PISM roundtable: Reducing the Role of Nuclear Weapons in European Security

The aim of the roundtable was to analyse possible paths to the reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in NATO’s deterrence policy while also meeting the security needs of Central and Eastern European NATO members. To facilitate fruitful and thought-provoking discussions, PISM invited leading international security experts from Central and Eastern Europe to the seminar, as well as chosen specialists from outside the region.

Some participants underlined that it is unlikely that the status quo related to non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe will be sustainable in the future, especially taking into account fiscal pressure in the U.S. and political pressure in European states that host U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons. There were divergent perspectives about a timeframe in which changes to NATO’s nuclear posture would be necessary. Nevertheless, many participants agreed that without a cohesive approach amongst NATO members towards further reducing the role of nuclear weapons in Europe, the credibility of NATO’s nuclear posture could be weakened.

At the same time, some speakers emphasised that in the current security environment a radical change in the overall mix of NATO deterrence-and-defence capabilities is not desired. The further deployment of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe is still perceived as a security guarantee that may be needed in some specific, though highly unlikely, scenarios. While the “Russia factor” is still important as the country is modernising its tactical nuclear weapons and retains a significant role for them in its military doctrine, that is not the only factor shaping Central and Eastern European perspectives on NATO’s deterrence posture.  The possible emergence of a new nuclear-armed state in close vicinity to NATO (e.g., Iran) and the potential impact of that on non-proliferation efforts also influences the need to retain U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe.

According to a number of participants, there is not a direct link between reducing the role of nuclear weapons and the implementation of territorial missile defence or other non-nuclear assurances to Central–Eastern European states. It was pointed out that further implementation of NATO territorial missile defence (MD) is contingent upon many factors, including the level of the ballistic missiles threat, the affordability of MD systems, and the availability of proven technologies. Since elements of the U.S. European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) could be redeployed to other regions, the sustainability of EPAA as an important element of transatlantic link is also in question. 

The role of conventional deterrence and “visible assurances” was highlighted by many experts. Routine exercises encompassing Article 5 scenarios, constant updates of contingency plans and adequate power projection capabilities amongst NATO members to enable reinforcements in times of crisis were presented being particularly important to Central and Eastern European states. While the importance of the Smart Defence initiative was stressed, some participants emphasised that its impact on overall NATO member capabilities in upcoming years will be rather limited. The overall perception of NATO’s conventional capabilities is significantly influenced by concerns about reducing defence spending in European NATO members, including Central and Eastern European states.

Some participants highlighted that Central and Eastern European states, while defining their approach to the role of non-strategic nuclear weapons, should look beyond their direct security concerns. They should also take into account the broader global context and longer-term security benefits of creating conditions for a nuclear weapons-free world. However, the participants perspectives differed about if or when a nuclear weapons-free world could be realized.

The preferred approach Central and Eastern Europeans favour for reducing the role of nuclear weapons in Europe is that NATO and Russia would take reciprocal steps. Emphasis was put on the need for NATO to have a clear strategy towards gaining Russian reciprocity. NATO members, including Central and Eastern European states, have yet to decide what they expect from Russia in exchange for the reduction or eventual removal of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe (e.g., a reduction in the number of Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons, their withdrawal from territories near NATO states, or complete elimination).

Seminar agenda

By Jacek Durkalec
Photos by Jadwiga Winiarska