ most recent history (primarily from their positive view of NATO’s armed intervention in Kosovo in 1999) and the widespread conviction of the existence of a historically based alliance between Albania and the United States. The US role in NATO is seen by the Albanian authorities as unique, a view that is undoubtedly influenced by United States’ contribution to the stabilization of the Balkans and the assistance to nation-building extended to some Balkan countries.¹

In 2008, the Albanian armed forces were 14,300 strong. Defense expenditures that same year amounted to 233 million USD, as compared to 198 million USD the previous year. Albania has the smallest defense budget of any NATO member,² a fact that significantly affects its ability to reform its armed forces. In 2002, aided by the United States, Albania embarked on a 10-year plan to reduce its then 30,000 strong army, to dismantle obsolete weapons and to initiate modernization processes, e.g. the rebuilding of air bases.

Hierarchy of NATO tasks

The character of Albania’s relations with the United States is reflected in Albania’s contributions to NATO stabilization missions. Prior to joining the Alliance, the Albanian army took active part in NATO’s missions in Afghanistan and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Albanian presence in Afghanistan currently stands at 280 soldiers.³ This contingent doubled in size after Albania joined NATO. In this manner, by stressing its pro-active approach to participation in out-of-area missions, Albania wishes to strengthen its position within the Alliance. At the same time, NATO forces have their part in increasing Albania’s security. NATO airplanes patrol Albanian airspace as part of the Air Policing mission until Albania purchases its own fighters.⁴ Albanian authorities also emphasize the importance of NATO membership given the possibility of renewed conflicts in the Western Balkans, especially in Kosovo.

Albania supports expanding the scope of NATO tasks beyond purely military missions. In addition, it supports the Alliance’s participation in the ensuring energy

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¹ Note from the author’s conversation of 18 September 2009 with Sokol Gjoka, Ambassador of the Republic of Albania in Poland, PISM archive.


security and in counteracting new threats, such as cyber-terrorism. Albania also considers it possible for NATO to collaborate in the field of combating organized crime in the Western Balkans, which it views as one of the most important security threats.

Military transformation and internal reforms

Albania is making efforts, proportional to its very modest potential, to take part in the Alliance’s military transformation process, even though the majority of the weapons in its possession are obsolete. Its newer equipment, such as helicopters, has almost entirely been donated by countries such as the United States, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy. Albania’s small defense budget does not allow it to have any significant impact on transformation processes within the Alliance.

An expression of Albania’s desire to strengthen its presence in the Afghan mission and make it more effective is its participation in the so-called helicopter initiative, which already involves the V4 countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), Great Britain, Spain, Norway and Turkey. The initiative entails mutual assistance in the use of Mi-8, Mi-17 and Mi-171 helicopters, pilot training as well as possible partial financing of helicopter related tasks. This will increase the chances of using helicopters for countries that have problems with financing transport in Afghanistan.

Another indication of strong attachment to the Albanian-US alliance was, among other things, the declaration made by Albanian Prime Minister Sali Berisha in February 2009 that should the United States turn to Albania with a request to deploy the anti-missile shield on Albanian territory instead of Poland, Tirana’s response would be positive.5

Enlargement

Albania supports NATO’s open door policy and the efforts to join the Alliance made by “democracies that express such a desire and will be able to take on the responsibilities and obligations inherent in membership”.6 Albania grants its exceptionally strong support to all countries of the Western Balkans aspiring to join the Alliance. This is not only due to Albania’s conviction that the reforms conducted by these countries as part of the process leading to membership have served greater stability and the growth of democracy, but also to its own experience of regional political and economic cooperation.

Albanian authorities believe that Macedonia is well prepared for NATO membership and that the Albanian minority living in that country takes an active part in its political life, including its security policy. In addition, Albania supports the fastest possible admission of Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Alliance. At the same time, it considers that membership for Kosovo will solve this newly emerged country’s stability problems.

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Relations with the European Union

Albania supports cooperation between NATO and the European Union. At the same time, it is calling for the creation of a defense system in Europe based on NATO structures. In Albania’s view, an overlap of tasks in the sphere of European security and defense between NATO and the EU is undesirable. Albania also draws attention to the United States’ changing strategy with regard to Europe.\(^7\)

Conducting a balanced security policy could constitute a certain challenge for Albania in the near future. On the one hand, the country bases its security on a strong alliance with the United States. On the other hand, it seems natural that Albania should support EU security and defense initiatives, given its desire to join the EU.

Relations with Russia and other partners

The government of Albania is supportive of NATO’s cooperation with Russia. It is especially stressed that, since the United States – despite history and frequently divergent interests – are working with Russia, such cooperation should be supported in relation to the entire Alliance.

Albania supports cooperation with other willing partners, provided that such cooperation would serve the interests of the Alliance and would gain the support of member states. Albania speaks favorably about NATO regional cooperation initiatives with third countries, not only in the Balkans but also, for example, as part of the Mediterranean Dialogue.

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\(^7\) Note from the author’s conversation with the Ambassador of the Republic of Albania ..., op. cit.
Belgium

Introductory information

Belgium, one of the founding members of the North Atlantic Alliance, has invariably looked upon this organization as the principal pillar of its national security, as well as of Europe as such. It is reflected in the direction taken by the transformation of the Belgian armed forces. In keeping with NATO recommendations, in the last few years Belgium has placed an emphasis on increasing the ability of its military units to operate beyond the country’s borders (about 60% of Belgium’s 39,000-strong professional army is able to take part in expeditionary operations). NATO’s importance for Belgium is also reflected in its participation in the ISAF mission (with a relatively numerous contingent of about 500 soldiers, recently increased almost two-fold) and by its participation in the Alliance’s nuclear sharing policy. However, Belgium has earmarked only 1.4% of its GDP for defense purposes in 2007, which is lower that the NATO average (about 1.73% in 2007, excluding the United States). These numbers are going to shrink systematically given the country’s budgetary difficulties, thus falling to less than 1% in 2010 (a reduction of the army to 34,000 men by 2012 has also been announced).

At the same time, Belgium is one of the NATO countries that has traditionally been calling for a greater “Europeanization” of the Alliance, i.e., increasing the weight and importance of European allies in relation to the United States. This will no doubt have an important influence on its position with regard to the new strategic concept. Moreover, a permanent element of the Belgian security policy, one by which Brussels decidedly stands by, is the determination to accelerate and tighten European integration in the sphere of defense, i.e., the rapid development of the European security and defense policy. In some circumstances, this could run counter to certain postulates concerning NATO development.

It is worth stressing that, according to Belgium, drawing up the new strategic concept for the North Atlantic Alliance is an opportunity to popularize NATO among the public of its member countries. For this reason, Belgium seems to be inclined toward giving the new strategy a form that would be understandable for the average citizen by using simple language, among other means, to define only the general and most important elements of the Alliance’s strategic concept and to explain clearly the basic aims that led to the founding of the Alliance, the reasons why it takes action and, last but not least, the values and principles that animate it.

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10 Comment made by Pieter De Crem, Belgian Minister of Defense, *Summit 2009*, op. cit.
Hierarchy of NATO tasks

For Belgium, the core of the Alliance is the Washington Treaty’s Article 5 which should, in Belgium’s view, be interpreted in a narrow sense, solely in terms of an obligation for collective defense. Belgium opposed attempts to redefine or widen the interpretation of Article 5, such as in terms of NATO’s obligation to react globally to crises, fearing that this could lead to the dilution and undermining of NATO’s basic function – collective defense. Nonetheless, in principle Belgium does not oppose out-of-area operations and stresses that there is no contradiction between collective defense and such missions. They are, considering the character of contemporary security threats, an appropriate form of defense of the Trans-Atlantic area.

According to Belgium, the strategic concept should rationalize NATO’s approach to out-of-area operations. It should, among other things, precisely define the geographical limits within which the Alliance would be inclined to intervene, establish criteria by which the strategic significance of a given operation for Allied security would be assessed and which would be applied in order to decide whether an operation should be launched or not, as well as forms in which such an operation would be conducted. Another issue in need of clarification is whether NATO should always conduct expeditionary missions on its own or whether it should offer only limited support for actions of local organizations or for UN operations. At the same time, according to Belgium, NATO should not intervene in all out-of-area crises and conflicts unrelated to the security of the Allies. Thus Belgium could be seen as a country that clearly favors stressing the importance of the defense of the treaty area, while pleading for a stricter definition of the conditions in which NATO would embark on out-of-area operations.

Military transformation of the Alliance and internal reforms

Belgium’s position affects its approach to the question of the growth of its military capabilities. Even though it supports the development of such capabilities for the needs of out-of-area operations, it has pointed out that the concept of the NATO Response Force (NRF) should be revised in terms of its size, especially in the light of NATO’s engagement in Kosovo and Afghanistan. At the same time, Belgium stresses that expeditionary capabilities can be very often applied to territorial defense. Thus, there is no contradiction between the development of one and the other. Belgium could, therefore, adopt a skeptical position with regard to calls for the creation of new military capabilities or for the expansion of existing ones to be used solely in expeditionary operations.

Moreover, making the internal functioning of NATO more efficient by way of institutional and administrative reform, both on the civilian and military levels, is important for Belgium, especially in the context of the financial crisis. Upholding the principle of decision-making by consensus in NATO institutions is not a key issue for Belgium.

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11 Unofficial conversation with a Belgian diplomat, September 2009, PISM archive.
12 Unofficial conversation with a Belgian diplomat, September 2009, PISM archive; Statement made by Karel de Gucht [the then Belgian Minister of Internal Affairs] at the NATO Defense College, Rome 1 February 2008.
13 Ibid.
Belgium. In addition, Belgium points to the positive effect that the intensification of intelligence sharing concerning various issues and geographical areas would have for NATO’s efficiency.¹⁴

It should be stressed that Belgium greeted the plans of building elements of the US missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic with reserve, seeing it as a project that would undermine a similar program (ALTBMD), which Belgium supported. For this reason, and despite a lack of official reaction, it can be assumed that Belgium was satisfied with the modification of the US project.

NATO and non-military elements of security

Belgium shows great prudence in the face of calls to extend the Alliance’s portfolio to new types of tasks related to, among other things, energy security, IT security, unfavorable demographic trends, migrations and climate change. Belgium stresses that although the Alliance should debate these problems and attempt to define methods to counteract them, such threats can not form the core of its strategy, since it would entail a departure from NATO’s basic functions.¹⁵ Of course, in specific cases – such as the prevention of piracy, or security of the Arctic maritime routes that is expected to emerge in the near future as a result of climate change – NATO can use its resources for specific action, but only insofar as they are available. In addition, such actions can not weaken NATO’s collective defense capabilities. Therefore, Belgium is one of the countries that are calling for NATO to concentrate on its traditional tasks related to security threats of a mainly military nature.

Enlargement

Regarding NATO enlargement, Belgium calls for prudence, arguing that due consideration should be given to whether the potential admission of new members will strengthen the security of all Allies and to what degree it would involve the Alliance in dormant conflicts and political tensions.¹⁶ For this reason, it would seem that Belgium will either confine itself to present commitments concerning NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine (made at the 2008 Bucharest summit) or not broach the subject at all. On the other hand, it will most probably support any proposal that would strengthen the membership prospects of Western Balkan countries.

Relations with the European Union

Confining the Alliance’s mandate to carry out strictly military tasks is consistent with Belgium’s approach to the question of NATO’s relations with the European Union. Belgium has traditionally called for the strengthening of European integration, including the European (currently Common) Security and Defense Policy - ESDP (CSDP). In keeping with the oft-repeated Belgian position, the development of the CSDP is not and will not be competitive with NATO, as in the sphere of security the EU’s aims are

¹⁴ Comment made by Pieter De Crem, Belgian Minister of Defense, Summit 2009, op. cit.
¹⁵ Ibid.
¹⁶ Ibid.
different than those of the Alliance. Insofar as NATO’s basic function is the defense of member states, that of the CSDP is to undertake comprehensive measures to integrate military and civilian instruments used to stabilize regions engulfed in crisis. According to Belgium, the EU is better equipped to combat new “soft” security threats as it possesses more civilian resources (but also military ones) and is more capable of a flexible approach to the resolution of security threats. Moreover, it seems that there are geographical regions, most notably Africa, in which potential EU stabilization measures would be both more effective and better viewed than analogous NATO operations. Therefore, according to the Belgian position, the development of the CSDP is necessary and of equal importance for NATO. Hence the cooperation between the EU and NATO should be significantly tightened, especially at the operational level, i.e., in situations in which both organizations are conducting parallel stabilization missions in the same area. It is worth noting that, according to Belgium, there is no need for a greater institutionalization of EU-NATO cooperation – something that could prove elusive given the Cyprus problem – to achieve this goal. Thus, Belgium will be one of the Allies calling for a more dynamic development of the CSDP as a complementary instrument with regard to NATO, even is this were to entail a de facto weakening of the Alliance.

Relations with Russia and other partners

For Belgium, the issue of cooperation with Russia is one of the most important problems to be solved. Belgium calls for an open and intensive dialogue with Russia through a effective use of existing institutions (the NATO-Russia Council). In addition, Belgium stresses that the Alliance should not take steps that could be interpreted by Russia as hostile (such as contingency planning for the possibility of Russian aggression). NATO’s policy toward this country cannot be subject to any specific conditions that Russia would have to meet in order to secure Alliance’s cooperation. It should be expected, therefore, that Belgium will not support such initiatives, especially as cooperation between NATO and Russia on a wide range of issues is universally seen as valuable.

Belgium recognizes the benefits of NATO’s cooperation with global partners. However, the formalization of cooperation between the Alliance and Japan or Australia is not a priority for Brussels.

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17 Statement made by Karel de Gucht [the then Belgian Minister of Internal Affairs] at the NATO Defense College, Rome 1 February 2008
18 Unofficial conversation with a Belgian diplomat, September 2009, PISM archive.
Bulgaria

Introductory information

The question of NATO’s new strategic concept is not the main issue for Bulgaria’s political elites. Electoral campaign and the change of government in July 2009, along with a general lack of interest in this topic on the part of the Bulgarian elites and society may serve as explanations of this fact. It is telling that in his January 2009 speech before the Bulgarian parliament entitled “National security in the face of new challenges”, President Georgi Parvanov did not mention NATO. Despite the fact that Bulgaria promoted its own candidate for the post of NATO Secretary General (former Minister of Foreign Affairs Solomon Passy), it does not seem that this country will play a significant role in the formulation of the Alliance’s strategy.

Bulgaria joined NATO in 2004. About 40,000 soldiers serve in its armed forces, which turned professional in 2008. Bulgaria’s defense budget for 2009 amounted to about 1.190 billion lev, which represents about 1.98% of the country’s GDP. There are 507 Bulgarian soldiers serving in NATO expeditionary missions, 460 with the ISAF mission and 47 with KFOR. The percentage of Bulgarians who think the Alliance is a key national security instrument has decreased since their country joined the Alliance in 2004. In 2006, this view was shared by 58% of Bulgarians, a number that has fallen to 54% in 2008 and only 50% in 2009.

Hierarchy of NATO tasks

While recognizing the increased importance of asymmetric threats, Bulgaria draws attention to the risk of the outbreak of traditional conflicts. In this context, Bulgarian authorities point to the Western Balkans and the region of the Black and Caspian seas. This represents a departure from the position of the previous government, which stressed that the role of the Alliance is not only to defend its members but to contribute to peace and stability on a global scale through the development of partnerships and through peace and stabilization operations. This view held that limiting NATO’s role to the defense of its members from traditional threats

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takes the Alliance back to the times of the Cold War and undermines the very purpose of its existence.\textsuperscript{21}

Bulgaria sees participation in NATO operations beyond the treaty area (especially in Afghanistan) as a priority of its defense policy. Bulgaria plans for at least 8\% of its armed forces to be ready for participation in foreign missions, which are seen as the first line of defense of Bulgaria’s national interests – a means to neutralize threats far from the national territory.\textsuperscript{22} The success of the ISAF operation is a pre-condition not only for the internal stability in that country, but also for ongoing confidence in NATO’s ability to respond to new security challenges. Bulgaria will strive to include clauses in the new strategic concept that will guarantee a balanced approach to out-of-area and territorial defense missions.

NATO and non-military aspects of security

Bulgaria does not underestimate threats of a new type, especially cyber-terrorism and phenomena affecting energy security. It draws attention to the need to guarantee uninterrupted supplies of energy resources in cooperation with EU and NATO partners. The former government, headed by Prime Minister Sergei Stanishev, while aware of the relation between energy and national security, ascribed secondary importance to NATO’s role in ensuring energy security. It appreciated the “added value” that the Alliance could contribute through intelligence-based analysis of threats. On the other hand, the importance of threats to security that could arise from climate change, especially in developing countries, as well as terrorist attacks on energy infrastructure, was emphasized as well. Therefore NATO’s competences with respect to energy security were limited to the physical protection of energy infrastructure. The diversification of supplies was seen as a responsibility for the EU. It seems that this position has not changed significantly. It is worth noting that President Parvanov sees no particular role for NATO in the sphere of energy security.\textsuperscript{23}

Military transformation and internal reforms

As a coastal state, Bulgaria attaches great importance to participating in such NATO programs as the protection of ports and the development of maritime control and management systems. It also supports the development of Allied infrastructure on


\textsuperscript{22} Актуализиран план ..., Н. Младенов, Актualните предизвикателства ..., op. cit.

members’ territory. An absolute priority for Bulgaria is to increase the interoperability and compatibility of the armed forces of the Allies. Obstacles to this include problems with the modernization of Bulgaria’s armed forces, which could possibly lead to undermining Bulgaria’s credibility as an ally. The delays in the implementation of the program to acquire a multi-purpose fighter plane to replace the Soviet-vintage MiG 29s are a case in point.

At the Bucharest summit, Bulgaria expressed the desire to join the NATO missile defense system. In June 2007, the then minister of defense Veselin Bliznakov made the reservation that the creation of a missile defense system has to be consistent with the principle of indivisibility of the security of all members and should be accompanied by open dialogue with Russia. At the beginning of 2010, preliminary consultations were conducted between Bulgaria and the US on the possibility of hosting elements of the new US missile defense system, which caused Russia’s criticism. However, formal negotiations on the issue have not been commenced.

Former defense minister Boyko Noev saw the desirability of maintaining the consensus principle in NATO decision making as an issue worthy of consideration and called for its maintenance only in matters of strategic importance. On the other hand there is a fear that maintaining the consensus principle only at the North Atlantic Council and in the NATO Military Committee will practically reduce to zero the significance of smaller countries, including Bulgaria.24

Enlargement

Bulgaria sees the process of NATO enlargement as a fundamental aspect of its political transformation. It is consistently supportive of the Alliance’s open door policy. The prospect of European and Euro-Atlantic integration constitutes, according to Bulgaria, the strongest guarantee of the emergence of stability, security and prosperity in the region. Bulgaria decidedly supports the accession of Western Balkan countries, including Macedonia, to NATO. According to Bulgaria, Greece’s opposition can only be overcome on a regional level. Bulgaria also favors the growth of cooperation between NATO and Ukraine and Georgia, whose Euro-Atlantic aspirations it unequivocally supports.25 It is ready to provide those countries, as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan, with technical assistance and consulting on their way to NATO.

Relations with the European Union

Bulgaria recognizes that the reinforcement of the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO, as well as the intensification of the trans-Atlantic dialogue is of fundamental importance for the increase of the Alliance’s capabilities and for its members’ security and stability. The present state of affairs is seen as very unsatisfactory and calls for a deepening and strengthening of mutual relations. This will be one of the

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priorities of the new Bulgarian government. The capabilities of NATO and EU are complementary in the military domain as well as with respect to stability and reconstruction operations. NATO’s future and the EU’s obligations in Kosovo and Afghanistan require further expansion of the existing cooperation framework – something that should be reflected in the new NATO strategic concept.

Relations with Russia

Bulgaria is a proponent of cooperation – including military cooperation – between NATO and Russia, seeing in it a fundamental element of security in the Euro-Atlantic region. Such cooperation should include political dialogue, as well as practical cooperation based on common benefits. According to the Bulgarian government, the main areas of cooperation between the Alliance and Russia are fighting terrorism and piracy, transit of supplies to Afghanistan and the fight against the drug trade, the future of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), questions of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disarmament and energy security.

Partnerships

In terms of developing partnerships with non-NATO countries, Bulgaria holds the view that such partnerships should rest on principles of equilibrium, pragmatism and flexibility, and take both a geographical and functional approach. Bulgaria sees as desirable the use of instruments available within the framework of the Partnership for Peace program, both in relations with partner and “contact” countries, primarily participating in NATO operations. Bulgaria decidedly supported involving Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Partnership for Peace program. Further, it advocated launching an intensive dialogue with the two latter countries. It also supports the development of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative as an important contribution to the building of regional security and stabilization as a response to new challenges facing the Alliance in the area between the Adriatic and the Caspian Sea - a region of strategic importance for Bulgaria. Ultimately, Bulgaria will strive to maintain an integrated approach to regional security within the framework of the international organizations that play an important role in this area – NATO, the EU and the OSCE.

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Canada

Introductory information

The renaissance of Canada’s involvement in NATO activities that has been observed in recent years is closely connected with that country’s participation in the operation in Afghanistan. More generally, it can be associated with greater assertiveness of Canada’s foreign policy, especially after the conservative government of Stephen Harper assumed power in 2006. Canada is moving away from Cold War practice, when it tried to keep the costs resulting from NATO membership at the lowest possible level. Toward the end of the 1980s, Canada’s defense expenditures placed it in third place from last (before Luxembourg and Iceland). Canada’s position in the Alliance in the Cold War period was also waning as a result of its decreasing military presence in Europe.28

Presently, Canada’s defense expenditure stands at about 1.3% of its GDP. The Canadian authorities announced that this figure would stabilize around 2% by 2011. Even in the face of a visible economic slowdown, these plans have not been officially revised, although the costliest projects were subject to reappraisal. Canada is introducing a new equipment purchase program increasing both its capability to defend its territory, including maritime areas (the modernization of its existing fleet of frigates and destroyers, purchases of a new fleet of rescue, reconnaissance and fighter aircraft), and its ability to participate in operations overseas (strategic and tactical air transport) of a total value of about 18.5 billion dollars. As early as 2007, the creation of the Standing Contingency Force, which was supposed to be rapidly deployable in crisis areas as a so-called “entry force”, was suspended. The Canadian armed forces presently number about 62,000 soldiers in regular service – the Regular Force, over 50% of which is made up of land forces – and about 25,000 reserve soldiers, including border defense units (the Canadian Rangers, about 4,200 people) – deployed solely in the Arctic region. The Canadian government plans to increase the size of the armed forces to 70,000 and 30,000 soldiers, respectively.29

Undoubtedly, the Afghan mission poses the greatest challenge for the Canadian armed forces. With the fifth largest contingent in the ISAF operation (over 2,800 soldiers), Canada also directs the provincial reconstruction team in Kandahar. The actual magnitude of Canada’s engagement, including units that have completed their tour of duty and the ones getting ready for their mission, is estimated at about 12,000-15,000 soldiers and involves only land forces.

The most important Canadian document on security policy, outlining the country’s defense strategy for 2008–2028 – Canada First Defense Strategy (CFDS) – refers to NATO only in the context of possible participation in overseas operations of both sudden and short-term nature and requiring longer involvement, including playing the role of a “lead nation”. The Strategy declares support for missions undertaken by the

Alliance, but equates their rank with that of actions taken on the basis of a UN mandate and reserves the possibility to act as part of “coalitions of the willing”. The Canadian authorities do not see NATO as a chief instrument of their security policy, and attach greater importance to the development of Canada’s own military capabilities and to bilateral cooperation with the United States.30

Still, Canada is going to play an important role in the debate over NATO’s new strategic concept, thus making use of its increased clout within the Alliance following its participation in the ISAF mission, regardless of the fact that it has yet to specify its position vis-à-vis all pertinent issues. Marie Gervais-Vidricaire, Canada’s ambassador in Vienna, has become a member of the Group of Experts.

Hierarchy of NATO tasks

Canada is mainly interested in the expeditionary aspect of NATO’s activities. This is consistent with Canada’s readiness – seen as a permanent ingredient of Canada’s foreign and security policy – to contribute to peace enforcement and peace keeping operations (toward the end of the 1990s about 4,000 Canadian soldiers were deployed overseas). At the same time, it relates to that country’s perception of threats as originating primarily beyond the treaty area.31 The conspicuous omission of any role for NATO in ensuring Canada’s territorial defense can be associated to the autonomy that characterizes North America as part of the area defined in Article 6 of the Washington Treaty,32 and is additionally derived from the specific character of Canada’s interests in the Arctic (see below). Canada presently identifies allied solidarity with a uniform apportioning of tasks connected with participation in NATO missions. Canada will thus be interested in defining as precisely as possible the involvement of allies in specific NATO out-of-area missions. Origin of this approach should be traced back to Canada’s experiences during the Afghan mission, when the limited nature of certain allies’ engagement in strictly combat actions came as a surprise to Canada.33

Military transformation and internal reforms

Canada is an advocate of transforming NATO into a crisis response organization. The modernization priorities of the Canadian armed forces make Canada a natural proponent of transformation initiatives within the Alliance. Canada participates in two projects intended to meet the Prague Capabilities Commitment: Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) and the development of strategic sealift capabilities. Canadian involvement in the functioning of the NATO Response Force is limited to its participation in the Standing Maritime Group.

31 The CFDS associates the most important threats to international security with the existence of failed states, international terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, ethnic conflicts and transnational crime.
32 The Canada-US Regional Planning Group, whose activities are based on existing national (Canadian and American) command structures (and appointments to which lie directly in the hands of Canada and the United States) is responsible for planning and coordination in North America.
33 This was reflected in, for example, the report entitled Canadian Troops in Afghanistan: Taking a Hard Look at a Hard Mission, An Interim Report of the Standing Committee on National Security and Defense, February 2007 www.parl.gc.ca; see also J.T. Jockel, and J.J. Sokolsky, op. cit., p. 108.
Canada does not take part in the NATO tactical missile defense system (ALTBMD). However, following on the bilateral understanding of August 2004, information obtained by Canada and the United States in connection with the functioning of the air and outer space monitoring system and early warning system as part of the NORAD command were to be used for the needs of the U.S. missile defense system (MD).\textsuperscript{34}

NATO and non-military aspects of security

Canada appreciates the significance of non-military threats. It tracks such threats primarily in the Arctic region. It draws attention to challenges for the natural environment, but also to long term effects of climate change for the increased accessibility of the region, by which Canada’s northern boundaries could be exposed to a number of adverse phenomena, such as illegal immigration, illegal extraction of minerals or drugs and arms trafficking into North America. Given the specific nature of Canada’s interest in the Arctic one should not expect that Ottawa will be interested in engaging the Alliance in counteracting these threats. At the same time, nothing indicates that Canada would be opposed to increasing NATO’s capabilities in connection with, among other things, combating threats to IT security. Still, the Canadian authorities tend to point to the necessity to reinforce domestic resources, primarily in cooperation with the United States (both countries’ electrical power grids are managed through an integrated system).\textsuperscript{35}

Enlargement

Canada favors the maintenance of the Alliance’s open door policy, in keeping with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. According to Canadian authorities, the prospect of NATO membership increases the chances of success of political and economic reforms under way in candidate countries. In this, they are guided by the decisions taken at the Bucharest NATO Summit and stress the aspiring countries’ freedom to choose to which political-military organization they wish to belong to. In the Canadian public debate, the question of NATO enlargement to include Ukraine and Georgia is very visible. Canada has actively striven for these countries to be granted the Membership Action Plan (MAP), and joined the March 2008 public initiative of nine Central-European countries in this matter, as expressed in a letter to NATO Secretary General. Support for Ukraine’s membership seems to be a permanent position of Canada, mainly on account of the numerous and influential Ukrainian-Canadian community. Ottawa has not withdrawn its support for Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations following the Russian-Georgian conflict on August 2008. Presently, both in the case of Georgia and Ukraine, Canada stresses the necessity for those countries to adapt maximally to membership requirements, utilizing the Intensified Dialogue mechanism. Membership of Western Balkan countries is decidedly less visible in the official Canadian position.

\textsuperscript{34} For more on the significance of the integration of the North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) with the American anti missile defense system, see J.T. Jockel, \textit{Four US Military Commands: NORTHCOM, NORAD, SPACECOM, STRATCOM — The Canadian Opportunity}, Institute for Research on Public Policy, Working Paper Series, no. 2003-03. NORAD is characterized by far-reaching autonomy within NATO’s integrated military structure; see J.T. Jockel and J.J. Sokolsky, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 324-325.

Relations with the European Union

Canada will be interested in deepening cooperation between the two organizations. The Canadian authorities see the growing significance of the EU as an institution active in the security domain, especially in the context of its civilian capabilities. The Canadians have supported, for example, the EU mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina after responsibility for security in that country was taken over by the EUFOR mission (the Canadian contingent was placed under the command of EU structures). Canada also decided to contribute to the EU mission in Congo (providing airlift capability). Canada thus appreciates the possibility of complementing NATO actions with EU action but, at the same time, it strives to develop its own cooperation with the EU, also beyond the framework of NATO-EU relations. In this manner, the Canadian authorities are trying to bypass the obstacles on the way to stronger cooperation between NATO and the EU (such as, for example, the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus) and to secure a possibility of participating in EU security related actions as a non-EU country.

Relations with Russia

The Canadian position presupposes closer practical cooperation at the NATO-Russia Council in areas such as the development of theater missile defense, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, arms control, common crisis response, developing confidence building measures or combating maritime piracy (Canadian units take part, alongside Russian vessels, in the Active Endeavour operation). An important pre-condition for directing NATO-Russian relations towards a search for a community of interests will be the convergence of methods used in resolving jurisdiction disputes in the Arctic. Both Canada and Russia recognize the primacy of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in this context. At the same time, the Canadian authorities are worried by Russian military activeness in the Arctic (such as maneuvers of Russian submarines in international waters surrounding the Arctic, flights of Russian strategic bombers) that, in Canada’s opinion, could be a threat for Canada’s sovereign rights in the region and could constitute a confirmation of Russia’s confrontational attitude towards its neighbors. As a result, while stressing the legitimacy of involving Russia as an important partner, Canada will not avoid criticizing those aspects of Russia’s policies that reduce the level of security of NATO members. Canada will also oppose the recognition of any Russian sphere of influence in former Soviet territory and any forms of Russian interference in the Alliance’s internal decisions, particularly in connection with its further enlargement.

The Arctic (the High North)

In the past years, Canada has significantly increased its interest in the Arctic.\(^\text{36}\) Ottawa is not striving to emphasize the question of security in this region on the NATO forum, a fact which confirms the secondary importance of the Alliance for ensuring the protection of its territory from the Canadian point of view. A partial explanation can also

\(^{36}\) The most recent manifestation of this trend was the publication in July 2009 by the Canadian government of a document entitled ’Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future’. 
be provided by the aforementioned autonomy of the North American continent within NATO. It is the desire to confirm and reinforce Ottawa’s position in the region that is of key importance, however, especially in face of the territorial jurisdiction disputes existing between Canada and other Arctic countries, including NATO members. As a result, Canadian expenditures incurred in order to increase its possibilities of taking action in the Arctic are rather substantial. This may imply efforts to achieve a self-sufficiency of sorts in the military and operational spheres and provide an additional argument for the absence of a need to bring NATO into the table, in contrast to the position of NATO’s European members active in the region (Iceland and Norway).
Croatia

Introductory information

The Republic of Croatia, along with Albania, is the newest member of NATO. This country was invited to join the Alliance on the North Atlantic Council summit in Bucharest in April 2008, and joined the organization a year later, on 1 April 2009. The North Atlantic Alliance is to be the guarantor of the security and stability of Croatia, which was one of the belligerents in the war in Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The stability of some of the countries which emerged from the breakup of Yugoslavia is uncertain and, for this reason, the Croatian government is of the opinion that the country’s immediate neighborhood could be a source of threats to its security.

In a document concerning defense planning for 2009, the Croatian Ministry of Defense mentions “building an effective defense system based on the concept of collective defense” – in addition to membership in NATO and the EU – as a priority. Other aims are related to developing Croatia’s capabilities in such a way as to enable that country to take an active part in the building and improvement of international stability and security. In 2008, the Croatian defense budget amounted to 962 million USD and was 100 million USD higher than the previous year. Croatia’s armed forces are 18,600 soldiers strong, with 21,000 more soldiers in reserve units.

Presently, 450 Croatian soldiers are participating in out-of-area missions. A significant majority of them – 290 soldiers – has been deployed in Afghanistan. Even before it joined NATO, Croatia took an active part in the ISAF operation and in other activities under NATO auspices. The size of the Croatian contingent in Afghanistan has not changed significantly since the end of 2008. Croatia is intending to increase the strength of its forces participating in out-of-area operations to 650 in 2010. At the same time, in the next few years it will gradually reduce the size of its contributions UN missions for the benefit of NATO operations (presently about 115 Croatian soldiers serve in UN missions).

In order to reinforce its land forces, in 2007 the Croatian Ministry of Defense ordered 82 armored personnel carriers of the Patria AMF 8x8 type, and 42 more such vehicles were ordered in December 2008. Part of these vehicles will be deployed in Afghanistan.

Hierarchy of NATO tasks

Croatia is interested in a more precise definition of the mechanisms of action taken on the basis of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. This country also holds the view that NATO member states should take an approach based on the principle of solidarity. Given that Croatia is a small-sized country in which the effects of a possible cyber-terrorist attack could be more painfully felt than in larger countries, Croatia

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40 The Military Balance, op. cit.
supports NATO involvement in combating such forms of terrorism and other new threats to the security and peace of democratic countries.

The Croatian government also emphasizes the need to respect global and regional conventions and agreements on, among other things, the production, stockpiling and use of anti-personnel mines and chemical and biological weapons. Political declarations do not always translate into action, however. The Croatian Minister Ministry of Defense refused to let NATO build a training centre for combating terrorist attacks with the use of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons in Šibenik on the Adriatic coast, which was supposed to be the largest training center of this kind in Europe. The refusal was motivated by the fact that the building of such a center was not one of the aims of the Alliance.\(^42\) The real motives could have been fears of the center’s impact on tourism, which is one of the most important branches of the Croatian economy.

The government of Croatia pays particular attention to regional problems that influence the country’s security, also in the context of the broadening of the Alliance’s mandate. In this context, it mentions above all are the necessity to implement the Understanding on Sub-Regional Arms Control,\(^43\) as well as to continue cooperation between states as part of the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC),\(^44\) with headquarters in Rakitje near Zagreb, as a forum for exchange of experiences with regard to the fight against transnational organized crime, especially human trafficking and trade in drugs and arms.\(^45\) Croatia supports involving NATO in the struggle against these forms of crime via common exercises in intercepting smuggling vessels. In connection with maritime issues, Croatia mentions the Alliance’s possible involvement in dealing with environmental threats, especially in connection with the ecological and fishing zone in the Adriatic. Interception of suspect vessels in this zone was the purpose of the Yadran 2009 exercises held in April 2009 by the Croatian army and police.\(^46\)

Enlargement

Croatia strongly supports NATO enlargement, especially with respect to Macedonia. The Croatian government appreciates numerous reforms that Macedonia has implemented in order to join the Alliance and considers it well prepared for membership. At the same time, Croatia stresses that membership for Macedonia – a country located at the opposite side of the Western Balkan region – would contribute to the improvement of security and stability as well as to greater cooperation in the entire

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44 A forum of 25 states made up of countries of the Western Balkans and Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom.
45 ‘Godišnja razmjena informacija …’, op. cit., p. 8.
46 Euroatlantski tjednik, no.49, 30 April 2009, p. 2.
region. Croatia sees NATO membership as a chance to improve relations with its neighbors, both on a bilateral and a multilateral plane.⁴⁷ The government in Zagreb favors the quickest possible accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro to NATO. It is also ready to support Serbia when that country decides to apply for membership. Croatia’s definite support for Alliance’s enlargement to include countries of its immediate neighborhood is due to its conviction that the inclusion of Western Balkan countries in NATO structures will increase stability in the region and, thus, Croatia’s security.

Croatia also supports the accession of Georgia and Ukraine to the Alliance, even though – given these countries’ location and the less intensive bilateral cooperation with them – that support is not as obvious as in the case of Western Balkan aspirants to NATO membership.⁴⁸

Relations with the European Union

Croatia supports the strategic partnership between the European Union and NATO, one based on strong transatlantic ties and the cohesive development of complementary capabilities and competences.⁴⁹ Croatia proclaims equal cooperation with the EU and NATO as part of its national defense policy. In addition, Croatia proposes parallel engagement of both institutions in the building of an effective defense system in Europe.

Croatian support for cooperation between the EU and NATO in the defense sphere, as well as for EU initiatives such as the Common Security and Defense Policy may be attributable to Croatia’s candidacy for EU membership. In fact, only 15 out of a total of 450 Croatian soldiers serving on foreign missions have been deployed as part of operations under EU command.

Relations with Russia and other partners

While intensive cooperation between NATO and Russia is of no fundamental significance for Croatia, it supports such cooperation, pointing to the necessity for working together in such areas as combating Muslim fundamentalism. It also stresses that, given the changing nature of threats, NATO should play a greater role in assuring energy security.

Croatia speaks favorably about NATO cooperation with third countries, if such cooperation is to serve equally the interests of individual states and the collective interests of the Alliance. At the same time, the issue of closer cooperation occupies a subordinate place in the Croatian discussion over NATO’s strategic concept. Still, Croatia supports institutionalized regional initiatives with the participation of the Alliance, such as the Mediterranean Dialogue.

⁴⁸ Note from a conversation between the author and the Defense Attaché, PISM archive.
⁴⁹ ‘Godišnja razmjena informacija …’, op. cit., p. 5.
Czech Republic

Introductory information

The Czech Republic (CR) became a NATO member on 12 March 1999. For a long time, however, it was not in a position to perform all of the tasks inherent in membership, mainly on account of the condition of its armed forces which, at the time of accession, were undergoing a process of deep transformation to adapt them to NATO standards. It is only in 2005 that the process of restructuring and professionalizing the CR’s army was completed.\textsuperscript{50} Presently, the Czech armed forces include 24,000 soldiers serving in line units, 3,000 soldiers serving in auxiliary units, and 11,500 civilian personnel.\textsuperscript{51} Defense expenditures in 2009 amounted to 55.98 billion CZK (about 3.11 billion USD), which represents only 1.37\% of the Czech GDP.\textsuperscript{52}

In keeping with the Czech Republic’s Security Strategy adopted in 2003 and amended in 2007, NATO is “the basis of security in the Euro-Atlantic area”.\textsuperscript{53} For the time being the discussion over NATO’s new strategic concept has not gained much attraction the CR. Neither the government nor any of the country’s leading politicians have taken a clear stand in the matter. This also applies to the former Deputy-Prime Minister of European Affairs, Alexander Vondra, whom the Czech representatives unsuccessfully tried to have included in the Group of Experts charged with preparing the new strategic concept.

The lack of deeper reflection on NATO’s future is due to several factors. In the recent past, the Czech Republic was involved in preparing, and then holding the EU presidency. At the same time, since April 2009, the CR has been at grips with a political crisis that resulted from the fall of the Topolánek government. It was replaced by a cabinet of experts charged with administering the country until the elections scheduled to take place in May 2010. The pre-electoral campaign has been under way since the end of April, focusing the attention of Czech politicians on internal affairs.

For these reasons, the CR has not pronounced itself in favor of a rapid initiation of the discussion on the subject the Alliance’s strategic concept. Before the Strasbourg/Kehl summit, the Czech government had no precise position on the direction of the future discussion. It only emphasized that the discussion about the transformation of NATO and Article 5 should be conducted solely among member countries (so as not to allow any Russian interference in NATO’s strategic issues and in the debate on the future of the Alliance).

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\textsuperscript{50} The two others are the Military Chancellery of the President of the CR and the so-called Castle Guard. See ‘Struktura ozbrojených sil v míru’, www.armadaceskerepubliky.cz.


Hierarchy of NATO tasks

The conviction prevails in the CR that despite changing external conditions and new challenges, NATO should focus on deterrence and the defense of member states’ territories. At the same time, according to the Czechs, NATO should continue in its role of binding Europe with the United States which, in turn, should not reduce its responsibility for the security of its European allies. In this context right-wing Czech politicians stress that NATO’s activity as a de facto “global stabilizer” should not result in Alliance’s evolution in the direction similar to that of the OSCE. Some Czech social-democrats (ČSSD) would be inclined to support such an evolution. In turn the communists – the ČSSD’s potential allies following the elections – would be eager to see the Alliance dissolved as a “relic of the Cold War”.

Balance between NATO’s traditional and new tasks has not been much debated in the CR. The Czech nevertheless recognize the need for the new concept to provide answers to the following questions: is there a contradiction between Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and out-of-area operations; what is the relation between the building of expeditionary forces and the Alliance’s defense; what will be the approach to the issue of nuclear deterrence, etc. There is no doubt that the majority of right-wing analysts and politicians stress the need to maintain and reinforce NATO’s traditional role as a defense organization.

Military transformations and internal reforms

Issues related to missile defense in NATO and, more generally, to the transformation of the Alliance’s military structures take up an important place in Czech discussions about the future of the organization. The CR favors changes aimed at increasing the mobility and expeditionary capabilities of NATO member states’ armed forces. The Czechs consider the NATO Response Force (NRF) to be the most important instrument leading to this goal. The participation of Czech units in this initiative is treated as a factor favoring the transformation of the CR’s own armed forces. In a limited way, the CR also takes part in the realization of other projects, such as the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) and the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS). Recently, it has also considered participating in the building of the Airborne Early Warning and Control system.

The issue of missile defense within the NATO framework is closely tied to the CR’s participation in the American MD program and the plans to deploy the third site of the system in the CR and in Poland. The CR’s decision to participate in this program was motivated by both military considerations (protection from a possible attack from countries such as Iran) and the desire to seal the CR’s geopolitical shift from the Russian sphere of interests to a status akin to that of NATO’s western European members. Although Czech officials have consistently denied it, this issue was of key importance in the government’s decision to participate in the MD program. The reservations raised by some NATO members about the project and about its relation vis-à-vis the ALTBMD...
program pursued by the Alliance were of lesser importance for the CR. The Czech side emphasized, however, that it managed to convince the US to propose, during the NATO summit in Bucharest, that the two systems be linked. As a result, the CR calls for the creation of a missile defense system made up of both the MD and ALTBMD systems.

Czech right-wing politicians looked unfavorably on the US decision to alter the plans for the deployment of missile defense installations in Central Europe, disapproving the fact that the decision had been made in the context of US-Russian relations. They pointed to the fact that the Americans agreed to link the two systems in Bucharest. In the opinion of most Czech analysts, the CR should now refrain from any activity that could lead to fielding missile defense installations in the CR. They advocate a wait-and-see approach with respect to the outcome of US policy towards Russia, especially in the light of repercussions it may have for Iran’s attitude.56

NATO and non-military aspects of security

NATO’s 1999 strategic concept did not take into account certain threats to international security which have emerged recently. According to the CR, it is necessary to define a new list of such threats, including non-military threats (maritime piracy, cyber-security, energy security, the consequences of climate change, poverty, failed states and the consequences of globalization). Even if right-wing Czech politicians admit that responsibility for energy security should rest principally with the EU, they are calling on the United States to become more involved in this area, pointing to America’s involvement in the project of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline as an example. They have yet to specify what NATO’s role in this area should be.

Enlargement

There is relative agreement in the CR on the issue of NATO enlargement. The Alliance should grant admission to Western Balkan states that are still not members.57 There is also agreement with respect to the future accession of such countries as Georgia and Ukraine, although on this question the social-democrats are inclined to take into account the effect that their accession would have on NATO-Russian relations. At the same time, all analysts and politicians are leaning toward a clear definition of the Alliance’s geographical boundaries, with the entire Balkans and the countries of the EU’s Eastern Partnership as its limits.58 In this context they are pointing to the dangers inherent in further NATO’s enlargement, yet without denying the political desirability of this process. Above all, they argue that admitting states with increasingly weak military and economic standing leads to the weakening of the Alliance. In addition, NATO must maintain its ideological cohesiveness as an organization based on specific values.

56 See N. Hynek, ‘Kontinuita a zmìna v americké zahranièní bezpeènostní politice s nastupemprzidenta Obamy a jejì dopad na NATO a Èeskou republiku’, Ustaw mezinarodních vstahu, Prague 2009.
57 This concerns primarily Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also Montenegro and Serbia.
Relations with the European Union

The Czechs see the need for cooperation between NATO and the EU as defined in paragraph 14 of the Bucharest Summit Declaration. They see the implementation of the values underpinning both institutions as the core of cooperation. As former Czech Prime Minister M. Topolanek put it, “The EU does not have the means to promote liberty, whereas NATO doesn’t have the means to maintain it”. According to the Czechs such cooperation should take place in Afghanistan, where NATO’s military success will be impossible to achieve without political progress facilitated by the EU. They are convinced that both institutions have to cooperate in order to eliminate challenges to the European continent (terrorism, threats to energy security). Right-wing politicians emphasize that the build-up of EU military structures (as part of the CSDP) cannot lead to the weakening of NATO’s role in Europe or of the transatlantic link. Politicians on the left tend to favor strengthening the CSDP. They believe that the EU could, at least partially, fulfill the functions currently performed by NATO.

Relations with Russia

NATO-Russian relations are a key element in the deliberations of Czech analysts and politicians as far the future of the Alliance and the US role in Europe is concerned. In this context, it should be stressed that the view described below – even if definitely the prevailing one – is not the only one to be formulated in the CR with respect to relations with Russia. These issues are viewed differently by politicians connected with the ČSSD, and differently by the communists who exhibit – very roughly speaking – views that are identical to those formulated by Russia’s present political elites.

It could thus be argued that as early as 2002, the CR has been growing anxious about Russia’s increasingly aggressive policy towards the West, yet not countered by an appropriate response, as well as about the attitude of “certain NATO member states” which have established relations with Russia that “extend beyond the main stream of the Alliance’s policy”. Germany and France are the countries most often mentioned in the latter context. A new factor that fuels anxiety in the CR is the US policy regarding Russia – also in the context of the construction of the anti-missile shield (a project into which the Czechs have engaged considerable political capital) and in connection with the situation in Ukraine and the South Caucasus.

For these reasons, the Czechs call for reinforced internal cohesion in NATO’s relations with Russia. Most notably, they advocate a return to the practice by which member states came to a common position with respect to issues debated by the NATO-Russia Council. On specific issues, NATO has to be more decisive in its relations with Russia and abide by adopted principles and obligations. Catching up on defense planning with regard to new NATO members will be important in the context of relations with Russia, and should include such elements as planning for emergencies and deployment of troops, equipment, weapons, etc.

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59 See the Bucharest Summit Declaration, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html.

60 See the speech given by the Prime Minister during a conference at the Senate of the CR ‘Deset let od rozšíření NATO: úspěchy, výzvy a vyhlídky’, 13 March 2009, www.vlada.cz.

Relations with other partners

The CR tends to see institutionalized cooperation between NATO and non-NATO countries as limited to EAPC, whose framework also includes cooperation with potential candidates for membership. In this context, the CR is particularly interested in cooperation with Macedonia, Ukraine and Georgia. Relations between the Alliance and the two latter countries and NATO are viewed in the context of relations with Russia. The Czechs favor the fulfillment of all of NATO’s obligations with regard to Ukraine and Georgia. They support Macedonia in her dispute with Greece.

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Denmark

Introductory information

Denmark is a NATO founding member and its participation in the Alliance is the basic instrument of its security policy, all the more so as it does not participate in the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) despite its membership in the EU. Until the end of the 1990s, as well as during the Cold War, Denmark’s membership in NATO was relatively passive. A radical increase of its activeness in the Alliance took place after September 11, 2001. This decision was partly motivated by the desire to tighten relations with the United States in the security domain, although it was also stimulated by the desire to become more involved in providing for international stability. What followed was a profound – especially after 2004 – reform of the Danish armed forces, focused on its expeditionary capabilities, and a greater involvement in out-of-area missions, including the ISAF operation (presently 690 Danish soldiers are deployed in Helmand province). Changes to Denmark’s NATO policy in the 21st century strengthened its position in the Alliance, as borne out by Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s appointment to the position of NATO Secretary General in July 2009.63

Denmark’s partly professional armed forces amount to 29,550 persons in active service, including civilian personnel. The defense budget amounts to about 5.54 billion USD (1.7% of GDP), but the political elites and the public are presently opposing any increase in military spending. Following the reforms, about 60% of all units are capable of overseas deployments, with 10% ready to be deployed immediately. Territorial defense (the Home Guard) is provided mostly by reserve units, totaling 53,500 soldiers, which are integrated with civilian crisis management and public security structures as part of so-called “total defense”.64

Hierarchy of NATO tasks

Denmark is a strong supporter of NATO’s out-of-area activity without setting any geographical limitations whatsoever. It should serve as a means of adapting the Alliance to the changing geo-strategic realities. Denmark argues that given the scant probability of a conventional armed attack against member states, focus on functions related to collective defense of the treaty area would lead to the weakening members’ will to participate in the organization and to the erosion of public support for its existence. At the same time, Denmark opposes the logic of collective defense vs. out-of-area missions. The Danish authorities argue that expeditionary missions and engagement beyond treaty area are not only NATO’s (or the West in general) contribution to international stability, humanitarian relief or economic development, but that they also serve the fundamental interests of NATO members in that they counteract new types of threats (terrorism, terrorism,

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organized crime), which are more plausible to occur than an old-style armed aggression. Denmark also stresses that in order to carry out both kinds of tasks, NATO members need modern, mobile and integrated armed forces. Thus the growth of expeditionary capabilities also contributes to increasing the Alliance’s readiness to defend the treaty area, while participation in out-of-area operations increases the interoperability between NATO forces. Denmark puts great emphasis on the effectiveness of the Alliance, especially of the ISAF operation. The Afghan mission is regarded precisely as a test for the Alliance’s effectiveness and utility. At the same time, until now Denmark tended to treat its own relatively significant involvement largely as a means to strengthen its position within the Alliance and to reinforce its ties with the United States.65

NATO and non-military aspects of security

Denmark voices the need for NATO to discuss the issue of soft security. However, it recognizes that effective cooperation within the Alliance is possible mainly with respect to issues that are more similar to traditional security threats (piracy, cyber-terrorism). It supports, among other things, the organization of joint anti-piracy missions, training and exercises in IT security and the growth of intelligence sharing. In the sphere of energy security it views the EU as the more appropriate institution to address such problems. Also in the context of combating climate change – one of Denmark’s foreign policy priorities – it does not make any specific proposals for NATO involvement. It does not express fears, however, that widening the scope of NATO tasks to include non-military issues would result in a weakening of its capabilities to carry out its basic tasks.66

Military transformation and internal reforms

Denmark is a resolute supporter of military transformation focused on increasing the flexibility, adaptability and expeditionary capabilities of the NATO members’ armed forces. Progress and pace of these processes in the Danish armed forces are high, as is the level of Danish participation in allied transformation projects. Denmark attaches particular importance to the development of the NATO Response Force (NRF). At the same time, since 2006, it has been calling for NATO transformation (and operations in progress) to be shaped in line with the concept of “comprehensive approach”, expecting especially a capability to cooperate with civilian structures, including non-governmental ones. Denmark applies this concept while planning for its own expeditionary involvement - recognized as an additional impulse leading to the modernization of the Danish army – and the reforms of its armed forces.

Denmark calls for the reorganization of NATO’s civilian and military structures, pointing to the need for a reduction of allied bureaucracy and a simplification of decision making processes. It also advocates an increase in the mobility of NATO commands, something that would serve to improve the planning and realization of

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operations. It supports the expansion of common financing programs (suggesting that such financing should be used in, among other cases, to certain NRF related costs) and the creation of common Allied resources (modeled on the SAC initiative).

Denmark’s attitude vis-à-vis missile defense has so far been ambivalent. Denmark agreed for the American radio-location installations in Greenland be integrated with the system developed in the United States. Danish authorities did not oppose coordination of this project with programs being implemented by NATO. Denmark did not participate actively in the inter-Allied debate on this subject, aligning itself with the views prevalent in the Alliance.  

Enlargement

Denmark declares support for the Alliance’s open door policy. It argues, however, that potential candidates must be truly prepared for membership, especially in the area of the appropriate internal reforms, including civilian control over the armed forces. It also holds the view that NATO enlargement should not proceed if it were to decrease the level of regional security and stability. This means that, for the time being, Denmark would view as irresponsible any attempt to initiate the process of accession of the Balkan countries (with the exception of Macedonia), as well as of Ukraine and Georgia, whose accession would additionally be seen as provocative in nature.

Relations with the European Union

As an EU member that has chosen not to participate in the CSDP, Denmark is not likely to propose initiatives that would further the growth of NATO-EU cooperation. In fact, a radical strengthening of such cooperation could place Danish authorities in an awkward situation, especially as the referenda announced by the Danish government for 2009 and 2010 on the subject of exclusions from cooperation with the EU, including in the area of defense, were postponed (in December 2008 57% of citizens supported Denmark’s accession to the CSDP). Denmark supports the development of cooperation between the Alliance and the EU, however, especially in the functional sphere, during out-of-area missions, in line with the criteria of the “comprehensive approach”, and as part of the modernization of NATO members’ armed forces. It generally supports basing NATO-EU relations on the Berlin+ model, while being aware of the need to improve practical cooperation and to develop specific solutions that would boost the effectiveness of such cooperation. Denmark would oppose all efforts aimed at replacing NATO with the EU as the principal instrument of the security policy of European countries and thus allowing the EU to play an overriding role vis-à-vis the Alliance (which would then perform purely technical functions).
Relations with Russia

At present Denmark does not perceive Russia as a threat but rather as an important, if troubled, partner. For this reason, it calls for the widest possible political dialogue between the Alliance and Russia that would not, however, shy away from covering difficult issues. Denmark supports the growth of cooperation on the operational level and speaks favorably of all proposals to expand it, especially if it could contribute to the improvement of NATO’s expeditionary capabilities and stimulate the Alliance’s military transformation. Denmark also calls for streamlining of the activities of the NATO-Russia Council and continues to consider this forum as appropriate for cooperation with Russia.71

Cooperation with third countries

As a proponent of multilateralism, Denmark supports the continuation of cooperation with third countries on the basis of existing structures. It proposes neither new initiatives in this respect nor any proposals for institutional reform. Some Danish analysts view favorably the concept of “global partnerships” (the intensification and formalization of cooperation between NATO and selected non-European countries that represent a congruent civilizational cluster and/or enjoy a similar level of development). Denmark sees in it a chance to increase the effectiveness of NATO’s actions beyond the treaty area and to reinforce the organization as such. Even though the Danish authorities have yet to take an official stand on the matter, it would presumably be similar.72

The Arctic (the Far North)

Denmark’s territorial sovereignty over Greenland and the Faroe Islands turns the Arctic into an important direction of its foreign and security policies. The Danish authorities recognize, however, that the problems of the Arctic region should be resolved through multilateral cooperation, mainly based on UN structures and the provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Denmark would interpret attempts to increase NATO’s role in the region as leading to a weakening of “civilian” methods to regulate relations in the region (UN, UNCLOS) and a “militarization” of the problems of the Arctic, something that could prove feckless or harmful. In the internal discussion, recommendations to increase Denmark’s presence in the Arctic have been voiced, but this would not necessarily have to take place through NATO structures.73

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Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania

Introductory information

Given the similar security situation of the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), their position within the Alliance and their common proposals concerning the new strategic concept supported by the appointment of one person representing all three states to the Group of Experts, their views on the future of NATO will be presented in one section.

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania joined NATO in 2004. All three countries see the North Atlantic Alliance – in addition to the strong ties between them and the United States – as the cornerstone of their security. In symbolic terms, they have considered the membership in NATO as an affirmation of their adherence to the sphere of Western values and of the right of every state to make independent choices in matters of security policy. One of the important issues that accompanied these countries’ process of accession to NATO was an animated debate about whether NATO would be able, when faced with the threat of a conventional military attack, to meet its obligations under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Ultimately, the issue of the possibility (or lack thereof) to defend the territories of these countries against aggression receded into the background of the decision-making process while NATO focused on the need to conduct operations outside the treaty area (the Balkans, Afghanistan). In addition, a majority of NATO members grew increasingly convinced that the future threats will rather stem from terrorism, instability generated by failed states, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc. Despite their modest military capabilities, the Baltic States declared to be able to support operations undertaken by the Alliance outside the treaty area in both political and military dimension.

The question of NATO’s ability to defend the territories of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and the credibility of the Alliance’s commitment toward those countries has recently resurfaced during the internal discussions in the Baltic States. The principal factor that has sparked this discussion was the Russian Federation’s military intervention in Georgia and the insufficient – in the view of the three countries – reaction of the international community, including NATO, to these events. Moreover, one of their greatest concerns is the lack of any significant NATO military infrastructure on the three countries’ territories.\(^\text{74}\) Their loudest discontent arises from the fact that they were not, despite their five-year long NATO membership, covered in the Alliance’s contingency planning. It is all the more significant given the fact of quite regular violations of the three countries’ airspace by the Russian air force. Concerns are made worse by the pronouncements of certain politicians and experts admitting that the lack of a significant NATO presence on the territory of the three new members could be attributed to an unspoken accord among some NATO members, who view this policy as a confidence building measure of sorts in NATO’s relations with Russia.\(^\text{75}\)

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\(^{74}\) These states mainly use funds from the NATO Security Investment Program, which were earmarked for, among other things, the modernization of ports and military airfields in these countries (such as in Lielvarde in Latvia) and for setting up of the Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence in Estonia, etc.

\(^{75}\) See, for example the statement of Ron Asmus for the Wall Street Journal Europe, 18 August 2009.
The absence of important NATO infrastructure on the territory of the Baltic States is significant insofar as the three countries are aware of the limited resources at their disposal. Even prior to their accession to the Alliance, the Baltic States abandoned the doctrine of total defense (consisting in the engagement of the entirety of a country’s material and human resources should a need to defend the national territory from various types of threats arise), and plans to expand their armed forces for defense purposes (assuming a rather low level of professionalization). Presently, all three Baltic States have very small armies (Estonia – 5,000, Latvia – 5,200, Lithuania – 8,800 soldiers; in addition, given the long tradition of paramilitary organizations in these countries, they are capable of mobilizing several times larger forces if necessary). The Latvian and Lithuanian armies decided to give up the draft and began professionalizing their armed forces. The three Baltic States’ defense plans assume, among other things, that they would be capable of throwing off a possible attack in the first stage, before the arrival of allied forces. At present, all three Baltic States are striving for their armies – though numerically small – to be highly mobile and capable of responding rapidly, carrying out both territorial defense tasks and expeditionary missions (various stages, including high-intensity combat). Lithuania’s flagship project in this respect is the Iron Wolves mechanized infantry brigade, which is to be supplied with the most modern equipment and become fully inter-operable with NATO forces by 2010. In keeping with the plans of the Lithuanian government, by 2014 up to 50% of Lithuania’s land forces are to be capable of taking part in expeditionary missions. Many of the modernization plans, however, are being put to the test by the financial crisis, which have had a particularly severe effect on the Baltic States. Though the Baltic States have mostly reached the defense spending levels recommended by NATO in recent years (Estonia – 1.9% of GDP, Latvia – 2% of GDP, with Lithuania being the exception – a little over 1% of GDP), in 2009 the three countries’ governments were forced to carry out additional cuts. In relation to 2008, the Lithuanian defense budget shrank by 20%, that of Estonia by 14% and that of Latvia by as much as 35%.

The desire to join NATO as quickly as possible incited the governments of the Baltic States to transform their armed forces so as to enable them to participate in NATO out-of-area operations (for example, in 1994 a common battalion Baltbat was established for this purpose). Given modest possibilities of sending large contingents, it was also decided to develop a number of niche capabilities (for example, Latvia created special units of divers, military police, medical personnel, etc.). Presently the three countries take active part in Allied operations. They are present in the Balkans (although they are beginning to withdraw their contingents from KFOR) and in Afghanistan (Estonia has 150 soldiers there, mainly in Helmand province, Latvia has 165 in Mazar-i-Sharif and Lithuania has 200; since 2005, Lithuania has bee commanding the PRT in Ghor province, in addition its special forces are fighting in Kandahar). The Latvian rail network is also an important segment on the supply route for equipment shipped by the United States to Afghanistan.

76 For more on this topic, see, for example, B. Górka-Winter, “Miejsce Estonii, Litwy i Łotwy w europejskiej architekturze bezpieczeństwa”, Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny, vol. 2, no. 3 (7) 2003, pp. 17-50.

77 However, at the beginning of 2009, Lithuania suspended the recruiting of professional soldiers and even began discharges (with a target of 5% f the army), quoted after http://www.altair.com.pl/start-2465.

78 Data from NATO ISAF placemat of 22 October 2009.
For the time being the three Baltic States have not managed to conduct common purchases of armaments, despite many declarations and plans in this respect. Armaments are bought (or obtained from donors) mainly individually (such as, for example, providing the Lithuanian army with C-27 J Spartan transport planes or a Standard Flex 300 type patrol boats; Latvia and Estonia are investing, among other things, in a sea patrolling system by purchasing mine sweepers) or in cooperation with countries from out of the region, including non-NATO members (such as the agreement between Estonia and Finland about the purchase of the Ground Master 403 radar airspace surveillance system). The three countries still do not have their own fleet of multi-role fighters, and for this reason, they will be covered by the Allied Air Policing mission until 2014. They are seeking to extend this operation even until 2018, their argument being that its prolongation is justified – in addition to the difficulties inherent in having to purchase the fighters in the midst of a financial crisis – on account of the fact that for many years prior to their accession to NATO, they were urged by the Alliance to invest mainly in developing the ability of their land forces to participate in out-of-area missions. The financial crisis and the abovementioned defense spending cuts will additionally affect the three countries’ ability to acquire modern equipment, although they could also force them to revert to the concept of joint armament purchases (in April 2009, the defense ministers of the Baltic countries met to discuss this issue).

All the above factors explain why the present debate about the Alliance’s new strategic concept is seen in the Baltic States as a crucially important one, and why the outcome of this debate and the degree to which the document will reflect the demands of the three countries will determine whether they will continue to see NATO as a credible organization – which in this case means primarily whether it will be able to ensure the security of their territories. The Baltic States can thus be expected to be very active participants in the debate. All three of them are represented by a common representative at the Group of Experts – the Latvian diplomat Aivis Ronis.

Hierarchy of NATO tasks

The governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania believe the Alliance should focus on maintaining the ability to deter aggression and guaranteeing the collective defense of member states’ territories. Thus no country should be overlooked in the formulation of threat scenarios (especially those that affect territorial integrity) and the means (including military ones) to counteract them. A situation in which one of the members or an entire group of countries is excluded from this type of planning gives rise to incomprehensible

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79 For more on this topic, see, for example, Tomas Jermalavičius, ‘Baltic Military Cooperation: Past, Present and Future’, Postimeesz, 18 March 2009.

80 In January 2009, Estonia adopted a plan for the development of its armed forces for the period of 2009-2018. However, its premises are to be modified on account of the financial crisis. Among other things, it is planned to reduce expenditures for infrastructure modernization by 25%. See “Estonia tnie wydatki”, http://www.altair.com.pl/start-2517.

81 Aircraft taking part in this mission are stationed at the Lithuanian base of Zoknai.

82 On this subject, see, for example, A. Vigulis, NATO Air Policing – A Permanent Solution, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, AU/ACSC/8881/AY06, April 2006, pp. 3 et seq.

inequalities. It also contributes to the diminishing of credibility of the Allied security guarantees arising from Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, both inside NATO and in the perception of outside actors. No allied country should find itself in a situation in which it would be forced to face security challenges exclusively on its own. These countries, in addition to seeking relevant provisions in the new strategic concept, will most certainly also seek to draw up executive documents to accompany it. More precisely, they will advocate defining the steps that need to be taken in order to attain the appropriate level of security for all member states (including the schedule of maneuvers, joint training, exercises, plans for the intensification of intelligence sharing, improvements in the early warning system, dislocation of NATO infrastructure, etc.) and increasing NATO’s overall “visibility”, particularly on the territory of new members. In fact, their call for the creation of defense plans for countries that are not yet covered by them has a good chance of succeeding: in 2008 General J. Craddock, the then Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, called for initiating work in this direction. In addition, the Defense Committee of the British parliament underscored the necessity of creating such plans for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (although its Report had a purely recommendatory status). It seems that the United States will also be in favor of such a solution.

While the Baltic States stress NATO’s principal role in the defense of Allied territory, they are not denying the need for the Alliance to engage in the resolution of pressing international crises. In particular, they emphasize the importance of the successful completion of the ISAF operation for NATO’s future. As already mentioned, they are participating in this operation despite their limited resources. The Baltic States share the conviction that out-of-area operations should not be allowed to put a strain on the Alliance’s ability to defend its territory. This also applies to the question of intelligence gathering. They point to the fact that as NATO members’ intelligence services focus on activities beyond treaty area (Afghanistan, Pakistan), it comes precisely at the expense of monitoring threats to the treaty area. In their view, this trend is reflected by the fact that the Alliance was surprised by Russia’s intervention in Georgia in August 2008.

Military transformation and internal reforms

All three Baltic States declare their support to NATO’s military transformation and are striving to take part in it in a manner commensurate to the military and financial potential at their disposal. In spite of the initiatives undertaken prior to joining NATO, these countries are determined to professionalize their armed forces. They recognized the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF) as an important modernization impulse,

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84 See, for example, the statement made by Kadri Liik during the conference “The United States and Central Europe: Diverging or Converging Strategic Interests” organized by PISM and CSIS on 4 November 2009, http://csis.org/multimedia/audio-united-states-and-central-europe-converging-or-diverging-strategic-interests.


86 See, for example, the pronouncement of the Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Urmas Paet, http://www.vm.ee/?q=en/node/8542.


announcing contributions to its successive rotations. The Baltbat will serve as a basis for setting up a joint battalion that will participate in the NRF rotation in the first half of 2010. Estonia and Lithuania have declared their intent to contribute to the NATO Airlift Capability (SAC). Additionally, all three countries are taking part in the Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS) program aimed at the monitoring of ground based objects from the air.

Given the close ties between the three Baltic States and the United States, the Bush administration’s plans for the location of third site of the missile defense system have been greeted favorably in the region. When the Polish-U.S. negotiations stalled in July 2008, media speculated about the supposed willingness of the Lithuanian government to discuss the conditions for hosting GBI facilities with the U.S. administration. Accordingly, after the conclusion of the Polish-U.S. agreement and as plans to deploy Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad District were aired by the Russian president Dmitri Medvedev, the three Baltic States openly voiced their anxiety. Following the decision of the Obama administration to reconfigure the MD system and the willingness to make it a NATO project, all three countries are stating that NATO is an appropriate forum to pursue it, all the more so if this were to entail the deployment of installations that could enhance their security.

NATO and non-military aspects of security

Two issues are especially important from the viewpoint of the three Baltic States: energy security and cyber-terrorism. All three countries are significantly dependent on energy supplies from Russia and have on numerous occasions been subject to a Russian energy blackmail. Moreover, in the spring of 2007, Estonia suffered an unprecedented attack on its cyber-space. The attack targeted portals belonging to the government, banks, information services, etc. It eventually served as an impulse for developing NATO’s policy in this area, as mirrored in the Bucharest Summit Declaration.89 Another matter of importance to the Baltic States is the environmental security, tied closely to the contamination of Baltic Sea by chemical weapons stored on the seabed in Soviet times. Official pronouncements made by these countries’ representatives indicate that they will strive for NATO to remain engaged on these issues, and this should be reflected in the Alliance’s strategic concept. Additionally, the Lithuanian government has offered to establish an Energy Security Excellence Center in Lithuania.

Enlargement

All three Baltic States are supporting an open door policy towards countries that declare their desire to join the Alliance and which have met the conditions for membership. They are strongly committed to supporting the candidacy of Ukraine and Georgia and were the most active advocates of granting the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for those two countries at the Bucharest Summit. In addition, they take active part in aiding the reform of the Georgian and Ukrainian security sectors (including defense planning and civilian control over the armed forces). They lobby on behalf of NATO’s intensive cooperation with those candidate countries. In his last conversation with the NATO Secretary General, the Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs urged a rapid decision to

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be taken on the subject of opening a NATO Information Center in Georgia, in keeping with decisions taken by the Alliance in December 2008. Also, they carry out joint security related projects, such as the creation by 2011 of a Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian brigade meant to take part in operations. Although the priority for the Baltic States is to lobby actively on behalf of Ukrainian and Georgian membership, they also support the candidacy of all Balkan countries. They claim that only if NATO remains truly committed its open door policy will it be possible to expand the zone of security and stability on the European continent. The adhesion of additional countries that had been part of the Soviet Union to the Alliance would have a symbolic significance for the Baltic States. It would be indicative of the existence of a real choice for the former Soviet republics – presently independent states – as far as foreign and security policy is concerned.

Relations with the European Union

The Baltic States are interested in developing rational and effective cooperation between NATO and the European Union. As members of both organizations, they are striving to synchronize military planning (as a result of limited resources) in a manner that takes into account the needs of both institutions. They pay particular attention to the need to engage in joint political consultations, improving cooperation and enhancing coordination mechanisms between NATO and the EU, especially in areas where their absence is detrimental to the effectiveness of ongoing operations.

Relations with Russia

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are among those NATO members with the most clearly defined views on the subject of NATO’s relations with Russia. Although they are proponents of constructive cooperation and recognize that Russia is an important partner in the resolution of security related problems (especially as far as nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and combating terrorism is concerned), they do not think that such cooperation should take place at the expense of Alliance’s core values. They have thus recognized that normalization of relations with Russia following the Georgian crisis took place too fast and that Russia did not suffered any negative consequences for its actions. In addition, the Baltic States observe with considerable anxiety the lack of decided, steadfast reaction on the part of the majority of the Allies to those aspects of Russia’s foreign policy that in their views could constitute a threat to their security (the concept of the spheres of influence, Russia’s self-declared right to defend Russian-speaking populations of the former Soviet republics, the concept of a new security architecture, etc.).

At the same time, the three countries realize that their ideas for a more firm NATO stance toward Russia have little chance of success given the attitude of some of the alliance’s most influential members (the United States, France, and Germany) which, albeit for different reasons, do not wish to antagonize Russia. During the discussion on the new strategic concept, the Baltic States will thus focus on securing the most favorable provisions possible concerning the guarantees arising from Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. To a certain extent, it would entail an assurance of the Alliance’s adequate response to Russian (or other states or non-state entities) actions that would be deemed as threatening the security of the Baltic States.

France

Introductory information

France will actively participate in the discussion on the new strategic concept. French opinions and views on reforming NATO have a chance of gaining the support of many other members, including the United States. It reflects France’s growing importance in this organization, which is in turn attributable to a number of factors. Firstly, France is one of the most important contributor to the NATO operations, both in terms of number of troops (presently, about 5,000 French soldiers are stationed in the Balkans and in Afghanistan) and financial dimension (France covers about 13% of the operations’ budget). France has also been an important contributor to the NATO Response Force in each of its rotations so far (about 13% of its strength). Secondly, following the end of the Cold War, the French armed forces have undergone an intensive transformation process to increase both its ability to defend the national territory and participate in overseas missions, thus making France one of the Allies with the greatest power-projection capability. Thirdly, during the anniversary summit of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg and Kehl in 2009, France officially rejoined the Alliance’s integrated military structure and took on several important command positions. It is presently heading, among others, NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and the Joint Command in Lisbon. Fourthly, the strength of France’s voice in the Alliance has been growing in conjunction with the gradually decreasing ability or willingness of the Alliance’s traditional leaders to engage in shaping NATO’s future course. This seems to be the case with respect to the United States, which is disappointed at the majority of the Allies’ refusal to increase their military involvement in Afghanistan, but also Germany, whose position has grown weaker following the consistent rejection of pressure to participate in ISAF combat operations. Last but not least, the level of ambition of the French authorities, most notably of the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, is a factor of considerable importance, as it is being stressed that in the past the French voice in NATO was not commensurate to the value of France as a member of the Alliance.

In the last decade, the French armed forces have been undergoing an intense process of modernization and professionalization. The draft was ultimately abandoned in 2002. This was consistent with the 1994 Defense White Book, which announced a gradual reduction of tasks related to territorial defense, while increasing the ability of the 320,000 strong army to engage in operations beyond the national territory, thus underscoring mobility and rapid response capabilities. However, the successive edition of the White Book 2008 stressed territorial defense capabilities, especially in the face of possible terrorist attacks, and capabilities to protect the critical infrastructure. Further reductions of personnel, about 54,000 posts, was also announced. The greatest cuts were to affect the air force, the smallest – the navy. The aim is to sustain a potential that

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92 See, for example, the speech given by N. Sarkozy during the Conference entitled “La France, la défense européenne et l’OTAN au XXIème siècle”, www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/article_imprim.php3?id_article=71348.
would allow appr. 50,000 soldiers to take part in high-intensity operations in Europe under NATO auspices or to engage 30,000 soldiers beyond European territory autonomously or as part of a larger coalition for a period of one year. In addition, a force of 10,000 soldiers is to stand ready to respond to terrorist attacks (including cyber-attacks), help alleviate the effects of natural disasters and epidemics. The White Book foresees the appropriation of new equipment (particularly satellite systems, intended to detect the launching of ballistic missiles in the direction of French territory, and UAVs) and an increase of the intelligence-gathering capabilities. Budget for 2009-2014 provides for over 100 billion euro for weapon systems and about 400 million euro for the operation in Afghanistan (total expenditures on foreign operations in 2010 will reach 800 million euro). It was also announced that, despite the financial crisis, no cuts of defense expenditures are being planned.

Hierarchy of NATO tasks

The French government believes that NATO should primarily serve to defend the Euro-Atlantic area, although it admits that the likelihood of a conventional military aggression against the treaty area is small. At the same time, it rejects the role of NATO as a global policeman, emphasizing that the Alliance cannot act as a rival to the United Nations. Accordingly, NATO’s engagement in operations beyond the treaty area should not become the rule. Expeditionary operations would be justified in extraordinary situations such as a response to a terrorist threat or responding to an attack on energy supply infrastructure, even though France claims that energy security as such should not be a significant element of NATO’s agenda. In such cases, the Alliance has to be ready to respond adequately, both in terms of the manifestation of political will and the employment of adequate capabilities. According to the French government, operations akin to the ongoing mission in Afghanistan should not become standard NATO activities. Although French involvement in this mission is currently undisputed – it is widely recognized that a pullout could contribute to increased terrorist threat to NATO members – the French government nevertheless emphasizes that operations of this character should be the exception rather than the rule. In fact, France does not treat the Afghan mission as originating from Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. France also makes it clear that these kind of missions requires a UN mandate.

Military transformation and internal reforms

The assumption of the position of head of the ACT by a French general will reinforce France’s influence on the Alliance’s transformation process, and could even make France a leader of change. Increased efforts to grant the ACT greater importance in the command structure have already been announced, even as the Allied Command Operations in Mons takes priority at present, given the operation in Afghanistan. Above

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95 For a time, France was against NATO assuming command of the ISAF forces and extending the scope of its responsibilities to other provinces. See, for example, L. Michel, ‘NATO’s ‘French Connection’: Plus ca change…?’, Institute for International Strategic Studies, National Defense University, April 2007, pp. 7-8.
all, France will strive to have the Alliance focus, in the foreseeable future, on its credibility and effectiveness. This is to be furthered by greater efforts on the part of European members especially. French foreign minister Kouchner goes as far as to emphasize the need for the “Europeisation” of NATO, making the European allies capable, to a degree, of conducting operations without support from the United States should such a need arise. The European NATO members’ increased defense capabilities are also intended to increase their influence on the directions in which the Alliance’s will evolve. In addition, France will opt for reforming the methods of financing NATO operations so as to modify the “cost lie where they fall” principle – something that is to entail the increase of the Alliance’s common budget – and for NATO institutional reform (reducing bureaucracy, especially the civilian personnel). Proposals were also circulated for a review of command structures and a review of the decision making mechanism, most probably in the direction of increasing the competences of military commanders. Traditionally, France will also opt for limiting to an extent possible the development of the Alliance’s civilian capabilities (such as humanitarian and police-type operations, etc.). In France’s view, the Alliance should focus on beefing up military instruments and increasing the readiness to use them adequately. Indeed, France has found it greatly disappointing that the NATO Response Force has heretofore been used solely for humanitarian purposes and is thus calling for deploying the NRF in Afghanistan. France is not questioning the “comprehensive approach” concept as a pre-condition for the success of present-day peace operations. However, it recognizes that as the need arises for the Alliance to employ civilian instruments, it should rely on the potential of other organizations – primarily the European Union and the UN.

France takes part in many significant NATO military modernization initiatives, among them the development of the Allied Ground Surveillance program and the extension of the satellite surveillance system. The NATO Research and Technology Agency is based in Paris.

France has adamantly opposed the missile defense system in the version pursued by the administration under President G.W. Bush, especially its European component. Above all, it was alleged that the Bush administration was paying too little attention to the political consequences that could arise from the project’s realization, all the more so in light of Russian protests and the question of NATO’s cohesiveness. Hence the French authorities were content with the Obama administration’s proposal to reshuffle the system. Long-term French perspective could change, however, depending on the direction in which the project might evolve. France will track issues such as the integration of the American system with the program implemented by NATO.

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96 It is worthwhile to note that despite the NATO’s increased significance in France’s security policy, the European Union continues to be mentioned as the first instrument of its security. See ‘La France, la défense européenne et l’OTAN…, op. cit.


cooperation with Russia, as well as the involvement of European defense contractors in the project.

Relations with the European Union

From the French point of view, NATO’s relations with the European Union are a question of utmost importance although, in this respect, the views of the present French government are rather ambivalent. On the one hand, France would welcome a rapprochement between the two organizations. It is officially announcing the necessity of bringing the rivalry between them to an end, something that is to be served by, among other things, France’s return to NATO’s integrated military structure. On the other hand, traditional French misgivings that this cooperation may weaken the security and defense policy developed by the EU or reduce it to the role of an auxiliary institution assisting the Alliance in its operations are still alive. Until now, the French government has been opposing common defense planning between the two organizations, or the introduction of the concept of the so-called reversed Berlin Plus arrangement, meaning that the EU would be making resources available for NATO operations. The French position in this matter could change, however, if the CSDP was to be considerably reinforced, for example by the creation of its own military staff capable of planning EU operations. According to the French, only a strong EU can be a NATO partner without fears that one organization would dominate the other.

Relations with Russia and other partners

France is traditionally a proponent of close relations between NATO and Russia. According to the French government, a long list of threats requiring the cooperation of both partners is the principal justification for such relations. These include the danger of failure in Afghanistan, combating drug trade and terrorism, countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or the progress on resolving the Iranian nuclear program. For this reason, France will be opposed to all initiatives that, in her view, could antagonize Russia and harm relations between the two partners. It should thus be expected that the French government will oppose further NATO enlargement to the East. The French defense minister, Hervé Morin, went as far as suggesting that further NATO enlargement ought to be consulted with Russia. It will also oppose the establishment or updating of plans for territorial defense for the Baltic States or countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Official French position emphasizes that nothing justifies preparing such plans at this point, since these countries are not facing the threat of a military aggression and that this kind of planning could unnecessarily antagonize Russia.

Cooperation with countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative is particularly significant for France. It is one of the most active participants in these initiatives. It should be expected that France will wish to maintain their importance on NATO’s agenda. It is worthwhile to note the growing significance of the Middle East for the French foreign policy has been growing. France recently opened a military base in the United Arab Emirates, and about 100 French soldiers are

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to be stationed there permanently.\textsuperscript{100} On the other hand, France has on many occasions signaled great reserve towards the idea of global partnerships promoted by the United States or the United Kingdom. France holds that the Alliance should remain an element of the transatlantic link, and thus opposes establishing formal ties between NATO and countries such as Australia, Japan or New Zealand.\textsuperscript{101}

\textsuperscript{100} Jane's Defense Weekly, 1 October 2009.

\textsuperscript{101} In his speeches, President Sarkozy stresses, for example, that NATO should only remain open to membership of countries of the Euro-Atlantic area. Among conditions for enlargement, France points to the need for an applicant country to share the values on which the Alliance was founded, to possess capabilities suitable of bringing a significant contribution to its military potential and to the continent’s stability in general.
Germany

Introductory information

Despite the redefinition of Germany’s security policy that took place in recent years, that country remains a specific NATO member and its approach to the issues of security and defense is somehow different than many of its allies. Above all, Germany has a large, 240,000-strong, army made up in part of draftees (about 30%). German expenditures on defense are also among Europe’s highest even if they remain clearly below the NATO average in relation to GDP (1.3% of GDP in 2007, while the NATO average, excluding the United States, was 1.73%). In addition, the Bundeswehr is highly integrated in the Alliance, a fact reflected in, for example, Germany’s participation in NATO’s nuclear sharing policy or the availability of its troops for duty as part of the NATO Response Force (NRF). Germany’s engagement in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan is very important (it has the third largest contingent, with over 4,200 soldiers). At the same time, the army’s tasks, its importance for the state and its role in society are viewed in a specific manner, as is reflected in the government’s continued refusal to refer to the task to be accomplished by the German contingent in Afghanistan as a combat mission (whereas the humanitarian character of the contingent’s activities is stressed). In this context, it should be mentioned that according to a little over 60% of the German public, the Alliance continues to be of fundamental importance for German security, and only 30% of respondents hold the opposite view. At the same time, about 40% favor the immediate withdrawal of German troops from Afghanistan.

The strategic partnership with France is very important for Germany’s security policy and is expressed, among other things, through the will for a dynamic development of the Common Security and Defense Policy, even at the cost of duplicating certain military capabilities in the European Union. Germany’s special relations with the United States should also be mentioned. These relations are warming up after having been seriously strained during the time of G.W. Bush’s presidency and during the tenure of Chancellor G. Schroeder.

The change of government following the latest elections (the emergence of a Christian-Democratic and Liberal coalition between the CDU/CSU and the FDP) entails a departure from certain traditional elements of the German position with regard to NATO. However, the overall direction of German policy in the Alliance will remain unchanged, considering the decisive say of the Christian-Democrats in the coalition, a symbol of which is the re-assumption of the post of Chancellor by Angela Merkel. Still, steps leading toward the removal from Germany of US nuclear weapons (and, therefore, Germany’s withdrawal from the nuclear sharing policy) – the main postulate of the coalition partner FDP, whose leader, Guido Westerwelle became foreign minister in the new government – signal the most visible change.

103 NATO materials about the military engagement of member states in missions and operations www.nato.int/issues/commitment/index.html.
104 Data about the number of ISAF troops – www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.html.
Hierarchy of NATO tasks

Germany is attached to the traditional interpretation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and emphasizes the importance of NATO as an alliance whose fundamental purpose is collective defense. This does not entail, however, any negative view of out-of-area missions, as these are, in Germany’s view, a method of ensuring the security of the allies through the elimination of threats that arise far from their territories but which could infiltrate treaty area. Nonetheless, such missions should always be justified by the existence of a direct threat for the allies and have a clear impact on the security of treaty area. At the same time, Germany is strongly positioned against the vision of a global NATO promoted by certain other member states. In its view, the Alliance cannot play the role of a “world policeman” engaged in the stabilization of all greater crises and conflicts. According to Germany, it would even be desirable to define the geographical limits of NATO’s engagement, beyond which the Alliance would not take action as a matter of principle. Therefore, it is possible that Germany will be in opposition to those members that favor elevating the significance of out-of-area missions in the new strategic concept.

NATO transformations and internal reforms

Considering Germany’s stance with regard to NATO tasks, it is natural that Germany would support both the further development of the Alliance’s military capabilities that are necessary for expeditionary missions (especially considering the Bundeswehr’s limited capability to take up such operations – in keeping with the guidelines of the German defense policy, less than 40,000 soldiers, about 20% of its armed forces, are ready to take up immediate action beyond the country’s borders) and would be ready to support certain initiatives connected with territorial defense.

Germany finds it extremely important to increase the efficiency of the Alliance as a forum of political dialogue and trans-Atlantic cooperation. It stressed on many occasions that an effective trans-Atlantic community, and thus, NATO solidarity and cohesiveness, requires a “joint analysis of threats to the allied security, a joint decision making process and joint action”. Therefore, Germany’s aim is to change the existing shape of trans-Atlantic relations which is determined by the dominant position of the United States in the Alliance and which on many occasions has brought the dialogue between allies to a mere discussion of American proposals. According to Germany, European states, acting as a group, should create a counterweight to the United States in NATO, so that the alliance would have a chance to become the basic forum of political dialogue between America and Europe, with both treating each other as equal and strategic partners.

108 Speech of Chancellor Angela Merkel at the Bundestag on March 26, 2009, www.sofia.diplo.de/Vertretung/sofia/de/03/NATO_60_Jahre_Regierungserkl_C3_A4rung_BK_Angela_Merkel,property
During recent years, Germany has consistently adopted a negative stance towards the U.S. plans to deploy elements of its anti-missile system in the Czech Republic and Poland, and warned that the finalization of this project would complicate the European security system and NATO’s relations with Russia. For the same reasons, it greeted the U.S. decision to reconfigure the system’s European component with satisfaction. According to Germany, this step will help improve NATO’s relations with Russia and could bring tangible benefits, such as Russian support for the Western countries in their negotiations with Iran about the latter’s nuclear program. At the same time, Germany expects that the American decision will prompt Poland and the Czech Republic to strengthen their relations with NATO’s European members and to become more involved in the shaping of the CSDP.

Non-military aspects of security

The logical outcome of Berlin’s approach to the interpretation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is that Germany calls for limiting the types of tasks to be carried out by NATO. In relation to threats to energy security and cyber security, unfavorable demographic trends, migrations or climate change, the Alliance should conduct analyses and hold consultations concerning the influence of such phenomena on the security of the allies and the desired methods of counteracting them. In Germany’s opinion, NATO should focus on its basic function, i.e., common defense, and focus on the military dimension of security.\textsuperscript{110} Under such a premise, the role of the Alliance in counteracting new threats would still be large. It would enable a political dialogue to define the means, also of a civilian character, that should be used in responding to new threats. In addition, it would offer already operational and tested military capabilities that could become necessary should there be a need to use force. Germany thus belongs to those allies that favor an Alliance whose competence is limited to the sphere of traditional activities related to threats of a military nature, without undue expansion of its responsibilities to include non-military threats.

Enlargement

In relation to NATO enlargement, Germany is reluctant to continue the debate about the potential membership of Ukraine and Georgia. It calls for a rapid resolution of the Greek-Macedonian conflict and the completion of Macedonia’s accession process. While emphasizing the need for NATO to maintain an open door policy and the principle of the sovereignty of states that allows governments to freely join international organizations, Germany points to the need to define and enforce specific Alliance accession criteria that would ensure that only countries ready for membership would be admitted.\textsuperscript{111}

Relations with the European Union

For Germany, the issues of the change of form and substance of EU-NATO relations is closely related to the promotion of a comprehensive approach to the

\textsuperscript{110} Speech of Chancellor Angela Merkel at the Bundestag, 26 March 2009, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{111} Article of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany F.-W. Steinmeier, op. cit.
resolution of conflicts and crises and to the notion of networked security. Both are tenets of Germany’s security policy. According to Germany, a significant improvement of cooperation between the EU and NATO is an urgent need and the only manner in which to respond to a wide spectrum of threats to the trans-Atlantic region, especially those necessitating the simultaneous use of civilian, military, economic and other instruments.112 While pointing to the possibility of reaching a favorable synergy of action between NATO and the EU, Germany (along with France) calls for the overcoming of the Cypriot problem and for making both EU-NATO political consultations at the highest level as well as the mechanisms responsible for field cooperation between the two organizations more effective, particularly in conducting stabilization and peace operations. Nonetheless, Germany – in contrast to other Allies, such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands – is not calling for a “division of labor” and for leaving the EU to deal with strictly civilian matters, leaving military ones solely to NATO. The EU’s building of an autonomous security and defense policy is seen by Germany as a complementary effort with regard to NATO’s tasks, one that reinforces the Alliance’s European pillar and increases the European allies’ credibility and capability to take action. For this reason, Germany is calling for the recognition of the CSDP in the NATO strategy as a necessary instrument that complements the Alliance.113

Relations with Russia

For Germany, the problem of NATO-Russian relations is one of the key issues to be resolved and, at the same time, a multi-dimensional problem. Germany is calling for strong cooperation between NATO and Russia, using existing mechanisms and institutions and concerning many spheres, such as assistance for the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, support for anti-piracy operations, non-proliferation, arms control, etc. At the same time, Germany emphasizes that Russia is a difficult partner, and that relations with it require above all measures to restore confidence, which has been severely strained by Russia’s recent moves. This is indicative of Germany’s indecision about how to view Russia and what Russian policy to adopt. Nonetheless, Germans believe that the dialogue with Russia – albeit a difficult one – should be pursued at all times as a matter of principle.114

Global partnerships

It needs to be stressed that Germany expects NATO to develop close cooperation with other international organizations and institutions for the purpose of counteracting various types of threats. Germany is strongly opposed to the formalization of such cooperation, however, even with the Alliance’s recognized partners such as Australia and Japan, fearing that NATO would be detracted from its core function – common defense.

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113 Speech of Chancellor Angela Merkel at the Bundestag, op. cit.
114 Ibid.
Greece

Introductory information

Greece joined NATO in 1952. Despite disturbances related to the Cypriot problem (in the years 1974-1980 Greece remained outside the Alliance’s military structures) Greece considers itself an important member of this organization, something that corresponds with the general importance of multilateral structures in Greek foreign and security policy. Participation in the Alliance’s mechanisms and institutions not only reinforced Greece’s security but also animated its political, economic, and military transformations.

Greece’s importance to NATO during the Cold War, along with that of Turkey, was attributable to the fact that both countries constituted the Alliance’s southern flank. Nonetheless, even as the Cold War ended, Greece has been involved in NATO’s political and operational activities. It could be argued, however, that the Greek contribution does not entirely match that country’s military potential. Greece has a considerable defense budget – it amounted to 5.62 billion USD in 2008. 156,600 soldiers and 4,000 civilians in paramilitary organizations are on active duty, while another 237,500 soldiers are in the reserve. Even though Greece supports NATO’s out-of-area operations, as of October 2009 it contributed only about 145 soldiers to the ISAF operation. Greece’s engagement in the KFOR mission is more substantial – the Greek contingent there in that same period amounted to 588 soldiers. Presumably, just as in the case of the discussion about NATO’s global role, during more general considerations over the Alliance’s new strategic concept, Greece will not be very active as a proponent of new initiatives. It will rather continue to respond to the overtures from other countries.

Hierarchy of NATO tasks and non-military aspects of security

For Greece, NATO remains to be important as a defensive alliance. It attaches great importance to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, in part because of Greece’s geopolitical location and complicated relations with Turkey. Yet both Greece’s pronouncements and actions indicate that it sees the need for transforming the Alliance into a global player. In this, Greece does not go beyond the mainstream, it does not single out any of the two components of NATO’s activities, and this will no doubt continue to be the case. According to Greece, the new strategic concept should balance NATO’s basic missions (with great emphasis on the Balkans) with expeditionary

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115 The section on Greece is based, in addition to the sources mentioned in the footnotes, on the survey conducted by Dr Marios Efthymiopoulos – an expert for NATO affairs, presently visiting professor at Cyprus University and General Director of Strategy International, a Greek think-tank – sent on 20 September 2009, PISM archives.

116 See M. Efthymiopoulos, ‘Experiencing the paradox: Greece’s past, current and future of co-operation at NATO’, www.strategyinternational.org


operations. Energy security in the context of NATO is not the subject of the Greek debate for the time being. The same can be said for cyber-terrorism, although in May 2009, a discussion took place at the Greek ministry of defense about Greece joining NATO’s actions on behalf of a “cyber-defense policy”. This discussion was suspended for the duration of the electoral campaign. Greece supports NATO’s counterterrorism activities as borne out by its dynamic participation in the Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean Sea. It is worth noting that NATO vessels contributed to ensuring security during the Athens Olympic Games at the request of the Greek authorities. Greece also calls for NATO, as well as the EU, to play an important role in countering threats such as piracy in the Gulf of Aden. It belongs to the founding members of the UN Contact Group for Piracy. As far as NATO is concerned, Greece took part in the Allied Provider operation and is involved in the Allied Protector operation.119 Thus, Greece should not be entirely passive in the process of shaping NATO’s global role. However, its involvement will be limited to select areas of importance and will be driven by new challenges to international security.

Military transformation and internal reforms

Greece supports NATO’s military transformation, especially in terms of ensuring the efficiency of out-of-area missions. For this reason, it actively supports the NATO Response Force. Having deployed a Patriot missile system, Greece saw no need to participate in the U.S. missile defense project. Consequently, it is not in the forefront of countries supporting the realization of such a project within the NATO framework. However, according to the Greek government, should a discussion on this topic unfold, it ought to involve the Alliance as a whole – and the European Union – rather than take place at the bilateral level. Such a project can under no circumstances be directed against Russia and should be consulted within the NATO-Russia Council, so as to fulfill the requirements of transparency. After President Obama’s decision to change the MD configuration, the Greek government withheld itself from any comments, a fact attributable to the ongoing election campaign. However, during the electoral debate, the issue resurfaced in critical statements on the MD plans issued by opposition politicians from PASOK, the Communists and the SYRIZA group.120

Enlargement

Greece supports NATO enlargement and the open door policy, yet not unconditionally. Firstly, new members should be able to contribute to the Alliance’s policies. Secondly, the principles guiding NATO’s conduct need to be maintained in an enlarged alliance. Greece thus supports enlargement provided that candidate countries


fully meet the requirements set by the Alliance, especially those concerning the establishment and sustainment of good-neighborly relations. This stance refers to Macedonia, whose accession is blocked by Greece on account of the name dispute. Greeks hold that their consent to the accession of the FYROM to NATO will be possible only after the resolution of the name issue. Greece would accept names such as “New Macedonia” of “Upper Macedonia”. According to the Greek foreign ministry, Greece is interested in a positive conclusion of the negotiations in this matter, as this would be beneficial for the development of bilateral relations and regional cooperation. It cannot, however, accept provocative acts and pronouncements made by FYROM representatives, such as giving the name of Alexander of Macedonia to airports and motorways, interpreting them as being inconsistent with good-neighbor relations and, therefore, constituting an obstacle to NATO membership.121 On the other hand, Greece has long been engaged in stabilizing the Balkans. It supported the aspirations of Croatia and Albania and supports the future accession to NATO of countries such as Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, yet stopping short of naming any deadlines. Taking Russia’s position into consideration, Greece points out that while Georgia and Ukraine should not be discouraged in their attempts to join the Alliance, they should first meet the membership criteria.122 Hence, the Greek support for NATO enlargement varies according to the candidate. Greece will presumably find it difficult to change its position with respect to the candidacy of Macedonia and the countries of Eastern Europe.

Relations with the European Union

Every Greek government – irrespective of its political makeup – and the country’s public opinion support the development of the CSDP and NATO-EU relations. They should be based on the framework provided by the long-negotiated Berlin Plus arrangement from 2003, the respect for international law, as well as on common sense, meaning that the Alliance’s cooperation with the EU should involve all EU member countries and be based on good will. In pointing to these factors, Greece relates to the activities of Turkey, which refuses to agree to the use of NATO resources by the EU in the context of the Cypriot problem. Knowing that a breakthrough in NATO-EU cooperation would benefit Greece and Cyprus, Athens will most probably press on Turkey to change its position, but this could have an adverse effect.123

Relations with Russia

Greece is interested in furthering relations between NATO and Russia, traditionally an important Greek economic and cultural partner, something that should

be one of the Alliance’s priorities. The first meeting of the NATO-Russia Council following the Russian-Georgian conflict of 2008 took place on the Corfu island in June 2009, with the presence of the prime ministers of Greece and Italy. During the meeting, Greece called for constructive cooperation between NATO and Russia in the operational and political dimensions, which entails the continuation of the political dialogue at different levels, even on topics that the two partners do not agree on. However, according to then foreign minister Dora Bakoyannis, this cooperation has to be based on certain principles, such as respect for states’ territorial integrity – a clear reference to the conflict between Russia and Georgia. In this context, Greece often points to the OSCE principles.\textsuperscript{124}

Cooperation with other partners

Greece supports the further development of relations between NATO and international organizations – the UN and the OSCE, in addition to the EU. According to Greece, they have to be complementary in their performance of security-related tasks. Growth of cooperation with those structures should take into consideration their respective institutional frameworks and the principle of autonomous decision making. Greece is ready to engage in discussions with every EAPC state and, in case of need, to promote the principles of the Alliance. It also strongly supports bilateral cooperation within the framework of the Partnership for Peace (one of the PfP’s training centers is located in Greece) and multilateral initiatives – the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, all of which are high on the NATO Secretary General’s agenda. Greece advocates an expansion of the Mediterranean Dialogue mechanism, arguing that security in Europe depends on the stabilization of the Mediterranean region, clearly one of Greek priorities. Greece displays no active approach towards the so-called contact countries such as Australia.\textsuperscript{125}


\textsuperscript{125} See Statements of Prime Minister Mr. Kostas Karamanlis, op.cit.
Hungary

Introductory information

NATO is the main pillar of Hungary’s security policy. Hungarian authorities believe that as the world’s most powerful military alliance, NATO cannot limit itself to ensuring the security in the North Atlantic region. As a country with a relatively small defense potential, Hungary stresses the importance of coordinated action between all members, arguing that the neutralization of new threats exceeds the capabilities of a single state.\(^{126}\) It should thus be expected that Hungary will be an active participant in the discussion on the Alliance’s new strategic concept.

Hungary has been a member of NATO since 1999. In November 2004, the Hungarian armed forces have given up universal conscription. At the present time, Hungary has about 30,000 soldiers (a reduction of about 100,000 in comparison with 1989). The budget of the Ministry of Defense for 2009 amounted to about 300 billion HUF (1.17% of GDP). Until 2013, this figure is to rise to 1.3% of GDP. The level of public support for NATO membership remains stable – 2/3 of Hungarians hold the view that the Alliance reinforces their country’s security and up to 78% supports the participation of Hungarian military units in peacekeeping missions beyond the country’s borders.\(^{127}\) Presently, about 1,000 Hungarian troops are serving in operations in 13 countries on three continents, including 320 in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan (the Hungarians also run the Provincial Reconstruction Team in the province of Baghlan) and 243 in the KFOR mission in Kosovo.

Hierarchy of NATO tasks

Hungary stresses the need to maintain a balance between collective security guarantees, the Alliance’s principal function embedded in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, and out-of-area operations. Hungary does not feel threatened by a direct aggression conducted by a state, but by phenomena of a new type: terrorism, organized crime, cyber-terrorism, climate change, the effects of natural disasters, illegal migration and threats to energy security. Hungary’s National Security Strategy, amended in 2009, states that “Hungary is not threatened by military aggression, and the risk of any other traditional threat is also minimal”.\(^{128}\) A predominantly non-military character of contemporary threats means that the Alliance’s armed forces should not be limited to typically military operations. NATO has to be ready for action far from its members’ territory, as it defends their interests there as well. Hungary sees no contradiction between the defense of the treaty area and out-of-area operations. According to Hungary, the latter will be an increasingly important NATO task in the long-term perspective. Hungary regards participation in expeditionary operations as its contribution to the realization of the Alliance’s aims. Toward the end of 2008, Hungary adopted a very ambitious plan to increase the number of its military units capable of


\(^{127}\) Ibid.

foreign deployments from the present 22.8% to 40% by 2013 and even to 60% by 2017. It would exceed the NATO-recommended figure of 40%.  

Contribution to peacekeeping missions is a key element of Hungary’s foreign policy. Such operations are now seen as standard tasks of the Hungarian army. Hungary, fearing that terrorism might spread to Europe, stresses the importance of achieving success in Afghanistan, a mission it interprets as the greatest challenge facing NATO. Success in Afghanistan would also show the world community that NATO is able to shoulder the task of global security guarantor. According to Hungary NATO’s new strategic concept should take into account these circumstances as central to Alliance’s operations beyond treaty area.

Military transformation and internal reforms

One of Hungarian priorities is to expand the Papa airbase, which is home to three C-17 transport planes from the NATO Heavy Airlift Wing. This program was established by ten NATO members and two countries participating in the Partnership for Peace program as part of the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) initiative, serving to beef up these capabilities. Hungary belonged also to the initiators of co-financing from the NATO budget of 2-3 AWACS airplanes operating over Afghanistan. Hungary points to the SAC program as an example of the effective use of financial resources to carry out NATO’s tasks, based on individual planning and financing, yet employing the principle of Allied solidarity in economic terms. Hungary will call for increasing the number of allied projects co-financed by many countries, especially considering the global economic crisis. Such projects include the NATO Response Force. Hungary sees the formula of "costs lie where they fall" as unjust and as holding back many members from contributing to programs that are carried out in the interest of the entire Alliance. Hungary also supports reforming the Alliance’s command structure to make it more rational and effective.

Hungary initially viewed the European component of the US missile defense system as a measure that could enhance European security. Hungary later modified this position and argued for a NATO-run missile defense in order to mitigate Russia’s opposition.

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NATO and non-military aspects of security

Hungary agrees – especially following the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009 – that energy security is fundamentally important for most NATO member states and that the next few years will deepen this tendency. NATO should thus take on a more active role in ensuring the security of energy distribution networks. One of the ways to secure energy supplies is to stabilize NATO-Russian relations. Hungary argues that the European Union is the most important forum as far as furthering energy security is concerned, understood both as the diversification of energy sources and supply routes.131

Enlargement

Hungary recognizes the importance of stability in the Balkans for European security. It is Hungary’s strategic objective to see Balkan states – including Serbia – that fulfill membership criteria joining NATO. Budapest does not favor the prospect of leaving some countries of the region outside NATO or the EU. Such was the reason for Hungary’s participation in peacekeeping missions in the Balkans (2/3 of Hungarian troops serving in foreign missions are deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo) and the selection of the Hungarian embassy in Montenegro as the NATO contact mission there (prior to that, a similar function was played by the Hungarian embassy in Zagreb). Hungary advocates continued NATO military presence in this area until the EU takes over as the stabilizer.

Hungary’s stance towards admitting post-Soviet states to the Alliance is visibly more subdued. Although Hungary favors continued consultations with Ukraine to facilitate that county’s integration with Euro-Atlantic structures, it argues that Ukraine needs to meet a number of conditions: internal political stability, greater public support for Ukraine’s membership in NATO, completion of the military reforms and stabilization of relations with Russia. Hungary also stresses the need to meet the criteria set out in the document addressing the question admitting new members that NATO adopted in 1995 and which oblige candidate countries to settle all outstanding conflicts. Such a rigorous approach means that Hungary sees no chances for the rapid admission to the Alliance of either Ukraine or Georgia, despite its formal support for the open door policy.132

Relations with the European Union

As a member of both NATO and the EU, Hungary attaches great importance to the cooperation between those two organizations. Budapest assesses its current state as highly unsatisfactory. In Hungary’s view, the Berlin Plus mechanism has already exhausted its possibilities. As far as crisis management is concerned, the EU and NATO have unique roles to play, a situation further facilitated by their converging interests in

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reinforcing international security. Cooperation between NATO and the EU could benefit from harmonization of their strategies in an institutionalized manner. This will require overcoming certain difficulties, however, such as the EU-Turkish conflict. The importance of NATO-EU cooperation arises from the complementary nature of the Alliance’s military capabilities and the EU’s instruments of economic and social reconstruction and stabilization. The latter are a necessary precondition for the success of any military mission. Hungary sees the CSDP as complementing NATO, with a clear division of responsibilities between the two organizations. Hungary believes that of the C-17 planes stationed in Papa airbase could be used for the purposes of both NATO and EU missions, thus enhancing such cooperation.

Relations with Russia

Hungary believes that Russia’s political, military, geographic and energy potential renders Moscow a strategic NATO partner. Hungary emphasizes the question of Europe’s dependence on Russian gas and oil supplies. NATO should cooperate with Russia in order to reinforce international and regional security. According to Hungary, the tensions following the Russian-Georgian war are a thing of the past and presently relations can be rebuilt on the basis of shared interests. NATO-Russia Council has a vital role to play in this context. Hungary stresses, however, that cooperation with Russia should rest on respect for certain principles: Russia should not have a veto over further NATO enlargement, it also has to respect the principle of territorial integrity and sovereignty of other countries, including the right to join the military alliances of their choice. Hungary sees the principal areas of NATO-Russia cooperation as being transit of materiel for the mission in Afghanistan and the situation in Central Asia in general; security in Europe; combating terrorism, piracy and the drug trade; non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and arms control. Given its good relations with Russia, Budapest is of the position that it could be a catalyst in the process leading to improved NATO-Russian relations.133

NATO’s relations with other partners

New security challenges requiring the Alliance’s engagement beyond the trans-Atlantic region highlight the importance of relations with partner and contact countries. Hungary is interested in a gradual development of the present partnership framework while maintaining the Alliance’s trans-Atlantic character itself. This framework should also include countries from beyond the Euro-Atlantic region but which have shared interests with NATO and are ready to work together on behalf of strengthening common security. Hungary attaches particular importance to developing partnership ties with Western Balkan countries, Russia, Ukraine and other members of the Commonwealth of the Independent States. According to Hungary, the cooperation between NATO and Russia could serve as an example for intensified cooperation between NATO and other regional powers, such as India and China.134

133 Presently, the head of the NATO Military Liaison Mission Moscow is General Laszlo Makk. ‘Imre Szekeres: NATO’s sixtieth anniversary’, op. cit.
Iceland

Introductory information

Iceland is one of the original signatories of the Washington Treaty. It is the smallest NATO member and has no armed forces. Its value for the Alliance, especially during the Cold War, was its geographical location. Despite this, until 2006, the main pillar of Iceland’s security policy was not its membership in NATO but its bilateral ties with the United States. That year, Washington, without paying heed to Iceland’s objections, decided to put an end to its permanent military presence on the island originally based on a bilateral agreement from 1951, even as the agreement itself remained intact. As a result of this development, NATO became the most important security policy instrument for Iceland. It is complemented by bilateral relations with the United States and by the Nordic Cooperation, recently pursued on the initiative of Norway. The evolution of Iceland’s approach to security is also reflected by the creation in July 2008 of the Defense Agency, a quasi-ministry of defense subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and responsible for managing the defense budget (34.6 million USD, 0.2% of GDP in 2008 r.). Transformations in Iceland’s security policy were slowed down in the second half of 2008 by the economic crisis.135

Hierarchy of NATO tasks

As a country without armed forces, Iceland is vitally interested in maintaining NATO’s ability to provide effective collective defense of territories of its member states. At the same time, however, it views the threat of armed aggression against itself, as against other NATO members, as minor, and the degree of the Alliance’s readiness to fulfill its traditional functions as commensurate to the requirements of the international situation. Iceland expects other Allies to provide support in upholding its rights with regard to its maritime area and airspace. Following NATO’s decision to cover Iceland by the Air Policing program from 2008, this expectation is seen as largely fulfilled. At the same time, Iceland supports NATO’s involvement in activities intended to contribute to greater international stability and security. From Iceland’s perspective, it is important that NATO’s presence beyond the treaty area allows it to make real contributions through the participation of Icelandic civilian experts (since 1994) in such missions. Iceland supports efforts to make NATO operations beyond treaty area consistent with a comprehensive approach. It calls for equal treatment of NATO’s traditional tasks and its out-of-area activities, which in practice means the acceptance of the Alliance’s focus on

the latter. For Iceland, NATO remains the main forum of trans-Atlantic dialogue on
security.\footnote{Risk Assessment for Iceland: Global, Societal and Military Factors, March 2009, www.mfa.is; S. Gisladottir, Changed Security Environment..., op. cit.}

NATO and non military aspects of security

Iceland would wish for NATO activities to reflect threats and challenges to the
security of its members in non-military areas, especially environmental problems and
energy security. According to the Icelandic authorities and experts, this is connected
almost exclusively with the safety of maritime transit routes of energy resources.
However, Iceland presents specific initiatives concerning NATO’s role in this domain
solely in the context of the Alliance’s involvement in issues of security in the Arctic.\footnote{Risk Assessment for Iceland..., op. cit.; V. Ingimundarson, Iceland’s Security Policy..., op. cit.}

Cooperation with third countries, enlargement issues,
relations with the European Union

Iceland has yet to present a clear position with respect to these issues. Its
participation in the work of appropriate NATO bodies suggests that it accepts the
present institutional shape and the extent of the Alliance’s cooperation with third
countries and with the European Union. The motive behind Iceland’s application in July
2009 for membership in the EU was dictated primarily by economic considerations,
and not by a desire to obtain an additional security policy instrument, to join the CSDP
or to propose changes in NATO-EU relations.

Relations with Russia

Iceland does not perceive Russia as a source of military threats. Its concerns over
Russia are fuelled, however, by the military potential maintained by Russia in the Arctic
(Kola Peninsula), especially in light of the resumption of patrols by Russian strategic
bombers (at times encroaching on Iceland’s airspace). This does not, however, have a
significant impact on Iceland’s view on the necessity of NATO’s cooperation with
Russia – a view that is convergent with NATO’s official position.\footnote{Risk Assessment for Iceland: Global, Societal and Military Factors, March 2009, www.mfa.is; S. Gisladottir, ‘Changed Security Environment...’, op. cit.}

The Arctic (the Far North)

Iceland is – as is Norway – a country that is strongly interested in NATO’s
involvement in the shaping of security in the Arctic. On this issue it has a similar
position to Norway’s, and expects primarily that issues of Arctic security (in all its
dimensions) be recognized as meriting the interest of the Alliance as a whole. Iceland
sees possibilities for the effective use of the Alliance’s potential in the Arctic in relation
to maritime security. It is proposing, among other things, that NATO forces be used for
the protection of maritime routes and areas where energy resources are being extracted
(especially in light of the increasing maritime traffic as a result of climate change). It is
also proposing an increase in the Alliance’s readiness to conduct rescue missions in the Arctic and to prevent environmental catastrophes or limit their impact there. This would be served by, among other measures, appropriate exercises and a permanent presence in the region of specialized equipment and crews. However, Iceland is not calling for a significant expansion of NATO infrastructure in the Arctic.  

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Italy

Introductory information

The internal discussion about the position of Italy with regard to the North Atlantic Alliance’s new strategic concept has only begun. No far-reaching initiatives should be expected from the government which, as far as NATO matters are concerned, has been acting rather reactively than proactively in the last few years.\textsuperscript{140} Italy has its representative in the Group of Experts – Giancarlo Aragona – who is a professional diplomat and who is presently the Italian ambassador to the United Kingdom. As a general rule, the Italian public does not attach great importance to issues of the Alliance’s future, with the exception of the operation in Afghanistan.

The 184,000-strong Italian armed forces are to be reduced to 141,000 soldiers by 2012. About 9,000 soldiers are serving in foreign (NATO, EU, UN) missions. The economic crisis has had the result of further limiting defense expenditure. Resources devoted to the maintenance of equipment and to financing overseas operations have been reduced by as much as 29%. In all, the defense budget in 2009 have been reduced by about 7% in relation to 2008, i.e., to 14.3 billion EUR.\textsuperscript{141} The expeditionary operations themselves are financed from a separate fund that has not been reduced. The state of Italian public finances will be an argument against increasing the scope of NATO’s activities.

Italy’s position within the Alliance is relatively strong. It plays an important part in NATO operations. About 1,800 soldiers are serving in the KFOR mission (the largest contingent in this operation), and Italy is responsible for the command of one of five sectors – the Multi-National Force West (MNF-W).\textsuperscript{142} Italy has about 2,800 soldiers in Afghanistan (the sixth largest contingent), acting as a leading country for the Regional Command West (RC-W) and running a provincial reconstruction team in the province of Herat.\textsuperscript{143} In connection with the criticism of national limitations (caveats), which in the case of Italy concerned, among other things, operating solely within the framework of the areas of responsibility of the Regional Command West, the Italian government announced during the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008 that in extraordinary situations, Italian forces could be deployed to other areas of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{144} Italy also contributes to the NATO training mission in Iraq, while Italian vessels take part in the Active Endeavour operation and the piracy combating mission off the Somali coast. Italy is also assuring the defense of Albanian airspace as part of the Air Policing mission.

Several important NATO commands and institutions are located in Italy. These are the Allied Joint Force Command in Naples (JFC Naples) – responsible for the KFOR operation, the Active Endeavour operation and the training mission in Iraq; the Allied Maritime Component Command Naples (CC MAR Naples) subordinate to JFC Naples;

\textsuperscript{140} Author’s correspondence with A. Carati, analyst with the Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI), September 2009.
\textsuperscript{142} As of 12 October 2009 according to NATO data (NATO KFOR Placemat).
\textsuperscript{143} As of 1 October 2009 according to NATO data (NATO ISAF & ANA Placemat). For the period of the presidential elections in Afghanistan, the contingent was increased by 5000 soldiers.
\textsuperscript{144} ‘Italy revises caveats for Afghan troops’, Associated Press, 1 July 2008.
the command of the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Italy (NRDC-ITA) in Solbiate Olona; the Commander of Italian Maritime Forces (COMITMARFOR); and also the NATO Defense College (NDC) in Rome, as well as other centers responsible for training in the sphere of communications and IT systems (Latina) and undersea research (La Spezia). A considerable success for Italy was NATO’s 2009 decision to establish the main base for unmanned aerial vehicles of the Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS) program in Italy (Sigonella). In addition, the US tactical nuclear weapons that NATO could use in case of war are most probably being stored on the airbases of Aviano and Ghedi Torre.

It is worthwhile to note that Italian representatives occupy high ranking positions in NATO’s political and military structures. Italians have traditionally held the posts of NATO Deputy Secretary General (presently it is Claudio Bisogniero) while Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola has been the Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee since 2008.

The importance of Italy’s viewpoint in the discussion about the Alliance’s new strategy will be reduced by the absence of a precise definition of Italian political and strategic interests to be pursued via NATO. This is part of a larger problem: Italy would like to play a greater role on the international stage, but these ambitions are hampered by the quality of Italy’s political life, which is characterized by a highly confrontational climate and a lack of substantive debate.

Italy is interested in maintaining strong trans-Atlantic ties, also in the area of security. Italy hosts over 10,000 US soldiers, and has decided to purchase the F-35 fighter plane. Strong anti-American sentiment developed in the Italian society during the George W. Bush tenure. After a change of administration in Washington, it is expected that the Berlusconi government is going to make great efforts to improve US-Italian relations. It could turn out that Italy will not be inclined to oppose American initiatives on the NATO forum.

Hierarchy of NATO tasks

Italy believes that Article 5 serves as the foundation of the Alliance, but it’s interpretation should take into account the changes that have taken place in NATO’s strategic environment. Apart from protecting the treaty area, NATO should ensure the protection of citizens of member states from various types of threats, including those originating beyond treaty area (such as terrorism, cyber attacks and threats to energy supplies). Article 5 should be treated as an obligation to ensure comprehensive security for the populations of NATO member countries through out-of-area missions, among other methods. Having adopted such a stance, Italy most probably wishes to balance the positions of members championing a traditional interpretation of Article 5 and proponents of focusing on expeditionary missions.

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Military transformation and internal reforms

Nothing seems to indicate Italy’s interest in bringing about the “globalization” of the Alliance or any significant expansion of its tasks beyond the present framework. Given its location, potential and interests, Italy is likely to stress the importance of the Allied maritime forces, including their role in ensuring the safety of sea lanes.\(^\text{146}\) Italy will draw attention to the issue of the transformation of member states’ armed forces. However, Italy’s position will be weakened in the light of the difficulties it has encountered while implementing the plans to modernize its own armed forces and to increase their expeditionary capabilities.\(^\text{147}\)

Relations with the European Union

Italy presents a pragmatic approach to the issue of NATO-EU relations and emphasizes that the need for operational cooperation and for developing institutional contacts arises from the nature of present-day security challenges. Both organizations should complement each other and act jointly not only within the framework of the “comprehensive approach” to stabilization missions but also, for example, in ensuring the safety of sea lanes and increasing energy security.\(^\text{148}\) This does not mean, however, that the European Union should hold back the autonomous development of the Common Security and Defense Policy. There is no contradiction for Italy between engagement via NATO and support for the common security dimension of the EU.

Relations with Russia

Italian approach to the issue of NATO-Russia relations is characterized by a noticeable dissonance between the initiatives and actions of Prime Minister Berlusconi (a proponent of closer relations with Russia) and the much more prudent line pursued by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In a speech from September 2009, foreign minister Frattini referred to granting Russia a right to veto NATO enlargement or to alter boundaries in Europe through the use of force, among other things, as “red lines that cannot be crossed”.\(^\text{149}\) He also rejected the concept of a sphere of interests and the possibility of recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Italy advocates maintaining the NATO’s partnership with Russia and cooperating with it in order to increase European security in keeping with the decisions taken at the NATO-Russia Summit in the Italian town of Pratica di Mare in 2002 (during which the NATO-Russia Council was established). Italy sees Russia as an important element of the European security system. It should thus be expected that Italy will oppose any NATO decision that could be seen as leading to a confrontation with Russia.

\(^{146}\) Vice Admiral (ret.) Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte, ‘Considerations on a New Strategic Concept’, article published by the Italian Atlantic Association, http://www.comitatoatlantico.it/articolo/316/.


\(^{148}\) F. Frattini, ‘NATO’s new strategic concept: the Italian vision’, op. cit.

\(^{149}\) Ibid.
The question of partnerships and NATO enlargement

Italy will prioritize the relations with countries of the Mediterranean Sea Basin and the Middle East, aiming to elevate their place in the hierarchy of NATO tasks.\(^\text{150}\) This includes two most important questions – the further engagement in the Western Balkans as well as continuing and adding more dynamism to NATO initiatives such as the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. Italy considers these two regions as the greatest challenges for security, also on account of threats related to migration and crime.

Italy believes the Alliance should avoid concentrating on Eastern Europe, so as not to complicate relations with Russia while remaining engaged in areas that are important for Italian interests. Italy should thus not be expected to support NATO enlargement toward the east, even though Italy will no doubt support the open door policy towards the Balkans (including support for Macedonian membership in NATO). It should be pointed out that emphasizing the importance of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and the necessity for the Alliance to maintain a measure of cohesiveness in its ability to defend member states is advanced as an argument against NATO eastward enlargement.\(^\text{151}\)

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\(^{150}\) Author’s correspondence with N. Sartori, analyst with the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), September 2009, ‘Interview with Ambassador Stefano Stefanini, Permanent Representative of Italy to NATO’, Unioncamere News, Brussels No. 24, 5 February 2008.

Luxembourg

Introductory information

Luxembourg is a founding member of the North-Atlantic Alliance – a fact that is significant insofar that historically this small country enjoyed the status of a neutral state. However, for more than half a century, the equivalent and unchanging pillars of Luxembourg’s foreign policy have been the stimulation and participation in European integration processes, NATO membership and developing special relations with the United States. Luxembourg’s special position in the Alliance is due, on the one hand, to the symbolic size of its armed forces (about 900 persons) and its small defense expenditures (about 200 million EUR in 2007, almost 0.6% of its GDP) and, on the other, permanent interest in NATO activities. This manifests itself in the form of Luxembourg’s active participation in the political debates about various questions connected with the Alliance and European security as a whole (such as the initiative to build a new European security structure in common with, among other countries, France and Germany, in reaction to the American-led invasion against Iraq in March 2003), and also in the participation of Luxembourg’s soldiers in a number of NATO operations, most often in close cooperation with France and Belgium (presently 23 persons in the KFOR mission and 8 in the ISAF operation).

Hierarchy of NATO tasks

According to Luxembourg, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is the core of the Alliance and is of primary importance for NATO’s existence. For this reason it should be interpreted in a narrow sense, i.e., above all as an obligation for collective defense. Luxembourg is of the opinion that NATO’s main task it to guarantee the security of its member states, their defense in case of a crisis situation and supporting them in the restoration of security on their territory. In addition, Luxembourg points out that the message of NATO’s Anniversary Summit in Strasbourg and Kehl was intended explicitly as a confirmation of the vitality of the Washington Treaty and of its fundamental notion – collective defense. Luxembourg is skeptical about the proposals concerning a “global NATO”, intervening beyond the North-Atlantic area in crises having no direct influence on its members’ security. It stresses that the Alliance should not get involved in out-of-area missions on a regular basis, but should always carry out an in-depth analysis of the effects that a possible operation could have for the security of the treaty area and only then, on its basis, decide on a possible intervention. In addition, NATO’s operations should be limited in terms of their geographical reach. In order to ensure the legitimacy of a given mission, a UN mandate should be treated as a pre-condition to any action.

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153 NATO materials on of member states’ military engagement in allied missions and operations http://www.nato.int/issues/commitment/index.html.
154 Unofficial conversation between the author and a Luxembourg diplomat, October 2009.
NATO and non-military aspects of security

Luxembourg does not question the seriousness of the impact that new kinds of non-military threats might potentially have on members’ security. It stresses that cooperation within the organization and in international institutions is necessary in order to counteract them but, at the same time, it holds that only organizations that have the necessary resources and capabilities should be competent to take action against such non-classical threats to security. Accordingly, Luxembourg regards NATO as being unprepared to deal effectively with, for example, problems of environmental, demographic or energy security. At the same time, it notes that adapting the Alliance to play such a role does not enjoy wide support among NATO members at present. In Luxembourg’s opinion, NATO should develop effective mechanisms to cooperate with other international organizations which, given their character, could deal far better with this type of non-traditional threats. According to Luxembourg, the European Union is a natural partner for the Alliance in this context.

Enlargement

For Luxembourg, the problem of NATO enlargement is made up of two fundamental issues. The first if the accession of Western Balkan countries – in this case Luxembourg supports further NATO enlargement fully, pointing out that it will help reinforce democracy and the rule of law in these countries and will contribute to regional stability. The second issue is the accession of Ukraine and Georgia. In this context, Luxembourg stands firmly by the principle that each enlargement should contribute to increasing the security of the treaty area, not to undermining it. According to Luxembourg, both countries’ numerous problems, including their complicated relations with Russia, presently rule out any possibility for rapid membership in the Alliance.

Relations with the European Union

Cooperation between the European Union and NATO is an issue of particular importance for Luxembourg. Reinforcing the military dimension of European integration, i.e., the development of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is seen by this country as a necessity, as a guarantee of stability in the European Union and the growth of its global position. At the same time, Luxembourg points out that the CSDP and NATO have complementary, not competitive roles to play. As a result, cooperation between them should be made more effective and closer. Luxembourg also points out that France’s return to the Alliance’s integrated structures has deep consequences for the European security environment, as it entails a chance to accelerate the development of the CSDP, as the second (besides NATO) pillar of European security.

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155 Ibidem.
156 Ibidem.
Relations with Russia and other partners

NATO’s relations with Russia are seen by Luxembourg as an unusually delicate problem that requires the allies to conduct a thought-out policy. Luxembourg points to the fact that it is not possible to build the security of the Euro-Atlantic area while circumventing Russia. The latter should be drawn into a constructive dialogue and mutually beneficial cooperation in many areas. On the other hand, existing problems (such as Russia’s attitude to the countries of the South Caucasus, exploitation of the status of a major gas and oil exporter in the conduct of foreign policy) should not be omitted. Luxembourg believes that a situation in which Russia would gain a de-facto veto power over the decisions taken by the Allies is unacceptable and should thus be prevented at all costs.

Netherlands

Introductory information

The traditional tenets of the Netherlands’ security policy is full support for NATO, which is viewed as the foundation of the country’s national security; the conviction about the need to maintain America’s commitment to NATO as the fundamental guarantee of its effectiveness; and a strong sense of responsibility for security and respect for human rights around the world, resulting from the Netherlands’ activeness in promoting its global interests – especially political stability, international law and open markets. The Alliance enjoys unusually strong public support. Over 70% of the Dutch continue to view NATO as important for the security of the Netherlands, but weariness with the ISAF operation is beginning to show – continued presence in Afghanistan at current levels was supported by roughly 40% of the public in 2008, while about 20% called for a reduction in the number of troops, and 30% wished for an immediate withdrawal of Dutch forces.\textsuperscript{158}

The Netherlands’ strong reliance on NATO is reflected in the functioning of its armed forces – as a result of transformation processes, 60% of its 40,000 strong professional army is prepared for action in expeditionary operations. Thanks to this, the Dutch contingent in the ISAF mission is not only one of the largest (about 2,100 persons) but, above all, is actively involved in combat operations. However, the combat role in the Southern province of Uruzgan is to be relinquished in the second part of 2010.\textsuperscript{159} The Netherlands does not question its participation in the Alliance’s nuclear sharing policy.

Dutch expenditures for defense per capita in 2007 were relatively high – at the level of, for example, Sweden, Greece and Finland, and greater than Germany, although it amounted to about 1.5% of GDP – lower than the NATO average (which in 2007 amounted to 1.73%, excluding the United States); in addition, the Netherlands’ expenditures on defense continue to fall.\textsuperscript{160}

Hierarchy of NATO tasks

In relation to the question of how to interpret Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Netherlands stresses that it forms the core of NATO and determines the strength of the Alliance. The Netherlands sees the tasks that arise from the obligation to maintain the security of treaty territory in a non-classic manner: it strongly emphasizes the key importance of operations conducted beyond member states’ boundaries (out-of-area missions) for counter-acting threats which, even if they do not affect the


\textsuperscript{159} NATO materials about the military involvement of member states in allied missions and operations – http://www.nato.int/issues/commitment/index.html, data about the number of ISAF troops – http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.html.

allies directly, could in the future have serious consequences. In this context, it should be noted that the participation of the Dutch in such operations has two additional and significant dimensions. The humanitarian one has to do with bringing assistance to the population that inhabits conflict areas and arises from the oft-declared (and borne out in practice) readiness of this country to become militarily engaged in stabilizing regions subject to crises. The second dimension remains strictly political – it is the will to maintain the cohesiveness of the Alliance and its internal solidarity through common involvement of European allies and the USA in combat operations.

Considering that the Netherlands is one of the NATO member countries that exhibit a strong Atlantic orientation manifested through frequent support for the United States and the United Kingdom (with which the Netherlands has particularly close relations, also in the sphere of military cooperation), it can be expected that the Netherlands will support U.S. and British proposals to place particular emphasis in the Alliance’s new strategy on NATO’s ability to act beyond treaty area and engage in the entire spectrum of out-of-area missions.

NATO transformations and internal reforms

The Netherlands’ notion of collective defense in the context of expeditionary missions entails specific priorities in the sphere of the Alliance’s military capabilities. The Netherlands is calling for further development of the NATO Response Force (NRF) and of other capabilities related to expeditionary operations. On the other hand, this country would not support the expansion of the Alliance’s mechanisms and permanent infrastructure used for territorial defense. For these reasons, proposals to include provisions in the new strategic concept that would expand contingency planning mechanisms in case of classic military threats in Europe will presumably not gain Dutch support.

In recent years, although it generally supported the idea of a missile defense system, the Netherlands greeted the U.S. plans to deploy permanent installations in Poland and the Czech Republic with reserve. The change of the MD concept is thus considered to be a step in the right direction – one that reduces costs and increases the mobility of the planned system, and which could in the future allow to set up missile defense within the framework of the Alliance (on the basis of the ALTBMD project) with the participation of a greater number of countries.

NATO and non-military aspects of security

The problem of non-traditional tasks in NATO’s future strategy is unusually important for the Netherlands, because it can see the negative impact a number of newly-emerged challenges, such as climate change, unfavorable demographic and migratory trends, threats to countries’ IT and energy security, have on the Alliance’s security. According to the Netherlands, the Alliance should address some of these

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162 Unofficial conversation with a Dutch diplomat in September 2009.
163 Comment made by General P. van Uhm, op. cit.
issues, but is not able to deal with all such problems in an effective manner. Threats related to demographics, migrations and climate change are particularly important and addressed often by the Netherlands, which thinks they should also be taken up by other organizations (the European Union and various UN agencies), better equipped to deal with them.\textsuperscript{164} The Netherlands will thus most probably not support any calls to grant new prerogatives to the Alliance’s institutions in these spheres.

The problem of energy security is of particular importance for the Netherlands because that country, being at once an important producer and consumer of natural gas, as well as an important point of gas transfer, attaches great importance to safe deliveries of energy resources. The Netherlands is determined to take up negotiations on the redefinition of NATO’s role in maintaining energy security in member countries.\textsuperscript{165} At the same time, it should be pointed out that it has not yet been determined what role for NATO in energy security the Netherlands will opt for. Any potential obligation to protect the energy infrastructure would be viewed by the Netherlands as equally problematic as calls to highlight solidarity among NATO members (for example, in the form of consultations, in keeping with Article 4 of the Washington Treaty) in case of any deliberate interruption of supplies.\textsuperscript{166}

Enlargement

For the Netherlands, the question of future NATO enlargement is closely related to the problem of the Alliance’s relations with Russia. Enlargement should not lead to the weakening of the Alliance through the admission of countries that are unprepared and which are solely security consumers, and should not be used as a way to antagonize Russia. In the Netherlands’ view, Russia would be justified in feeling encircled by the Alliance in the case of further accessions of countries from the post-Soviet space.\textsuperscript{167} It would seem that the Netherlands share the view – a popular one among some European allies – that countries of the former Soviet Union could draw the Alliance into political disputes of a historical and identity nature with Russia. Such a turn of events would, in turn, be dangerous for the cohesion and credibility of the Alliance, which would not always be able to or willing to come to such countries’ aid. For this reason it can be assumed that any postulates to include in NATO’s new strategy mechanisms bringing Georgia and Ukraine – the two countries presently giving rise to the most controversies – closer to membership will not be supported by the Netherlands. On the other hand, the Netherlands would probably not block the progress of the Western Balkan states on its way to accession, especially as the Dutch have long been militarily engaged in the stabilization of this region.

Relations with the European Union and partners

Closer relations between NATO and other international organizations, especially the European Union, is a very important subject for the Netherlands. Overcoming

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{164} Statement made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands during the Conference on Security and Development in The Hague, 7 April 2006.
\item \textsuperscript{165} Energy 2008, a report of the Dutch Ministry of the Economy, p. 50.
\item \textsuperscript{166} Unofficial conversation with a Dutch diplomat in September 2009
\item \textsuperscript{167} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
existing problems and increasing the level of cooperation between these two organizations is one of the basic pre-conditions leading to the increased effectiveness of steps taken by European countries in the security domain (especially in the case of missions conducted simultaneously by the EU and NATO). In keeping with its traditional approach to issues regarding the stabilization of conflict situations (the need to merge military and civilian assets), the Netherlands points to the European Union’s considerable competence as a player able to assume non-military tasks through the use of civilian instruments in regions engulfed in conflict. At the same time, it stressed on many occasions the need for the EU to be ready to use force decisively, if necessary.\(^{168}\)

This means that the Netherlands could be disinclined to support mechanisms of cooperation between the EU and NATO that would, in its view, increase the EU’s military capabilities at NATO’s expense.

The Netherlands views future cooperation between NATO and its potential global partners as being conditional on the existence of good chances that such cooperation will be effective. Still, it does not seem to favor the formalization of such relations with, for example, Australia and Japan which – as the Netherlands points out – are already close partners of NATO member states.

Relations with Russia

The Netherlands consistently stresses that Russia should be treated by NATO as a strategic partner – one that is particularly valuable in the context global challenges that NATO will be facing in the next few decades and rejects suggestions that Russia should be viewed as a potential NATO rival.\(^{169}\) At the same time, according to the Dutch, given the specific character of Russian policy, it seems that one should not expect a partnership based on common values, but functional relations based on shared interests. It is also worthwhile to add that the special economic relations that tie the Netherlands and Russia could make the former disinclined to support proposals to increase the cohesiveness of NATO’s policy toward Russia.

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\(^{168}\) Statement made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, op. cit.; Comment made by Eimert van Middelkoop, Minister of Defense of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in ‘Summit 2009’, op. cit.

\(^{169}\) *Ibid.*
Norway

Introductory information

Norway is one of NATO’s founding members. The Alliance, apart from close bilateral cooperation with the United States, is the main pillar of Norway’s defense policy. That country also strives to maintain the autonomous capability to enforce its sovereignty, especially with regard to the territories and waters in the Arctic. It also calls for the development of Nordic cooperation in matters of security, especially in non-military areas.170

Norway’s defense budget in 2008 amounted to 4.83 billion USD (about 1.2% of GDP; in defense expenditures amounted to 2% of GDP). Norway’s partly professional armed forces include 19,100 soldiers on active duty and 42,250 in reserve (the Home Guard). A considerable proportion of the units on active duty are able to take part in expeditionary missions. Presently, the greatest engagement of this type in which Norwegian forces participate is the ISAF mission (480 soldiers – the northern province of Faryab). Territorial defense rests mainly on units of the Home Guard.171

Hierarchy of NATO tasks

Norway expects a reinforcement of the importance of the Alliance’s traditional functions in the hierarchy of NATO tasks, i.e., countering threats to the security of the territories and populations of member states as well as other challenges arising on treaty area or in its near vicinity, which is referred to as the core area. Nevertheless, Norway recognizes the need for NATO’s political and military engagement beyond treaty area, both in order to defend the vital interests of the member states and for humanitarian reasons. Norway is calling for the organization of NATO’s expeditionary activities in accordance with the concept of comprehensive approach. It considers out-of-area missions – and the participation of Norwegian forces in them – as serving the maintenance of the Alliance’s cohesiveness and sustaining the interest of member states (above all the United States) in working together within the framework of the Alliance. The Norwegian authorities believe, however, that NATO is presently focusing excessively on expeditionary operations. In order to restore a right proportion of NATO’s activities, they propose to reform the command structure and the Alliance’s headquarters including the partial restoration of regional commands’ territorial responsibility; a closer relationship between NATO commands and national command structures; developing capabilities to conduct situational analysis in relation to treaty area and its immediate vicinity; adapting exercise and training programs to the requirements of the Alliance’s traditional tasks; and extending the scope of tasks of NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT). Norway recognizes the need to update


NATO and non-military aspects of security

Given the growing impact of non-military issues on the security of member states and international stability, Norway expects a discussion within the Alliance about the real importance of these issues for NATO as a whole. In its opinion, the decision to become involved in non-military dimensions of security has to take into account the Alliance’s limitations as a political and military structure and to strengthen or at least not to weaken its ability to carry out its basic functions. Norway is also stressing the need to develop cooperation in this respect with other international structures (the EU, UN, specialized and regional institutions). It supports the Alliance’s involvement in fighting maritime piracy and organized crime. NATO’s involvement in environmental issues (in the shape of, for example, the monitoring of environmental change, participation in scientific research, limiting the effects of natural disasters) could be linked with the postulate of the Alliance’s engagement in the Arctic (see below). Norway also sees a role for NATO in ensuring energy security, and proposes, among other things, that its members’ armed forces participate in the protection of extraction sites and distribution routes of energy resources, as well as the development of the Alliance’s capability to react to environmental catastrophes and accidents. Norway is not adamant in its demands for the implementation of these proposals, but it opposes the Alliance’s interference in market mechanisms in the energy sector, including the introduction of the principle of “allied solidarity” with respect to energy security.\footnote{A.-G. Strom-Erichsen, ‘Threats and challenges, Security and Defense’, address to the Oslo Military Society, 7 January 2008, www.regjeringen.no; E. B. Eide, ‘Energy security: A common concern’, 27 October 2007, www.regjeringen.no.}

Military transformation and internal reforms

Norway takes an active part in NATO’s military transformation and favors its continuation. It is against excessive concentration on the development of expeditionary capabilities at the expense of the need to defend the territory of member states. For this reason it greeted favorably the British proposal to create so-called solidarity forces within the NATO Response Force, seeing in this a manner to revive the very idea of the NRF and to give it a character closer to the defense needs of members. It also supports – in cases when the requirements of collective defense justify it – the extension of allied infrastructure in the treaty area. Norway is conducting the modernization of its armed forces in two ways. First, it increases their expeditionary capabilities. Second, it augments their ability to defend the national territory and monitor Norwegian airspace and territorial waters.

Norway expects reforms of NATO’s internal structure, including a reduction of the Alliance’s bureaucracy and increasing the autonomy and the mobility of lower level NATO commands. It supports the common financing of NATO projects and activities
but is opposed to the limitation of the principle of consensus in the decision making process in NATO.

Norway held a skeptical view of the missile defense program pursued by the United States in cooperation with certain allies, going so far as to voice reservations about the legitimacy of this project. This opposition was mainly due to domestic factors and ultimately was withdrawn, even though Norway remained doubtful about the program. Norway’s reaction to the changes in the project announced by the United States in September 2009 was favorable. These changes were seen in Norway as consistent with the need to maintain the indivisibility of NATO security and as something that increases the chances for a real “NATOization” of the program.¹⁷⁴

Enlargement

Norway officially supports the open door policy pursued in keeping with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. It has adopted rather passive attitude in debates about enlargement, however, with the exception of the accession of the Baltic States. It is skeptical about further enlargement, especially in the case of Ukraine and Georgia. It views the accession of the Balkan states more favorably. Even though its position is partially due to fears of Russian reaction, the conviction that enlargement could have a negative influence on the Alliance’s cohesion and effectiveness is equally important. Candidates should first attain a level of readiness, especially in the sphere of reforms of the security sector and implementation of democratic standards. Hence, for Norway, enlargement issues are a problem of a secondary nature.¹⁷⁵

Relations with the European Union

As a state that does not belong to the EU but which has close political and economic ties with it (membership in the EEA) and is a participant in the CSDP (including the Nordic Battlegroup and EU military operations), Norway recognizes the importance of closer cooperation between NATO and the EU. It does not raise any specific proposals for reform on its own, however, but merely emphasizes the need to avoid duplication of efforts and structures, to rationalize expenditures and to increase the complementarity of both organizations so as to allow for a comprehensive approach to improving the expeditionary activities of NATO and the EU. Norway is interested in granting non-EU NATO members their due influence on the shaping of this cooperation, but does not expect NATO to oversee CSDP development.¹⁷⁶


¹⁷⁶ Interview with an expert from the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies, September 2009.
Relations with Russia

Given its geographical location and complex political and economic relations with Russia, Norway is particularly interested in maintaining a high intensity of NATO-Russia cooperation. Although Norway does not see Russia as a threat, it views certain Russian moves (such as the resumption of strategic bomber patrols), especially in the context of the war in Georgia, as worrisome. Despite this, it is interested in avoiding excessive tensions between NATO and Russia also on account of such tensions’ negative impact on its bilateral relations with that country. Norway is also calling for the development of the widest possible operational cooperation between the Alliance and Russia, especially in questions of mutual interest, such as combating piracy and terrorism, the operation in Afghanistan, arms control and disarmament (including the future of the CFE Treaty). Norway sees the NATO-Russia Council in its present form as an adequate forum for dialogue, although in reaction to the crisis in NATO-Russia relations following the war in Georgia, the Norwegian authorities suggested that work be taken up on strengthening this structure and turning it into an “all weather forum” allowing for sustained dialogue at all times.  

Cooperation with third countries

Norway has not adopted a clear position in its assessment of the institutionalized forms of cooperation between NATO and third states. It participates in all structures of this type, concentrating on cooperation within the framework of the Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), especially given its connection with the cooperation of Nordic states and its role in the stabilization of the Balkans. It fears that the idea of “global partnerships” would make difficult the restoration of adequate proportions between in and out-of-area operations in NATO’s activities.

The Arctic (the High North)

As a country particularly interested in the situation in the Arctic (High North), Norway is making intensive efforts to direct the Alliance’s attention to these issues. The Norwegian authorities are primarily interested in NATO’s recognition of the present and future importance of the Arctic region for the security of all allies. In their opinion, meeting this end should be greatly aided by the growth of the geo-strategic significance of the Arctic as a result of climate change and the melting of the polar ice cap (increased extraction of energy resources; growing maritime traffic, especially given the possibility of making regular use of the so-called Northeast and Northwest Passage; the scale of negative consequences of environmental changes in the High North). According to Norway, the importance of the Arctic requires the Alliance to maintain a “visible presence” in the region, though not necessarily in the form of an ongoing deployment of allied troops or infrastructure. It could consist in ensuring the allies’ readiness to act in the region thanks to regular military exercises and the preparation of plans of action in case of unfavorable changes in the Arctic. Norway also proposes that NATO considers

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taking partial responsibility for the safety of the northern maritime routes (maritime and airborne patrols) and the development of capabilities to react to environmental disasters and accidents, e.g. to engage in rescue operations.\textsuperscript{178}

Arms control and disarmament

In 2007, Norway (with Germany) came forward with an initiative to raise NATO’s profile in arms control and disarmament. It is presently maintaining this initiative, whose declared aim is to ensure that questions of arms control and disarmament become an important topic of inter-allied discussions and be adequately considered in Allied decision making in the defense policy sphere. Norway also calls for reducing the dependence of NATO’s deterrence concepts on nuclear weapons, and points to the unique possibilities resting with NATO’s conventional forces.\textsuperscript{179}

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Poland

Introductory information

According to the current National Security Strategy, adopted in 2007, “the North Atlantic Alliance is for Poland the most important form of multilateral cooperation in a political and military dimension of security and a pillar of stability on the European continent, as well as the main platform of trans-Atlantic relations.”\(^{180}\) In the last few years, the functioning of the North Atlantic Alliance was criticized in Poland increasingly often, however, given the insufficient stress on fulfilling tasks arising from Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (collective defense), an excessive concentration on out-of-area missions, and also the reluctance to include Ukraine and Georgia in NATO. The failure to place important allied installations on Polish territory (while NATO infrastructure is well developed in Western Europe) is treated as evidence of the Alliance’s failure to give sufficient weight to the need to ensure equal security of all members. NATO was also blamed in Poland for excessive prudence in relations with Russia and for the Alliance’s disinclination to oppose its aggressive steps, a confirmation of which was, among other things, the Alliance’s failure to grant the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia and Ukraine at the Bucharest NATO summit (2008) as well as the Alliance’s restrained reaction to the war in Georgia in August 2008. It is worthwhile to note that – irrespective of the critical opinion of experts – according to the public opinion poll conducted by CBOS in February 2009, a majority of Poles (80\%) supported Poland’s membership in NATO, while only 11\% were opposed to it.\(^{181}\)

Poland’s armed forces are undergoing a process of professionalization. According to the “Professionalization Program for the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland for the 2008-2010”, they are to number up to 120,000 professional soldiers by the end of 2010. The last group of conscripts completed their service in June 2009 and, according to figures for September 2009, about 95,000 soldiers are serving in the Polish armed forces. The professionalization process also applies to the modernization of equipment. The Polish defense budget for 2009 amounted to 4.86 billion PLN (about 9 billion USD).\(^{182}\) The draft budget for 2010 calls for defense expenditures at the level of about 25.5 billion PLN, a figure that points to the maintenance of defense expenditures at the statutory level of 1.95\% of the previous year’s GDP.\(^{183}\) Given that in 2009 there was an important decrease of real defense expenditures in connection with the financial crisis and the need to settle outstanding obligations from 2008 (amounting to 2.5 billion PLN), this will represent a real increase of defense spending in comparison with the "crisis" year of 2009.

Poland takes an important part in NATO operations. The Polish contingent in the ISAF mission is 2,025 soldiers strong and ranks as the eighth largest.\(^{184}\) In 2008, it took

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\(^{181}\) ‘10 lat w NATO’, communiqué from CBOS public opinion poll BS/38/2009, March 2009.

\(^{182}\) The Military Balance 2009, p. 142.


\(^{184}\) As of 1 October 2009 according to NATO data (NATO ISAF & ANA Placemat).
over the responsibility for security and training of Afghan security forces in the Ghazni province as part of the Regional Command East under US command. Polish soldiers in Afghanistan are not bound by any national caveats. Besides the Afghan mission, 226 Polish soldiers are serving in Kosovo (KFOR) as part of the Polish-Ukrainian battalion making up a part of Task Force - East.\textsuperscript{185} Polish airplanes regularly participate in the Air Policing missions providing protection of the airspace over the Baltic States. Polish ships are part of the NATO teams conducting the Active Endeavor anti-terrorist operation in the Mediterranean Sea. Over a dozen Polish military instructors are also taking part in NATO’s training mission in Iraq (NTM-I). Poland also set aside contingents for the NATO Response Force.

So far efforts to secure the deployment of NATO military units and installations in Poland have yielded limited results. North-western city of Szczecin is the headquarters (HQ) of the Command of the North-Eastern Multinational Corps, made up of military units from Germany, Poland and Denmark. The personnel of that command was used in the mission in Afghanistan. The Joint Forces Training Center (JFTC) is based in Bydgoszcz. In 2009, the Alliance decided to deploy there as well the command and selected components of a NATO communications battalion (starting in 2011). Efforts to host the main base for unmanned aerial vehicles used in the Allied Ground Surveillance program proved unsuccessful, however.

Dissatisfaction with the Alliance’s present situation means that Poland will be very active during discussions over the new strategic document. The Group of Experts includes Prof. Adam Daniel Rotfeld, a former Polish foreign minister and an authority on matters of international security and arms control (who had earlier taken part in drafting of the “Declaration on Alliance Security” adopted during the summit in Strasbourg/Kehl). Poland primarily fears a deepening of differences in the perception of threats to security within the Alliance between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (for whom the Alliance’s tasks should include preventing armed aggression against their territories or protecting them from outside pressure through the use of military means) and the other NATO members (for whom the importance of “classic” threats of aggression is marginal). Poland will attempt to influence the evolution of the Alliance in such a manner as to prevent the erosion of its importance and potential as an organization serving to protect its member states.

Hierarchy of NATO tasks

The point of departure for the work on the new document remains the Washington Treaty and its core premise – the obligation of collective defense contained in Article 5.\textsuperscript{186} In keeping with Poland’s established position, the strengthening of the significance of Article 5 requires changes in the present functioning of the Alliance and taking into account collective defense function in the NATO’s actions, particularly through a return to the defense planning (including defense plans of individual states or regions in the treaty area), adequate shaping of future defense capabilities and preparation of armed forces (national training, exercise scenarios for NATO forces).

\textsuperscript{185} As of 12 October 2009 according to NATO data (NATO KFOR Placemat).

\textsuperscript{186} See, for example, the speech of foreign minister R. Sikorski at the conference ‘NATO – Challenges and Tasks Ahead’, 13 March 2009, Warsaw, in: NATO – Challenges and Tasks Ahead, Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych, Warsaw 2009, p. 33.
There is also a need for NATO to build an appropriate infrastructure on the territories of states admitted to the Alliance after 1999 and to increase NATO’s “visibility” by deploying there commands and institutions that are important for the functioning of the Alliance. Moreover, it is necessary to reinforce the exchange of information within the Alliance (including better intelligence) about threats related to Article 5. Polish representatives stress that taking such steps will provide a degree of “automatism” in the application of Article 5 after the North Atlantic Council decides to activate it.\footnote{Polish defense minister B. Klich during the common meeting of the Foreign Affairs Commission (no. 102) and the National Defense Commission (no. 49), 2 April 2009.}

The Strategy of the Polish Armed Forces’ Participation in Foreign Operations\footnote{See http://www.nato.int/issues/commitment/docs/090306-poland.pdf} adopted in January 2009, grants primary importance to missions organized within the framework of NATO and the EU. The Strategy sets the optimal size of all Polish forces taking part in foreign missions at any one time at a range between 3,200 and 3,800 soldiers.

Although the importance to involve the Alliance in stabilization missions is unquestioned, according to the government such missions should be closely tied with the pursuit of the interests of countries belonging to the Euro-Atlantic area (including Poland) and should make use of the possibilities connected with cooperation with other partners and organizations. Poland’s view is that its participation in NATO missions arises from a sense of allied solidarity and reinforces Poland’s position in its efforts to place a greater emphasis on Article 5, but this reasoning is put seriously to the test in connection with the Alliance’s involvement in Afghanistan. Firstly, conflicts between member countries about the strategy to adopt and the means to be used for the ISAF mission (including caveats) have not had a positive influence on the perception of trans-Atlantic solidarity. Secondly, problems in Afghanistan are contributing to a reduction of NATO’s credibility as a military alliance, while the burdens entailed by the operation make it difficult to find the means to develop collective defense capabilities.

It is significant for Poland to maintain and reinforce trans-Atlantic ties and the presence of the United States in Europe. The initiative of deploying elements of the missile defense system on Polish territory was meant to tie US security with Central Europe. Despite the change in the MD concept announced in September 2009, Poland continues to see benefits from the US involvement in European security, and NATO remains one of the principal instruments of this involvement. Declarations made by the United States about a greater role for NATO in the new system were greeted positively in Poland as a possibility to give a new impulse to the work within the Alliance on a common missile defense system.

Military transformation and internal reforms

The ultimate goal of the military reforms in Poland is to increase the capability of its armed forces’ to carry out expeditionary missions and also to maintain the ability to protect Poland’s population and territory. Poland expects the same kind of balanced approach to developing allied military capabilities within the NATO framework. The Chief of General Staff of Polish Armed Forces, General Gągor, emphasized during the meeting of the NATO Military Committee in September 2009, that in defining the future
military needs of the Alliance it is necessary to take regional conditions into
consideration. It means that, in addition to preparations for expeditionary missions,
the armed forces of NATO countries should develop their capabilities to defend areas
that are important for part of the member states. Also, just as NATO defines the
percentage thresholds for readiness to use forces in expeditionary missions, it should
also take into account that some of the national static forces are in fact being used for
defense purposes. This gives them specific value for the Alliance.

Poland calls for the development of the NATO Response Force in a manner that
would make it capable to perform a wide range of tasks, including those associated with
collective defense. This would make the process of force generation easier. The
principle of financing operations mainly from national sources does not encourage
member states to make greater contributions to the NATO Response Force as its use
entails additional costs. Poland is also in favor of increasing the common financing of
NATO activities, but it is aware of the practical difficulties connected with the
implementation of this concept.

Regarding internal reforms, Poland is cautious vis-à-vis the proposals to
renounce or reduce the consensus rule with respect to decision-making. On the other
hand, agreed decisions should be implemented as quickly as possible, something that
requires the reduction of bureaucracy. Poland stands by the postulate of increasing the
number of staff (civilian and military) originating from countries admitted after 1999
within the Alliance’s structures, particularly as far as higher echelons are concerned.

NATO and non-military aspects of security

The so-called “new threats”, most notably cyber security and energy security,
have already been recognized by NATO as a serious challenge, and part of the
Alliance’s activities is directed at counteracting them. Poland argues that this should be
reflected in the new strategic concept. The Alliance’s practical role is in any case
dependent on the nature of the threat and the capabilities at the Alliance’s disposal.
Accordingly, NATO’s activities with regard to energy security should focus on
protecting the critical infrastructure. Given that NATO has to act in coordination with
other organizations co-responsible for European and international security (the EU, the
UN and regional organizations), their non-military capabilities to act should be used to
the maximum degree, without the need to extend the scope of the Alliance’s tasks.

Enlargement

Poland has traditionally supported NATO enlargement on the basis of Article 10
of the Washington Treaty without placing political limitations on this process or
granting external entities a veto right in the matter. There is a need for candidate
countries to meet specific membership criteria concerning their governance and armed
forces, but such arguments cannot be used in order to artificially delay the admission of

189 ‘Gen. Gągor o nowej koncepcji strategicznej NATO’, press communiqué of General Staff of
the Polish Armed Forces, 21 September 2009.

190 See, for example the speech of the Minister of National Defense B. Klich at the conference
‘NATO – Challenges and Tasks Ahead’, 13 March 2009, Warsaw, in : NATO – Challenges and Tasks
Ahead, op. cit., p. 28.
new states to the Alliance. In particular, Poland supports NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia and favored the granting of the Membership Action Plan to both countries during the Bucharest summit. According to Poland, their admission should not be interpreted as a confrontational step toward Russia but as a way to consolidate those countries’ pro-democratic reforms and to increase stability in Europe. Besides this, both countries can contribute to the functioning of the Alliance.

The question of eastward NATO enlargement remains on the Polish agenda. However, the prospects of granting membership to Georgia have become more remote after the August 2008 conflict in the Caucasus, while Ukraine’s chances are reduced given the Ukrainian public’s opposition to joining NATO and the internal political dispute connected with this question. This means that the principal Polish postulate during working on the new strategic concept will be to stress the open door principle in keeping with Article 10, without introducing any additional criteria.191

Relations with the European Union

Poland sees the working out of new principles for NATO-EU cooperation as one of the most difficult, but potentially the most important, issues to be resolved in the new document. Experiences in Afghanistan indicate that the European Union should increase its support for those NATO operations which involve a majority of EU’s members. Given that Poland has pointed to the strengthening of the Common Security and Defense Policy as one of the priority issues for its presidency of the EU Council (scheduled for the second half of 2011), it will be interested in the adoption of solutions allowing for better strategic and operational cooperation by the Alliance. The “Berlin Plus” formula should be adapted to both organizations’ present conditions of operation. It should not be expected that Poland will take up the issue of resolving the Turkish-Cypriot-Greek dispute, which constitutes an obstacle to deeper EU-NATO cooperation, but it will support constructive solutions to this problem.

Relations with Russia

Poland is interested in dialogue and cooperation with Russia in areas in which the interests of the Alliance and Russia converge (for example, projects concerning Afghanistan or joint airspace surveillance). A pragmatic involvement in the realization of common projects has to be based on the recognition by all the allies that, at least for the time being, there are differences with respect to values and methods of conducting foreign and internal policy between the Alliance and Russia that make it impossible to establish a genuine strategic partnership. For Poland, it will be important not to provide Russia with any formal or de facto means to exert influence in areas that are the exclusive prerogative of NATO member states.

The Alliance should not conduct business as usual in the face of Russia’s hostile rhetoric and confrontational steps toward the Alliance (such as its opposition to NATO enlargement, violating the airspace of NATO member states, shaping elements of its military doctrine and training its armed forces on the basis of scenarios foreseeing a

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potential conflict with the Alliance), but should make a readiness for increased cooperation dependent on change of the Russian conduct. Russia’s conflict with Georgia, its recognition of independence for Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia, and its claim to a zone of privileged interests have led Polish representatives to assert that Russia has lost the trust of NATO member states.\textsuperscript{192} Restoration of this trust will be a long-term process. The principles of cooperation with Russia set out in 2002 remain in force, but Poland argues that the potential of the NATO-Russia Council is not being fully explored.\textsuperscript{193} Russia remains an important neighbor of NATO countries, but the Alliance cannot ignore those elements of Russia’s foreign and security policy that give rise to justified apprehension among certain NATO members.

\textsuperscript{192} The speech of the Minister of National Defense B. Klich, \textit{NATO – Challenges and Tasks Ahead}, op. cit., p. 29.

\textsuperscript{193} A. Rotfeld, ‘NATO musi mieć otwarte drzwi’, conversation with J. Pawlicki, Gazeta Wyborcza, 5 August 2009.
Portugal

Introductory information

Portugal is one of NATO’s founding members and attaches great importance to cooperation within the North Atlantic Alliance. For many years, it was seen as an Atlantic state both in view of its geographical location at the periphery of Europe and on the Atlantic Ocean, as well as its privileged relations with the United States. Since the middle of the 1990s, along with the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the importance of the European Union for Portugal’s security and defense policy has been increasing. However, despite a considerable Europeization of Portugal’s policy in this domain, the Alliance remains the principal pillar of that country’s security and defense.194

Portugal, as a small country with modest-size (42,700 men), professional, but not very modern armed forces, is not one of the leading members of the Alliance. Despite this, it is rather active in the debate on NATO’s future. The socialist government of José Socrates is particularly interested in the course of the work on NATO’s new strategic concept, as the adoption of this document will most likely take place during the summit that is to take place in Lisbon in November 2010.195 Public support for NATO is traditionally high in Portugal. In 2009, 67% of the Portuguese saw the Alliance as being of key importance for their country’s security, while 25% held the opposite view.196

Hierarchy of NATO tasks

Portugal argues that the Alliance needs to adapt to new international realities while maintaining the traditional foundations on which its functioning is based. In this context, according to the Portuguese authorities, Article 5 should be exempt from any debates as the basis of NATO. At the same time, they oppose the idea of NATO becoming a “world policeman” or the West’s “military arm” which, through the use of military force, tries to entrench, or even impose, its values. Portugal favors a NATO that focuses on the trans-Atlantic area and its collective defense, as provided by the North Atlantic Treaty. At the same time, Portugal recognizes that NATO plays the role of a global security organization, and recognizes in this context that withdrawal from operations conducted by NATO is unacceptable.197 This applies particularly to the mission in Afghanistan, in which Portugal also takes part (without so-called caveats).198

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195 Ibid.
198 The Portuguese contingent is 105 soldiers strong. In addition to this Portugal participates in the NATO mission on Kosovo (295 soldiers). About Portugal’s participation in NATO missions, see the issue entitled ‘Portugal e a Aliança Atlântica’ of the periodical Nação e Defesa, Instituto de Defesa Nacional, no. 123, 2009, pp. 41-86.
The Portuguese share the opinion that the NATO needs to succeed in Afghanistan, although, according to the Portuguese defense minister, the future of the Alliance should not be made dependent on the outcome of a single mission to the detriment of its remaining functions and areas of activity. Afghanistan is not only a NATO matter but one of the entire international community.

Portugal calls for NATO to develop capabilities allowing it to take up action connected with both territorial defense and out-of-area missions. Given Portugal’s limited financial possibilities (its defense expenditures amount to 1.54% of GDP), it is unlikely to propose specific solutions in this respect.\(^\text{199}\)

Portugal adopted a negative stance towards fielding of the missile defense components in Poland and the Czech Republic. In March 2008, it called for a discussion on the subject on the forum of NATO and within the EU.\(^\text{200}\) Considering the prudence with which Portugal approaches relations with Russia, the United States’ decision not to pursue the missile defense project in its initial form was greeted positively in Portugal. According to commentators, the anti-missile project was a “thorn in the side of US-Russian and EU-Russian relations”.\(^\text{201}\)

Military transformation and internal reforms

In the context of NATO’s transformation, Portugal was especially interested in a review of the command structure. Its efforts to transform the Joint Command Lisbon into the Joint Forces Command (JFC) ended successfully. Portugal took part in all NATO Response Force (NRF) rotations, while the Joint Command Lisbon is responsible for the training and certification of successive NRF rotations. In its view, participation in the NRF is an important factor that favors the transformation of the Portuguese armed forces. Changes to their structure are introduced with the aim of attaining the parameters of usability and deployability as defined by NATO. The modernization of the military equipment serves the same purpose.\(^\text{202}\)

Enlargement

Formally, Portugal calls for upholding the open door policy, although it argues that the strength of Russian opposition to the admission of Georgia and Ukraine to the Alliance has been underestimated. It also points to the fact that decisions taken during the summits in Riga and Bucharest in the context of enlargement were characterized by


“excessive political voluntarism”. It is viewed that the period when enlargement defined the Alliance’s agenda has ended. In light of these declarations it can be expected that Portugal will take an extremely prudent stance on further NATO enlargement.

Relations with the European Union

As far as relations between NATO and the EU are concerned, Portugal supports the development of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) on the assumption that the EU will maintain its privileged relations with the United States and build its defensive capabilities not in opposition to NATO but as an element that complements the North Atlantic Alliance. Portugal points to the need for a precise definition of relations between NATO and the EU. According to the Portuguese foreign minister, considerable responsibility in this respect lies with the United States, which should look upon the EU not in terms of bilateral relations with its individual members, but with the EU as a whole and treat the Common Security and Defense Policy as a pillar of the Alliance. On the other hand, the European allies should contribute to preservation the trans-Atlantic bond. In this context, the re-integration of France into Alliance’s military structures is seen as a factor that could facilitate cooperation between the EU and NATO. Reflections on the future of the Alliance also bring up proposals for division of labor that would require an increase of EU defense capabilities. Should it come to that, NATO could focus more on issues of international security, while the EU would be responsible for collective defense of Europe and security in its vicinity.

Relations with Russia

In Portugal’s view, Russia is an important partner, with which NATO should maintain good relations. Portugal points out that the growth of cooperation requires considerable skills, as the new NATO members are particularly sensitive to relations with their eastern neighbor. It also stresses that decisions about the transformation of the Alliance should take into account what consequences this could entail for relations between NATO and Russia. It is important to maintain good relations with Russia and, with that in mind, Portugal supports the policy of the new US administration toward Russia. It stresses that relations with Russia should be based on “principles that can’t be abandoned”. It does not enter into detail as to what such principles should be – a fact that could be indicative of a rather flexible position in this matter on the part of Portugal, the more so as it appreciates Russia’s role in areas such as disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

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205 Luís Amado, op. cit.
206 Speech of the defense minister, Nuno Severiano Teixeira, op. cit.
207 Ibid.
Relations with other partners

Portugal recognizes the significance of relations with third countries and of the partnerships for NATO’s future. Portugal emphasizes that NATO should be more involved in the development of relations with neighbors of the Alliance than it has been until now. In addition to Russia, Portugal includes in this group countries of Central Asia, the Greater Middle East and the Mediterranean area, which is of particular importance for the interests of Portugal. Portugal can be credited with drawing attention to the fact that the South Atlantic, an area connected with Latin America, is also a region neighboring on NATO. A special place in Portugal’s reflections on the matter is taken by Brazil which, according to the Portuguese, could play an important role in a system of collective security. Portugal argues that the consolidation of the Alliance can not take place without greater attention being paid to the situation in both the Mediterranean Basin and Latin America.  

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208 Ibid.
Romania

Introductory information

Romania joined NATO in 2004. Romanian politicians see the need for active participation in work on NATO’s new strategic concept, something that is to guarantee that Romania’s fundamental security interests in its immediate neighborhood will be taken into account. The new concept should reflect future threats and, at the same time, guarantee the indivisibility of Euro-Atlantic security. Romania also stresses the need for the Alliance to return to the building of Euro-Atlantic security on a clearer regional dimension, by supporting a greater involvement of the Alliance in the Western Balkans and the wider Black Sea region (up to the countries of Central Asia) with consideration for energy security. Romania also favors the closest possible relations with the United States, although this does not have to entail unconditional support for the American vision of the new strategy. For Romania, the allied security guarantees arising from Article 5 of the Washington Treaty continue to be viewed as a priority matter.

Since 2007, the Romanian armed forces have been fully professional and have about 75,000 soldiers and 15,000 civilian personnel. Defense expenditures in the 2009 budget amounted to 7.65 billion lei, i.e., 1.3% of GDP (2.05% in 2007). This seems to put in question the armed forces modernization plan (13 billion EUR during 10 years), which calls for the purchase of multi-task fighters, C-27J Spartan transport planes, the modernization of T 22 frigates, or the purchase of submarines. About 1,150 Romanian soldiers are participating in NATO operations, of which 990 as part of the ISAF and 145 as part of the KFOR missions. Since Romania joined NATO in 2004, public has consistently supported Romania’s membership in the Alliance. In 2006, 63% of Romanians saw NATO as a key instrument of their country’s security policy while the corresponding figure in 2008 was 75%, and 60% in 2009.

Hierarchy of NATO tasks

The National Defense Strategy, adopted in November 2008, states that territorial defense has to remain NATO’s fundamental task, but stresses the importance for the Alliance to be able to conduct operations in response to asymmetric threats both on the territory of member states and beyond. Such measures are to support efforts on behalf of stabilization taken up by other international organizations. Romania consistently favors strong trans-Atlantic ties and the indivisibility of the Alliance’s security both of which are based on the principle of collective defense as defined in Article 5 of the

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Washington Treaty and which have to form the basis for NATO’s new strategic concept.\(^{211}\)

The opinion is prevalent at the Romanian Ministry of Defense that the direction set out in 1999 and which – in addition to issues of collective defense and traditional deterrence functions – introduced the idea of responding to crises beyond treaty area as a priority issue for the Alliance, should be maintained. In this context, Romania favors a comprehensive approach requiring NATO to cooperate closely with international organizations with a civilian potential, particularly the UN and the EU. At the same time, it is admitted that, especially in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which are apprehensive given Russia’s aggressive rhetoric, that the role of territorial defense remains important.\(^{212}\)

Military transformation and internal reforms

Romania wishes to specialize in the training and use of civilian specialists in crisis resolution and reconstruction of social and political structures. According to the Romanian government, work on NATO’s new security concept constitutes a convenient vehicle of integrating these capabilities into a wider institutional framework. Romania also wishes to consolidate its position as a leading human intelligence training center – the decision to establish NATO’s Center of Excellence for Human Intelligence at Oradea was taken in 2008.\(^{213}\)

Romania supported the US plans to deploy missile defense elements in Poland and the Czech Republic, but emphasized that this system also has to cover NATO’s South-East European members. Moreover, its installation should be conducted in parallel with the development of the cooperation with Russia in order to increase the transparency of the entire process and assuage Russia’s fears. Before the United States decided against building the radar in the Czech Republic and the missile base in Poland, Romania expressed its readiness to join the project.\(^{214}\) President Obama’s decision gave rise to disappointment but also hope that Romania would be covered by the new system. This decision was seen as a negative signal for Central and Eastern Europe, and even evidence of a Russian success. Somewhat more moderate views were expressed by politicians of the ruling coalition government, who recognized the US


administration’s right to alter its concept of missile defense. They stressed the prospect of covering the territory of all NATO member states, including Romania, with the new system. Consequently, Romania reacted positively on the US proposal to host elements in the new system, made public in February 2010. This created a chance for reviving the strategic partnership with the United States whose dynamics have recently been unimpressive.

NATO and non-military aspects of security

NATO is determined to include the question of energy security in the agenda of the Alliance and advocates giving NATO a more active role in this area. Romania emphasizes that this question has ceased to be a solely economic issue restricted to the competence of individual member states. Energy security is seen in Romania in the context of access to energy resources and also in terms of the security of its energy infrastructure. The importance of energy security from Romania’s point of view is visible especially in the context of Alliance’s contacts with partner countries from the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions. It represents an enormous potential for cooperation within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), including the use of private-public partnerships. According to Romania, NATO is the most convenient platform for consultations and cooperation because it brings together producers, transit countries and clients through an extended network of relations based on partnership. It also has tools making it possible to ensure the protection of energy infrastructure and distribution networks. This warrants the hope that Romania will call for a clear reinforcement in the new strategic concept of NATO’s role in ensuring energy security. Moreover, according to Romanian parliamentarians, the new strategic concept should take into account questions of environment protection, civilian planning in case of technical breakdowns, problems with malnourishment and access to drinking water.

Enlargement

Romania is determined in its support of the open door policy and demands that the Alliance respects its obligations toward Ukraine and Georgia made at the summit in Bucharest. The prospect of membership for both countries is to depend solely on their determination on the path to NATO membership and on the fulfillment of the criteria for membership. Romania attaches particular importance to the progress made by candidates in the implementation of Transatlantic values, the rule of law, respect for human rights, including the rights of ethnic minorities, environmental protection and contributions to the regional security system.

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Romania also favors a more open and engaged policy with regard to Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which must have a prospect of integration with Euro-Atlantic structures. In the case of Macedonia, the only obstacle to the admission of this country to the Alliance is the Macedonian-Greek dispute regarding the name of that country. Romania advocates giving NATO a very important role in the stabilization and democratization of the Western Balkans, and calls for the most extensive relations possible between NATO and its partner countries through the use of all existing institutions and instruments – intensified dialogue, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Partnership for Peace (PfP), NATO’s South East Europe Initiative (SEEI), the South East Europe Security Cooperation Steering Group (SEEGROUP) and the South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP). Romania attaches particular importance to the partnership with Moldova with regard to which it has been implementing the Individual Partnership Action Plan since 2006. Moldova’s possible admission to the Alliance is not being mentioned, however.

Relations with the European Union and other partners

Romania favors a strong NATO-EU partnership while stressing the need to preserve the autonomy of both organizations. The example of the two organizations’ cooperation in the Balkans, according to Romania, evidences the need for close cooperation. The two organizations’ common interests include Kosovo, Afghanistan, support for democratic reforms and the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Western Balkan and Eastern European countries, the threat of international terrorism, counteracting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and human trafficking. According to the Romanian government, NATO, as the world’s most powerful military alliance, should become a partner for the EU and the UN.

Romania prioritizes promotion of peace, security and stability in the Mediterranean basin. According to Romania, the Black Sea region (“the bridge to Central Asia and Afghanistan”) has to be recognized by NATO as an area of special interest and strategic security within the framework of the allied security policy – also on account of its significance for Europe’s energy security.

According to Romania, the development of partnerships with countries such as Australia, Japan and South Korea will be very important for the future of the Alliance. Romania does not rule out the possibility of reinforcing such a partnership by giving it an institutional framework.

Relations with Russia

Romania attaches great importance to an open political dialogue and practical cooperation with Russia on security matters, as without Russia, it is impossible to ensure security in the Black Sea region. Romania supports pragmatic cooperation, with full respect of the principles and obligations adopted in international relations – this applies above all to respect for countries’ territorial integrity and to arms control. It stresses the


importance for such relations of maintaining a balance between pragmatism and values that formed the basis for the creation of the Russia-NATO Council. According to Romania, the fundamental areas of such cooperation and dialogue between NATO and Russia are energy security, the issue of the missile defense systems and the possible deployment of U.S. troops in Europe, the future of the CFE treaty, unresolved ethnic conflicts and the matter of further eastward enlargement of NATO.219

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Slovakia

Introductory information

For Slovakia NATO – an institution, through which the security of the country is tied with that of the United States – is “the only real security guarantee” and, at the same time, “a key strategic security forum” for peace and stability in Europe and the world.\textsuperscript{220} Slovakia is trying to participate actively in the discussion about the future of the Alliance by stressing that all member states should be involved in this process. Slovakia is interested in maintaining the principle of consensus at all levels of the decision making process in NATO, in keeping with the principle of equality between member states.\textsuperscript{221} It is a small country which joined the Alliance only in 2004 and with modest armed forces (17,000 soldiers) that spends less than 2\% of its GDP on defense. In connection with the financial crisis, the Slovak defense expenditures in 2010 are to be further reduced from 1.045 billion EUR to 822 million EUR (1.22\% of GDP).

Hierarchy of NATO tasks

Slovakia is striving for NATO to remain the main platform of cooperation in the area of security and defense in the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO is to be a credible guarantor of the defense of its members and, at the same time, an effective instrument of international crisis management.\textsuperscript{222} For Slovakia, the priority remains to maintain the capability of collective defense and protection of NATO member states’ territories. Although Slovakia announced that it would support NATO transformation and adapt its own military capabilities to the needs arising from the Alliance’s operations beyond treaty area, according to the Slovak government the Alliance should above all confirm its interest in its basic function as expressed in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.\textsuperscript{223} Allied agreement for operations beyond treaty area should not, according to Slovakia, imply military or technical involvement of individual states. One has to accept that such operations will de facto be pursued only by certain members particularly interested in the given operation.

According to Slovakia, considering the financial crisis, one should not expect a clear reinforcement of expeditionary capabilities of the European allies in the next few years. Slovakia is interested in conducting a NATO-wide assessment of the impact of the financial and economic crisis on the defense planning of member states and on their

\textsuperscript{220} Speech of the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs M. Lajčák at the conference on Slovak foreign policy for 2008, organized by the SFPA in Bratislava on 22 June 2009, www.mzv.sk; Opening address delivered by Minister of Foreign Affairs Miroslav Lajčák at the conference entitled “New Challenges – Better Capabilities” organised on the margins of the NATO defense ministers meeting on 21 October 2009, www.ata-sac.org.

\textsuperscript{221} Speech of the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs M. Lajčák at the conference “5 rokov Slovenska v EÚ a NATO, od prijímaca bezpečnosti k jej poskytovateľovi 60 rokov transatlantickéj vízie: ako dálej?”, Bratislava, 2 June 2009, www.mzv.sk.


\textsuperscript{223} ‘Nová koncepcia NATO by nemala narušiť princíp « všetci za jedného »’, TASR, 7 March 2009.
ability to meet their present obligations. Slovakia sought, during the meeting of NATO defense ministers in Bratislava in October 2009, to elevate the issue of the implications of the crisis for the fulfillment of allied obligations. According to Slovakia, the new strategic concept is to take into account the need for a just division of expenditures for defense among the allies. It also tried to speed up discussions on the financing of engagement in out-of-area mission from the common NATO budget. The government’s 2006 plan stipulated that foreign operations should not be financed at the expense of expenditures for the modernization of the Slovak armed forces. The reduction of defense expenditures will not reduce Slovak involvement in overseas operations (on the other hand, in February 2009, 25% of the employees of the Ministry of Defense have been laid-off and command structures are being streamlined).²²⁴

According to Slovakia, NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan indicates that the Alliance’s military capabilities are inconsistent with its aspirations for global responsibility. The ISAF mission should be a priority for all NATO member states. Since the spring of 2009, the Slovak contingent has been reinforced, bringing the number of its soldiers from 175 to 245 (mainly two patrol units in the province of Uruzgan and sentries and a company of engineers in Kandahar). Slovakia has announced that it would send additional security forces to Afghanistan (50 persons) but it has no intention to send combat units. At the same time, Slovakia does not want to reduce its involvement in the KFOR mission, in which 145 Slovak soldiers take part.²²⁵

Military transformation and internal reforms

According to Slovakia, there are chances to increase NATO’s functionality by reinforcing the Alliance’s command structures and by improving its decision making processes. Slovakia also sees a need to optimize defense planning processes, particularly to introduce harmonization between NATO and EU processes. The transformation of the Alliance has to include the reform of NATO main headquarters.²²⁶

Slovakia viewed plans to field elements of the U.S. missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic critically and opposed NATO’s support for US plans in this respect. Slovakia emphasized the need for conducting talks about the missile defense system within NATO and the EU and for adequate cooperation with Russia. Slovakia’s stance with regard to the system proposed by the Obama administration is ambiguous. Prime Minister Fico has announced that he will not agree to the deployment of any elements of the system on Slovak territory. At the same time, the Slovak Minister of Defense supported the new concept as benefitting NATO’s collective defense.²²⁷

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²²⁶ ‘Informácia o priebehu a výsledkoch summitu NATO’, op.cit.

NATO and non-military aspects of security

According to Slovakia, NATO should reinforce allied cooperation in order to identify and counteract non-military threats in areas such as energy security, cyber-terrorism, pandemics, uncontrolled mass migrations, organized crime, human trafficking, smuggling and drug trade. Slovakia attaches particular importance to energy security, the more so as in connection with the gas crisis at the beginning of 2009 it ceased to perceive the eastern source of energy supplies as entirely dependable. Reinforcing discussions within NATO on energy security is to assist in the building of real energy security for the EU. Slovakia is hopeful in this respect following the conclusions of the Strasbourg/Kehl summit, during which the importance of stable supplies, the diversification of supply routes, suppliers, sources of energy and the extension of existing energy distribution networks was stressed. Slovakia is also interested in combating cyber-terrorism. It is a co-founder (along with the three Baltic States, Germany, Italy and Spain) of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) based in Tallinn.228

Enlargement

Support for NATO enlargement is one of Slovakia’s priorities. Slovakia opposes the creation of “buffer zones” in Europe and calls for the admission to the Alliance of all countries ready to take on allied obligations while maintaining the “absorption capabilities” and functionality of the Alliance.229 Slovakia favors speeding up the process of NATO enlargement in the Western Balkans. This is manifested in the discussion over granting the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Slovakia recognizes the experience it has gained in preparing for membership in the Alliance and which it shares with countries aspiring to NATO membership as its particular advantage. Since the beginning of 2007, the Slovak embassy in Kyiv has been the NATO contact embassy in Ukraine and has been responsible for conducting public diplomacy.230

Relations with the European Union

Slovakia advocates an extension of the political dialogue and practical cooperation between NATO and the EU on the strategic and operational level. Intensifying NATO-EU and US-EU cooperation is of key importance when it comes to

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NATO and the EU have common strategic interests and should cooperate closely. NATO, however, should remain the principal forum for trans-Atlantic dialogue and cooperation in the sphere of politics and security between European and North American members of the Alliance. From the point of view of Slovak security, the alliance with the United States is of principal importance. France’s return to the Alliance’s military structure contributes significantly to Europe’s defense potential and should bring about a better “balance of trans-Atlantic relations”.232

Relations with Russia and other partners

According to Slovakia, NATO needs a wider partnership in order to meet global challenges in the military and civilian spheres. NATO’s stabilization capabilities are to be reinforced above all through a strategic partnership with Russia. Slovakia calls for the development of cooperation within the NATO-Russia Council and mutual confidence building. Russia is and has to remain NATO’s strategic partner, and the Alliance’s somehow passive attitude toward Russia was, in Slovakian view, counterproductive. Slovakia also favors a cooperative model of relations between the West and Russia but is opposed to Russia’s concept of zones of influence in which countries could not decide on their own about the directions of their foreign policies and their choice of key allies. Slovakia’s position is that Russia should not perceive NATO’s activities as a threat to itself. It stresses that NATO and Russia have to stand up to common challenges, particularly in stabilizing Afghanistan, and in areas such as terrorism, piracy, the drug trade, arms control and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Slovakia wants to participate in mutual confidence building between Russia and the West and is striving to present itself as an example of a new NATO member state whose foreign policy is a confirmation that membership in the Alliance and good relations with Russia are not mutually exclusive.233 Slovakia attaches great importance to dialogue with Russia about the future of European security in the OSCE (the Corfu process) and favors stronger cooperation between the Alliance and the OSCE.
Slovenia

Introductory information

Slovenia is one of the smallest members of the Atlantic Alliance. It joined NATO in 2004, as the first country of the former Yugoslavia. Standards adopted by this organization serve as key reference points for efforts made by the Slovenian Ministry of Defense in order to improve the structure and functioning of the national security system.

Presently, the Slovenian army has 7,200 soldiers, supported by 3,800 troops in reserve units. In 2009, the operational budget of the Slovenian armed forces was reduced from the planned 701 million EUR to 589.3 million EUR. This means that defense expenditures will increase by 5.36% in relation to 2008 – a figure considerably smaller when compared with the average 9.2% increase in the period between 2001 and 2008. This could lead to significant delays in the realization of part of the plans laid out in the 2007-2012 medium-term defense program. The program entails an increase of troops to 8,500 soldiers and the creation of a fully professional 5,500 strong reserve force by 2012. In fact, delays in the implementation of this plan can already be observed.

Reforms leading to the modernization of the armed forces focus on increasing rapid response and mobilization capabilities. Presently, about 17% of the defense budget is spent on modernizing the army and adapting it to NATO standards.

Hierarchy of NATO tasks

Transformational initiatives are the prime movers in the reconstruction of the Slovenian defense system and draw on the Alliance’s defense planning process. In keeping with the defense program for 2007-12, 40% of all Slovenian forces are to be capable of participating in out-of-area operations, a figure consistent with NATO standards. However, given the reduction in defense spending, achieving this goal could be delayed.

The plan also foresees an increase in the number of Slovenian soldiers participating in stabilization missions to 8%. In 2008, this figure stood at 6.9% (in comparison with 3.3% in 2007), placing Slovenia well ahead of the rest of the NATO member countries from Central and Eastern Europe, where the percentage of forces serving in expeditionary missions was at least two times lower. Slovenia dispatched 500 soldiers to serve in international missions in 2008 (as compared to about 190 in 2007). The vast majority of missions involving Slovenians are conducted under NATO auspices. Slovenian participation in the KFOR mission accounts to 360 soldiers, while

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234 The Military Balance, 2009
Slovenia was interested in the fastest possible accession to NATO due to the unstable situation in other countries that emerged after the break-up of Yugoslavia. In fact, Slovenia planned to join in 1999 along Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Slovenia hoped for NATO’s protection against possible danger originating from neighboring countries, and continues to emphasize maintaining high readiness of its territorial defense units. Even though the threat of an armed conflict in the Balkans is presently much lower than in the second half of the 1990s, Slovenia attaches great importance to the participation of its soldiers in stabilization missions in the Balkans. In 2008, nearly 400 Slovenian soldiers out of the 500 deployed abroad served in the Balkans.

Slovenia supports NATO actions that have not been defined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty but are aimed at ensuring the security of the Alliance. Slovenian authorities believe that NATO could extend its mandate to areas such as energy security and countering cyber-terrorism. Still, it holds the view that it is first necessary to examine whether the Alliance could act effectively in these areas. For this reason, it is unlikely that Slovenia would demonstrate particular interest in extending the activities of the Alliance in this direction.

Relations with the European Union

Slovenia advocates cooperation between NATO and the EU. Given that both institutions have different but complementary instruments at their disposal, their concerted action helps to meet new security challenges. For this reason, both organizations should have an equal say as far European security is concerned. Slovenia supports the development of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). It sees EU Battle Groups as an important instrument for ensuring security, stability and peace in the world. Such groups, with Slovenian (and Hungarian and Italian) participation were ready for deployment in peacekeeping operations in 2007. Through its participation in such European initiatives, Slovenia intends to balance its greater attachment to NATO as a guarantor of its security. In addition, it helps Slovenia to present itself on the European stage as a trustworthy partner in crafting the European security system within the EU framework.

Enlargement

Slovenia supports NATO’s open door policy. It sees the Membership Action Plan (MAP) as the best mechanism for establishing the admission criteria for the countries aspiring to join the Alliance. Slovenia will support the candidacy of any country striving for membership if it meets the requirements set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Western Balkans is a highly important region from the viewpoint of Slovenia’s security. Slovenia sets the long-term stabilization of the region as its strategic priority. For this reason, Slovenian authorities lend their support to the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of countries of this region and assure of their continued assistance. Slovenia

points out that security in the Western Balkans is an integral part of common European security and that there are at least two main sources of instability or conflict in the Balkans – Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both countries should not only be helped in the military area but also offered other forms of assistance – using political and diplomatic instruments – in their reforms and in building up their defense and security capabilities.239

The Slovenian government considers that Macedonia is well prepared for admission to NATO and meets all the requirements for membership.240 Slovenia supports the admission of this country into the Alliance and offers its assistance to Macedonia’s integration with NATO. Slovenia also stresses the exceptional military cooperation between the two countries, including Macedonia’s logistical support for Slovenian troops in transit to Kosovo. Slovenia attaches particular importance to defense cooperation in the Balkans.

Slovenia also supports Montenegro’s efforts to join NATO. It estimates that, in the past three years, this country has made enormous progress on the way to membership. Also important in this context is the increasingly intensive military cooperation between the two countries.241

The government in Ljubljana speaks with optimism of the future membership of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Alliance. It also supports the transformation of the “Althea” operation and assuming of its responsibilities by the defense ministry of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Slovenia argues that the reinforcement of that country’s military structures will lead to greater possibilities for its armed forces to attain NATO and EU operational standards. This in turn will contribute to closer integration with Euro-Atlantic security structures.242

Relations with Russia and other partners

Slovenia claims that Russia is an important partner for NATO, given their shared security interests. Relations of partnership with Russia should be upheld despite certain divergences in positions or occasional tensions. Besides cooperation in specific areas (counterterrorism activities, stabilization of Afghanistan, arms control), there should also be room for open political dialogue between NATO and Russia.

According to Slovenia, NATO’s cooperation with other partners is particularly important if the Alliance wishes to meet its basic goals of ensuring stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Contemporary threats are multi-faceted and reach beyond the military sphere, which means that NATO needs partners to effectively neutralize such

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241 Declaration of the Slovenian Minister of Defense, Ljubica Jelušič, during a bilateral meeting with the Minister of Defense of Montenegro, Bore Vučinić, on the occasion of the 26th International Workshop on Behalf of Global Security in Istanbul on June 25-26, 2009.

242 Position of the Slovenian Minister of Defense, Ljubica Jelušič, during an informal meeting of EU defense ministers in Goteborg on September 28-29, 2009.
threats. For this reason, Slovenia asserts that all international players who express such interest and who are able to contribute to security and stability should be invited to cooperate. However, considering their shared interests and values, the EU should be the main partner for NATO.

Slovenia supports institutionalized cooperation between NATO and third countries, as this brings tangible benefits such as opportunities for intensified dialogue about security. Such cooperation is also beneficial for defense reforms. Moreover, it makes it possible for partners to act jointly with the Alliance, primarily in peacekeeping missions.\(^\text{243}\)

\(^{243}\) Note from the author’s conversation with the Ambassador of the Republic of Slovenia.
Spain

Introductory information

In May 1982, Spain became the 16th member of the Alliance. In a referendum held in 1986, Spanish society opted for membership in the Alliance on the condition that Spain remained outside of the organization’s military structure, that its territory remained nuclear free and that a complementary European security and defense dimension be developed. Changes in Europe following 1989, the reform of the Alliance, the prospect of eastward enlargement, and Spain’s fear or becoming marginalized in the organization that forms one of the pillars of European security, prompted that country to gradually revise some of the premises on which its participation in NATO was based. Spain agreed to enter the military structures of the Alliance on 1 January 1999. The decision was taken as NATO adopted a new military structure in order to reflect the concept of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), and as Russia-NATO dialogue evolved. Spain took operational and command responsibility for the western part of the Mediterranean Sea. Still, Spain retained its nuclear-free status in the Alliance.

As a large country occupying a crucial geo-strategic position in the western part of the Mediterranean, Spain is an important NATO member. Its armed forces are fully professional and number 126,000 soldiers, of which 79,000 are in the army and the navy. In terms of its contributions to the NATO budget, Spain ranks seventh in the Alliance. Despite this, interest in NATO issues and the new strategic concept in Spain is slight, despite the fact that a Spanish representative was invited to the NATO Group of Experts. Spanish society does not belong to NATO’s greatest supporters, although an increase of approval for this organization has been observed there in 2009: 61% of Spaniards declared that the Alliance plays a crucial role as far as national security is concerned. It should be stressed, however, that NATO is closely associated with the United States, and the increase in support is primarily a reflection of Barack Obama’s electoral victory in 2008.

Hierarchy of NATO tasks and non-military aspects of security

NATO is treated as the foundation of its members’ common defense. In practice, however, there is little interest in the principle of common territorial defense. Territorial defense against the Soviet threat was not the primary motive that inclined Spain to join NATO. It was rather a matter of securing a better bargaining position in relations with the United States. Spain was also interested in joining regional security

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structures from which it had been excluded on account of the authoritarian rule of General Franco, as well as gaining possibilities to influence situation in the Mediterranean region.

Spain holds that NATO’s actions should be limited to the Euro-Atlantic area as defined in the Washington treaty and to adjacent areas. At the same time, it advocates NATO’s decisive involvement in activities other than territorial defense. In this context, the Spanish government draws attention to the necessity of adapting the Alliance to new challenges and threats. It points out that in view of threats originating from the failed states, terrorist groups, the prospect of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, piracy, or conflicts over access to natural resources, such as energy supplies or water, there is a well-founded need for the Alliance to work out a new strategic concept.\footnote{Response of defense minister Carmé Chacón to a question in parliament, Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, Pleno y Diputación Permanente, no. 74, 1 April 2009, p. 44.}

The evolution of the Alliance in the direction of an organization capable of defending its members against unconventional threats, especially terrorist threats, lies in Spain’s interest. The 11 March 2004 attack in Madrid made clear the urgency of a threat of an outside terrorist attack on the country, which had for years been combating terrorism at home (the ETA group). The struggle against both kinds of terrorism is one of the aims of Spain’s security policy. Fernando Perpiñá-Robert Peyra, Spain’s former special representative for terrorism, became a member of the Group of Experts. He will most surely attempt to highlight this issue in the report of the group.

The present Spanish government is a proponent of further NATO involvement in out-of-area operations. It attaches great importance to the legality of such actions under international law. The government of Jose María Aznar stressed that upholding international peace and security could be realized through other means than in the framework of the organizations such as the United Nations or NATO, and even under the leadership of individual members of the international community, which effectively meant the United States.\footnote{‘Revisión Estratégica de la Defensa’, Ministerio de Defensa, Madrid, 2003, p. 178.} In contrast to that approach, the policy of the present government presupposes that Spanish armed forces will participate only in missions undertaken in accordance with the UN Charter and principles of international law, intended for defense missions, humanitarian and stabilization purposes, or to maintain or secure peace. In addition, these missions should be conducted on the basis of one of the following: a direct appeal made by the government of the country on whose territory the mission is planned; a resolution of the UN Security Council; a decision made by international organizations of which Spain is a member, particularly the EU and NATO.\footnote{See B. Wojna, ‘Udział sił zbrojnych w misjach poza granicami państwa - nowe ustawodawstwo Hiszpanii’, Biuletyn (PISM), no. 86(331), 30 November 2005.}

Spain participates in NATO’s operation in Afghanistan, albeit with caveats. In the context of the Afghan presidential elections in 2009, Spain’s contribution has increased from 780 to 1000 soldiers. It would seem that this decision was motivated by a desire to
improve Spanish-American relations and to mitigate the negative impression left by the withdrawal of the Spanish contingent from the NATO mission in Kosovo.  

Military transformation and internal reforms

Spain calls for NATO to be able to counter new threats. It contributed over 20,000 soldiers during the eleven rotations of the NATO Response Force. Spain should not be expected, however, to suggest ambitious initiatives or other proposals in the domain of NATO’s military transformation. A number of factors makes it difficult for this country to become more involved in this area. Firstly, Spain spends little on defense (1.22% of GDP in 2007). Additional cuts are expected due to the financial crisis. Moreover, beginning in 2001, when compulsory military service was abolished and the professionalization of the armed forces began, the Spanish army has been facing difficulties related to recruiting and with a high rotation of personnel.

From the moment the discussion about the deployment of missile defense facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic began, Spain expressed serious reservations about this project’s desirability. It was feared that it would lead to an arms race, while adversely affecting the effectiveness of efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Among possible consequences of extending the system to southern Europe, Spain pointed to a worsening of relations with Russia and with Arab states in the Mediterranean, as well as to problems arising from the decision to develop the missile defense system outside the NATO framework. It does not mean, however, that Spain would be more inclined to implement the project within NATO. Spain is observing with anxiety the progress of the Iranian nuclear program and the development of the means of delivery of the weapons of mass destruction. A nuclear-capable Iran is not perceived as a direct threat to Spanish national interests, though. In addition, Spain participates in the regional maritime defense system that has emerged several years ago following the initiative of the United States and is outfitted with missile defense capability. Spain’s acquiescence was due to the presence of medium range ballistic missiles located in North Africa.

Enlargement

Spain belongs to countries favoring admission of the Balkan states to the Alliance. It treats enlargement as an instrument serving to stabilize the Western Balkans and to anchor the region in the European and Euro-Atlantic area. During the Riga summit, Spain supported Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia in their efforts. Accordingly, it greeted the admission of Croatia and Albania to the Alliance with

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250 Madrid has still not recognized the independence of Kosovo and this predetermined Spain’s withdrawal from the KFOR mission. The Spanish contingent was 620 soldiers strong. This decision was taken quite unexpectedly in March 2009. The opposition criticized the unclear decision-making process and pointed to the lack of consultations with other participants of the mission.

251 Response of defense minister Carme Chacón to a question in parliament, Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, Pleno y Diputación Permanente, no. 74, 1 April 2009, p. 44.


satisfaction. Spain advocates upholding the open door policy towards all democratic European countries that express the desire to join NATO and are ready to meet the obligations associated with membership. It makes the reservation, however, that their integration should contribute to the reinforcement of common security.254

Relations with the European Union

At present, the North Atlantic Alliance – in addition to the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) pursued within the EU framework and the agreement on defense cooperation with the United States, renewed many times since 1953 – is the basic instrument of Spain’s security policy. However, today Spain seems to be more committed to the further development of the CSDP. Spaniards believe that a stronger EU does not weaken NATO but, quite the opposite, strengthens the Alliance and trans-Atlantic relations. According to Spain, it is necessary to continue work on detailed coordination procedures between NATO and the EU, so as to ensure that the operations are conducted effectively.

Relations with Russia

Russia is seen and treated by Spain as an important NATO partner. The opinion prevails that the strategic nature of the partnership with that country needs to be maintained. This partnership is to serve the creation of a common area of security and stability. Declarations aside, Spain sees Russia primarily as a NATO partner in combating threats originating beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, especially terrorism. Spain tends not to raise conditions for such cooperation. It points out that an open discussion concerning important issues for NATO and Russian security is necessary and, in this context, it abides by the provisions which have guided relations between European states since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975.255

Relations with other partners

The position of the present government constitutes a departure from Spain’s former Prime Minister José Maria Aznar’s vision, which presupposed the establishment of a global NATO, in which there would have been a place for all democratic states, including Japan, Australia, Israel, ready to defend democratic values on the international stage.256 Spain is a staunch proponent of developing cooperation with partners from beyond the Alliance, especially in the context of the need to promote cooperative security. Spain’s main field of interest is the Mediterranean region, which is

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255 Ibidem.

the source of the greatest challenges and threats for the Spanish national security (energy supplies, migration and terrorism). Spain and Italy, among other countries, put forward an initiative to create the Mediterranean Dialogue in 1994. Its progress thus far – due to a rather slight interest of Spain’s other allies and the Dialogue’s partner countries – has not fulfilled Spain’s expectations. Spain declared, therefore, that it will strive for greater NATO involvement in this initiative. The question concerns not only furthering political dialogue through a greater number of meetings at the highest level, but also practical cooperation. For this purpose, Spain proposed in April 2006 to create a special fund that would finance common NATO and Mediterranean Dialogue operations. Spain also supports the development of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. It also points to the need for greater attention to be paid to the consequences that the conflict in the Middle East has for the security of the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{257}

Turkey

Introductory information

Turkey joined NATO in 1952. The Alliance remains the basic pillar of Turkey’s defense and security policy until this day. Turkey sees NATO above all as the foundation of trans-Atlantic ties and of the Euro-Atlantic security system of which Turkey is a part. Given its geopolitical location, Turkey played a very important role in the Alliance during the Cold War. Now that it has ended, the state remains an influential member, possessing a large defense budget (8.84 billion USD in 2008) and the second largest army in the Alliance (after that of the United States). Turkey has 510,600 soldiers and 102,200 members of paramilitary units in active service, and a further 378,700 soldiers and 50,000 members of paramilitary units in reserve. Turkey’s military potential allows it to participate in the Alliance’s missions – primarily in the Balkans (509 soldiers with KFOR) and in Afghanistan (720 soldiers). Turkey will be an active participant in the debate on NATO’s new strategic concept, as is indicated by the presence in the Group of Experts of an experienced Turkish diplomat, Ümit Pamir.

Hierarchy of NATO tasks; NATO and non-military aspects of security

Turkey sees the need for NATO reform so that the Alliance can meet modern-day challenges, become a global actor and take actions in response to crises and conflicts beyond the treaty area. Turkey also advocates NATO’s involvement in combating terrorism. This was the reason for the establishment in 2004 of the Center of Excellence on Defense Against Terrorism (COE-DAT), which has been launched in June 2005 and operates from Ankara. The tasks of the center have recently come to include fighting cyber-terrorism, which is the subjects of trainings organized by this institution. According to Turkey, NATO’s fight against terrorism cannot be conducted in such a manner as to produce the impression that the actions of the Alliance are directed against the world of Islam. Ankara also advocates an increased role for NATO in the energy sector (Turkey aspires to the role of an energy hub), but with a dose of prudence, due to its consideration for the interests of Russia and Iran. According to Turkey, NATO should not pursue global tasks that it cannot perform adequately. For example, Turkey has doubts about whether NATO is the appropriate organization for combating maritime

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258 The section on Turkey is based, in addition to the sources mentioned here, on the poll conducted on 4 July 2009 by Prof. Mustafa Kibaroðlu from Bilkent University in Ankara, a NATO expert and COE-DAT advisor and on the author’s notes from conversations with Prof. Faruk Sönmezodlu, dr Özel Terzi and dr Hakan Güneþ from the University of Istanbul (NATO-EU and NATO-Russian relations and NATO enlargement), Istanbul, 12-13 May 2009; with Prof. Meltem Müftüler-Baç from the University of Sabancý (NATO-EU relations), Istanbul, 14 May 2009; and dr Mert Bilginem from the University of Bahçeþehir (NATO’s role in the energy sector), Istanbul, 15 May 2009, PISM archives.


piracy, although finding a solution to this problem is in Turkey’s interests (Turkish vessels are often hijacked in the Gulf of Aden).262

At the same time, Turkey continues to attach importance to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. According to Turkey, dealing with global challenges cannot result in neglecting the security of individual members. This question should, in Turkey’s opinion, remain a high priority issue for NATO. Turkey’s attachment to NATO’s role as a defensive alliance arises from both that country’s geopolitical situation and the ideological aspect of its concept of security. Turkey is located in an unstable area, it has unresolved disputes with some of its neighbors and, therefore, it sees NATO’s protective umbrella as indispensable. In the light of the operation in Iraq, Ankara had doubts about whether its European allies continue to see the protection of Turkish territory as part of their obligations. This concerns, firstly, the hesitation of European allies in 1991 and 2003 over the request to install an early warning system and Patriot missiles on Turkish territory in connection with a potential threat from Iraq. Secondly, Turkey’s European allies hesitated to recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization and to take appropriate steps to counteract that organization’s activities in Europe. In addition, Turkey clearly perceives Greece as a threat (this is the position of the National Security Council, for example), a view influenced by a state ideology rooted in historical events of the First World War and the so-called liberation war following the Treaty of Sévres. Membership in NATO as a defensive alliance is thus very important for Turkey. The importance of Article 5 is also emphasized in the Turkish security concept, with its indivisible pillars of national and collective security.263

In the debate on the new strategic concept, Turkey will call for maintaining a balance between NATO’s pursuit of its traditional role as a defensive alliance and its ability to respond to threats that were non-existent when NATO was established.

Military transformations and internal reforms

Turkey recognizes the need for NATO’s military transformation, as is shown by its large contribution to the NATO Response Force (NRF). On two occasions, Turkey led the land component of the NRF (the last time in 2007) and hosted the first NRF exercises in Izmir in November 2003. The NATO Rapid Deployable Corps – Turkey (NRDC-T) is located near Istanbul, while the Component Command Air Headquarters (CC Air HQ) is located in Izmir. At the same time as it supports the military transformation of the Alliance, Turkey strives to transform and modernize its own army, to make it smaller, but professional and modern, with greater expeditionary capabilities and firepower.264

At present, Turkey basically supports the idea of creating a missile defense system, but sees it as a NATO project, not as a purely American one. It wishes to be

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involved in arranging a system that would involve protection of its own territory. Turkey thus looked upon the construction of the US installations in Poland and the Czech Republic with disfavor, a stance also dictated by concern for Russia’s interests (the same concerns fueled Turkey’s disapproval vis-à-vis the construction of US bases in Bulgaria and Romania). In 2007, the Turkish defense minister, Vecdi Gönül, stated that Turkey is not engaged in the American project and will provide protection for its territory through its “own means”, an intention reflected in Turkey’s plans to set up its own anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense systems.\footnote{See ‘Gönül: Turkey not involved in US-proposed missile defense’, \textit{Turkish Daily News}, 14 March 2007, www.hurriyetdailynews.com.}

Following President Barrack Obama’s decision to modify the US missile defense system, speculations appeared in the Turkish press about Turkey’s possible participation in the new missile defense program that the United States would like to establish.\footnote{See ‘Missiles in Turkey traded for shield, diplomat says’, \textit{Hurriyet Daily News}, 18 September 2009, www.hurriyetdailynews.com} The Turkish foreign ministry denied that either the United States or NATO had turned to Turkey in this matter, while the Turkish embassy in Washington asked the Pentagon about details on the new plans. In the media, Obama’s decision on MD was often associated with his administration’s earlier notification to Congress of its intention to sell the PAC-3 anti-missile defense system to Turkey. Turkish military circles and representatives of the Pentagon rejected, most probably truthfully, any such association. The notification is due to the fact that the United States, Russia and China are participating in a tender for the purchase by Ankara of the Turkish Long Range Air and Missile Defense System (T-LORAMIDS). The relevant call for tenders was announced in March 2007. According to the Turkish foreign ministry, the system will not be directed at Turkey’s neighbors, but is to be an element of the Turkish armed forces’ modernization.

Enlargement

Turkey supports the idea of NATO being open to all European democracies that wish to join and are able to meet all the obligations that membership entails. In Turkey’s opinion, it is necessary for the survival and the strengthening of the organization. The Turkish position, however, varies depending on a specific candidacy. Turkey supported the membership of Albania and Croatia and favors the accession of Macedonia (Turkey belongs to those members that side with Macedonia in the so-called name dispute). On the other hand, although Ankara favors membership for Ukraine and Georgia in principle, in practice it shows restraint in supporting those two countries on account of Russia’s interests. For example, in the case of Ukraine, it speaks rather of intensive cooperation, dialogue and supporting reforms there. Turkey opposed NATO membership for Cyprus – this would only be possible after the resolution of the Cypriot question.\footnote{See ‘Turkey’s Security Perspectives and its Relations with NATO’, op.cit.} No changes should be expected in Turkey’s position about admitting individual countries to the Alliance in the near future.
Relations with the European Union

Officially, Turkey greeted the decision to establish a strategic partnership between NATO and the EU with satisfaction. Cooperation between those two organizations raises problems for Turkey, however, and has been subject to dispute for about ten years. Nothing seems to indicate that it will end rapidly, given that both Turkey and the EU are entrenched in their positions. Turkey does not want to grant a blanket agreement for the EU to use NATO resources, considering that they could be used in a manner that would be inconsistent with its interests. This applies primarily to Cyprus which, as an EU member, would have access to NATO resources. The resolution of the Cypriot problem, through negotiations between the Turkish and Greek leaders in Cyprus, could only be helpful in achieving an understanding on the subject of NATO-EU cooperation. The European Union in turn, does not agree to let Turkey participate in CSDP institutions (such as the European Defense Agency). From Ankara’s point of view, Turkey is not the one standing in the way of closer cooperation, and the blame for the present situation should fall on the EU (among other reasons, because it agreed to let Cyprus in before resolving the Cypriot question).

Relations with Russia

Turkey favors the deepening and strengthening of cooperation (based on the principles of mutual trust and transparency) between NATO and Russia, with which it has intensified its relations in the last few years, especially in the energy sector. For this reason, Turkey is striving to avoid tensions between the Alliance and the Russian Federation. This was clearly indicated during the Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008. Within NATO, Turkey argued against taking radical steps towards Russia and did not agree to send AWACS planes to Georgia. In Turkey’s opinion, the Alliance should take into account Russia’s sensitivities in certain matters, such as respect for the provisions of the Montreux Convention and NATO presence in the Black Sea, an issue that is also important for Turkey. Both Russia and Turkey are opposed to any NATO mission there modeled on the Active Endeavour operation in the Mediterranean. Turkey calls for the development of cooperation as part of the NATO-Russia Council in combating terrorism, drug trade and organized crime. During the debate on NATO’s new strategic concept, Turkey will be one of the countries taking the Russian factor into account.

Cooperation with other partners

Turkey has always favored the development of NATO cooperation with countries and regions beyond the Alliance. In Turkey’s view, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) demonstrated its worth as a practical instrument for strengthening

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268 This could lead to problems in the context of the Cypriot question, but also that of the actions of Cyprus and Greece on the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas connected, for example, with exploration for energy resources near the island.


NATO’s relations with partner countries and relations between the latter. It also supports the Partnership for Peace program and suggests that it should be kept dynamic and flexible so as to adapt to new challenges. As early as 1998, Turkey established the Partnership for Peace Training Center (BIOEM) in Ankara. The center is open to all partners, including those participating in the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). As a Mediterranean country, Turkey has supported the Mediterranean Dialogue from the very outset (its embassy in Morocco was the NATO Contact Point in 2007-2008). According to Ankara, both the Dialogue and the ICI reinforce the security of the Turkish state. Turkey calls for the development of the Dialogue in areas in which NATO could bring added value. Turkey’s embassies in Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan acted as NATO Contact Points in the period between 2007 and 2008, thus confirming Turkish support for developing NATO’s relations with countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus.
United Kingdom

Introductory information

The United Kingdom is a key European member of the Alliance and participates actively in the debate over its future. The significance of this country for the Alliance is reflected in its second place (after the United States) in terms of the value of its contribution to the NATO budget, the fifth place in the world in terms of defense expenditures (these amounted to 31.2 billion GBP in 2008 – 2.4% of GDP) and the size of its armed forces (over 160,000 professional soldiers).271 The British member of the Group of Experts for NATO’s new strategic concept is Geoffrey Hoon, the Defense Secretary in Tony Blair’s government in 1999-2005.

The British expect the Alliance to be involved globally and to adapt its capabilities to face such threats as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery as well as instability generated by failing or failed states. According to the British, the Alliance should focus on the development of its expeditionary potential and cooperation with partners from outside the organization, with the mission in Afghanistan being the most important test of NATO’s capabilities and credibility. The British contingent in the ISAF mission – the second largest after the American one – reached 9,000 at the end of 2009, a figure that is to rise to 9,500 in 2010, keeping with the announcement made by Prime Minister Gordon Brown on 14 October 2009.

Hierarchy of NATO tasks

The British government emphasizes the inadequacy of dividing Alliance’s tasks into those arising from Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and those conducted beyond treaty area. The British argue that there is no risk of a conventional aggression against NATO countries at present, at the same time pointing to the fact that global threats have real implications for their security. In addition, both types of operations require the same type of military capabilities.272 In response to the Alliance’s eastern flank countries’ apprehensions with regard to Russia’s policies, in February 2009, the British government proposed to establish the Allied Solidarity Forces, set aside from the NATO Response Force (NRF) and numbering 15,000 soldiers. This formation would be destined exclusively for the realization of tasks arising from Article 5, thus increasing the possibilities of using the remaining part of the NRF in out-of-area operations.273

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Military transformation and internal reforms

According to the British government, NATO transformation is indispensable to order to adapt the Alliance to new challenges. The three fundamental aims are the build-up of expeditionary potential, improvement of operational planning and management, and working out effective cooperation between partners with convergent interests.\textsuperscript{274} The British are demanding greater burden-sharing between allies and a reduction of caveats of individual member states that limit their engagement in the Alliance’s operations.\textsuperscript{275} They admit that the mission in Afghanistan turned out to be the most effective vehicle of change for the Alliance, even though they point out that the NRF should play this role. The United Kingdom is advocating the strengthening of the Alliance’s civilian potential and public diplomacy instruments so as to build support among the public for NATO aims and missions. Reforming the allocation of expenses and simplification of defense planning structures are also necessary.\textsuperscript{276}

The United Kingdom approved of the US missile defense system, interpreting it as a response to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The British supported the project, pointing to the need to integrate it with the missile defense system developed by NATO and seeing a possibility for Russian cooperation. The British government reacted positively to the decision of the Obama administration about the resignation from installing elements of the missile shield in Europe, as announced in September 2009. It recognized the validity of arguments claiming that the threat from Iran is not as immediate as was thought, and that alternate missile defense systems are more feasible and credible. In addition, an important question was the common interests of NATO and Russia in the area of non-proliferation, especially in the face of the Iranian nuclear program. The British are counting that the debate on the new strategic concept will take into account the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as one of the Alliance’s priorities.\textsuperscript{277}

NATO a non-military aspects of security

The British authorities believe that NATO should be interested in discussing issues such as energy security, climate change or cyber-terrorism. The Alliance’s new strategic concept should provide guidelines for mounting a response to those problems by calling upon and strengthening existing instruments and by cooperating with partners. The nature of many new threats only rarely calls for a military reaction. Should


such a reaction prove necessary, according to the British, NATO will also be the appropriate player.\textsuperscript{278}

Enlargement

The British authorities declare their full support for the Alliance’s open door policy and the idea of NATO enlargement as a means to expand the area of stability and security, and as a catalyst for reforms in countries aspiring for membership. In keeping with the British position, every European country that expresses its sovereign will to join the Alliance, meets the appropriate criteria and is ready for membership should be able to do so. Another condition for membership is the need to resolve all territorial disputes and frozen conflicts. These principles stood behind the UK’s skepticism towards granting the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Ukraine and Georgia in Bucharest in 2008. The British argued that the decision to do so would entail a time frame and expectations that would be difficult to meet by either those countries or the Alliance.\textsuperscript{279} The United Kingdom supports further NATO enlargement to include the Balkan countries as way of strengthening regional security.

Relations with the European Union

According to the British government, the cooperation between NATO and the EU is necessary in given both organizations’ overlapping interests in the sphere of security and defense, yet NATO’s dominant position needs to be maintained. The British government points to the two organizations’ natural division of functions allowing for joint engagement – NATO specialized in intensive military operations and the EU in actions requiring a greater civilian potential. The EU should have the means to operate autonomously and complement the activities of the Alliance or to take action in crisis situations where NATO is not present. The cooperation between NATO and the EU is limited primarily by the European countries’ low outlays for defense and the inadequacy of investments in military capabilities, given existing challenges.\textsuperscript{280}

Relations with Russia

The government of the United Kingdom sees Russia as a key NATO partner given both sides’ shared security interests. It points to the need to cooperate in order to resolve the problems such as Afghanistan, Iran, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the drugs trade. The NATO-Russia Council offers the most appropriate forum for dialogue and the talks have to be based on mutual acceptance and respect for the basic principles of territorial integrity, democratic governance and international


\addnote{279}{See M. Madej, “Wyniki szczycaktu NATO w Bukareszcie”, Biuletyn PISM, No. 14 (482), 8 April 2008.}

\addnote{280}{See HC, DC, ‘The Future…’, op. cit., pp. 55, 84, Ev 61 and Ev 107.}
The British do not accept Russia’s notion of spheres of interest which suggests a subordinate position for post-Soviet states, or Russia’s claimed right to decide about their membership in the Alliance. On the other hand, they think that Russia does not constitute a direct military threat to NATO. The British authorities are open to discuss the so-called Medvedev’s initiative regarding a new security architecture, provided that Russia does not question the present position of either NATO or the OSCE, that it recognizes commonly accepted principles and takes into consideration the question of human rights and economic and geopolitical matters.

Cooperation with other partners

The British support the institutionalization of cooperation between NATO and third countries. They see the Partnership for Peace program and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council as effective tools for fostering security and defense reforms as well as building mutual trust and cooperation between NATO countries and its partners. They also stress the importance of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative in supporting regional stability and in promoting practical cooperation in the sphere of defense. According to the British, dialogue with countries such as Australia and Japan should be developed for the needs of present and future NATO operations and with such organizations as the UN or the African Union through the comprehensive approach formula.

The position of the Conservative Party

In May 2010 at the latest, and during work on NATO’s new strategic concept, the United Kingdom is scheduled to hold elections to the House of Commons. After 13 years of Labour Party’s rule, the Conservative Party may form the next government. The views of both parties on NATO’s future are largely similar. The Tories are primarily critical of the way the CSDP has been evolving and the current state of NATO-EU cooperation. They point to the problem of duplication of the capabilities of both organizations and the weakening of ties with non-European NATO members. They favor underlining the development of trans-Atlantic cooperation and reinforcing the primary role of the Alliance in ensuring collective security. The mission in Afghanistan would remain the key area of British military involvement also with the Tory government.

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283 Ibid., pp. Ev 56 and Ev 63.
United States

Introductory information

The United States is the most influential member of the North Atlantic Alliance. It has the greatest economic and demographic potential of all members. Together with the global scope of America’s foreign and security policy, these circumstances are reflected in the size of the United States’ defense expenditures and the size of its armed forces. The United States spends about 4% of GDP on national defense (about 607 billion USD in 2009, including expenditures associated with operations), a figure significantly higher than the NATO average. It comes first in terms of investments in new equipment and in defense sector research and development (in 2007-13 about 73 billion USD, i.e., 12% of the Defense Department’s budget). The American armed forces have about 1.4 million soldiers on active duty, and the United States also has important mobilization reserves in relation to each of the four military branches (the army, the navy, the marine corps and the air force – about 980,000 soldiers in all). The United States’ power-projection capability is unmatched, thanks to the high degree of its armed forces mobility, the ability to operate in distant theaters (in 2008, overseas operations involved over 210,000 soldiers), permanent presence in areas of potential conflict and the network of military bases.286

The United States’ position in NATO is a consequence, in addition to that country’s status as the sole superpower, of its political and military involvement in ensuring the security and stability of the European continent and in the treaty area, arising from the provisions of Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. Despite the reduced size of America’s military presence in Europe in comparison with the Cold War period, there are almost 80,000 US soldiers stationed on the territory of European NATO members (of which over half are land forces and about 38% the air force). With the exception of American involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, this continues to be the United States’ largest overseas military presence. The Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) has traditionally been an American who is, at the same time, the Commander-in-Chief of United States European Command (USEUCOM).

The public pronouncements made by the US authorities refer to NATO as the most important multilateral alliance of the United States. The value of the Alliance for the United States could be attributed to the following factors: the existence of well-established operational planning procedures and common exercises making possible the development of inter-operable military capabilities; the legitimization of the use of force by anchoring such decisions in a multilateral context; and maintaining the readiness to act by countries sharing or favoring America’s vision of the international order.287


At the same time, NATO’s actual significance for the United States’ security policy following the Cold War is a subject of debate. Even though the United States initiated Alliance’s transformation into an organization ready to act out-of-area, as late as the middle of the 1990s, action through NATO (i.e., above all the use of force) was seen as one of many options rather than as a necessity in terms of American interests. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 1997 did not mention NATO among critical enablers in terms of the possibility of the use of force by the United States on the international stage. The administration of President G.W. Bush, faulted for causing a deep rift in NATO following the decision to invade Iraq in 2003, did not negate the important role of the Alliance in its strategy, with the reservation that this institution had to adapt in order to be able to deal with new kinds of threats, originating beyond the European continent. The national security strategies the United States adopted in 2002 and 2006 placed a strong emphasis on the use of NATO institutional mechanisms for creating “coalitions of the willing”. This particular type of multilateralism was equated with cases of actions taken up by the entire Alliance. The decisive criterion defining NATO’s value for the United States security policy was the Alliance’s usefulness and effectiveness as it adapted to the new security environment. The United States’ National Defense Strategy from 2008 is has also been written along these lines. In turn, the declarations made by members of the Obama administration about the United States’ readiness to become more engaged in cooperation within NATO are accompanied by announcements of increased American expectations vis-à-vis the Allies.

Hierarchy of NATO tasks

The United States invariably sees NATO’s role as providing an effective mechanism for the collective defense of member states’ territories and their military units in the treaty area. The United States readiness to uphold the traditional function of the Alliance is not dictated by the American threat perception, however. American sensitivity to European threat perception seems to be derived rather from its efforts to secure support for measures countering threats originating beyond the treaty area. The United States could confirm its role as a “European power” by, for example, committing itself to maintaining a significant number of troops in Europe (an additional symbol would also be the presence of American tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of some NATO member states); support for the resumption of contingency planning procedures (in keeping with the declaration made by President Obama in Prague in April 2009); exercises with the participation of American and European units (Central Europe comes to the forefront in this context); and turning the North Atlantic Alliance into a real forum of trans-Atlantic dialogue and allied consultations.

During the work on the new strategic concept, the United States will strive to consolidate its allies’ agreement for NATO to also play the role of an expeditionary alliance determined and capable of taking on out-of-area operations. There is no shortage of voices claiming that engagement of this kind should be selective in nature.

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289 See the address made by the Vice-President of the United States, J. Biden, during the 45th Conference on Security Policy in Munich, 7 February 7, 2009, www.whitehouse.gov.
and made depending on the degree of urgency of a specific challenge, the range of available options as well as the appraisal of the consequences of taking action or failing to act. An important yardstick of NATO’s utility for the US security policy will be the possibility of setting out in detail the obligations of the allies in situations when NATO gets involved beyond the treaty area. Equally important will be the assurance that, should NATO become engaged in a crisis response or stabilization mission, all members will be ready to share its burdens commensurate with their abilities and resources and to accept the risk that such a mission entails. NATO’s experience in Afghanistan, especially the cases of limitations placed by certain allies on their armed forces, have prompted discussions about the possible implications of a de facto split of the Alliance into countries engaged in combat operations and those refraining from the use of force (a so-called two-tiered Alliance). The United States has warned its allies of the erosion of the collective defense mechanism should certain members strive to limit their contribution during expeditionary missions solely or principally to their civilian resources, thus leading to a disproportionate distribution of responsibility for the conduct of military operations.290

NATO military transformation

The United States favors the consistent increase of the Alliance’s ability to take up and conduct expeditionary missions. American experts estimate that about 30% of the land forces of NATO’s European members are capable of taking up actions other than those related with the defense of their own territory. Given the fact that such forces need to rotate, this means that only 10% of those land forces can be effectively used. Significantly, this applies to both out-of-area missions and tasks arising from Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, meaning that the credibility of the collective defense guarantees – seen as the ability to come to the aid of allies in case of armed aggression – becomes considerably limited. It was the United States’ idea to set up the NATO Response Force (NRF), which was thought of, among others things, as a practical means for furthering the inter-operability of US and European forces and as a testing ground of sorts for the military transformation of the entire Alliance. The United States’ participation in the NRF was supposed to consist mainly in providing resources unavailable to its allies at the time, such as strategic airlift. The United States will most certainly call for an increased importance of the NRF while emphasizing the role that these forces – fully outfitted and able to respond on short notice – could play in upholding the credibility of the commitment arising from Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. At the same time, the lack of determination on the part of the European allies to make use of these resources (recently in the context of the American proposal that the NRF be used to reinforce

NATO forces in Afghanistan during the period immediately preceding the presidential elections in that country, in conjunction with difficulties in outfitting forces for successive rotations, could lead to the deepening of one of the reasons for the present crisis within NATO, which is associated precisely with “a lack of modern military capabilities”, suitable for cooperation with US units”. One cannot rule out that, in addition to supporting NATO transformational initiatives (such as Strategic Airlift Capability), the United States will strive to create financial projects from the NATO military budget that would be aimed at providing the Alliance with successive force enablers. These would be, for example, systems of command, control and communications that would also make it possible to deploy allied command structures in distant theaters (instead of projects created ad hoc for the needs of specific crisis response operations), or allow for mid-air refueling. The United States also call for the financing of NRF operations from the common NATO budget.

Non-military aspects of security

The desirability of involving NATO in countering threats other than armed aggression, mainly in the spheres of energy and cyber security, is unquestioned by the United States. American experts advocate taking those questions into account while drafting NATO’s new strategic concept – above all in order to improve the existing mechanisms. In terms of energy security, this refers to the value of allied consultations as provided by Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. In terms of ensuring cyber security, the leading role of steps taken by member countries is being stressed and this is accompanied by, for example, calls to increase the potential of NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence in Tallinn. In practice, the United States favor the maintenance of NATO’s accessory role in the context of non-military aspects of security. The application of Article 5 in order to neutralize new kinds of threats should be conditional upon providing the Alliance with credible resources.

Relations with the European Union

The United States is determined in its support for closer relations between NATO and the EU. It sees chances for closer cooperation between the two organizations above all in France’s resumption of its full-scale role in the Alliance’s integrated military structure. According to the US, this fact should serve to overcome the mutual fears of NATO and the EU about their independence and respective mandates. The United States favors the recognition of the complementary nature of NATO and the EU and,

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293 See the address made by the Vice-President of the United States, J. Biden..., op. cit.; R. Hunter, NATO After the Summit..., op. cit.; D. Hamilton et al., op. cit., pp. 35-36, and I. Daalder: NATO in a New Era..., op. cit.
above all, it stresses the need to work out an instrument by which the EU could support the Alliance’s operations which presuppose the need to use civilian resources, while also calling for NATO to expand its “comprehensive approach” instruments.\textsuperscript{294}

Relations with Russia

US position regarding NATO-Russia cooperation is likely to be determined by the so-called “reset” policy in US-Russian relations, consisting in recognition for the coexistence of diverging and converging interests between those countries. The United States sees the need for cooperation with Russia (reduction of strategic weapons arsenals, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, support for the ISAF mission in Afghanistan) while consistently opposing, for example, the idea of granting Russia the right to possess a zone of privileged interests and stresses the right of countries neighboring on Russia to affiliate freely with political and military organizations of their choice. At the same time, the United States strives to use NATO-Russian cooperation as an element giving credibility to its “reset” policy. A possible reflection of this fact was the United States’ determined arguing for the resumption of cooperation within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council – a cooperation that had been suspended following the Russia-Georgia conflict in 2008. Irrespective of the current state of bilateral relations, the United States has also declared its readiness to conduct talks in this form on all topics of interest to the parties (an “all-weather forum for dialogue”), in which it included ensuring the success of the mission in Afghanistan, combating international terrorism, countering drug trade, etc. At the same time, Americans see the OSCE as being the appropriate forum for discussing the details of the so-called Medvedev initiative. The views of the current US administration and expert circles are relatively concordant in that Russia should be treated as a key NATO partner.\textsuperscript{295}

Enlargement

The United States is a strong advocate of the Alliance’s open door policy in keeping with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. In this context, the United States expresses its readiness to support the efforts of countries that declare an interest in joining NATO during the process of meeting membership requirements. From the US point of view, the prospect of NATO membership is a factor that favors the lasting nature of potential members’ domestic political reforms and, as such, also plays an important role in bringing about security and stability on the European continent. The United States will stand by the prospect of NATO membership for both Ukraine and Georgia, while being fully aware of certain allies’ (Germany and France among others) disapproval for a rapid admission of those countries and Russia’s opposition. Work on the forum of the NATO-Ukraine Council and NATO-Georgia Council should

\textsuperscript{294} See R. Hunter, ‘NATO’s Strategic Focus: Satisfying All of the Allies’, American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol. 31, no. 2, March 2009, pp. 85-86; D. Hamilton et al., op. cit., pp. 40-44; R. Gates, op. cit.; NATO After the Summit…, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{295} See Strengthening the Transatlantic Alliance: An Overview of the Obama Administration’s Policies in Europe, address of Philip Gordon, Under-Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia in the US State Department, made to the US House Committee for Foreign Relations United States, 16 June 2009; the address by J. Biden, op.cit.; the address by I. Daalder: A Full and Urgent Agenda for NATO, 8 June 2009, Security & Defense Agenda, Brussels.
concentrate on furthering and monitoring the implementation of internal reforms bringing the two countries closer to meeting membership standards. The United States will also favor further NATO enlargement so as to include countries of the Western Balkans, but in this context Washington recognizes the need to resolve disputes between countries of the region.296

The question of partnerships

The United States sees the development of NATO’s contacts with third countries as a process complementing the enlargement. This derives from the United States’ stance of both stressing NATO’s identity as an organization with a regional membership profile, in keeping with the provisions of Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, and unwaveringly pushing for its supra-regional (and even global) role. As a result, the United States favors closer practical cooperation with non-European countries engaged in NATO activities beyond treaty area. This applies in equal measure to the institutionalization of political consultations, the increase of inter-operability (common exercises) and to working with the so-called contact states (Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea) for more effective exchange of information in combat situations. The United States will also support the development of NATO cooperation with countries located in the Mediterranean Sea region and the Persian Gulf as part of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and the Mediterranean Dialogue. However, given the scale of US interests in the region of the so-called Greater Middle East, cooperation within the framework of forums involving NATO will be of secondary importance for the United States. Moreover, the United States would be ready to support the reform of the Partnership for Peace program that would adapt it to the needs of its participants. The PdP currently involves countries far more diverse than those which participated in it in the first years of the program’s existence.297

The US missile defense system and NATO

The new version of the missile defense system presented by President Obama in September 2009 supposedly entails a far-reaching NATO involvement in the system’s creation and in the development of its defense capabilities, at a rate commensurate to existing threats or threats expected in the short term. It would thus become possible to eliminate situations in which the territories of individual member states have different levels of protection, as was the case with the old system architecture. The philosophy of “NATOization” of the missile defense system would remain unchanged compared with the approach favored by the G.W. Bush administration. The decision about deploying individual elements of the system in Europe would continue to be a matter of bilateral agreements between the United States and chosen allies. NATO would become

296 P. Gordon, Strengthening..., op. cit.; I. Daalder, A Full and Urgent..., op. cit.
involved at the stage of the inclusion of these resources into the allied ALTBMD system, for example through NATO’s participation in the control and command system.298

The future of American tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

The basic reason for the deployment of American tactical nuclear weapons in Europe was the need to strengthen the trans-Atlantic bond. The air forces of several allied countries were charged with carrying out nuclear strike missions, something that was meant to increase the role of non-nuclear Alliance members in the process of shaping NATO’s nuclear doctrine and decision taking procedures. Discussions about the desirability of continued presence of these weapons in Europe, given the considerable reduction in size of nuclear arsenals following the end of the Cold War, are stimulated by, for example, American plans to introduce nuclear warheads capable of assuming sub-strategic tasks which use strategic delivery platforms. Arguments are being voiced about the political benefits that the withdrawal of US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe could bring to NATO’s relations with Russia, including that country’s acceptance for procedures to ensure the transparency of its own nuclear arsenal. At the same time, during the debate at the expert level it was noted that the presence of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe constitutes a “pillar of NATO’s unity”. As a result, the conviction prevails that Europeans themselves should initiate the debate on withdrawal of US nukes. The decisive argument against a unilateral US decision on the tactical arsenal in Europe has to do with the political consequences for inter-allied relations that such a step would entail. The United States will thus be willing to keep its tactical nuclear weapons in Europe for as long as its European allies voice the desire to depend on this form of deterrence and maintain the capabilities that allow them to employ it.299


Annex
Introductory remarks

Each generation formulates its security expectations according to its own perception of risks and threats. Those who called the Alliance into being, were acting in the shadows of the catastrophe of the II World War. They tried to prevent any similar tragedy in the future. The threat was self-evident.

The Stalin’s Soviet Union followed the ideology, according to which the war between the democratic world and the communist one was inevitable. NATO was called into being to respond to such a threat. Today, twenty years after the end of the Cold War, there is no Soviet Union and no imminent threat. The risks of today are of different nature. And thus, new generations ask themselves a question: is the Alliance of democratic states, along with its mechanisms, procedures and military potential adequate to face and respond to the challenges of the new security environment?

The Great Transformation and “The Cold War Settlement”

In the American political thought there is a deeply rooted sense of responsibility and a need for self-criticism. Some analysts wrongly assume that the United States is a causal force, that is responsible for anything negative happening in the world and in the international relations. An example of such approach can be noticed in an article recently published in the Survival, which is entitled: The Unravelling of the Cold War Settlement\(^1\). The authors made an assumption saying that the Soviet Union, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the regaining of sovereignty by the Central and Eastern Europe, and more broadly – the whole Transformation, were all part of what the authors call The Cold War Settlement. The authors argue that this settlement had many elements but “a major, if not central, feature was a combination of great-power restraint and liberal order-building. The principles of accommodation, restraint and integration

that defined the settlement were, in turn, expressions of a larger and older agenda of
great-power peacemaking and American and Western liberal order building”. And they
conclude: “The key, therefore, to resetting relations is to return to and refurbish
the architecture and principles of the Cold War settlement”. In other words, the
fundamental change and collapse of communist regime in Russia and Central and
Eastern Europe was possible due to “the Cold War Settlement” among great powers
(i.e. Soviet Union and the United States).

There are also those, who attribute an excessive role to the process initiated in
Helsinki. They believe that without the CSCE Final Act there would have been no
peaceful change. In reality, the Soviet system has run out because its internal driving
forces were exhausted. The external factors could favor and did favor the situation,
namely that, with the exception of the Balkans, the changes in the Central and Eastern
part of Europe went bloodless. The West and some multilateral institutions assisted and
contributed to manage the change. Yet, it is a misconception to propose a thesis saying
that NATO enlargement was a mistake because it violated the unwritten, yet agreed by
the Soviet Union and the West, a common “After-Cold-War Strategy”.

According to U.S. critics: „The conversation centered on reconfiguring NATO as
political rather than a military alliance, and on question of whether the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe would be expanded to replace or complement
NATO”.

Let me say it openly: such thinking is very popular in Russia. Let us hypothetically
imagine that there was no NATO enlargement process. Would Europe and the world be
safer? What is more – would Russia feel safer?

The enlargement of NATO has contributed to stability. Everybody benefited from
this fact: new and old members. Eastern and Western Europe, United States and Russia
did benefit as well. However, the thinking which has arisen from the nostalgia for what
has disappeared irretrievably, is still very popular. The Czechs usually say in such
situation: “To se ne vrati!” (Now way back!). In a community of democratic states, there
is no return to the world, in which great powers decide about the fate of small and
medium-sized states. We should look for solutions, which match expectations of all of
the actors of the European scene.

A slowly vanishing NATO?

In fact, it is the first time in the last three hundred years that we live in Europe,
where there is no country preparing an aggression against its neighbours. In this context,
a lot of critical comments were formulated, namely that the Alliance is in a state of crisis
and we are currently witnessing a slowly vanishing NATO.

Is NATO really vanishing? Or perhaps this powerful and efficient engine is
running in sterile and neutral functioning, because its mechanism, decision-making and
armed forces were designed in different times, to cope with different challenges, threats
and risks? During the Cold War no one could see the need to start a great political
debate on the interpretation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. To the Allies and the
Alliance’s opponents it was obvious that if any NATO country came under a threat, the
Alliance would muster its entire might in its defence. That was clear because the Cold
War left no doubt as to what were the sources of the threat: it was obvious who was the
friend and who was the foe. Today, things have gotten complicated, the threats and risks
are more ambiguous and unclear than in the past. That is why, those who believe that it would suffice to introduce minor corrections into the Alliance’s 1991 and 1999 strategic concepts are wrong. Just how wrong they are was indicated by former Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of Germany at the 41st Security Policy Conference in Munich. In a speech – read out by the Defence Minister Peter Struck (the Chancellor was ill) on February 12, 2005 – it was ascertained that the Alliance no longer was a platform for consultations on the common strategy of the NATO member states. In other words, Schröder was signaling that the Alliance had lost its importance and was being

Why a New Strategic Concept?

A year later, Chancellor Angela Merkel unveiled in Munich an initiative to work out NATO’s New Strategic Concept. Since then dozens of serious analyses, studies and monographs have been published on the new strategic concept of NATO. All these essays, proposals and suggestions are the result of reflection by experts and politicians, conducted outside the Alliance. The New Strategic Concept is supposed to fulfil various functions: re-invigorate the Alliance and help overcome the uncertainty, shortage of confidence and lack of purpose in defining NATO’s place and role in the contemporary world.

I recall this in order to highlight – however briefly – three significant elements:

First, the current works on the concept address demand by states and governments, but also by academics, analysts and broad public opinion.

Secondly, the group of 12 (established in August 2009) does not intend to rediscover the wheel. What has been achieved to date – including documents adopted in the past – will not be ignored. This applies equally to assessments, recommendations and methodology.

Thirdly, regardless of the new security environment, which requires appropriate change in the Alliance, it is crucial to restore a common understanding of the principles and norms contained in the 1949 Washington Treaty and to rebuild the consensus among the Allies. This applies, in particular, to the interpretation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty as the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The New Strategic Concept is meant to be a visionary look into the future. A common vision will strengthen the bond between the member states, and shall bolster their engagement in fulfilling such fundamental tasks as defence of their independence and security. The public should be explained in order to understand why NATO is committing itself beyond Europe and how this impacts our security.

Old questions, new answers

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1 Address by Federal Chancellor G. Schröder at the 41st Munich Security Policy Conference, February 12, 2005.
3 Cf.: In his report Klaus Wittmann presented a review of the most important works devoted to the new strategic concept. See his study: Towards a New Strategic Concept for NATO. NATO Defense College, Rome, September 2009.
The new times require that in defining the tasks of the North Atlantic Alliance we return to the fundamental questions and seek new answers to them. It is true that addressing the old questions again, carries a risk that the answers might expose differences among the main Allies: not only between the United States and European countries, but also among the European Allies themselves. Due to the factors that determine the sense of security the perspectives of the countries in Central-Eastern Europe, their history and experiences are different than those of West and South of Europe. Opponents of an open debate claim that a pragmatic approach would be preferable. It would imply a reactive rather than creative policy – the introduction of just minor corrections into the NATO strategic concept that has been in force for a decade – instead of attempting to nail down a qualitatively new document, which would reflect the requirements for new times and would address new challenges, risks and threats.

At the end of the day, a different philosophy prevailed, and it was decided that works on the new strategic concept would be conducted with the participation of many opinion-making communities. Hence, the decision to convene four strategic seminars in Luxembourg, Brdo, Oslo and Washington. In addition: there are a lot of other meetings (one of them was organized in Brussels – about NATO-EU relationship; an another in Prague – NATO Strategic Concept: Response to our Concerns?; dozens of other meetings will be arranged in next few weeks). Important debates and consultations will be held in Brussels and in Moscow on NATO-Russia relations.

Opponents of the new strategy insist that the Alliance has proven itself in practical action, so there is no need to split hairs, particularly since radical and innovative attempts to boost its effectiveness could well produce the opposite result. The launching of works on the new strategic concept of the Alliance, according to the opponents of the document, carries the risk of potential divisive factors, which may lead rather to weakening than strengthening of NATO. It is so, because NATO member states have different positions on several issues of fundamental importance to the future of the Alliance. This refers, in particular, to the role that the Alliance plays and should play in the contemporary world.

The debate is quite often focused on three questions:

– Is the Alliance’s main task for the 21st century – pursuant to the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty – to ensure defence of the territories and security of the states – signatories, or its role is rather to address new threats that have emerged beyond the treaty area?

– Is the Alliance transatlantic or global in character? And should the Alliance’s functions be mainly military in character (hard security) or should they increasingly involve soft security, namely political, economic and social tasks?

– Should they be implemented completely autonomously, independently from other multinational security structures, or should that be achieved in a close coordination and cooperation with the United Nations and institutions of the European Union, and Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe?

There are more questions and differences. They concern the common strategy towards Russia, the further enlargement of the Alliance, the role of NATO in resolving problems in the regions distant from Europe, prominently including Afghanistan, and new and proportionate sharing of defence and security burdens and costs by all of the member states. It is also essential to clearly define the role of the Alliance in combating
terrorism and maritime piracy, countering the cyber attacks, preventing proliferation and ensuring energy security of the member states.

Differences on these and other issues are natural. They are rooted in different historical experience, diverse perspectives and different perception of problems by the global powers on the one hand, and by the medium-sized and small countries on the other. The perception of threats and security priorities is different in countries directly bordering Russia, and those South European countries of the Mediterranean who have different list of security threats than North America, separated from Europe by the Atlantic Ocean.

From the Central and Eastern European point of view it would be crucial to underline in such a document that unity, solidarity and cohesion of the transatlantic community is of key importance to the security of our region. Unlike many alliances in the past, the Atlantic Alliance is based on common interests and values. This is a matter of great significance in elaborating a common NATO strategy. In the past, alliances used to define the rules of games and based their policies on the balance of interests and military potentials; values were not very high on the list of priorities. That was the essence of the effectiveness of the Metternich Concert of Powers in Europe. Attempts to revive the 19th century formulas in order to address the 21st century security needs are doomed to fail.

Today, security threats are generated primarily inside the respective countries. That is why, we have more domestic conflicts, more bloody wars inside countries than among them. The distinction – once clearly pronounced – between what is internal and what is external, is becoming fuzzy and blurred.

On the priority list of the European security policy – alongside “integration” and “increased effectiveness of NATO and the Union” – I would place the issues of leadership and partnership and new ways of consolidating the Alliance through durable anchoring of the United States in Europe. Such an approach would restore to the Alliance its proper function of guarantor of the security of the member states.

The significance of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty

In the new conditions, we need to find new ways of durable tying of the security of Europe with the security of the United States, and of affirming the binding force of the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The key commitment undertaken in this article is the following: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all…” Should such a situation occur, the Alliance members obliged themselves to take, individually or collectively, “such action as they deem necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”4.

In other words, Article 5 is an instrument designed to ensure:

- effective protection of states against military attack or an attack, the consequences of which are comparable to a military attack (e.g. cyber-attack);
- protection against an attack that constitutes an existential threat to the independent and sovereign existence of a state and its territorial integrity.

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The effectiveness of the mechanism of Article 5 is based on several principles: inevitability and automatism of extending the support to a victim of aggression or a state under the threat of aggression, priority of access to NATO resources in the event of aggression and adequacy of measures and actions applied to effectively counter, eliminate and neutralize the consequences of a possible aggression.

Deterrence is an effective way of preventing and countering aggression. During the Cold War unambiguous interpretation of Article 5, coupled with the presence of American nuclear forces in Europe, proved to be effective in ensuring the security of the Alliance’s member states.

Defensive alliance and collective security

The Alliance is often perceived as an emerging structure of collective security, particularly in connection with the establishment of numerous new institutions, which constitute for NATO a form of cooperation with non-members, such as the Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Russia Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission and others. However, these institutions cannot conceal the fundamental goals that guided the signatories of the Washington Treaty, who committed themselves “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law” and “to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security”. It needs to be clearly stated that the political dimension of the Alliance, and its new perception as a collective security system, constitutes an added value, though it does not replace the defensive essence of the Alliance. The fundamental distinction between collective security and a defensive alliance is reflected in the fact that a collective security system (e.g. the UN) is supposed to prevent and neutralize a potential attack from inside – by one of the member states of the system, while a defensive alliance ensures security and protects states from an external attack.

Doubts concerning the effectiveness of the Alliance are connected with the way it has responded in specific situations and to specific challenges. After the armed conflict in Georgia in August 2008 and the crisis triggered by the halting of Russian gas supplies to Central and Southern Europe across Ukraine – the issue of adherence to the fundamental principles that regulate relations between states regained its relevance. This applies, in particular, to the principle of territorial integrity, the inviolability of frontiers and non-intervention. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, by its very nature, extends security guarantees only to member states. However, neither the Alliance nor its individual member states can remain indifferent to violations of fundamental principles and norms of international relations.

We should strive for such a transformation of the Transatlantic Security Community that will allow all democratic states of the continent, in line with the Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, to freely define the ways of ensuring their independence, including the option of joining multilateral security structures. (This concept was also recognized by all CSCE Participating States, including Russia, in the first principle of the Helsinki Final Act.) In short, this should be a sovereign decision of the states, which apply, as long as they meet the criteria of membership in NATO and the Union.

The strategy of the Alliance and the Union should, on one hand, avert the “renationalization” of security by the major states of Europe and North America, and on
the other, prevent from a return to the establishment of 19th century “concerts of powers”, “directorates” or other forms of imposition of great and powerful states’ will on medium and small states.

Some security analysts consider that the international system emerging after the end of the Cold War reflects the way of thinking deeply rooted in the past: “The Cold War settlement was a hybrid, a mixture of Vienna-like great power accommodation and Versailles-like liberal international institution building.” Neither, nor. There is no analogy for the settlements after the Napoleon’s wars of 19th century and the Versailles Treaty after the First World War. The situation after the collapse of totalitarian regimes in Central Eastern Europe was not a result of the war between great powers, but of peaceful transformation within the states. No doubts that Russia’s interests should be respected and accommodated – but not at the expense of the regained sovereignty of the Central European nations. The concept of “whole and free” Europe replaced the system of bipolarity and division of Europe, in which Soviet Union dominated and imposed limited sovereignty on such nations like Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and many others. A new architecture of international security was built in accordance with the political will and free choice of the sovereign nations. It was not a result of “the great-power comity”... This is a fundamental change of circumstances and there is no analogy neither to Vienna Congress nor to the Versailles Treaty.

The Alliance and security guarantees

The North Atlantic Alliance fulfils a number of basic functions vis-à-vis the member states: it ensures their protection (security guarantees); it deters potential aggressors (mainly by the way of the nuclear deterrent); it is capable of intervening – particularly in the area of terrorist threats (out-of-area missions); finally, it performs a preventive function on the periphery of the Alliance (partnership) and is a stabilizing factor, both in transatlantic relations and on the global scale.

Interdependence of states – large and small, weak and powerful, democratic and authoritarian ones – is the idea that has organized the international security system in the 21st century. However, interdependence in conditions of globalization and fragmentation of the contemporary world does not ensure the necessary control of the development of relations between states or, even more so, control over developments within the states. No mechanism of effective crisis management has yet evolved. In many regions, governments – particularly in weak, failing or failed states - have lost control over the development of events within their territories and under their jurisdiction. This applies, in particular, to the situation in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf region, and especially to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen and Somalia.

In other words, the tasks confronting the Alliance require a redefinition of the essence of transatlantic relations, and providing of the answers to the following questions: should NATO undergo further simultaneous transformation and enlargement, and if so – to what extent? What conclusions should be drawn from the operations of the NATO Response Force? Should the main emphasis be placed on out-of-area forces, or on forces needed to defend the territories of the member states?

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5 Deudney, Ikenberry, op. cit., p. 45.
And finally: what kind of relations should NATO have with its partners and, in particular, what role should NATO play when armed conflicts break out on its periphery?

The shift in American policy, departure from unilateralism and restored importance of multilateral security institutions, including the need to establish new type of partnership between NATO and the EU, does not only create a new climate but also opens qualitatively new prospects for the elaboration of the document that lays down a strategy of the Alliance’s security comparable to the one initiated in the sixties of the 20th century by the Harmel Report.

Concluding Remarks

The NATO strategic priorities, in line with its enduring purpose of collective defence for members and the role of a main contributor to Euro-Atlantic co-operative security, shall be:

– to deter and prevent any possible military aggression;
– to constantly develop ways and means for both defence and security-related missions;
– to strengthen and promote transatlantic community of values;
– to address, through available instruments of action, new security threats and challenges;
– to develop partnerships and patterns of co-operation contributing to the co-operative security network of organizations and nations.

The strategic concepts adopted by the Alliance in the past played a substantial role in shaping the international security, overcoming divisions and promoting peaceful transformations. This particularly applies to the Harmel Report, which combined political courage, vision and a sense of responsibility for the security of the member states. The ideas contained in the document reflected a two-track strategy: maintenance of the military (nuclear) deterrent, with simultaneous pursuit of détente and a readiness to cooperate. Today, we need an equally effective strategy, tailored to the new challenges. This implies a need to affirm the might and vitality of the Alliance, which should be capable of bolstering security guarantees of both the old and new members (contingency plans) and at the same time, capable of willing to enter into cooperation, based on reciprocity and inter-dependence of states in the contemporary world.