Apart from those elements of the strategic nuclear arsenals of the US and the UK believed to be assigned for NATO missions (France insists on total independence on nuclear issues), the nuclear posture of the Alliance includes a number of US tactical nuclear weapons (B-61 gravity bombs) stationed at a number of military bases in Europe and manned by US personnel. NATO has never officially confirmed either the size of this arsenal or the specifics of its deployment, however, according to research conducted by Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists, in 2008, the United States kept between 150 and 240 weapons at six bases in Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Turkey. During wartime, the weapons can be transferred and used by these five countries (though the status of Turkey is not clear), which, to that purpose, signed nuclear sharing agreements with the US and have at their disposal aircraft modified to deliver US nuclear gravity bombs (the so-called dual-capable aircraft).

The attention in the intra-Alliance discussions has so far been focused on the possibility of removing US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe and discontinuing the nuclear sharing arrangements. It is important to note that the strategic component of the nuclear deterrent would remain available to the Alliance even if a decision is made to reduce the number of US nuclear weapons in Europe to zero.

Any proposals to change NATO force posture should be a consequence of reflection by its members on the tasks assigned to the nuclear weapons, not the presumptuous point of departure. If one subscribes to the notion that the only function of nuclear weapons for the Alliance is the “insurance” role, the utility of the US tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe can be questioned. The strategic arsenals of the US and UK make these weapons redundant, as the credibility of the insurance function depends not on the deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe nor on the modalities of transferring them to the Allies, but on the convergence of interests within the Alliance and the willingness of the nuclear weapon states to defend other members from armed aggression. Despite occasional disagreements over policy issues between the Allies, the level of interdependence and policy cohesion between the two sides of the Atlantic (and the two sides of the English Channel) has reached a point where Europe no longer needs “hostages” in the form of US bombs stored on the continent. The fears, which were often expressed during the Cold War, concerning the unwillingness of the US to use its arsenal to defend Europe from a Soviet assault should finally be put to rest. It is hard to imagine a situation in which Washington and London (and Paris) would not react to an aggression against a member of the Alliance, even if conducted by a nuclear-armed adversary. Any failure of one to act on the other’s behalf would result in an inevitable collapse of the “West” as a geopolitical construct.

The conventional wisdom holds that the countries of Central Europe, and especially Poland, would strongly object to any changes in the NATO nuclear posture because of their fear of Moscow. This is an oversimplification. Certainly, Poland, as well as other Central European nations, is interested in an alliance which can credibly fulfill its defence and deterrence function. As a consequence, as long as NATO is serious about remaining a military alliance (and not a kind of global crisis management organization), and counts three nuclear weapon states among its members, the nuclear component should be an integral part of the “Article 5 package”. The extended deterrence, especially that provided by the United States to its European allies, both in its conventional and nuclear forms, remains a significant reason to treat the Alliance as the most important guarantee of the security of Poland. Does it mean that any changes in the nuclear strategy of NATO are a taboo for Warsaw? Not necessarily, but such changes would need to be conducted in a way that does not weaken the transatlantic link nor the image of the Alliance as a credible security provider in the eyes of outside actors, including Russia.

One cannot expect nuclear weapons to be a sort of magic glue holding the transatlantic alliance together in difficult times. It would be especially naïve to think that the deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe would guarantee the attention and support of the United States during a crisis. As we have learned recently in the context of the Iraq war, ups and downs in transatlantic relations are not connected with the state of nuclear sharing. In the context of the current US administration, it seems that a better investment in NATO’s future on the part of the Europeans might be to strengthen their presence in Afghanistan rather than to allocate money for the replacement of the dual-capable aircraft currently in service.

The gravest danger of any move to eliminate US nuclear weapons from Europe, from the perspective of Central Europe, would be to create the impression that NATO has gone “soft” where its primary function of defending the territories of the member states is concerned. Therefore, such a move would probably need to be counteracted by a set of decisions giving credible reassurance on the value of Article 5. These should include first and foremost the affirmation of the function of the strategic nuclear forces as the supreme guarantee of security of the Allies. Moreover, practical measures can be agreed upon to strengthen the conventional defence potential of the Alliance. Finally, the role of NATO in creating a Missile Defence architecture covering all the territories of the Allies would need to be reaffirmed, thereby compounding the overall deterrence potential of the organization. On a parallel track, some of the Allies would likely expect the United States to increase its military footprint within the territory of those member states situated along the eastern border of the Alliance, though not necessarily by building major new bases or installations.

By making a decision on the discontinuation of nuclear sharing now, the members of the Alliance can count on three “bonuses”. Firstly, this would provide an important contribution to the preparation for the NPT review conference in 2010. Even though this step would probably be criticized as insufficient, it can nevertheless serve (together with a possible US-Russian agreement on the strategic forces reductions) as evidence of the NATO states’ determination to move towards nuclear disarmament. That, in turn, should help facilitate agreement on strengthening the non-proliferation side of the NPT bargain. Secondly, by moving forward with such an initiative unilaterally, NATO would be in a good position to press Russia into changing its tactical nuclear weapons posture. Thirdly, the Alliance would avoid potentially divisive discussions over the acquisition of next-generation means of delivery for US nuclear weapons, an otherwise inevitable mid-term eventuality given the aging of the dual-capable aircraft operated by Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and possibly also by Greece and Turkey.

Assuring the cohesion of the Alliance when such a change is agreed upon would remain the top priority. In practice, this calls for close consultations between the two sides of the Atlantic during all stages of the process. There should be a common assessment that the positive consequences of the discontinuation of the nuclear sharing arrangement will outweigh the negative ones, and that the other elements of NATO’s nuclear policy will remain valid. It would be damaging for the Alliance to create the impression that the US weapons are being “pushed out” of Europe by pacifist Europeans, or that the US is weakening its commitment to NATO by initiating changes in the nuclear strategy without properly consulting its allies.