

# Opening Address

**by H.E. Bogusław Winid**  
**Undersecretary of State**  
**Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland**

on the occasion of

**the workshop on**  
**Prospects for information sharing and**  
**confidence building**  
**on Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in**  
**Europe**

**Warsaw, February 7, 2013**

**Director Zaborowski,**

**Secretary Larsen,**

**Secretary Gottemoeller, Rose,**

**Distinguished Colleagues,**

**Ladies and Gentlemen,**

Welcome to Warsaw. We have gathered here to be equal to the task put forward by NATO ministers of foreign affairs in April 2011 in Berlin.

We were assigned to convene the workshop devoted to non-strategic nuclear weapons. In particular, to take up confidence building and transparency issues.

Poland and Norway, as the authors of two initiatives on these matters, volunteered to host such an event.

I would like to thank the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for providing indispensable resources, without which today's workshop could not take place.

Let me also thank the Norwegian Institute of Defence Studies, the US State Department, as well as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, for their intellectual and substantial input in crafting the workshop's agenda.

Special thanks go also to Dr. Marcin Zaborowski, director of the Polish Institute of International Affairs for excellent preparation of today's event.

Dear Colleagues,

Everyone in this room would agree that deliberation on such an important issue without the active participation of representatives of Russian think-tanks and academia would make no sense. Why I am delighted to see here with us a number of top Russian scholars – outstanding experts on arms control. This ensures our discussion will

not be – to quote former US President Ronald Reagan - “useless and obsolete”.

Our workshop agenda is demanding. It advances extremely serious questions that must be tackled and ultimately answered by us. We will try to define here:

1. -the role of non-strategic weapons in the doctrines of NATO and Russia;
2. - the scope of information sharing;
3. - the degree of verification mechanisms.

These questions guide us to the core of the problem: how to develop further measures of confidence building and instruments of transparency?

It is not my intention to give a simple answer, however we expect that the outcome of the Warsaw`s workshop would serve as a guidelines prompting us in which direction the discussion and afterwards – expected action - should go.

Whether we would need a follow up meeting of that kind?

or the proper forum would be the NATO-Russia Council?

or maybe a brand new format should be created by NATO and Russia?

What we definitely do not expect is the termination of the discussion process on Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons and the long-lasting deficit of serious involvement by our decision makers.

I am certain that the ensuing discussion will be very productive. It will lead to tangible results and guide the course of action for including non-strategic weapons into global disarmament process. This could be our ultimate goal in the future.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

We know the history of arms control well. I have often wondered when exactly the Cold War started to end and when the bipolar world began its erosion. Furthermore, and more importantly, where limited confidence and trust were born between the US and - at that

time - the Soviet Union? I think one of the legitimate answers would be: the Reykjavik summit of October 1986. Although its dramatic outcome did not bring any substantial results, the two-day meeting in Hofdi House at the Reykjavik bay, changed the attitude of both states towards the arms control.

The Secretary of State George Shultz writes in his memoirs *“Turmoil and Triumph”* that the limited space in the Hofdi House instilled a closer interaction between the two delegations that were forced to wash their hands in the same restrooms at the same time. He writes: *“I thought we had in fact arrived at an enormous turning point (...). We could at least glimpse a world with far diminishing danger from possible nuclear devastation (...). I had never learned to love the bomb – or the (...) missile that carried it”*.

Putting aside for the time being the question of whether non-strategic weapons are one of the last remnants of the Cold War, I believe the Warsaw Workshop is the right place to deeply think about confidence building and transparency methods.

I can assure you that Poland is and will remain active in this field. Not only within the NATO-Russia framework, but also in the global non-proliferation and disarmament process.

Wishing you good and substantial deliberations, thank you for your attention.